Profesor Willy Messerschmitt came to Spain in March 1951 and the "Oficina Técnica Profesor Messerschmitt" was established in La Hispano Aviación de Sevilla in January the 1st, 1952.
Hispano HA-200 was offered to the Luftwaffe in 1955 as Me-200 because it was a Messerschmitt design. Hispano HA-100 was a Messerschmitt design too, and the HA-400 from 1958 was inspired in the Messerchmitt P.1203.
The Hispano HA-100 is covered extensively in the Spanish periodical Aeroplano #38 (pages 50-71) and the Messerschmitt post-war marketing as the Me-100 is also featured.
It has some aviation in it but covers all sorts of military aspects (artillery, personnel, tanks, etc.) in brief paragraphs that give a detailed look at a particular picture.
I hope to get back to the Anschließend Sendereihe along with its sister publication series, Plane Profile Publications. They are a labor of love since there is no profit in them at all outside of a few pennies.
*North American studied the A-4b in the origins of MX-770 development, which became the Navaho missile. Research on the concept uncovered a severe stability problem.
*Hermes A-1 was a Wasserfall copy but was dropped in favor of the superior Nike Ajax design.
*In the Book "Superfortress", page 26 , General LeMay and Bill Yenne say the Me-264 was a copy of Boeing's Model 334 (a B-29 ancestor). Although I'm not really sure that could be true, that's an interesting claim to be confirmed.
I think III Reich Technological Blossom should be explained in its right dimension, which is extremely fascinating and there is no need for mythification exhibited by some authors.
This is really just the tip of the iceberg. German technology post WW 2 was examined closely in the West and by the Soviets. In the US almost none of it was actually adopted.
Wasserfall was tested just 6 times in the US before being dropped as unworkable as a missile. In the Soviet Union development went on for almost a decade with declining interest as they too couldn't get it to work.
MX 774 HIROC in the US was started in late 1945 based on captured German A-4 technology but Convair, Hughes, and Aerojet / Rocketdyne all rejected the German designs in favor of better ones. Convair's lead engineer on this was Charlie Bossart, who adopted the use of the skin of the rocket as the wall of fuel tanks making it rigid by pressurization, a design still used today. He rejected the German conventional (for the time) airframe with internal separate fuel tanks as too heavy and wasting too much space.
Hughes developed the AZUZA system (the Soviets adopted a similar system for their early ballistic missiles too) that removed most of the guidance from the missile to a ground station that used telemetry and radar to track and guide the missile via a radio link. That reduced the cost of the missile substantially and greatly improved accuracy.
Aerojet and Rocketdyne adopted swiveling nozzles for their engine designs, something the Germans couldn't get to work on the A-4.
In other SAM's the German developments were briefly looked at but nothing from them was adopted. Nike for the US Army was a completely US design. The USN was already testing Little Joe, Lark, and had Project Bumblebee in progress that was far in advance of anything the Germans were doing in SAM design through the end of the war.
In AAM's, the German technology was briefly looked at by the USAF at Wright Field post war but nothing was adopted. The Hughes Falcon (well it eventually became Falcon), Ryan Firebird, and Navy Sparrow were already starting development. The Navy experimented with AAM's in their Gorgon missile project during the war and the USAAF was testing the JB-3 Tiamat by late 1944. A Gorgon launch against an aerial target--probably the first time an AAM was actually tried against a live target-- in late 44 of Cape May NJ proved that command line-of-sight using television guidance was unworkable.
The Soviets made more use of German wartime technology up through about 1955 or so until they'd caught up as much as they could with the West. It was often more of a stopgap than starting point for later systems. As I said, in the US most of it was a curiosity and quickly surpassed or ignored.
Flying wings? Northrup. Both swept and forward swept wings were tested in the US prior to the end of the war. For example the L-39
Flew in early 1946 but was in development before the war ended.
The US and Soviets knew about this sort of aerodynamics, but they hadn't put as much effort into developing it during the war as Germany had.
There's a lot of documentation on this period now available on the internet, like this for example:
What you find is that the US and Russians, in particular, were comparing notes rather than finding that the Germans were so far ahead in almost anything that their stuff was adopted wholesale.
There are some niches here and there where the Germans had enough of a lead that it got other nation's attention, but for the most part their technology from WW 2 pretty quickly was surpassed postwar.
It seems that this discussion is heading in the wrong direction, veering towards debates over superiority or 'what ifs.' This direction is entirely and unequivocally incorrect.
The focal point here is just history and giving due credit—nothing more.
Consider this statement: 'Both swept and forward-swept wings were tested in the US prior to the end of the war, such as the L-39,' which is undeniably accurate.
In May 1945, the von Kármán mission of the Army Air Forces inspected the secret German aeronautics laboratory near Braunschweig. Von Kármán's team included the chief of the technical staff at Boeing, George S. Schairer. He had heard about the controversial swept-wing theory of R. T. Jones at Langley, but seeing German models of swept-wing aircraft and extensive supersonic wind-tunnel data, the concept was decisively confirmed. He wired his home office: "Stop the bomber design" and changed the wing design.[7][8] Analysis by Boeing engineer Vic Ganzer suggested an optimum sweepback angle of about 35 degrees.[9] Boeing's aeronautical engineers modified the Model 432 with swept wings and tail to produce the "Model 448", which was presented to the USAAF in September 1945. It retained the four TG-180 jet engines in its forward fuselage, with two more TG-180s in the rear fuselage. The flush-mounted air intakes for the rear engines were inadequate while the USAAF considered the engine installation within the fuselage to be a fire hazard.[6][10][11]
It seems that this discussion is heading in the wrong direction, veering towards debates over superiority or 'what ifs.' This direction is entirely and unequivocally incorrect.
The focal point here is just history and giving due credit—nothing more.
Consider this statement: 'Both swept and forward-swept wings were tested in the US prior to the end of the war, such as the L-39,' which is undeniably accurate.
In May 1945, the von Kármán mission of the Army Air Forces inspected the secret German aeronautics laboratory near Braunschweig. Von Kármán's team included the chief of the technical staff at Boeing, George S. Schairer. He had heard about the controversial swept-wing theory of R. T. Jones at Langley, but seeing German models of swept-wing aircraft and extensive supersonic wind-tunnel data, the concept was decisively confirmed. He wired his home office: "Stop the bomber design" and changed the wing design.[7][8] Analysis by Boeing engineer Vic Ganzer suggested an optimum sweepback angle of about 35 degrees.[9] Boeing's aeronautical engineers modified the Model 432 with swept wings and tail to produce the "Model 448", which was presented to the USAAF in September 1945. It retained the four TG-180 jet engines in its forward fuselage, with two more TG-180s in the rear fuselage. The flush-mounted air intakes for the rear engines were inadequate while the USAAF considered the engine installation within the fuselage to be a fire hazard.[6][10][11]
Even that shows that Germany wasn't particularly far ahead in this regard. They had just applied the theory to practice quicker than the US did, most likely because the top people in the US were more conservative in their design applications not seeing some immediate need for what, in their view, were largely untried aerodynamic designs.
Another interesting aspect of this is that the US, postwar started to adopt computer modelling of aerodynamics with a corresponding shift away from using wind tunnels. Sure, the US when the need arose quickly built a number of large supersonic wind tunnels, but by the 60's use was in serious decline compared to using purpose built (at the time) computer modelling.
Another interesting aspect of this is that the US, postwar started to adopt computer modelling of aerodynamics with a corresponding shift away from using wind tunnels. Sure, the US when the need arose quickly built a number of large supersonic wind tunnels, but by the 60's use was in serious decline compared to using purpose built (at the time) computer modelling.
We are at the right place, a history of computer modelling of aerodynamics has started this way :
Check this out: Helmut Hoelzer's Fully Electronic Analog Computer
We are at the right place, a history of computer modelling of aerodynamics has started this way :
Check this out: Helmut Hoelzer's Fully Electronic Analog Computer
Actually, his is only one of many analog computers that were independently, or semi-independently developed in the immediate post war years. A good book on this is:
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