An Australian Belknap or Leahy based DLG instead of the "Perth/Adams" Class DDGs

[Volkodav]

Eight Rivers? That's news to me. I'm not saying that you're wrong, only that what I've read before is that a plan was to build 6 was announced in August 1950 and they were part of an overall plan for 20 "frigoyers" as follows:

• 4 Daring class destroyers - 3 built.
• 2 Battle class destroyers - already built.
• 3 Modernised Tribal class - 2 modernised.
• 6 Type 12 - 4 built - but the 5th & 6th were reinstated in the 1960s
• 5 Q class destroyers to be converted to Type 15 frigates - 4 converted.

According to Jane's 1952-53.

• 1952 Programme (1952-53 to 1954-55) 3 years - £A 559,000,000 over 3 years of which the RAN to receive £A 137,000,000.
  • It looks like Australia's equivalent to the British 3-year rearmament programme of 1951.
• Naval Programme 36 active and 80 reserve ships, including: 2 CV, 3 cruisers, 9 DD, 11 fast FF, 14 slow FF, 32 minesweepers and 45 other vessels.
• Personnel (1952) 13,490 with 17,000 planned to be attained by 1953.
  • [It wasn't. According to Jane's 1953-54 personnel (1952) was 14,541.]
• 1952 New Construction Programme - 3 Boom Working Vessels, 4 MSC and 4 Seaward Defence Boats
• 4 Daring class ordered 1947 - building.
• 2 Battle class ordered 1946-47 - completed 1950-51 - cost £2.5m (Anzac) and £2.47 (Tobruk).
• 6 Type 12.
  • "In August 1950 it was announced that 6 Type 12 would be built in Australia. 3 at Cockatoo and 3 at Williamstown, but reduced to 2 at each yard. Cost £A 2 million each."
• 5 Q class being converted to Type 15 at a cost of £A 400,000 each.
• The 14 slow frigates were:
  • 4 Bay class.
  • 8 Loch class (one AGS, one on 3-year loan to RNZN and one as training ship for national servicemen).
  • 2 Grimsby class (Warrego as AGS).
• The 32 minesweepers were the 4 MSC in the 1952 NCP and 28 Bathurst class of which one was a training ship and 3 were with the National Service Training Flotilla.
• As amphibious capability has been mentioned earlier in the thread the RAN had 3 LST(3) on loan from the RN out of 6 that were originally transferred.

The 1952 programme was preceded by the 5-Year Programme of 1947 under which £A75 million was to be spend 1947-52. This was for 2 aircraft carriers (Melbourne & Sydney) and 6 destroyers (2 Battle class ordered 1946-47 & 4 Daring ordered 1947). That was according to Jane's 1947-48 which also said that Personnel (1947) was under 10,000, but was to be increased to 14,753 by 1952.

My bad, it was actually twelve Type 12s, a one-for-one replacement for the twelve wartime River and Bay Class Frigates. There was also the interim ASW conversions of two Tribal and four Q class destroyers.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

My bad, it was actually twelve Type 12s, a one-for-one replacement for the twelve wartime River and Bay Class Frigates.

What's your source for that?

There was also the interim ASW conversions of two Tribal and four Q class destroyers.

I know, see this quote from Post 39.

Eight Rivers? That's news to me. I'm not saying that you're wrong, only that what I've read before is that a plan was to build 6 was announced in August 1950 and they were part of an overall plan for 20 "frigoyers" as follows:

• 4 Daring class destroyers - 3 built.
• 2 Battle class destroyers - already built.
• 3 Modernised Tribal class - 2 modernised.
• 6 Type 12 - 4 built - but the 5th & 6th were reinstated in the 1960s
• 5 Q class destroyers to be converted to Type 15 frigates - 4 converted.

 

[BlackBat242]

One notes that INS Viraat had a crew of 1207+143 aircrew for a total of oh... 1350 very much in line with the figures listed for the Centaurs.

What's your source for that. I've got a spreadsheet with the crews for the Colossus & Majestic classes as quoted by Jane's from the late 1940s to the early 1980s. For Hercules/Vikrant they are.

• 1,343 "War" for Hercules Jane's 1949-50 to 1955-56.
• 1,343 "Designed Accommodation" for Virkrant Janes 1960-61 to 1975-76.
• 1,075 "Peace" for Vikrant Jane's 1976-77 to 1980-81.
• 1,345 "War" for Vikrant Jane's 1976-77 to 1980-81.

Lascaris was talking about INS VIRAAT - ex-Hermes... not VIKRANT!

 

[A Tentative Fleet Plan]

My what if is Australia approaches G&C for example, and asks for a DLG hull with one or two Mk-13s for Tartar and one or two Mk-42 5" or even Mk6 4.5" gun mounts and helicopter facilities.

There were attempts by the US to build improved DDGs in the late 1950s early 60s, including attempts in 1958 to build a new series of DDGs (to be ordered in FY60) with SQS-26, NTDS, an additional Mk 13 launcher replacing the aft 5"/54 mounting, with endurance increased to 8000 nautical miles. This enlarged the ship to DLG size, and despite alternative designs with 4300nm and 6000nm endurance respectively, the plan was dropped.

There were later plans for an SCB 212 DDG, planned to be ordered FY62, originally a DDG design using a Coontz/Farragut hull with a Leahy superstructure for additional volume, with either Terrier or Tartar, depending on the design study, which spoon evolved into a DDG on a Leahy hull

The combat systems of this ship was then merged with the hull of the planned FY61 DLG, SCB 172A, an improved Leahy with a hull-plug, SQS-26, NTDS and DASH, resulting in the Belknaps.

Both the FY60 and FY62 DDGs seem close to what you are suggesting.

 

[uk 75]

A bit later in the planning cycle but the Type 22 would have been a better ASW frigate for the RAN than the Perrys. Seawolf would have been able to goalkeep with one of the three Adams class and two Seakings/SH60 add to ASW.
The Type 82 would have been easier to fit with Tartar than a County or T42 as it already had Ikara.
A Leahy double ender Terrier/Standard with Ikara or a Coontz single ender with Ikara would have been interesting.

 

[TomS]

A bit later in the planning cycle but the Type 22 would have been a better ASW frigate for the RAN than the Perrys. Seawolf would have been able to goalkeep with one of the three Adams class and two Seakings/SH60 add to ASW.

The Type22/42 combos proved very limited in the Falklands -- trying to get two different ships to maneuver together safely, not blank each other's weapons, and not have radar interference with each other was not trivial. In any event, the Perths were better equipped than the Type 42s to deal with seaskimmers and would not need a Seawolf ship in close company. (especially with Phalanx added).

None of the T22s could carry 2 Sea King or Seahawk. From halfway through the Batch 2s (HMS Brave forward), there was room for a single Merlin or Sea King in lieu of two Lynx.

 

[Rule of cool]

FWIW Australian OHPs didn't carry an ASW helicopter for the first half of their service lives, and when the S70 Seahawks were acquired in about 1990 only the 2 Australian built Flight 2 ships could carry it and the first 4 ships needed refits. In any case the RAN Seahawk journey was an example of what not to do with an ASW helicopter.

 

[Rule of cool]

On a tangent from the OP; what happens to the DDL if Cabinet accepted the Nov 64 COSC recommendation for a 4th Perth class DDG to replace Voyager instead of a pair of River class? With a 4th 'big' SAM ship in service does the RAN get something akin to the RNs Type 21?

 

[Lascaris]

What's your source for that?

Viraat aka the former Hermes. Source: the Indian Navy here

Viraat : Naval Fleet : Indian Navy

Indian Navy, Ministry of defence, Government of India

web.archive.org

 

[Volkodav]

What's your source for that?

I know, see this quote from Post 39.

Yes, I saw that, sorry I didn't mean to come across as if I was telling you how to suck eggs, I was trying to provide context to my post.

As for the twelve Type 12s, Abraham Gubler, who used to be an active member of this and other sites, was the source. I believe he uncovered this in his searches of parliamentary papers relating to the RAN. He's the one who found and arranged the scanning of the papers regarding the DDL, the proposed Essex acquisition and I believe the later carrier replacement program etc.

 

[Volkodav]

There were attempts by the US to build improved DDGs in the late 1950s early 60s, including attempts in 1958 to build a new series of DDGs (to be ordered in FY60) with SQS-26, NTDS, an additional Mk 13 launcher replacing the aft 5"/54 mounting, with endurance increased to 8000 nautical miles. This enlarged the ship to DLG size, and despite alternative designs with 4300nm and 6000nm endurance respectively, the plan was dropped.

There were later plans for an SCB 212 DDG, planned to be ordered FY62, originally a DDG design using a Coontz/Farragut hull with a Leahy superstructure for additional volume, with either Terrier or Tartar, depending on the design study, which spoon evolved into a DDG on a Leahy hull

The combat systems of this ship was then merged with the hull of the planned FY61 DLG, SCB 172A, an improved Leahy with a hull-plug, SQS-26, NTDS and DASH, resulting in the Belknaps.

Both the FY60 and FY62 DDGs seem close to what you are suggesting.

Thank you! Where is this, I would love to read more on it? (If its Friedmans US Destroyers I will kick myself and reread).

 

[Volkodav]

A bit later in the planning cycle but the Type 22 would have been a better ASW frigate for the RAN than the Perrys. Seawolf would have been able to goalkeep with one of the three Adams class and two Seakings/SH60 add to ASW.
The Type 82 would have been easier to fit with Tartar than a County or T42 as it already had Ikara.
A Leahy double ender Terrier/Standard with Ikara or a Coontz single ender with Ikara would have been interesting.

There is a recurring force structure that keeps reappearing in RAN plans for a surface combatant structure of large multi-role combatants, roughly equal to twice as many high-end specialist ASW combatants, and a force of smaller multi-role / GP combatants to support the larger, more capable ships.

This has variously consisted of cruisers and later, large Destroyers (Tribals, Battles and Darings) and DDGs in the top tier, destroyers and ASW frigates (counting the FFGs as ASW frigates) in the second tier, and light destroyers, frigates and corvettes in the lower tier.

 

[Lascaris]

Friedman in US Destroyers page 303 speaks about estimated cost of $75 million for Belknap and $59 for the repeats. Which means you can exchange a pair of Belknaps for the 3 Charles F Adams whichwill also have aboutthe same crew as well. So what is preferable? Two Belknaps or three Adams?

 

[Scott Kenny]

Friedman in US Destroyers page 303 speaks about estimated cost of $75 million for Belknap and $59 for the repeats. Which means you can exchange a pair of Belknaps for the 3 Charles F Adams whichwill also have aboutthe same crew as well. So what is preferable? Two Belknaps or three Adams?

I'd rather have the 3 Adams, because then I can keep one ship at sea all the time.

 

[Rule of cool]

Friedman in US Destroyers page 303 speaks about estimated cost of $75 million for Belknap and $59 for the repeats. Which means you can exchange a pair of Belknaps for the 3 Charles F Adams whichwill also have aboutthe same crew as well. So what is preferable? Two Belknaps or three Adams?

The initial order was for 2 Adams, the 3rd wasn't ordered for another 2 years with a 4th being rejected in 1964 and 1966. In the early 60s it was planned to fit 3 Darings with Tartar alongside the Perths.

So the choice isn't 2 for 3, it likely would be 1 for 2 and another decision in a year or two or even three.

I'd rather have the 3 Adams, because then I can keep one ship at sea all the time.

Even with 3 DDGs it wasn't enough to keep 1 on the gun line off Vietnam after 3 or so years. The RAN had to send a Daring on a war deployment to allow the DDGs to have a break.

 

[A Tentative Fleet Plan]

Thank you! Where is this, I would love to read more on it? (If its Friedmans US Destroyers I will kick myself and reread).

It is from Friedman's US Destroyers, pages 303-307 for SCB 172A, and page 312-315 for the DDGs.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Yes, I saw that, sorry I didn't mean to come across as if I was telling you how to suck eggs, I was trying to provide context to my post.

No problem. We all make mistakes, including a howler by me in this thread.

As for the twelve Type 12s, Abraham Gubler, who used to be an active member of this and other sites, was the source. I believe he uncovered this in his searches of parliamentary papers relating to the RAN. He's the one who found and arranged the scanning of the papers regarding the DDL, the proposed Essex acquisition and I believe the later carrier replacement program etc.

That's interesting because according to my source (Jane's) the 6 Type 12s ordered in August 1950 were to be as well as the wartime River & Bay class frigates, not replacements for some of them.

In 1950 the RAN had 24 destroyers & frigates consisting of 10 destroyers (2 Battles, 3 Tribals & 5 Q class) and 14 frigates (8 Rivers, 4 Bays & 2 Grimsbys). The 1952 Programme was to expand the total to 34 destroyers & frigates because the 10 ships under construction & on order (4 Darings & 6 Type 12s) were as well as the 24 existing ships and not replacements for any of the existing ships.

Maybe the plan changed later. Or maybe your plan was before the 1952 Programme and the 6 ships announced in 1950 were to replace 6 wartime frigates and another 6 were to be ordered later to replace the remaining wartime frigates. Do you have a date for your plan?

Does anyone know why the RAN's Darings and Type 12s took so long to build? According to Conway's 1947-1995.

• 4 Darings were ordered in December 1946, but they weren't laid down until 1949-52 and one was cancelled in 1954. The other 3 were launched 1952-56 and completed 1957-59.
  • That's 13 years from ordering to completion of the last ship.
• 6 Type 12s were ordered in August 1950, but 2 were cancelled in 1956. The other 4 were laid down 1957-59 and completed 1961-64.
  • That's 14 years from ordering to completion of the last ship.
• The last pair of Type 12s wasn't as bad because they were ordered in 1964, laid down in 1965 and completed 1970-71.
  • That's 7 years from ordering to completion of the last ship.

My guess is that it was a combination of insufficient industrial capacity and not enough money.

Before anyone writes, "Remember the length of time the RAN's Battle class destroyers took to build, which had a knock-on effect on the Darings & Type 12s", I don't need to remember, because I haven't forgotten in the first place.

For the record RAN's 2 Battle class destroyers were ordered in 1945, laid down in 1946, launched 1947-48 and completed 1950-51. That is, 7 years from laying down to completion of the last ship, not bad for ships build in the immediate post-war period.

If the RAN's Darings had taken as long to build as the RAN's Battles, they'd have been launched circa 1951-54 and completed circa 1954-57, that is, if they'd been laid down on the same dates as IOTL. However, my guess is that they'd have been laid down a year or two earlier than IOTL, which would have brought their launching dates forward to circa 1949-52 and their completion dates forward to 1952-55.

Therefore, it seems that the long construction times for the RAN's Darings had a knock-on effect on the Type 12s because once they were laid down the first 4 Type 12s took a reasonable 4 to 5 years to build. If the Darings had been completed 1952-55 instead of 1957-59 maybe the first 4 Type 12s would have been laid down circa 1952-54 and circa completed 1956-59

FWIW I'm surprised that the RAN's Battles weren't built as Daring class ships, either by being ordered as Darings in the first place or being re-ordered as Darings before they were laid down. According to Conway's 1947-1995 the RAN Battles had a slightly larger crew than the RAN Darings, 332 v 320, which if correct means the running costs would have been virtually the same.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Viraat aka the former Hermes. Source: the Indian Navy here

Viraat : Naval Fleet : Indian Navy

Indian Navy, Ministry of defence, Government of India

web.archive.org

Fair enough, my bad (if that's the right expression) for not reading your post properly. I plead mitigating circumstances, i.e. that Vikrant & Viraat look similar.

FWIW the copy of Jane's 1996-97 says the crew of Viraat was 1,350 including 143 officers. The page on the Indian Navy website actually says 1,350 (43 officers) but the 43 officers may be a typo for 143 officers. Incidentally, Vikrant's entry on Jane's 1996-97 still says 1,075 "Peace" and 1,345 "War".

What start this off is that in Post 20 I wrote . . .

Jane's 1953-54 says Centaur's crew was "1,400 (war)" and every other subsequent edition (in the range 1954-55 to 1969-70) at says 1,028 "ship's company, including ship's air complement" and 1,330 to 1,390 "with air squadrons". Why Hermes had a crew that was 50% larger than Centaur is a mystery to me. They had the same machinery & a similar size air group, which leaves the more advanced electronics that Hermes had, but I find it hard to believe that the Type 984 radar, CDS & DPT required another 700 men. I suspect that Centaur had a much larger crew in the early 1960s but the editors of Jane's didn't have the information or didn't bother to update the entry if they did.

Which you quoted in Post 36 with this comment.

One notes that INS Viraat had a crew of 1207+143 aircrew for a total of oh... 1350 very much in line with the figures listed for the Centaurs.

However, in Post 20 I'd also written.

For example, the RAN didn't acquire Hermes in the late 1960s (to replace Melbourne) because her crew was much larger than Melbourne's. Hermes had a crew of 2,100 "with air squadrons" according to every edition of Jane's from 1960-61 to 1969-70 (i.e. when she was a strike carrier). In the 1970s Melbourne had a crew of 1,335 "includes 347 Carrier Air Group personnel" according to the editions of Jane's from 1972-73 to 1980-81.

And.

Interestingly, the same editions of Jane's say that the crew of Hermes without air squadrons was 1,830 to 1,834, which means the air squadrons 266 to 270 in the air squadrons, which is less than the 347 personnel in Melbourne's carrier air group. But it may not be a like-for-like comparison. The crew of Hermes went down to 980 after she was converted to a commando carrier (Jane's 1974-75 to 1976-77) but after her conversion to an ASW carrier in 1976 this increased to 1,350 (Jane's 1978-79 to 1980-81).

I looked at the copy of Jane's 1980-81 on Internet Archive and the exact wording is:

Complement: 1,350 (143 officers, 1,207 ratings). In emergency a Commando can be embarked.

Therefore, the Indian Navy website is exactly in line with the figures listed for Hermes.

I think the people at Jane's copied the final crew for Hermes in RN service over into their entry for Viraant because the Indian Navy didn't tell them anything different and whoever wrote the entry on the Indian Navy copied it from an edition of Janes.

 

[Rule of cool]

I don't know how in particular it affected RAN plans but in the mid-late 50s Australia's defence policy changed just like Britain's and to a less noticeable extent the US' did. In the early 50s we planned to re-fight WW2 but with a few nuke thrown in, we had conscription to the CMF (Reserves) to be able to mobilise 2 divisions for the 3rd AIF to fight in the Middle East and we had a RAAF fighter wing based in Malta. In 1956 we first deployed troops to Malaya and bought the RAAF fighter wing home. In 1957 we reduced the conscription intake from 33,000 to 12,000. In 1958 we amalgamated 3 of the 6 government departments associated with Defence and created a separate position for the Chairman of Chief of Staffs Committee as the head of the Services. In 1959 the conscription scheme was dropped and in 1960 the pentropic re-organisation occurred.

The upshot is that Australia realised that we were going to be fighting Limited Wars alongside Britain by the mid-late 50s so presumably the RANs plans changed to reflect that.

As for why Australia took so long to build ships, I think it was because shipbuilding wasn't a natural thing the way it was in Britain. The industry had to be pushed by the Government over decades rather than forming out of necessity over centuries or even millennia in the case of Britain. So Britain cold build carriers and battleships and spam cruisers and destroyers Australia had to be constantly prodded to build a handful of destroyers.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Even with 3 DDGs it wasn't enough to keep 1 on the gun line off Vietnam after 3 or so years. The RAN had to send a Daring on a war deployment to allow the DDGs to have a break.

True, but you really need more like a dozen ships of a class to keep 3-4 at sea, even accounting for broken stuff.

If you can only afford 2 ships of one design or 3 ships of a different design, you should always err on the side of more ships.

 

[Rule of cool]

True, but you really need more like a dozen ships of a class to keep 3-4 at sea, even accounting for broken stuff.

If you can only afford 2 ships of one design or 3 ships of a different design, you should always err on the side of more ships.

I wholeheartedly agree, however I was just pointing out that even the rule of 3 has it's limits. The RANs deployment of Vendetta is an example, but other apparent anomalies like the USN requesting the RAN send Melbourne on a Vietnam cruise can be explained by the USN's need to give it's own ASW assets a break.

In any case I think the Adams class is a better fit for the RANs requirements, whether they get 2, 3 or 4 of them.

 

[Volkodav]

I'd rather have the 3 Adams, because then I can keep one ship at sea all the time.

The advantage the Belknap had over the Adams was that it already had many of the features and capabilities the RAN desired and needed and was programmed for capability upgrades by the USN that they had no interest in undertaking on the Adams class. The Frigates/Cruisers were the USN's top-tier fast carrier escorts and task force leaders, the Adams were more utilitarian escorts for the USN but the premier ones for the RAN. Australia had to upgrade the Adams/Perths to a far greater extent than the USN did for theirs, there were costs involved in this that would not have occurred had the RAN acquired Belknaps.

It is entirely possible, by being able to hook into the USNs upgrade and sustainment programs for the Belknap, versus the bespoke upgrades required by the Perths, there would not have been as great a difference in the through-life costs of three Belknaps versus that for three Perths. Ironically the extent, time and frequency of upgrades required by the Perths to bring them up to the capability the RAN required, meant they needed four or five hulls rather than just three. There is a similar problem with the current Hobart Class, with only three hulls, that are smaller and less capable than required, there are major availability issues as they are scheduled to rotate through a major upgrade program.

 

[Volkodav]

It is from Friedman's US Destroyers, pages 303-307 for SCB 172A, and page 312-315 for the DDGs.

Thanks for that, time for a re-read.

 

[Pioneer]

FWIW Australian OHPs didn't carry an ASW helicopter for the first half of their service lives, and when the S70 Seahawks were acquired in about 1990 only the 2 Australian built Flight 2 ships could carry it and the first 4 ships needed refits. In any case the RAN Seahawk journey was an example of what not to do with an ASW helicopter.

As much as I appreciate the Seahawk's capabilities, this is why I would have opted for the Westland Lynx HAS.2, it would have negated the ridiculous refit of the first four OHP's and saved copious $$$.

Regards
Pioneer

 

[Volkodav]

No problem. We all make mistakes, including a howler by me in this thread.

That's interesting because according to my source (Jane's) the 6 Type 12s ordered in August 1950 were to be as well as the wartime River & Bay class frigates, not replacements for some of them.

In 1950 the RAN had 24 destroyers & frigates consisting of 10 destroyers (2 Battles, 3 Tribals & 5 Q class) and 14 frigates (8 Rivers, 4 Bays & 2 Grimsbys). The 1952 Programme was to expand the total to 34 destroyers & frigates because the 10 ships under construction & on order (4 Darings & 6 Type 12s) were as well as the 24 existing ships and not replacements for any of the existing ships.

Maybe the plan changed later. Or maybe your plan was before the 1952 Programme and the 6 ships announced in 1950 were to replace 6 wartime frigates and another 6 were to be ordered later to replace the remaining wartime frigates. Do you have a date for your plan?

Does anyone know why the RAN's Darings and Type 12s took so long to build? According to Conway's 1947-1995.

• 4 Darings were ordered in December 1946, but they weren't laid down until 1949-52 and one was cancelled in 1954. The other 3 were launched 1952-56 and completed 1957-59.
  • That's 13 years from ordering to completion of the last ship.
• 6 Type 12s were ordered in August 1950, but 2 were cancelled in 1956. The other 4 were laid down 1957-59 and completed 1961-64.
  • That's 14 years from ordering to completion of the last ship.
• The last pair of Type 12s wasn't as bad because they were ordered in 1964, laid down in 1965 and completed 1970-71.
  • That's 7 years from ordering to completion of the last ship.

My guess is that it was a combination of insufficient industrial capacity and not enough money.

Before anyone writes, "Remember the length of time the RAN's Battle class destroyers took to build, which had a knock-on effect on the Darings & Type 12s", I don't need to remember, because I haven't forgotten in the first place.

For the record RAN's 2 Battle class destroyers were ordered in 1945, laid down in 1946, launched 1947-48 and completed 1950-51. That is, 7 years from laying down to completion of the last ship, not bad for ships build in the immediate post-war period.

If the RAN's Darings had taken as long to build as the RAN's Battles, they'd have been launched circa 1951-54 and completed circa 1954-57, that is, if they'd been laid down on the same dates as IOTL. However, my guess is that they'd have been laid down a year or two earlier than IOTL, which would have brought their launching dates forward to circa 1949-52 and their completion dates forward to 1952-55.

Therefore, it seems that the long construction times for the RAN's Darings had a knock-on effect on the Type 12s because once they were laid down the first 4 Type 12s took a reasonable 4 to 5 years to build. If the Darings had been completed 1952-55 instead of 1957-59 maybe the first 4 Type 12s would have been laid down circa 1952-54 and circa completed 1956-59

FWIW I'm surprised that the RAN's Battles weren't built as Daring class ships, either by being ordered as Darings in the first place or being re-ordered as Darings before they were laid down. According to Conway's 1947-1995 the RAN Battles had a slightly larger crew than the RAN Darings, 332 v 320, which if correct means the running costs would have been virtually the same.

Thanks for that, very well researched and put together.

I believe construction on the Darings was slowed down to free up resources to convert the five Q Class destroyers into Type 15 ASW frigates (Quality was meant to be converted from 1956 but this was cancelled due to her poor materiel state). Fast ASW had become a priority for Commonwealth navies with the advent of Soviet fast-battery submarines, though upgraded the Rivers and Bays were no longer perceived as capable enough for the mission, meaning the Type 15s had priority.

The RAN was suffering manning and funding issues at the time which saw the cancellation of the fourth Daring, Waterhen, in 1954.

 

[Rule of cool]

The advantage the Belknap had over the Adams was that it already had many of the features and capabilities the RAN desired and needed and was programmed for capability upgrades by the USN that they had no interest in undertaking on the Adams class. The Frigates/Cruisers were the USN's top-tier fast carrier escorts and task force leaders, the Adams were more utilitarian escorts for the USN but the premier ones for the RAN. Australia had to upgrade the Adams/Perths to a far greater extent than the USN did for theirs, there were costs involved in this that would not have occurred had the RAN acquired Belknaps.

It is entirely possible, by being able to hook into the USNs upgrade and sustainment programs for the Belknap, versus the bespoke upgrades required by the Perths, there would not have been as great a difference in the through-life costs of three Belknaps versus that for three Perths. Ironically the extent, time and frequency of upgrades required by the Perths to bring them up to the capability the RAN required, meant they needed four or five hulls rather than just three. There is a similar problem with the current Hobart Class, with only three hulls, that are smaller and less capable than required, there are major availability issues as they are scheduled to rotate through a major upgrade program.

That's all well and good but the Government simply isn't going to provide the resources to allow the RAN to do what it wants to do. This isn't just the RAN either, the Army and RAAF's headline kit was delayed or underdone; the Army never bought enough tanks for the 2nd Armoured Regiment it wanted or enough Armoured cars to form the Recce regiment for 1st Division. Similarly the 1957 order for 30 F104s was cancelled and new fighters not ordered until 1961 and the recommendation to buy RA5C Vigilantes for the 1966 in-service date overturned for TFX with an in-service date of 1969.

Also, while the first 2 ships were ordered to fill a general SAM warship requirement Brisbane was ordered to fight emerging wars in our immediate neighborhood. Personally I think three smaller, handier Adams with its 2 guns is better for the Indonesian Confrontation and Vietnam War than two single gun Belknap with her DASH and Terriers.

 

[Volkodav]

As for why Australia took so long to build ships, I think it was because shipbuilding wasn't a natural thing the way it was in Britain. The industry had to be pushed by the Government over decades rather than forming out of necessity over centuries or even millennia in the case of Britain. So Britain cold build carriers and battleships and spam cruisers and destroyers Australia had to be constantly prodded to build a handful of destroyers.

It's even simpler than that, if governments don't order ships skills atrophy and capability is lost.

Australia was building warships before and during WWI and almost stopped between the wars. An excuse given was how long it took to complete the cruiser HMAS Adelaide, but ignored that the delay was caused by the loss of critical imported components in transit during the war and then a slowdown imposed by the government post-war.

There was an enquiry, headed up by Sir John Monash into whether to build the desired County in Australia or overseas and the government decided to order them from the UK to save money. The irony is they then ordered a seaplane carrier locally, in large part to maintain shipbuilding skills, but then when replacements were needed for the aging out Town class, there was no recent experience in building cruisers, so they had to be bought from the UK.

It's a vicious cycle, when the government believe they are not getting value for money they starve local industry and buy from overseas, when they realise the full costs of buying from overseas, they set up to build locally, and when it costs too much they buy from overseas again. Worst of all, when local builds work and prove local industry is competitive and necessary, government often decides the new fleet of ships is more than adequate and stop ordering new ones, starting the whole cycle again.

 

[Volkodav]

That's all well and good but the Government simply isn't going to provide the resources to allow the RAN to do what it wants to do. This isn't just the RAN either, the Army and RAAF's headline kit was delayed or underdone; the Army never bought enough tanks for the 2nd Armoured Regiment it wanted or enough Armoured cars to form the Recce regiment for 1st Division. Similarly the 1957 order for 30 F104s was cancelled and new fighters not ordered until 1961 and the recommendation to buy RA5C Vigilantes for the 1966 in-service date overturned for TFX with an in-service date of 1969.

Also, while the first 2 ships were ordered to fill a general SAM warship requirement Brisbane was ordered to fight emerging wars in our immediate neighborhood. Personally I think three smaller, handier Adams with its 2 guns is better for the Indonesian Confrontation and Vietnam War than two single gun Belknap with her DASH and Terriers.

Government directs the services on what their missions are, regarding fulfilling the government's strategic policies. The services advise government what they need so they can fulfil the missions assigned to them, the government decides they will provide what is required. The common factor is government makes the decisions and controls the purse strings, government also has other priorities and obligations as well as the need to be re-elected by an electorate that is more concerned about other issues.

Short-termism is a problem, so for all the carry-on about "minimum viable capability" these days, it has long been the case that government funds somewhere below the minimum size, numbers and capability required, with little or no thought to through life capability and costs. It is all a problem for future governments.

 

[uk 75]

The Adams RAN ships were fitted with Ikara amidships replacing the ASROC pepperbox.

The Belknaps used a combined Terrier/ASROC launcher and there would have been little room for Ikara.

The two guns on the Adams would be much more useful for the RAN than the single Belknap mount.

W Germany also bought three Adams class (three additional were cancelled). They were useful ships. Italy had a similar design in the Impavidos and a better armed one in the Ardito/Audace class.

 

[Volkodav]

The Adams RAN ships were fitted with Ikara amidships replacing the ASROC pepperbox.

The Belknaps used a combined Terrier/ASROC launcher and there would have been little room for Ikara.

The two guns on the Adams would be much more useful for the RAN than the single Belknap mount.

W Germany also bought three Adams class (three additional were cancelled). They were useful ships. Italy had a similar design in the Impavidos and a better armed one in the Ardito/Audace class.

It's not just the number of guns and missiles. its sensors, data links, command and control facilities, power generation, crew accommodation, the size of the technical departments etc.

There is a convincing argument that Australia could have done worse than build additional Darings and Rivers than they did, for the extra guns and improved ASW, and acquired a couple of DDH or CGH to cover off helicopters and area air defence. Another option would have been to have acquired ex USN DDs, likely various FRAM iterations as well as a couple of DLGs.

There was an opportunity cost in retaining the carrier capability, while fine for the Korean War they were too small to operate newer aircraft types in useful numbers. Hindsight is great and had it been realised there would never be a replacement for Melbourne the earlier decisions relating to her may have been different.

Nonetheless, the RAN may have been better served by never acquiring carriers and investing in a final generation of cruisers and a greater number of large destroyers.

 

[Rule of cool]

Government directs the services on what their missions are, regarding fulfilling the government's strategic policies. The services advise government what they need so they can fulfil the missions assigned to them, the government decides they will provide what is required. The common factor is government makes the decisions and controls the purse strings, government also has other priorities and obligations as well as the need to be re-elected by an electorate that is more concerned about other issues.

Short-termism is a problem, so for all the carry-on about "minimum viable capability" these days, it has long been the case that government funds somewhere below the minimum size, numbers and capability required, with little or no thought to through life capability and costs. It is all a problem for future governments.

That's all fine in theory, but in Australia's case the Government spelled out the peacetime and wartime tasks then didn't provide the resources to discharge these tasks. The postwar/Cold War RAN was too small to carry out its peacetime tasks and totally inadequate for its wartime tasks.

Under such circumstances the RAN is right to protect core capabilities like her Carrier and choose less capable ships in greater number to discharge other tasks as well as possible, rather than go for smaller number of high-end ships that will likely impact capabilities like the Carrier and/or subs and not provide enough numbers for the stated tasks.

 

[Rule of cool]

It's even simpler than that, if governments don't order ships skills atrophy and capability is lost.

Australia was building warships before and during WWI and almost stopped between the wars. An excuse given was how long it took to complete the cruiser HMAS Adelaide, but ignored that the delay was caused by the loss of critical imported components in transit during the war and then a slowdown imposed by the government post-war.

There was an enquiry, headed up by Sir John Monash into whether to build the desired County in Australia or overseas and the government decided to order them from the UK to save money. The irony is they then ordered a seaplane carrier locally, in large part to maintain shipbuilding skills, but then when replacements were needed for the aging out Town class, there was no recent experience in building cruisers, so they had to be bought from the UK.

It's a vicious cycle, when the government believe they are not getting value for money they starve local industry and buy from overseas, when they realise the full costs of buying from overseas, they set up to build locally, and when it costs too much they buy from overseas again. Worst of all, when local builds work and prove local industry is competitive and necessary, government often decides the new fleet of ships is more than adequate and stop ordering new ones, starting the whole cycle again.

This is true, but the solution becomes the tail wagging the dog; building ships in order to retain this capability regardless of whether these ships are needed according to the Defence policy and Strategy selected by the Government. It's important to remember that the first Australian Defence White Paper wasn't published until 1977 although one almost got there in 1972 but was downgraded late in the game.

To be honest I'm personally in favour for the tail wagging the dog; building enough ships to sustain the 2 naval dockyards. However I can't see it happening, the success horizon is too long for most governments to get any political benefit from.

 

[Rule of cool]

There was an opportunity cost in retaining the carrier capability,

During the Melbourne replacement 'saga' in ~1964 C-COSC AM Scherger asked why the RAN was so keen to put vast resources into a new carrier as opposed to the long laundry list of other capabilities that were going unfulfilled. This is a fair question, and I don't recall it being answered.

The answer of course is that of the long list of capabilities a Carrier is a once in a generation capability that once it is gone it can't be replaced in short order. This is in contrast with the surface fleet for example, if the need and resources became available in the time-frame we're talking about the RAN could have refitted the Darings with Tartar or Ikara, refitted some recently decommissioned ships like a Battle and/or Q class and ordered both a 4th DDG and 2 Rivers. In a few years the RAN's surface fleet is reinvigourated and enlarged.

The same can't be done if a carrier is needed, they aren't just lying around like surface warships tend to be, and their squadrons would need time for form up and train, Sqn and CAG Commanders don't grow on trees.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Part of Post 71.

To be honest I'm personally in favour for the tail wagging the dog; building enough ships to sustain the 2 naval dockyards. However I can't see it happening, the success horizon is too long for most governments to get any political benefit from.

Ironically (and you know much better than me) Australia had the same party in government for 23 years (1949-72) and the same prime minister for 17 years (1959-66).

 

[Rule of cool]

Part of Post 71.

Ironically (and you know much better than me) Australia had the same party in government for 23 years (1949-72) and the same prime minister for 17 years (1959-66).

Yep, and they were bandits for kicking the can down the road and doing the bare minimum and 'free riding' on the UK and US.

After Menzies in 1966 we had 3 PMs in 6 years, although to be fair one of them absconded in a Chinese submarine which couldn't have been foreseen.

 

[uk 75]

The RAN got a lot of use out of Melbourne. Her replacement by Invincible with Sea Harriers and Seakings would have been a good solution.
Another option might have been a version of Spain's SCS Asturias with similar airgroup.

 

[TomS]

Yep, and they were bandits for kicking the can down the road and doing the bare minimum and 'free riding' on the UK and US.

After Menzies in 1966 we had 3 PMs in 6 years, although to be fair one of them absconded in a Chinese submarine which couldn't have been foreseen.

You don't seriously believe that nonsense story about Harold Holt, do you? It's pure nonsense.

The Prime Minister Was a Spy - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

 

[Rule of cool]

You don't seriously believe that nonsense story about Harold Holt, do you? It's pure nonsense.

The Prime Minister Was a Spy - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

I was curious if anyone would get the reference.

 

[uk 75]

Talking of H Holt the US named a Knox class after him.
US frigate designs might have been adopted by the RAN instead of the Type 12.

 

[Rule of cool]

Talking of H Holt the US named a Knox class after him.
US frigate designs might have been adopted by the RAN instead of the Type 12.

The (formerly) US VLF radio station on the NE Cape is named after him. And who could forget the Harold Holt Memorial swimming pool.

As for US designs replacing River class, in my opinion the first US design that would equate to a River would be the Brontstien class, which were laid down in 1961, the same year as the 3rd and 4th Rivers. The 5th and 6th Rivers, which were Leanders rather than Rothsays, were authorised in 1964 and laid down in 1967 & 68, so they could be replaced by Knox class in theory but the RAN and COSC wanted a 4th DDG which would be a better fit for the RAN.