An alternative Royal Navy for the 1970s

[zen]

Hmmmm....This is reaching closer to my Sea Dart success thread, but.....

It's an option such a launcher is produced. Perhaps for Typhon aimed at Frigate sized ships.

However another option might be if say the UK had developed a rotary launcher for Sea Slug. Granted the actual launcher itself would need to be rebuilt, but the rotary magazine would have cells large enough to take any later weapon, and with 20ft of length to play with, that's about 3 decks.

 

[zen]

Additional.

Vicker offered a simple solution using the 105mm army gun during the process that lead to HMS Bristol's mk8.

 

[JohnR]

I thought that proposal was related to the Castle class OPV?

Regards.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

Hmmmm....This is reaching closer to my Sea Dart success thread, but.....

It's an option such a launcher is produced. Perhaps for Typhon aimed at Frigate sized ships.

However another option might be if say the UK had developed a rotary launcher for Sea Slug. Granted the actual launcher itself would need to be rebuilt, but the rotary magazine would have cells large enough to take any later weapon, and with 20ft of length to play with, that's about 3 decks.

A Typhoon sized vertically aligned launcher would probably need new fins for the Typhoon as the horizontal launchers used detachable fins. But this is not such a big problem as the advent of the VLS saw these big fins disappear from the boosted Standard, aTerrier replacement. Such a launcher could load and fire SM2 blk 4, SM3, TLAM, ASROC and Sea Lance (plus Sea Dart, Exocet and Otomat for the export market) so would be more flexible than the Mk 26.

A Mk 13 style launcher for Sea Slug is quite improbable. It could not include a checkout space unless a new room was placed between the magazine and the launcher. Also the high height and width of the Sea Slug with its wrap around boosters means the magazine ring would not support many units.

Having typed that you could make a neat launcher somewhat like a Terrier launcher orientated vertically. That is two side by side ring magazines (seperated laterally by bulkheads) each holding 8 Sea Slugs vertically. The missile is pulled from the magaine fore or aft through a door into the ready room. There it is checked out (it is aĺlready finned) and either discarded laterally or loaded vertically through the roof into the trainable launcher. Another pair or magazines could be located opposite the ready room. Providing 32 missiles in magazines, all ready to go with no assembly needed, located in five seperate spaces allowing a ship structure without large open spaces.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

I thought that proposal was related to the Castle class OPV?

Regards.

The OPV gun used the 105mm L7 tank gun and in concept was descended from the CFS Mk 2 3.3" (84mm, 20 lbs) gun.

The Mk 8 4.5" (113mm) gun used the technology of the 105mm Abbott field gun/howitzer and its Mk 2 ammo repackaged into the 4.5" calibre and a naval mount. The option to just keep the ordnance and shell as is (it would need a new cartridge and propellant design for naval use) would save a lot of money and provide Army-Navy commonality in artillery consumables (shells and barrels, and the Abbott tech was also reused in the towed Light Gun L118). The lighter shell could also potentially be used in a faster firing mounting like the Vickers Type N or French 100mm mount. Thougb I doubt it as the RN stressed high reliability for the Mk 8 gun with moderate ROF for sole use as a surface warfare, NGS weapon (not AA).

 

[JFC Fuller]

The 4.5" Mk.8 was always intended as an AA weapon in addition to an NGS weapon.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

The 4.5" Mk.8 was always intended as an AA weapon in addition to an NGS weapon.

The sentance in Warships 2015 I was referring too is quite clunky. It sayal the Mk 8 spec "called for Surface (SU) and Naval Fires, but the AA capability was dropped in the 1990s." Certainly the Mk 8 and FCS could engage air targets as delivered. However it was clearly not a major design requirement judging by the low ROF and low angle elevation of the gun.

 

[zen]

Hmmmm....This is reaching closer to my Sea Dart success thread, but.....

It's an option such a launcher is produced. Perhaps for Typhon aimed at Frigate sized ships.

However another option might be if say the UK had developed a rotary launcher for Sea Slug. Granted the actual launcher itself would need to be rebuilt, but the rotary magazine would have cells large enough to take any later weapon, and with 20ft of length to play with, that's about 3 decks.

A Typhoon sized vertically aligned launcher would probably need new fins for the Typhoon as the horizontal launchers used detachable fins. But this is not such a big problem as the advent of the VLS saw these big fins disappear from the boosted Standard, aTerrier replacement. Such a launcher could load and fire SM2 blk 4, SM3, TLAM, ASROC and Sea Lance (plus Sea Dart, Exocet and Otomat for the export market) so would be more flexible than the Mk 26.

A Mk 13 style launcher for Sea Slug is quite improbable. It could not include a checkout space unless a new room was placed between the magazine and the launcher. Also the high height and width of the Sea Slug with its wrap around boosters means the magazine ring would not support many units.

Having typed that you could make a neat launcher somewhat like a Terrier launcher orientated vertically. That is two side by side ring magazines (seperated laterally by bulkheads) each holding 8 Sea Slugs vertically. The missile is pulled from the magaine fore or aft through a door into the ready room. There it is checked out (it is aĺlready finned) and either discarded laterally or loaded vertically through the roof into the trainable launcher. Another pair or magazines could be located opposite the ready room. Providing 32 missiles in magazines, all ready to go with no assembly needed, located in five seperate spaces allowing a ship structure without large open spaces.

Rather like that idea, and having magazines able to handle 20ft long weapons , with span of 4.7ft and over 2,300lb each would allow quite a flexible space for new weaponry.

 

[uk 75]

I have often wondered what would have happened if the RN had emulated the Italian Navy in the 60s to 70s with the COUNTY ships designed to carry the ASTER Terrier Asroc launcher forward and 4 Sea Kings aft and a DARING class with guns forward and Tartar aft. The SHEFFIELD class would have been like the Dutch TROMP class or the cancelled Aussie DDLs. The Type 22s on the other hand would have Seawolf but T21s NATO BDPMS Sea Sparrow.

 

[Volkodav]

I have often wondered what would have happened if the RN had emulated the Italian Navy in the 60s to 70s with the COUNTY ships designed to carry the ASTER Terrier Asroc launcher forward and 4 Sea Kings aft and a DARING class with guns forward and Tartar aft. The SHEFFIELD class would have been like the Dutch TROMP class or the cancelled Aussie DDLs. The Type 22s on the other hand would have Seawolf but T21s NATO BDPMS Sea Sparrow.

One of the possibilities is if the RN had built the missile cruisers instead of the Counties the plan for the type was to replace two of the four Mk6 3" twins with Tartar, meaning a 70s upgrade for the type could have seen the suppression of Seaslug in favour of a large heli deck and hanger combined with the replacement of Tartar with Standard SM1. The other factor with the choice of the GW cruiser over the DLG is hull numbers meaning that if more than four GW ships were required either the Escort Cruiser would have to proceed, or a DDG / FFG would have to be built or converted. Apparently Tartar conversions of both the Daring and Battle classes were considered for Australia but why not the RN too? Alternatively a Tartar armed Super Daring or Type 12 M could have proceeded.

 

[Weaver]

Reading all this with interest. For anybody wondering about Tony's original article, the link in his original post is broken, but here's the new link to it:

http://www.quarryhs.co.uk/AltRN.pdf

 

[Purpletrouble]

Firstly the RN has to decide if it wants carriers and why. In real life, tying them to an overseas policy that proved rather ephemeral, easily changeable and was never going to be intrinsic in the way that NATO was, was a major mistake. Whether or not the RAF moved Australia - the key point is why did the RN's justification for such vastly expensive and budget distorting assets centre on Australia? I like Australia I really do, and I even like Australians, but in all honesty it is not, never has been and never will be, the centrepiece of major parts of our defence budget. I know in the 60s we were trying to relive the 20s/30s with the Far East thing, but India had gone, didn't want our number, and we hadn't be able to do it even when we were much larger and wealthier.

However, given UK carriers were only just survivable (were they even that?) East of Suez against 2nd/3rd rate opposition perhaps explains why they didn't seriously try them against the Russians in the way the USN did. Which of course has survived attempts to gut it the way the UK didn't.

Assuming one can come up with a cogent argument for Brit carriers and that they are fundamental to NATO in the same way as BAOR / Strike Command - and elsewhere is just a massive benefit in flexibility - then things rather change for the better.

Granted, with Polaris/SSNs that's 3 large projects, at a time when the Army was on, what, 0 large projects (FV432?) and the RAF down to 1 (TSR2).

But in terms of surface ships,
1) Go all GT with the T82 generation, i.e. whatever you build after County/Leander. This will restore (more likely merely sustain) your active fleet of hulls just due to availability, and also ease your manning crisis (thus helping keep the carriers - a major concern for 2SL at the time and he commented as being a lot easier when they were chopped!)
2) Don't build a cruiser. You're already struggling for hull numbers due to carrier/subs, County DLGs show the way to have a bit of everything and that the Cruiser-Destroyer category has merged, as you know full well from 10 years earlier with the 5" cruiser-destroyer project you should have built instead of completing Tigers and which would have segway'd nicely into Sea Slug armed ships with flexibility of what was armed with what when, rather than waiting until the early 60s for the first ones to complete.
3) Don't build any more Leanders. Stop at 16 or 18 or 20 or whatever, not 26. they are completely obsolete, but will provide your Tier 2 capability for the best part of 2 decades as you need.
4) 2 types is about the most you can consider simultaneously, both for building infra and design capacity.
5) One needs your best SAM system.
6) One needs your best ASW systems.
7) Don't bother with a cheapo gunboat T19/21. you are a 1st rate Navy that expects all ships to go in harm's way. Whenever you do that (purposely 2nd rate ships) they get sunk and people die. It's never worked before, and doesn't work now (LCS and probably T31). Make the argument to NATO if you need to that you are smaller but much better - after all even the real T42/T22 fleet vs T12/14/15/16/41/61/81 is a huge leap across the board. No-one else stumps up properly anyway. Plus as per (3) you've got Leanders.
8) So, an all GT T82 with Sea Dart, gun and helo, fit SSMs as they become available.
10) (and), A (large) Leander successor with ASW helos and SSMs.
11) Try to resist the idea of rebuilding the Leanders and just flog them off/use them for other tasks. There should be lots of interest.

If all else fails, copy the Dutch. They consistently built excellent ships.

 

[jpphoopha]

The possibility of this argument is only entertained when the gyrodyne is given range performance it doesn’t have. What is possible today with the JHX demonstrator is only realistic thanks to 50 years of gas turbine, gearing, flight controls and aero structure developments. With 1950-80s technology VTOL airlifters just aren’t competitive because they can’t carry the payload and the fuel to make them useful.

In its day, the Rotodyne was greatly superior to any other form of VTOL transport, and if it had "taken off" and become an established technology, then today it would also be benefiting from 50 years of technical development.

A factor which gets overlooked all too often when discussing Rotodyne, IMHO. The Rotodyne of today would be comparable or superior to the V-22 of today.

The Rotodyne of 1962 is superior to the MV-22 of today.

 

[Croatian Sailor]

A few questions:

a) was Ikara really so much superior to ASROC that the RN used her (or they simply lacked USDs to buy ASROC)

b) if ASROC range (about 10 km) was really so inadequate, why didn't the USN try to improve it somehow, by, say adding a larger/better booster, or cruise wings and/or data link to better direct the missile?

c) if Ikara was really that good, why the RN didn't fit her on T22 and later models, while VL ASROC is still in use by the RN?

 

[CV12Hornet]

a) was Ikara really so much superior to ASROC that the RN used her (or they simply lacked USDs to buy ASROC)

It had double the range and actual onboard guidance, so yes.

b) if ASROC range (about 10 km) was really so inadequate, why didn't the USN try to improve it somehow, by, say adding a larger/better booster, or cruise wings and/or data link to better direct the missile?

ASROC was de facto replaced on USN ships in the 1970s by LAMPS helicopters, thanks to studies done during the design period for the Perry-class frigates indicating that ASROC added very little to the SQS-26/LAMPS combination. By the time thinking turned back to such weapons, development was focused on the much more capable Sea Lance, and then the still significantly more capable VL-ASROC.

c) if Ikara was really that good, why the RN didn't fit her on T22 and later models, while VL ASROC is still in use by the RN?

Because Ikara was a destroyer weapon and the Type 22s were scaled up from an Ikara-less frigate rather than scaled down from an Ikara destroyer. Also, I have to imagine the RN reached similar conclusions to the USN on the marginal utility of Ikara on a ship with an ASW helicopter and modern sonar.

 

[Dilandu]

a) was Ikara really so much superior to ASROC that the RN used her (or they simply lacked USDs to buy ASROC)

She was superior in terms of range and accuracy - since it was guided in flight (while ASROC was merely a ballistic weapon in flight). But it was also MUCH more complex and heavier than ASROC.

b) if ASROC range (about 10 km) was really so inadequate, why didn't the USN try to improve it somehow, by, say adding a larger/better booster, or cruise wings and/or data link to better direct the missile?

Largerly because they didn't view it as inadequate. The USN anti-sub defense have three tiers: short range (provided by 324-mm torpedoes), intermediate range (provided by ASROC) and long range (providdd firstly by DASH drone, then by LAMPS helicopter).

From American point of view, ASROC was doing exactly what it was supposed to do - provide intermediate range anti-sub capability - and trying to increase its range would simply not be cost-effecive. It would not provide any standoff capabilty against Soviet missile-armed submarines anyway.

c) if Ikara was really that good, why the RN didn't fit her on T22 and later models, while VL ASROC is still in use by the RN?

Because it was bulky and maintenance-demanding weapon, with complex magazie and launcher. The RN version was even worse in that matter, because while Australiad employed the "sealed round" concept (i.e. missiles were only serviced on bases, not on ships themsevles), the British insisted on being capable to run missiles maintenance in sea.

 

[Rule of cool]

Ikara/ASROC is very much an issue of timing. They entered service in ~1961 and were all weather delivery systems giving surface ships greater ASW reach when the Limbo depth charge mortar was common and lightweight ASW torpedos were somewhat new.

In contrast the DASH ASW drone and Westland Wasp light helicopter entered service in 1963 and these are reasonable weather only, limited availability torpedo delivery systems. The helicopter and it's handling on small ships needed to evolve significantly before these ASW missiles were no longer needed in new ships.

 

[Rule of cool]

I've had a bit of a read over this thread and there is much love an early VLS Sea Dart and Sea Wolf.

Is VLS practical or technically possible before electronics allowed SAMs to have simple autopilots that gave them the ability to be fired into a 'basket' in the air and forgotten until the terminal phase? IIUC Sea Dart and Standard of the 60s and 70s had to be guided from the rail to the target, so a vertically launched Sea Dart/Standard would have to be guided by its tracking radar straight up then turned onto the target. I don't know if this is practical and/or technically possible in the 70s.

 

[Dilandu]

Is VLS practical or technically possible before electronics allowed SAMs to have simple autopilots that gave them the ability to be fired into a 'basket' in the air and forgotten until the terminal phase? IIUC Sea Dart and Standard of the 60s and 70s had to be guided from the rail to the target, so a vertically launched Sea Dart/Standard would have to be guided by its tracking radar straight up then turned onto the target. I don't know if this is practical and/or technically possible in the 70s.

Generally not. To elaborate:

* Launching the missile vertically would require more powerful booster (since aerodynamic lifting force would be nonexistent) and thus VL missile in 1960s would be even bigger and heavier;

* It would be rather hard to fit a big subsonic fins - required to stabilize missile during boost - into vertical launch system, and opening fins in flight would create additional complexity;

* Turning the missile into required direction after exiting the VLC would require a special control system (programmable autopilot, or external guidance) specifically for this. And 1960s electronics is bulky and heavy.

* There would be significant problems with gathering missile into guidance beam for beam-riding and command-guided systems, since the missile boost trajectory would not be aligned with the guidance beam;

* It would be very problematic to ensure than spent booster would not fell on someone's head (and 1950-1960s boosters were heavy enought to consider it a major problem - Talos even have special circuits in its fire control system, that calculated and visualized the booster falling zone, so operator could check for safety & manually adjust it in case booster falling dangerously close to other ship);

* Replenishing missiles in sea, as well as servicing them in sea would be a major headache for vertical launch system;

So to put it simply - it was extremely impractical.

 

[zen]

I've had a bit of a read over this thread and there is much love an early VLS Sea Dart and Sea Wolf.

Is VLS practical or technically possible before electronics allowed SAMs to have simple autopilots that gave them the ability to be fired into a 'basket' in the air and forgotten until the terminal phase? IIUC Sea Dart and Standard of the 60s and 70s had to be guided from the rail to the target, so a vertically launched Sea Dart/Standard would have to be guided by its tracking radar straight up then turned onto the target. I don't know if this is practical and/or technically possible in the 70s.

So several thoughts.
VL SAM concepts go at least back to Germany during WWII.
In the similar time frame early Seaslug did look at this, but the potential delay it added to a priority program was unacceptable.

VL for weapons like Thunderbird and Bloodhound was possible, and under Command Guidance able to be slewed to target after launch.

The main issues to resolve the then approach to VL and it's imposition of greater minimum ranges. The latter troubled the NIGS effort to the point of separate high and low angle launchers being a solution.
NIGS worked towards separate missile and target tracking radars. Which would have assisted this.

But Sea Dart as built didn't get autopilot for Command Guidance.
Only the expanded versions, which never were developed had that option.

So had Sea Dart gained that, in a Big Dart version, then VLS starts to make sense.

But again likely needed missile tracking radars and unless we're getting ASWRE C-band 3D radar, which allows smaller, lighter, TIR sets....then we're stuck with big heavy Desertcar (Type 909)

 

[Dilandu]

VL SAM concepts go at least back to Germany during WWII.

I say it's a VERY big stretch.

VL for weapons like Thunderbird and Bloodhound was possible, and under Command Guidance able to be slewed to target after launch.

It would require developing such kind of guidance first & fitting essentially the additional guidance block into missile. And for what reason? The land-based SAM's have much less space problem than naval ones; there are no practical reason NOT to simply use trainable launchers.

The main issues to resolve the then approach to VL and it's imposition of greater minimum ranges.

The main problem is why the hell land-based SAM in 1960s might even need a vertical launch?

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

I produced this scenario a while back, and am posting a link to it here for the ideas to be kicked around: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk/Alternative RN.htm

When is the Point of Departure for this?

 

[Rule of cool]

Generally not. To elaborate:

* Launching the missile vertically would require more powerful booster (since aerodynamic lifting force would be nonexistent) and thus VL missile in 1960s would be even bigger and heavier;

* It would be rather hard to fit a big subsonic fins - required to stabilize missile during boost - into vertical launch system, and opening fins in flight would create additional complexity;

* Turning the missile into required direction after exiting the VLC would require a special control system (programmable autopilot, or external guidance) specifically for this. And 1960s electronics is bulky and heavy.

* There would be significant problems with gathering missile into guidance beam for beam-riding and command-guided systems, since the missile boost trajectory would not be aligned with the guidance beam;

* It would be very problematic to ensure than spent booster would not fell on someone's head (and 1950-1960s boosters were heavy enought to consider it a major problem - Talos even have special circuits in its fire control system, that calculated and visualized the booster falling zone, so operator could check for safety & manually adjust it in case booster falling dangerously close to other ship);

* Replenishing missiles in sea, as well as servicing them in sea would be a major headache for vertical launch system;

So to put it simply - it was extremely impractical.

I thought as much, while British politicians and other influential people could be very short sighted the technology people had no problem conforming to best practice or state of the art when given the opportunity. While they often had to work with somewhat arbitrary limitations their designs were still the result of thoughtful deliberation of requirements and trade-offs.

 

[Rule of cool]

But again likely needed missile tracking radars and unless we're getting ASWRE C-band 3D radar, which allows smaller, lighter, TIR sets....then we're stuck with big heavy Desertcar (Type 909)

Or the Type 988, although I still think the Type 909 was needed for missile illumination even though the 988 replaced the 965 and 992.

 

[Dilandu]

I thought as much, while British politicians and other influential people could be very short sighted the technology people had no problem conforming to best practice or state of the art when given the opportunity. While they often had to work with somewhat arbitrary limitations their designs were still the result of thoughtful deliberation of requirements and trade-offs.

Yep. In 1950-1960s, there simply weren't much reasons to use vertical launch systems. They complicated things greatly, while advantages weren't exactly significant. For example, fast rate of fire simply could not be used with tube-based electronics; tubes need time to warm up, so the missiles would only be ready to launch when their tubes would warm up.

 

[Rule of cool]

Yep. In 1950-1960s, there simply weren't much reasons to use vertical launch systems. They complicated things greatly, while advantages weren't exactly significant. For example, fast rate of fire simply could not be used with tube-based electronics; tubes need time to warm up, so the missiles would only be ready to launch when their tubes would warm up.

I read that the British were surprised the Dutch chose the Tartar over the Sea Dart as it took 30 seconds to react whereas the Sea Dart only took 12.

 

[Dilandu]

I read that the British were surprised the Dutch chose the Tartar over the Sea Dart as it took 30 seconds to react whereas the Sea Dart only took 12.

Weight & complexity considerations won eventually; the Tartar was much more compact and Mk-13 GMLS was mechanically simple and reliable. And ammo capacity was significantly better, too; the Tromp-class frigates carried 40 missiles, while Type 42 destroyers only 22.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

When is the Point of Departure for this?

For what it's worth I think it should be February 1966. That is, the day after the cancellation of CVA.01 and the phasing out of the existing strike carriers by 1975 was announced.

I can think of more than a few changes to OTL. However, they require:

• The spending more money, which requires the British economy to be in better shape.
  • And/or.
• Britain's arms industry to be capable of delivering equipment on time & at cost or at least not-as-late & not as over budget.
  • And/or.
• The products of the British arms industry to work properly first time.

Which will upset more than a few people.

 

[Rule of cool]

Which will upset more than a few people.

It sure will!!!!

 

[GK Dundas]

Ikara/ASROC is very much an issue of timing. They entered service in ~1961 and were all weather delivery systems giving surface ships greater ASW reach when the Limbo depth charge mortar was common and lightweight ASW torpedos were somewhat new.

In contrast the DASH ASW drone and Westland Wasp light helicopter entered service in 1963 and these are reasonable weather only, limited availability torpedo delivery systems. The helicopter and it's handling on small ships needed to evolve significantly before these ASW missiles were no longer needed in new ships.

I seem to recall that the RCN viewed both the helicopter and ASROC as complimentary systems.
You can have only so many helicopters in the air and they can only be in so many places at any one time.Also ASROC could be used irregardless of the time of day or weather.
The Canadian solution was that each Helicopter equipped frigate was paired with a ASROC equipped frigate.

 

[Rule of cool]

I seem to recall that the RCN viewed both the helicopter and ASROC as complimentary systems.
You can have only so many helicopters in the air and they can only be in so many places at any one time.Also ASROC could be used irregardless of the time of day or weather.
The Canadian solution was that each Helicopter equipped frigate was paired with a ASROC equipped frigate.

I consider Canada to be a special case, sure some ASROC frigates that didn't get converted for helicopters, but their great leap forward was the operation of the big and highly capable Sea King from small frigates. They pioneered the Beartrap helicopter haul-down and stowage system for flying helicopters is filthy seas, combined with the long-range, hunter-killer Sea King (as opposed to a simple torpedo dropping helicopter) gave them unmatched capability for a long time.

I'm aware this picture isn't a Sea King, but this is the sort of helicopter operating conditions the Canadians pioneered.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Message 142.

When is the Point of Departure for this?

Message 148.

For what it's worth I think it should be February 1966. That is, the day after the cancellation of CVA.01 and the phasing out of the existing strike carriers by 1975 was announced.

I can think of more than a few changes to OTL. However, they require:

• The spending more money, which requires the British economy to be in better shape.
  • And/or.
• Britain's arms industry to be capable of delivering equipment on time & at cost or at least not-as-late & not as over budget.
  • And/or.
• The products of the British arms industry to work properly first time.

Which will upset more than a few people.

Part 1 - The Point of Departure​

As written in Message 148, the POD is, Wednesday, the 23rd of February, 1966, the day after the 1966 Defence White Paper was published. The defence cuts of 1967 and 1968 still happen so British forces still withdraw from "East of Suez" at the end of 1971. However, the Mason Defence Review of 1974-75 and Knott Defence Review of 1981 didn't happen ITTL with the result that HM Forces were maintained at their early 1970s strengths until the early 1990s.

The above was possible for the reasons given in Message 148. They actually came into effect from from Friday, 16th October, 1966, the day after the First Wilson Government was elected, but the improvement over OTL was gradual and wasn't tangible until the turn of the decade.

The improvement in the economy may mean that the Labour Party won the General Election held on 18th June 1970 IOTL too. If so, Harold Wilson still be succeeded as Prime Minister by James Callaghan on 5th April 1976 and Edward Heath will still be replaced as Leader of the Opposition by Margaret Thatcher on 11th February 1975. I don't know when Roy Mason will succeed Dennis Healey as Secretary of State for Defence. The Silly Billy* will become Chancellor of the Exchequer either in June 1970 or as IOTL on 4th March 1974. The Conservatives under Margaret Thatcher still win the General Election held on 3rd May 1979.

* That's a Mike Yarwood reference.

 

[Croatian Sailor]

http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk/Alternative RN.htm

The link isn't working.