Alternative Royal Navy during the Interwar period

[NOMISYRRUC]

This is a revised version of Post 141 in the thread "A single seat fighter for the Fleet Air Arm?" on alternatehistory.com.

Alternative Blackburn Skua.

• In common with the Real-Skua the first of two prototypes made its first flight on 09.02.37. Although I want both to be powered by Bristol Hercules engines that may not be possible and therefore would still have been powered by Bristol Mercury engines. They were designated the Skua Mk I.
• However, the first production aircraft, which made its first flight on 28.08.38, was powered by a Bristol Hercules engine producing 1,290hp instead of a Bristol Perseus engine producing 890hp. As it was intended to be a dive-bomber first and a fighter second, the fixed armament was still four 0.303in machine guns, but the extra 400hp may have allowed it to carry more than 500lb of bombs. This aircraft was designated the Skua Mk II.
• In common with the Real-Skua Mk II, production of the ALT-Skua Mk II ceased in March 1940. However, production of the ALT-Skua did not come to an end because the Mk II was replaced on the production lines by the Mk III powered by a Hercules engine rated at 1,500hp.

Alternative Blackburn Roc.

• There was no prototype as such and all of the 136 Real-Rocs were built by Boulton Paul.
• The first aircraft flew on 23.12.38 and production ended in August 1940.
• All other things being equal the ALT-Roc would have a Bristol Hercules producing 1,290hp instead of a Bristol Perseus engine producing 890hp. If production of the ALT-Roc had continued beyond that date in this "version of history" the aircraft delivered from August 1940 onwards would have been fitted with Hercules engines rated at 1,500hp.
• I have often thought that a Roc with a more powerful engine might make a half-decent torpedo-bomber. However, it duplicates the ALT-Albacore and I'd prefer to have more ALT-Skuas built by Boulton Paul instead of the ALT-Roc.

Alternative Fairey Albacore.

• In common with the Real-Albacore this aircraft entered service with the FAA in March 1940.
• The difference was that it is a monoplane powered by a Bristol Hercules engine.
• Think of it as a Hercules powered Barracuda.
• The version in service in 1940 had a Hercules engine rated at 1,500hp and in common wit the Super Roc & Skua later marks had more powerful Hercules engines.

Alternative Fairey Fulmar.

• In common with the Real-Fulmar this aircraft entered service with the FAA in June 1940.
• The Real-Fulmar was built to a specification issued in 1938 and was a modification of the Fairey P.4/34 which in turn was built to a specification issued in 1934.
• However, the ALT-Fulmar was a new aircraft built to a specification issued in 1935 or 1936.
• It was still a two-seat fighter, but it was powered by a Bristol Hercules engine, think of it as a Hercules powered Fairey Firefly.
• The version in service in 1940 has a Hercules engine rated at 1,500hp and in common wit the ALT-Albacore, Super Roc & Skua later marks had more powerful Hercules engines.
• I want all marks of the ALT-Fulmar to be armed with four 20mm cannon. However, the version in service from mid-1940 to mid-1941 may be armed with twelve 0.303in machine guns instead.

In the "Real World" the Bristol Hercules first ran in January 1936 and the first aircraft Hercules powered aircraft were the Saro Lerwick GR flying boat and the Short S.26 airliner in the second half of 1939. However, I think that can be improved upon in this "version of history" on account of HMG spending a lot more money on the RAF, FAA and Civil Aviation in the period 1922-36 due to the Geddes Axe not happening. Amongst the results of that were more R&D being done by HMG & industry over those years and a bigger aviation industry in the middle of the 1930s. Therefore, Bristol would have been a bigger firm in the middle of the 1930s with the resources to put a Hercules engine producing 1,300hp into production in the second half of 1938 instead of the second half of 1939.

 

[EwenS]

What books do you recommend, then?

On the development of naval aviation in the RN?

"British Carrier Aviation" by Norman Friedman for the development of the ships and aircraft from the earliest days of naval aviation through to the 1980s
"Naval Policy Between the Wars" Vol I & II by Roskill has chapters on The Naval Aviation Controversy throughout the inter-war period.

David Hobbs, a former FAA pilot & curator of the Fleet Air Arm Museum, has published many books on the history of naval aviation in Britain from its earliest days including:-
"The Royal Navy's Air Service in the Great War"
"The Dawn of Carrier Strike - And the World of Lieutenant W P Lucy DSO RN" about the inter war to 1940 period
"The Fleet Air Arm and the War in Europe 1939-1945"
"Taranto and Naval Air Warfare in the Mediterranean, 1940-45"
"The British Pacific Fleet - The Royal Navy's Most Powerful Strike Force"
"The British Carrier Strike Fleet after 1945"
"British Aircraft Carriers"
"A Century of Carrier Aviation"

Also other Friedman works like:-
"Carrier Air Power"
"Fighters over the Fleet - Naval Air Defence from Biplanes to the Cold War"

These two titles are good as they compare and contrast aspects of naval aviation development through the years.

"US Carriers - An Illustrated Design History"

As for Japan there are plenty of sources covering individual ship classes and aircraft. The various quarterly & annual "Warship" publications running since the early 1980s contain articles on Japanese carriers. Back copies are generally expensive to acquire. You will find an index here.

Warship (Journal) - The Dreadnought Project

dreadnoughtproject.org

That should give you a good grounding in the history and development of the ships, aircraft and tactics used in carrier warfare over the years.

 

[Scott Kenny]

This is a revised version of Post 141 in the thread "A single seat fighter for the Fleet Air Arm?" on alternatehistory.com.

Alternative Blackburn Skua.

• In common with the Real-Skua the first of two prototypes made its first flight on 09.02.37. Although I want both to be powered by Bristol Hercules engines that may not be possible and therefore would still have been powered by Bristol Mercury engines. They were designated the Skua Mk I.
• However, the first production aircraft, which made its first flight on 28.08.38, was powered by a Bristol Hercules engine producing 1,290hp instead of a Bristol Perseus engine producing 890hp. As it was intended to be a dive-bomber first and a fighter second, the fixed armament was still four 0.303in machine guns, but the extra 400hp may have allowed it to carry more than 500lb of bombs. This aircraft was designated the Skua Mk II.
• In common with the Real-Skua Mk II, production of the ALT-Skua Mk II ceased in March 1940. However, production of the ALT-Skua did not come to an end because the Mk II was replaced on the production lines by the Mk III powered by a Hercules engine rated at 1,500hp.

Alternative Blackburn Roc.

• There was no prototype as such and all of the 136 Real-Rocs were built by Boulton Paul.
• The first aircraft flew on 23.12.38 and production ended in August 1940.
• All other things being equal the ALT-Roc would have a Bristol Hercules producing 1,290hp instead of a Bristol Perseus engine producing 890hp. If production of the ALT-Roc had continued beyond that date in this "version of history" the aircraft delivered from August 1940 onwards would have been fitted with Hercules engines rated at 1,500hp.
• I have often thought that a Roc with a more powerful engine might make a half-decent torpedo-bomber. However, it duplicates the ALT-Albacore and I'd prefer to have more ALT-Skuas built by Boulton Paul instead of the ALT-Roc.

Alternative Fairey Albacore.

• In common with the Real-Albacore this aircraft entered service with the FAA in March 1940.
• The difference was that it is a monoplane powered by a Bristol Hercules engine.
• Think of it as a Hercules powered Barracuda.
• The version in service in 1940 had a Hercules engine rated at 1,500hp and in common wit the Super Roc & Skua later marks had more powerful Hercules engines.

Alternative Fairey Fulmar.

• In common with the Real-Fulmar this aircraft entered service with the FAA in June 1940.
• The Real-Fulmar was built to a specification issued in 1938 and was a modification of the Fairey P.4/34 which in turn was built to a specification issued in 1934.
• However, the ALT-Fulmar was a new aircraft built to a specification issued in 1935 or 1936.
• It was still a two-seat fighter, but it was powered by a Bristol Hercules engine, think of it as a Hercules powered Fairey Firefly.
• The version in service in 1940 has a Hercules engine rated at 1,500hp and in common wit the ALT-Albacore, Super Roc & Skua later marks had more powerful Hercules engines.
• I want all marks of the ALT-Fulmar to be armed with four 20mm cannon. However, the version in service from mid-1940 to mid-1941 may be armed with twelve 0.303in machine guns instead.

In the "Real World" the Bristol Hercules first ran in January 1936 and the first aircraft Hercules powered aircraft were the Saro Lerwick GR flying boat and the Short S.26 airliner in the second half of 1939. However, I think that can be improved upon in this "version of history" on account of HMG spending a lot more money on the RAF, FAA and Civil Aviation in the period 1922-36 due to the Geddes Axe not happening. Amongst the results of that were more R&D being done by HMG & industry over those years and a bigger aviation industry in the middle of the 1930s. Therefore, Bristol would have been a bigger firm in the middle of the 1930s with the resources to put a Hercules engine producing 1,300hp into production in the second half of 1938 instead of the second half of 1939.

I love the concepts, but this would be highly dependent on getting enough Hercules engines made for all those aircraft. Did Bristol have the production capacity to make that many?

I know that the RR Merlin required significant modifications to permit serious mass production without a Fitter going through and having to find parts the right size. As I understand it, RR allowed parts as machined a wide enough tolerance that you could not just grab the next 12 pistons off the assembly line and expect them to fit in the cylinders immediately. What Ford and Packard did was to make it so that parts as produced were completely interchangeable, instead of needing a Fitter to go through and pick and choose parts that did fit to a very tight as-assembled tolerance.

RR Merlins pre-redesign were essentially hand built blueprinted engines that had very tight tolerances. This gave them excellent performance, but took a lot longer to build and maintain. Think race car engine.
Packard Merlins post-redesign were modern mass produced production engines with looser tolerances. Think basic Ford or Chevy street car engine.

 

[Scott Kenny]

On the development of naval aviation in the RN?

(large list deletd for space) That should give you a good grounding in the history and development of the ships, aircraft and tactics used in carrier warfare over the years.

Thank you!

 

[A Tentative Fleet Plan]

I know that the RR Merlin required significant modifications to permit serious mass production without a Fitter going through and having to find parts the right size. As I understand it, RR allowed parts as machined a wide enough tolerance that you could not just grab the next 12 pistons off the assembly line and expect them to fit in the cylinders immediately. What Ford and Packard did was to make it so that parts as produced were completely interchangeable, instead of needing a Fitter to go through and pick and choose parts that did fit to a very tight as-assembled tolerance.

RR Merlins pre-redesign were essentially hand built blueprinted engines that had very tight tolerances. This gave them excellent performance, but took a lot longer to build and maintain. Think race car engine.
Packard Merlins post-redesign were modern mass produced production engines with looser tolerances. Think basic Ford or Chevy street car engine.

That's a myth which Calum Douglas has thoroughly debunked multiple times.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

I love the concepts, but this would be highly dependent on getting enough Hercules engines made for all those aircraft. Did Bristol have the production capacity to make that many?

It depends upon how many of the Alternative Skuas, Rocs, Albacores & Fulmars are made and upon how much larger than the "Real World" Bristol was in this "version of history".

Part One

Excluding prototypes, the numbers in the "Real World" were 190 Skuas, 135 Rocs, 800 Albacores and 600 Fulmars. That's at least 1,725 extra engines and according to its Wikipedia article 57,400 Hercules engines were built. Therefore, Bristol has to build at least 3% more if the number of ALT aircraft built was the same as the number of Real aircraft of these four types.

However, it would help that the due to "reasons" (see Post 41) the Hercules goes into production a year earlier in this "version of history" so it has more time to build the extra engines. It also helps that the Roc & Skua had Bristol Perseus engines and that the Albacore had a Bristol Taurus engine. Therefore, Bristol would be building 325 fewer Perseus & 800 fewer Taurus engines which would provide the capacity to build not all, but some of the 1,125 extra Hercules engines required for the ALT-Roc, ALT-Skua and ALT-Albacore.

I also thought that is Bristol couldn't built 1,725 extra Hercules engines it might be possible to play "musical engines". That is for example build 300 fewer Hercules powered Beaufighters to provide the engines for the 600 ALT-Fulmars and build 300 extra Merlin powered Beaufighters which would be fitted with the 600 Merlin engines used by the 600 Real-Fulmars.

Except, that I think more than 325 ALT-Rocs (instead of 190 Real Rocs & 135 Real Skuas), 800 ALT-Albacores and 600 ALT-Fulmars would have been built in this timeline. I also think that Bristol would have been able to make the extra Hercules engines. Part Two will explain why.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Aircraft Carriers and Naval Aviation
Part One
Aircraft Carriers 1921-35​

The Washington Naval Treaty

The Treaty was divided into three chapters.

CHAPTER I.-GENERAL PROVISIONS RELATING TO THE LIMITATION OF NAVAL ARMAMENT

Containing Articles I to XX of the Treaty.​

CHAPTER II.-RULES RELATING TO THE EXECUTION OF THE TREATY-DEFINITION OF TERMS

Which was divided into four parts.​

PART 1.-Capital Ships Which may Be Retained by the Contracting Powers​

PART 2.-Rules for Scrapping Vessels of War​

PART 3.-Replacement​

PART 4.-Definitions ​

CHAPTER III.-MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

Containing Articles XXI to XXIV of the Treaty.​

The parts of the Treaty that concern us are:

Chapter II, Part 4

An aircraft carrier is defined as a vessel of war with a displacement in excess of 10,000 tons (10,160 metric tons) standard displacement designed for the specific and exclusive purpose of carrying aircraft. It must be so constructed that aircraft can be launched therefrom and landed thereon, and not designed and constructed for carrying a more powerful armament than that allowed to it under Article IX or Article X as the case may be.

Paragraph One of Article IX

No aircraft carrier exceeding 27,000 tons (27,432 metric tons) standard displacement shall be acquired by, or constructed by, for or within the jurisdiction of, any of the Contracting Powers.

Part of Paragraph Two of Article IX

However, any of the Contracting Powers may, provided that its total tonnage allowance of aircraft carriers is not thereby exceeded, build not more than two aircraft carriers, each of a tonnage of not more than 33,000 tons (33,528 metric tons) standard displacement, and in order to effect economy any of the Contracting Powers may use for this purpose any two of their ships, whether constructed or in course of construction, which would otherwise be scrapped under the provisions of Article II. ...

Article VII

The total tonnage for aircraft carriers of each of the Contracting Powers shall not exceed in standard displacement, for the United States 135,000 tons (137,160 metric tons); for the British Empire 135,000 tons (137,160 metric tons); for France 60,000 tons (60,960 metric tons); for Italy 60,000 tons (60,960 metric tons); for Japan 81,000 tons (82,296 metric tons).

Chapter II, Part 3, Section I - Rules for Replacement

(a) Capital ships and aircraft carriers twenty years after the date of their completion may, except as otherwise provided in Article VIII and in the tables in Section II of this Part, be replaced by new construction, but within the limits prescribed in Article IV and Article VII. The keels of such new construction may, except as otherwise provided in Article VIII and in the tables in Section II of this Part, be laid down not earlier than seventeen years from the date of completion of the tonnage to be replaced, provided, however, that no capital ship tonnage, with the exception of the ships referred to in the third paragraph of Article II, and the replacement tonnage specifically mentioned in Section II of this Part, shall be laid down until ten years from November 12, 1921.

Article VIII

The replacement of aircraft carriers shall be effected only as prescribed in Chapter II, Part 3, provided, however, that all aircraft carrier tonnage in existence or building on November 12, 1921, shall be considered experimental, and may be replaced, within the total tonnage limit prescribed in Article VII, without regard to its age.

The Royal Navy's Aircraft Carrier Force at November 12, 1921

At that time the Royal Navy had two Aircraft Carriers plus two more were under construction. They were:

• Argus (14,000 tons) the World's first flush-deck Aircraft Carrier which was completed in September 1918.
• Furious (22,450 tons) a Light Battle Cruiser, completed in June 1917 with flying-off deck, which was converted into a flush-deck Aircraft Carrier 1921-25.
• Hermes (10,850 tons) which would be completed in May 1923.
• Eagle (22,600 tons) which would be completed in February 1924.

They had a total standard displacement (according to Lenton & Colledge) of 69,900 tons and according to Article VIII of the Treaty were experimental, and could be replaced (within the total tonnage limit prescribed in Article VII) without regard to their age.

There was also Vindictive (a converted Cavendish class Cruiser) which was commissioned October 1918 with flying-off deck forward and landing-on deck aft, but as she displaced less than 10,000 tons wasn't subject to the terms of the Treaty because according to Part 4 she wasn't an Aircraft Carrier. According to "The Squadrons and Units of the Fleet Air Arm" by Theo Ballance, Lee Howard & Ray Sturtivant she was obsolete by 1920 and according to the same source was converted back into Cavendish class Cruiser 1923-25 and was the first RN Cruiser with catapult gear. However, the source also says that the catapult and all aviation facilities removed in August 1928.

What the Admiralty wanted to do

Convert the Light Battle Cruisers Courageous and Glorious (which went into Reserve at the end of 1919) into Aircraft Carriers (which after their conversions displaced 22,500 tons each). This would have given the Royal Navy six Aircraft Carriers of 114,900 tons which was 20,100 tons short of the 135,000 tons of Aircraft Carriers that the British Empire was allowed by the Treaty.

The Admiralty also wanted to build four 17,000 ton Aircraft Carriers which would be laid down at the rate of one every three or four years 1924-35 and be completed 1928-38. Three of these ships would replace Argus, Eagle and Hermes, which as already related could be replaced without regard to their age.

Thus the Royal Navy would have had seven Aircraft Carriers at the end of 1938 consisting of the three converted Light Battle Cruisers (displacing about 22,500 tons each) and the four ships of the 17,000 ton type.

What happened

Courageous and Glorious were converted into Aircraft Carriers (1924-28 and 1924-30 respectively) at a cost of about £2 million each. However, none of the four 17,000 ton Aircraft Carriers were built.

The only new ship built in this period was the 22,000 ton Ark Royal, which was built under the 1934-35 Navy Estimates, laid down in 1935, launched in 1937 and completed in 1938. Her Vote 8 cost was £3,750,000.

Thus the Royal Navy actually had seven aircraft carriers in 1939 consisting of Argus, Ark Royal, Courageous, Eagle, Furious, Glorious and Hermes which (according to Lenton & College) could carry 257 aircraft. Except that Argus had been converted into a Depot Ship for Queen Bee target drones and Furious was serving as the deck landing training ship without aircraft.

And now for the wishful thinking.

As the Navy Estimates were about £24 million (43%) more than Our Timeline (OTL) in This Timeline (ITTL) from 1922-23 to 1935-36 there was more than enough money to build four Aircraft Carriers in the period 1924-38 instead of the one ship that was built IOTL.

However, due to hindsight and wishful thinking I want to do is build six 22,500 ton Aircraft Carriers (with a total displacement of 135,000 tons) at the rate of one every two years from 1924 which would complete 1928-38 as follows:

• The 1924 Carrier would be completed in 1928 instead of converting Courageous into an Aircraft Carrier.
• The 1926 Carrier would be completed in 1930 instead of converting Glorious into an Aircraft Carrier.
• The 1928 Carrier would be completed in 1932 and replace Argus which would be converted into a Depot Ship.
• The 1930 Carrier would be completed in 1934 and replace Eagle which would be converted into a Depot Ship.
• The 1932 Carrier would be completed in 1936 and replace Hermes which would be converted into a Seaplane Carrier.
• The 1934 Carrier would be completed in 1938 and replace Furious. This ship would be built in place of the OTL Ark Royal.

I want them to be modifications of the OTL Ark Royal. That is instead of the three double deck lifts in the centre that it had in the real would there would be one lift forward, one aft and one in the centre. However, as the ships were built over a period of about a decade and a half they would not form a single class. They would be more like Aircraft Carrier equivalents to the A-to-I classes of Destroyer.

Each ship would cost about £4 million to build. Therefore, the total cost would be £24 million from which we can deduct the £8 million that was spent on the OTL Ark Royal, Courageous and Glorious, which means a net increase of £16 million over the fourteen financial years 1924-25 to 1937-38. The running cost of the ships would be greater due to them having larger crews and carrying more aircraft but @Username666 had allowed us more than enough money to pay those expenses.

However, if the tonnage quotas still come to an end at the end of 1936 there would be no need to scrap Furious in 1938 to make way for the 1934 Carrier.

The result would have been a Royal Navy with seven Aircraft Carriers in September 1939, which was the same number as In Our Timeline (IOTL), but the quality of the Force would have been considerably improved as there would have been six ships of the 22,500 ton type & Furious which could carry 465 aircraft instead of Argus, Ark Royal, Courageous, Eagle, Furious, Glorious and Hermes which (according to Lenton & College) could carry 257 aircraft.

Furthermore, the tonnage quotas became a dead letter when the Second London Naval Treaty was signed so it might have been possible to keep Hermes as an Aircraft Carrier instead of converting her into a Seaplane Carrier in 1936 to make way for the 1932 Carrier. If it was possible there would have been eight Aircraft Carriers in September 1939 which could carry 480 aircraft instead of the seven ships which were able to carry 257 aircraft IOTL.

 

[Hood]

I think you are over-cooking it a bit on the wishful thinking. Ark Royal designed in 1924? About as fanciful as building Malta in 1938.

You have to remember that early carriers were prototypes well into the 1930s.
The key date was 1931 when it was realised that fitting arrester gear allowed a deck park to increase capacity - they looked at adding 12 aircraft to Eagle in this way. The prototype traverse arrester gear was fitted to Courageous in 1932, the first production safety barrier only in 1939! Again, it was not until 1931 that the accelerator (or catapult) was seriously considered and developed.

The first double-hangar proto-Ark Royal sketched up for the RN was in 1931, not until 1934 did the design gain three lifts.

I agree that the early 16,500, 17,200 tons and 25,000 ton designs were all flawed - hangar heights were too low, capacity barely over 30 aircraft, messing around trying to put 8in guns on the bigger carrier, insistence that forward flying off decks were very handy. If you consider Courageous and Glorious to be sub-optimal it's hard to see how a new-build design could be much better given the designers would likely repeat the same mistakes and a lot of key equipment just wasn't there for reliable carrier operations until the mid-30s.


My wishlist would be:
- Rebuild Courageous and Glorious but with a flush deck to the bows
- Building at least one of those 17,200 ton carriers in the late 1920s, probably the 1926 or 1927 Programme to complete in 1929/30 to replace Argus. (In my world with a more restricted budget I'd still back cruiser construction as my priority at this stage).
- Making sure the proto Ark Royal (2 lifts, 4.7in guns) gets on the 1931 or 1932 Programme (damn the Depression! full steam ahead!) to complete in 1934/35 and replacing Eagle or Furious - but most probably Eagle.
- Ark Royal as historical.
- I'd like to squeeze in another Ark if I could before the Armoureds take over. Whether or not to go with Illustrious is a vexed question but with my Admiral's hat on I'd feel more comfortable about building an armoured carrier for North Sea operations knowing that I have five large fast carriers already at my disposal (3 Sisters, Proto-Ark, Ark and ArkSecundus - something like 290/300 aircraft) and a couple of trade protection carriers (Hermes and Hermes 2.0) so that I could afford to lay down four armoureds for the Home Fleet and allowing the big flatops to form up the Eastern Fleet.

 

[CV12Hornet]

- Rebuild Courageous and Glorious but with a flush deck to the bows

Unfortunately, it's to my understanding that the reason this wasn't done was that there wasn't enough buoyancy on the bow to handle the flight deck extension. A hidden cost of converting the large lights.

 

[Scott Kenny]

What the Admiralty wanted to do​

Convert the Light Battle Cruisers Courageous and Glorious (which went into Reserve at the end of 1919) into Aircraft Carriers (which after their conversions displaced 22,500 tons each). This would have given the Royal Navy six Aircraft Carriers of 114,900 tons which was 20,100 tons short of the 135,000 tons of Aircraft Carriers that the British Empire was allowed by the Treaty.

The Admiralty also wanted to build four 17,000 ton Aircraft Carriers which would be laid down at the rate of one every three or four years 1924-35 and be completed 1928-38. Three of these ships would replace Argus, Eagle and Hermes, which as already related could be replaced without regard to their age.

Thus the Royal Navy would have had seven Aircraft Carriers at the end of 1938 consisting of the three converted Light Battle Cruisers (displacing about 22,500 tons each) and the four ships of the 17,000 ton type.

Just doing this would have been a good start...

 

[A Tentative Fleet Plan]

Building four 17,000 ton carriers means no Ark Royal, no Illustrious class, and no designs to base Indomitable and the Implacables on (although ships like them may have been laid down as the Treaty system collapsed, too late for much of the Second World War).

 

[Hood]

The RN at that time seemed torn on how to achieve a mass air attack - either a few large carriers or more smaller carriers.
Given they lacked catapults, arrester gear, safety barriers and all the rest of the stuff it seemed like a safer move to have more decks in case something fouled up - which is why they loved the whole bow take-off ramp idea.
Then (as I say above) around 1931 all the things start to align and big carriers look a safer bet.

Plus there was the fear of losing a carrier if an enemy cruiser penetrated the screen so they felt obliged to stick a battery of 5.5in guns in just to be safe.
The 17,000 ton designs were sub optimal, one would be a decent replacement for Argus but you wouldn't want to sacrifice any of the 'Weird Sisters' for them.
There was also a brief flirtation with building one or two 33,000 ton carriers! Not sure how that would have worked out. Plus it would have had 8in turrets like Lex and Akagi - not that that would necessarily be bad in some scenarios, after all Glorious found itself run down by battlecruisers, not that 8in guns would have done much to even the fight but it was proof that in European waters things could get hairy.
22,000 tons seems the sweet spot in this scenario.

Unfortunately, it's to my understanding that the reason this wasn't done was that there wasn't enough buoyancy on the bow to handle the flight deck extension. A hidden cost of converting the large lights.

Fair enough, its not a deal breaker for me.
Though I don't want to be shuffling off Flycatchers off the front end for a decade, in my AU dreams the RN needs to get into gear and get one of the many interwar fighter prototypes into service sooner.

 

[A Tentative Fleet Plan]

If only the three incomplete Admirals had hung around for a little longer there's some potential for a good conversion there.

 

[PMN1]

IIRC, the RN did have some form of arrestor gear but it was longitudinal to stop aircraft going over the edge of the flight deck??

 

[EwenS]

If only the three incomplete Admirals had hung around for a little longer there's some potential for a good conversion there.

The other 3 Admirals were nowhere near as complete as is sometimes suggested. Last time this subject came up on a forum I posted this:-


Ian Johnston, author of “The Battleship Builders”, wrote an article in Warship 2015 based on a visit to the former Fairfield yard, now BAe Govan. In that he noted that the various post Jutland design changes meant that

“...Rodney could not rise much above her double bottom while this redesign was underway, although the erection of engine and boiler room bulkheads gave some indication of the ship she could have been.” He then continued after noting that shipbuilding was fully stretched in 1917 “...At Fairfield, several thousand tons of Rodney was sterilised on the berth in the hope that she would eventually be restarted.....The situation was largely unchanged during the following year, mainly because of insufficient labour...”.

Hood’s hull alone weighed over 14,000 tons. So it would seem there was a lot of steelwork still to erect let alone armour and machinery to be fitted. The QE class took some 12-18 months from laying down to launch for a hull that weighed 60% as much. Rodney was laid down in Oct 1916. I am exceedingly sceptical that she could have been launched within one month of being suspended in March 1917, ie 6 months after being laid down.

Both Fairfield and Cammell Laird were keen to get these slips cleared. Both had invested heavily in their yards to be able to lay these large ships down. The final cancellation in Feb 1919 came as a relief to Fairfield as it allowed them to clear the slip and begin work on the merchant ship orders they held.

Edit Even the smaller Renown class took 12-14 months on the slips.

 

[EwenS]

IIRC, the RN did have some form of arrestor gear but it was longitudinal to stop aircraft going over the edge of the flight deck??

Yes they did. It was fitted to Argus, Eagle, Hermes and Furious i.e. those carriers completed up to 1925. It proved so successful, not, that it had been removed from them all by 1927!!! For the aircraft of the 1920s and with the small airgroups then aboard and low operating tempo some form of arrester gear was then felt unnecessary for the next few years.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

My wishlist would be:

- Rebuild Courageous and Glorious but with a flush deck to the bows
- Building at least one of those 17,200 ton carriers in the late 1920s, probably the 1926 or 1927 Programme to complete in 1929/30 to replace Argus. (In my world with a more restricted budget I'd still back cruiser construction as my priority at this stage).
- Making sure the proto Ark Royal (2 lifts, 4.7in guns) gets on the 1931 or 1932 Programme (damn the Depression! full steam ahead!) to complete in 1934/35 and replacing Eagle or Furious - but most probably Eagle.
- Ark Royal as historical.
- I'd like to squeeze in another Ark if I could before the Armoureds take over. Whether or not to go with Illustrious is a vexed question but with my Admiral's hat on I'd feel more comfortable about building an armoured carrier for North Sea operations knowing that I have five large fast carriers already at my disposal (3 Sisters, Proto-Ark, Ark and ArkSecundus - something like 290/300 aircraft) and a couple of trade protection carriers (Hermes and Hermes 2.0) so that I could afford to lay down four armoureds for the Home Fleet and allowing the big flatops to form up the Eastern Fleet.

Argus, Courageous, Eagle, Furious, Glorious and Hermes displaced 114,900 tons (according to Lenton & Colledge) which means 20,100 tons was unused from the WNT quota of 135,000 tons. Therefore, you could build your 17,200 ship and keep Argus.

 

[PMN1]

On the subject of arrester gear

Air Power and the Royal Navy 1914 – 1945, Geoffrey Till

Page 70

Moreover, the US Navy gained much advantage through its early mastery of athwartships arrestor wires, which the British had investigated extensively in earlier days, when the problem had been different. The performance of the first naval aircraft was such that the difficulty lay not on stopping them after they had landed, but in preventing them from bouncing when the wheels first touched the deck. Accordingly the British concentrated their early efforts on fore-and-aft wires and, when these eventually proved to be impracticable, abandoned arrestor systems altogether in 1927. The Royal Navy eventually adopted athwartships wires after experimentation in Courageous in 1931, but only after grave damage had been done to the British lead in carrier operations.

The absence of arrestor wires reduced the Fleet’s aircraft-carrying capacity in three distinct ways. First, as their performance increased, it grew more difficult to stop aircraft by wind pressure alone; carriers were forced to do a good deal of high-speed steaming into the wind, which wore out boilers (especially in older ships), increased the need for refits and reduced carrier time on station. Second, the British needed the whole deck to recover their aircraft and so were not able to adopt the American practice of keeping large numbers of aircraft permanently on deck, in addition to those struck below. Third, the aircraft operating capacity of a carrier depended also on the endurance of the aircraft and the time taken to land it.


also



The Aircraft Carrier Story 1908 – 1945, Guy Robbins

Page 13

Samson duly flew off the forecastle of the old battleship Africa in Sheerness harbour on 10th January 1912. His aeroplane (a Short 538) was equipped with pontoons attached to the wheels for emergency tough-down on the sea. As a result Seuter and Rear Admiral E C T Troubridge, Chief of the War Staff, suggested trials in four cruisers of the Home Fleet before issuing two machines per warship in the fleet. Further experiments involved flying-off from cruiser’s deck at sea and while underway at 10 ½ kts.

Unlike Ely, however, Samson never attempted to follow up these experiments (taking off) by flying onto a ship despite having a technique proposed for doing so. In December 1911 Lieutenant H A Williamson, a submariner, forwarded a proposal to the Admiralty to convert existing warships, or even to build a new carrier, to launch and retrieve aeroplanes for fleet anti-submarine duties. This design was rejected by Samson as too complicated, but primarily because he had decided to develop seaplanes. He considered flying onto a ship too dangerous for fast machines and unnecessary for seaplanes.


Page 29-30

On 5th March (1915) Williamson, injured in a seaplane crash, went home for treatment and was appointed to the Supply Section of the Air Department on 19th July. He tried to improve seaplane design by met with resistance from Booth, the designer who told Churchill seaplanes could not be used as aeroplanes.

He therefore turned to the problem of fleet carrier aircraft when scouting and attacking Zeppelins and, as in 1911, concluded that the solution lay in superior performance of both aeroplanes and landing-on technique. His design consisted of a long deck with flying-off forward and alighting aft (aided by arrestor gear) with a streamlined ‘island’ (for navigation, funnel and mast) on the starboard side to give a clear air flow. His explanatory model was similar to Eagle in the 1920’s.

Williamson went to Vaughn Lee and also to the Board of Intervention and Research (BIR), which Balfour set up on the 5 July to organise scientific theory for the Navy and to evaluate new ideas. The senior officer on the Seaplane Sub-Committee, Squadron Commander J W Seddon (AD test pilot), was a friend who had sponsored another of his ideas, undercarriages to enable seaplanes to fly-off decks.

The seaplane Sub-Committee was considering three proposals for launching sea-planes and preparing a ‘Report….on the problem of Seaplanes rising from and alighting back on Ships’ (18 September) for the BIR Central Committee. The Third Sea Lord had already decided on 23 September to ask the DNC to sketch a converted vessel (‘special unit’) to go with their report.

This was based on an American’s (P F B Biddle) proposal ‘for a mother ship with a clear run fore and aft’. A direct development of existing practice, his fast, flush-decked ship, with no superstructure to create dangerous air conditions, seemed the simplest solution for launching and landing, but required 20kts for safe alighting and 25-30kts for employment with the battlefleet. This was close to Williamson’s ideas.

The Seaplane Sub-Committee embodied Williamson’s proposal into the report, but the DNC stated Biddle’s flush-decked ship was impracticable because a reliable internal combustion engine (to eliminate funnels) capable of 20kts was not yet available. Williamson, moreover used ship speed and arrestor wires to reduce the deck length for safe landings. The BIR therefore recommended building a land deck, arrestor gear, and ‘island’ to test the wind conditions of landing on.

Seddon also showed Williamson’s model; to Sueter, now Superintendent of Aircraft Construction (SAC), who recognised the originality and importance of the ‘island’ on the starboard side. As Williamson required advice on placing the funnels on one side of the ship, Sueter arranged for him to see Chief Constructor J H Narbeth (DNC’s carrier designer) who saw ‘no difficulty’.

The BIR performed a most valuable service in championing deck landings, to which, Sueter, always ready to take advice, now committed the Air Department’s. At Grain it tested Williamson’s arrestor gear, which worked well. Squadron Commander G W Aldwell also tested aircraft brakes, suggested by Commander R M Groves (ASAC) which were adopted, together with a safety barrier of netting. Sueter hoped to test them in another ‘cross-Channel’ conversion (Manxman) but she was too small. The arrestor gear feature was shelved until August 1916 when it was decide d to convert a new carrier (Argus), with flying-on deck.

Little interest was now shown in Williamson’s ‘island’ and the BIR mock-up was not built. The DNC preferred two islands for navigation, accommodation, etc, and the advice of the BIR, which like Williamson appreciated the dangers of causing air eddies (later proved in Furious), was ignored. Williamson was appointed to the Air Department’s Operations Section as the DAS’s Assistant and continued to recommend the ‘island’ carrier. The DNC later took up the idea in 1918, but made no recognition of Williamson’s role. His only reward for the ‘island’ carrier concept was £500 from the Royal Commission on Awards to Inventors (1925).

 

[EwenS]

On development of arrester gear in the USN for comparison, see Stern "The Lexington Class Carriers" p112 onwards:-

"....When Langley was being converted, a reserve Lieutenant, Alfred 'Mel' Pride, was belatedly given the assignment of developing a practical arrester gear. The system he developed was a variant of the then current RN system, the so-called 'Busteed Trap'. The 'Busteed' system used a pair of ramps and longitudinal wires. The aircraft equipped with a row of small hooks extending downwards from its landing gear, would roll up and over the first ramp, dropping into the 'trap' between the two ramps. The hooks in theory at least engaged the wires; the longitudinal wires kept the aircraft from veering to either side (aircraft brakes did not appear for another few years). The aircraft then rolled up the second ramp, and the friction of the hooks acting on the wires was supposed to stop the machine. Sometimes it did. Pride kept the longitudinal wires and small vertical hooks, to keep the plane straight, but discarded the ramps. Instead, he developed a tailhook and a set of lateral wires (pendants) to stop the aircraft. The drag necessary to do this was provided by gravity. Each wire was connected by pulley to a weight hanging from a tower, as the wire stretched out, the weight went up and the aircraft was slowed by the conversion of its kinetic energy into potential energy in the suspended weight. Langley was completed with the original Pride system with towers, but within a year the system had been redesigned to do away with the towers, the weights hanging down into the hold.
The system had the advantage of being self contained, requiring no outside power source. It could keep working even if the ship's power failed but it was bulky, awkward and difficult to adjust for different weights of aircraft."
CV-1 Langley commissioned as a carrier on 30 March 1922 and her first deck landing occurred on 26 Oct that year. You can see the longitudinal and transverse wires in this photo of her in 1923.



When Pride moved on in his career, the baton was passed to Carl Norden (of bombsight fame) who developed the Mk.1 arrester system for the Lexingtons which completed Nov/Dec 1927 Stern continues:-

"This gear retained the longitudinal wires as well as the cross deck pendants, but there were those who thought the longitudinal wires were more of a hindrance than help.
'We should have discarded the fore and aft cables at the very beginning. We didn't discard them and they were put into the Lexington & Saratoga. It was there that a naval constructor named Stevens said @Let's do away with the fore and aft cables'. They were breaking up more aircraft than they were saving, but there was a great fear of going over the side.'
In May 1929 Saratiga experimentally removed her longitudinal wires and discovered that there were fewer problems than with them. The removal of these wires did reduce the rate of accidents but it also uncovered a latent problem with the Mk 1 arrester gear."
In the Mk 1 the arrester wire was connected to a winch which was connected to a braking mechanism with an electric motor to return the cable to its set position. Basically the problem was that if an aircraft landed off centre it was inclined to go further off centre until it was pulled up or went over the side.

By this time Pride was back in charge and set about designing the hydraulic Mk 2 arrester gear which was authorised to be fitted on 11 Aug 1931. Then in 1934 the number of wires was increased from the initial 4 to 8 of the then latest Mk 3 units plus 4 barriers. Then in 1936 another 8 wires were added forward to allow landings over the bow. By then she was equipped with Mk 3 & 4 units.

But all of this hides some simple facts. Firstly, for the RN the intention was to keep the aircraft in the hangar for most of the time. For the USN the aircraft were expected to remain on the flight deck most of the time. Then the Lexingtons had much longer flight decks (866ft) compared to the largest RN carriers (530-576ft in C/G/F). But there is a third less noticable difference - the intended touchdown point for the aircraft. This was further aft than in the earliest British ships. Note the location of the landing area in the following photos:-




HMS Eagle pre 1931.



This was a particular problem for Hermes, Eagle & Furious which all had a noticable hump at the aft end of their flight deck partly for streamlining and partly to hold the end of the origiinal longitudinal arrester gear. C & G had that portion of their flight decks flattened out before completion and so the landing circle could be further aft, as below.



Moving the landing area forward means less relative deck movement for an aircraft landing.

It was the waters that they expected to operate in that was responsible for the design differences in the carriers of each navy..

 

[PMN1]

Early carriers had the flight deck largely following the hull and ending in a point or close to a point.

What drove the flaring out, at least in RN carriers, that you see in say Ark Royal so making the flight deck almost continuous width?

Was it simply to provide space for two accelerators?

 

[EwenS]

Early carriers had the flight deck largely following the hull and ending in a point or close to a point.

What drove the flaring out, at least in RN carriers, that you see in say Ark Royal so making the flight deck almost continuous width?

Was it simply to provide space for two accelerators?

I've never seen any direct comment about that but a couple of things do come to mind.

The RN was very concerned about airflow over and around the flight deck and island. They carried out extensive tests from about 1916 about this. Eagle, as originally completed for her 1920 trials was given a blunt forward end to her flight deck that stopped short of the bow. She then went back to the yard to be finished off, to reappear in 1924 with a more pointed bow that overhung the end of the origianl battleship hull.


Hermes was a much smaller design, but was given a significant amount of flare to the sides of her bow to plate in the hull sides. She also had a low freeboard and widening it further might have caused damage in heavy seas had it been broader.


Then the RN produced conversions of F,C&G whose forward hull structure couldn't support a full length flight deck, but were completed with a very rounded flight deck forward, again for streamlining. No accelerators / catapults were initially intended for them. C&G became the first to receive them in the early 1930s.

Ark Royal was a completely fresh design from the keel up. In her case, and that of succeeding classes, the flight deck was a main strength member. So plating in the bow ensured the structural integrity of that connection between the keel and the flight deck from end to end. But again if you look closely her hull was shaped to smooth the airflow, especially between the accelerators.



She was also designed to carry many more aircraft, and was the first British carrier to be fitted with a crash barrier allowing aircraft to be parked forward. So flight deck space for parking and the accelerators was becoming more important. And that big rectanglar box, the hangar came much further forward (it ended just aft of the foremost 4.5" mounts) than in previous ships, and was taking up 60ft of her beam, so effectively forcing her upper hull sides outwards. You can see how her hull tapers much more under the forward hangar area.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Personnel

The number of Regular Naval Personnel (including Royal Marines) was shown under Vote A (Numbers) in the Navy Estimates. The figures I'm quoting here are the Average Number Borne which was the average for the Financial Year and the Maximum Bearing which was the maximum allowed for the Financial Year.

• In 1921-22 (the Financial Year before the Geddes Axe fell) Net Expenditure on the Royal Navy was £80.8 million and the Average Number Borne was 127,180.
• The Average Number Borne fell to around 100,000 for the Financial Years 1923-24 to 1929-30 when the average Net Expenditure was £56.6 million.
• The lowest years were 1932-33 & 1933-34 when the Average Number Borne was 89,667 & 89,863 and Net Expenditure was £51.1 million & £50.0 million respectively.
• The last full Financial Year of peace was 1938-39 when the Average Number Borne was 118,167 and Net Expenditure (including issues under the Defence Loans Act, 1937) was £126.9 million.
• The original Net Navy Estimates for 1939-40 (including issues under the Defence Loans Act, 1937) were £149.4 million and Vote A (Numbers) had a Maximum Bearing of 133,000. However, according to Roskill Vote A the Maximum Bearing for 1939-40 was 130,000 and the Average Number Borne for 1939-40 was 120,000.

So that's a decline of 29.5% from 1921-22 to 1932-33 and the Average Number Borne for 1939-40 was still 5.6% less than 1921-22 and in 1939-40 included the Air Branch which hadn't been part of the Royal Navy in 1921-22.

Had the Geddes Axe not fell using some of the extra money to maintain the Royal Navy's & Royal Marines regular personnel strengths at 1921-22 levels from then until the middle of the 1930s is as important as building more ships as said ships are only as good as their crews.

Sources:

• The Personnel Numbers from 1921-22 to 1938-39 are according to Appendix D of "British Naval Policy between the Wars" by Stephen Roskill.
• The Net Expenditure from 1921-22 to 1938-39 is according to the "Annual Abstract of Statistics".
• Unless otherwise stated the Personnel Numbers for 1939-40 are from the Navy Estimates 1939-40.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Part of Post 47

And now for the wishful thinking.

As the Navy Estimates were about £24 million (43%) more than Our Timeline (OTL) in This Timeline (ITTL) from 1922-23 to 1935-36 there was more than enough money to build four Aircraft Carriers in the period 1924-38 instead of the one ship that was built IOTL.

However, due to hindsight and wishful thinking I want to do is build six 22,500 ton Aircraft Carriers (with a total displacement of 135,000 tons) at the rate of one every two years from 1924 which would complete 1928-38 as follows:

• The 1924 Carrier would be completed in 1928 instead of converting Courageous into an Aircraft Carrier.
• The 1926 Carrier would be completed in 1930 instead of converting Glorious into an Aircraft Carrier.
• The 1928 Carrier would be completed in 1932 and replace Argus which would be converted into a Depot Ship.
• The 1930 Carrier would be completed in 1934 and replace Eagle which would be converted into a Depot Ship.
• The 1932 Carrier would be completed in 1936 and replace Hermes which would be converted into a Seaplane Carrier.
• The 1934 Carrier would be completed in 1938 and replace Furious. This ship would be built in place of the OTL Ark Royal.

I want them to be modifications of the OTL Ark Royal. That is instead of the three double deck lifts in the centre that it had in the real would there would be one lift forward, one aft and one in the centre. However, as the ships were built over a period of about a decade and a half they would not form a single class. They would be more like Aircraft Carrier equivalents to the A-to-I classes of Destroyer.

Each ship would cost about £4 million to build. Therefore, the total cost would be £24 million from which we can deduct the £8 million that was spent on the OTL Ark Royal, Courageous and Glorious, which means a net increase of £16 million over the fourteen financial years 1924-25 to 1937-38. The running cost of the ships would be greater due to them having larger crews and carrying more aircraft but @Username666 had allowed us more than enough money to pay those expenses.

However, if the tonnage quotas still come to an end at the end of 1936 there would be no need to scrap Furious in 1938 to make way for the 1934 Carrier.

The result would have been a Royal Navy with seven Aircraft Carriers in September 1939, which was the same number as In Our Timeline (IOTL), but the quality of the Force would have been considerably improved as there would have been six ships of the 22,500 ton type & Furious which could carry 465 aircraft instead of Argus, Ark Royal, Courageous, Eagle, Furious, Glorious and Hermes which (according to Lenton & College) could carry 257 aircraft.

Furthermore, the tonnage quotas became a dead letter when the Second London Naval Treaty was signed so it might have been possible to keep Hermes as an Aircraft Carrier instead of converting her into a Seaplane Carrier in 1936 to make way for the 1932 Carrier. If it was possible there would have been eight Aircraft Carriers in September 1939 which could carry 480 aircraft instead of the seven ships which were able to carry 257 aircraft IOTL.

Part of Post 48.

I think you are over-cooking it a bit on the wishful thinking. Ark Royal designed in 1924? About as fanciful as building Malta in 1938.

You have to remember that early carriers were prototypes well into the 1930s.
The key date was 1931 when it was realised that fitting arrester gear allowed a deck park to increase capacity - they looked at adding 12 aircraft to Eagle in this way. The prototype traverse arrester gear was fitted to Courageous in 1932, the first production safety barrier only in 1939! Again, it was not until 1931 that the accelerator (or catapult) was seriously considered and developed.

The first double-hangar proto-Ark Royal sketched up for the RN was in 1931, not until 1934 did the design gain three lifts.

I agree that the early 16,500, 17,200 tons and 25,000 ton designs were all flawed - hangar heights were too low, capacity barely over 30 aircraft, messing around trying to put 8in guns on the bigger carrier, insistence that forward flying off decks were very handy. If you consider Courageous and Glorious to be sub-optimal it's hard to see how a new-build design could be much better given the designers would likely repeat the same mistakes and a lot of key equipment just wasn't there for reliable carrier operations until the mid-30s.

I think it's more likely that the six 22,500 aircraft carriers would have been divided into three classes each of two ships.

• The 1924 & 1926 Carriers (completed in 1928 & 1930) would have been 22,500 ton "keel up" versions of Courageous & Glorious.
• The 1928 & 1930 Carriers (completed in 1932 & 1934) would have been 22,500 ton versions of @Hoods Proto-Ark Royal (See Post 48).
• The 1932 & 1934 Carriers (completed in 1936 & 1938) would have been 22,500 ton modified Ark Royals as described in the above quote from Post 47.

In February 1922 the Director of Naval Construction estimated that a new design for an aircraft carrier of the Furious type would displace possibly 4,000 tons less than Furious herself, or put another way 18,000 tons v 22,000 tons. That's why I want a pair of new 22,500 ton aircraft carriers built in the 1920s instead of converting Courageous and Glorious because it's effectively 25% more ship on the same displacement.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Building four 17,000 ton carriers means no Ark Royal, no Illustrious class, and no designs to base Indomitable and the Implacables on (although ships like them may have been laid down as the Treaty system collapsed, too late for much of the Second World War).

It would mean no Ark Royal, but it would not mean no Illustrious class and it would not mean there were no designs to base the Indomitable and Implacables on.

I'm ignoring many of the fine details, but in late 1935 it was clear that the tonnage quotas would be abolished and a plan for a fleet of 14 aircraft carriers by the middle of the 1940s was developed. The 14 carriers would consist of ten 23,000 ton armoured ships, Ark Royal, Courageous, Glorious and Furious. 8 would work with the main fleets, 5 were for trade protection (i.e. they would help the cruisers keep the trade routes clear of surface raiders) and one would be the deck-landing training carrier.

If the four 17,000 ton ships had been built the 1935-Plan would still have been for 14 aircraft carriers by the middle of the 1940s (8 fleet, 5 trade protection and one training) but it would have consisted of ten 23,000 ton armoured ships and the four 17,000 ton ships.

The aircraft carrier fleet in 1939 would have been the four 17,000 ton ships, Courageous, Glorious & Furious (plus six 23,000 ton armoured ships under construction) instead of Ark Royal, Argus, Eagle, Hermes, Courageous, Glorious & Furious (plus six 23,000 ton ships under construction). That is one 17,000 ton ship instead of Ark Royal, which is somewhat worse and three 17,000 ton ships instead of Argus, Eagle & Hermes which is much better.

The 6 ships that were under construction may take less time to build because one of the (intentional) side effects of building more ships between 1924 and 1935-ish is that the UK would have had a larger warship building industry in the middle 1930s. This aught to result in the ships laid down in the second half of the 1930s taking less time to build because the demand for new ships was the same but there was more building capacity.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Link to Post 47 - Aircraft Carriers and Naval Aviation - Part One - Aircraft Carriers 1921-35​

Aircraft Carriers and Naval Aviation
Part Two
Aircraft Carriers 1936-39​

Part of Post 64.

I'm ignoring many of the fine details, but in late 1935 it was clear that the tonnage quotas would be abolished and a plan for a fleet of 14 aircraft carriers by the middle of the 1940s was developed. The 14 carriers would consist of ten 23,000 ton armoured ships, Ark Royal, Courageous, Glorious and Furious. 8 would work with the main fleets, 5 were for trade protection (i.e. they would help the cruisers keep the trade routes clear of surface raiders) and one would be the deck-landing training carrier.

In this timeline the plan would still be for 14 aircraft carriers by the middle of the 1940s and the 14 ships would still include 8 fleet carriers, 5 trade protection carriers and one training ship. However, there would be ten 27,000 ton armoured ships and the six 22,500 ton ships.

In the "Real World" the Second London Naval Treaty abolished the tonnage quotas for aircraft carriers, but reduced the maximum displacement of individual aircraft carriers from 27,000 tons to 23,000 tons. This was because the British delegation (which actually wanted a reduction to 22,000 tons) believed that it would make individual ships cheaper and therefore easier to buy in the required numbers. I think that this was a mistake and they should have negotiated for keeping the 27,000 ton limit, which is what they do in this "version of history".

The extra tonnage aught to be enough to allow the ships to be enlarged Implacables with two full-length hangars that were wide enough to take aircraft that folded to a width of 18 feet four abreast and aircraft that folded to a width of 13½ feet four abreast. Hopefully they will also have hangars with clearances of 16 feet (like the Real-Ark Royal and Illustrious classes) instead of 14 feet like the Real-Implacable class. I wanted them to have hangars with clearances of 17½ feet (like the Audacious, Colossus, Majestic and Hermes classes) but that would have been an Audacious class in all but name and according to Conway's 1922-46 they displaced 36,000 tons as designed and according to Conway's 1947-95 displaced even more than that as completed.

In this "Version of History" British defence spending was maintained at pre-Geddes Axe levels until the middle of the 1930s. One of the results of this was that the UK has a much bigger armaments industry when full-scale rearmament began in the 1930s. As a result there was a smaller balance of payments deficit and less demand pull inflation in the second half of the 1930s. One of the results of this was that there was no need to "ration" the naval building programmes in the 1938-39 and 1939-40 financial years. As a result two aircraft carriers were ordered in each of these financial years instead of one which brought the total number of ships ordered in the four financial years 1936-37 to 1939-40 from six to eight as follows:

1936-37 Illustrious and Victorious​

1937-38 Formidable and Indomitable​

1938-39 Implacable and Inflexible​

1939-40 Indefatigable and Invincible​

Another (intentionally) beneficial side effect of maintaining a much bigger armaments industry between the middle 1920s and middle 1930s was that the UK could build more warships in the second half of the 1930s & World War II and it could build them faster. As a result I think each of the eight ships in the above list would have taken about 3 years to build instead of 4½ years which was the average building time for the six ships built in the "Real World".

Another ship begun in the period 1936-39 that I think wouldn't take as long to build is the aircraft maintenance ship Unicorn. In the "Real Wold" she was ordered on 14.04.39, laid down on 29.06.39, launched on 20.11.41 and completed on 12.03.43 which was 44 months after she was laid down. I hope that this would be reduced by about a year in this "version of history". However, the ship was part of the Building Programme for the financial year 1938-39 (i.e. from 01.04.38 to 31.03.39). So it may be possible to have the ship ordered and laid down six months earlier and therefore bring her completion forward by 18 months instead of by 12 months or put another way from March 1943 to September 1941 instead of from March 1943 to March 1942.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Post 34.

Post 2.

Are we allowed to spend more money? And if we are... How much more?

Post 3.

It's supposed to be more than real history, but I didn't think about the exact amount.

Is what I've proposed in Post 33 acceptable?

That is Total Defence Expenditure is maintained at 1921-22 levels for the 14 Financial Years 1922-23 to 1935-36. For the Royal Navy this means an increase in average spending from about £56 million a year to about £80 million, which is £24 million or 43% more per annum.

In Post 33 I suggested that the Point of Departure (POD) was that there was no Geddes Axe and defence expenditure was maintained at 1921-22 levels for the 14 financial years from 1922-23 to 1935-36.

This is the actual Defence Expenditure from 1st April 1919 to 31st March 1939
(Inclusive of Issues under the Defence Loans Act, 1937)

​

Notes

• Sources:
  • The Annual Abstract of Statistics 1911-26 for the financial years 1919-20 to 1923-24.
  • The Annual Abstract of Statistics 1924-39 for the financial years 1924-25 to 1938-39.
• Financial years run from 1st April to 31st March. That is 1919-20 is 1st April 1919 to 31st March 1920 and so on.
• This is net expenditure and doesn't include Appropriations-in-Aid from other departments.
• The issues under the Defence Loans Act, 1937 were:

​

• Which means that net expenditure exclusive of the issues under the Defence Loans Act, 1937 were:

​

 

[Scott Kenny]

Post 34.

In Post 33 I suggested that the Point of Departure (POD) was that there was no Geddes Axe and defence expenditure was maintained at 1921-22 levels for the 14 financial years from 1922-23 to 1935-36.

Unless the Great Depression doesn't happen in this timeline, I don't see the budget staying that high in the 1930s. Note the ~6% drop in budget in the 30-31 budget at the outset of the depression (well, some 6mos after it started in the US, not sure how quickly it spread to UK/Europe). Unless someone points out to Treasury that stopping construction of any warships would result in laying off thousands more people?

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Post 66 continued.

The averages for the 14 financial years 1922-23 to 1935-36 were:

• £41.7 million Army - £53.5 million less than 1921-22.
• £55.8 million Navy - £25.0 million less than 1921-22.
• £16.2 million Air Force - £2.6 million more than 1921-22.

Which means that total defence expenditure for the period averaged £113.3 million - £75.8 million less than 1921.22.

In This Timeline I want to:

• Double expenditure on the Air Force. This includes central government expenditure on Civil Aviation.
• Increase expenditure on the Army by at least £15 million. Most of the extra money would be used to quintuple spending on armaments and warlike stores.
• Sub Total £31 million which leaves £45 million to spend on the Navy.

Earlier in the thread I suggested maintaining naval expenditure at 1921-22 levels to 1935-36 which would have required an average increase of £25 million a year. If that was done there would have been a surplus of £20 million. I haven't done the arithmetic yet, but my guess was that an extra £25 million would have paid for most of what I want to do. The major exception was the ten capital ships that I want to lay down 1931-36 (because there was no First London Naval Treaty or a different one) because they'd cost an average of £12.5 million a year over 6 years. However, the surplus would cover that with £7.5 million to spare.

@Username666 it's your thread. Is the above acceptable to you?

 

[Username666]

Post 66 continued.

The averages for the 14 financial years 1922-23 to 1935-36 were:

• £41.7 million Army - £53.5 million less than 1921-22.
• £55.8 million Navy - £25.0 million less than 1921-22.
• £16.2 million Air Force - £2.6 million more than 1921-22.

Which means that total defence expenditure for the period averaged £113.3 million - £75.8 million less than 1921.22.

In This Timeline I want to:

• Double expenditure on the Air Force. This includes central government expenditure on Civil Aviation.
• Increase expenditure on the Army by at least £15 million. Most of the extra money would be used to quintuple spending on armaments and warlike stores.
• Sub Total £31 million which leaves £45 million to spend on the Navy.

Earlier in the thread I suggested maintaining naval expenditure at 1921-22 levels to 1935-36 which would have required an average increase of £25 million a year. If that was done there would have been a surplus of £20 million. I haven't done the arithmetic yet, but my guess was that an extra £25 million would have paid for most of what I want to do. The major exception was the ten capital ships that I want to lay down 1931-36 (because there was no First London Naval Treaty or a different one) because they'd cost an average of £12.5 million a year over 6 years. However, the surplus would cover that with £7.5 million to spare.

@Username666 it's your thread. Is the above acceptable to you?

Every time I see a discussion of everyone here, I feel like you're really amazing.

How do you get this many, and accurate information?

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Post 34.

In Post 33 I suggested that the Point of Departure (POD) was that there was no Geddes Axe and defence expenditure was maintained at 1921-22 levels for the 14 financial years from 1922-23 to 1935-36.

Unless the Great Depression doesn't happen in this timeline, I don't see the budget staying that high in the 1930s. Note the ~6% drop in budget in the 30-31 budget at the outset of the depression (well, some 6mos after it started in the US, not sure how quickly it spread to UK/Europe). Unless someone points out to Treasury that stopping construction of any warships would result in laying off thousands more people?

You will be displeased to know that the Great Depression does happen in this timeline and in spite of that total expenditure (not just defence expenditure) is maintained at 1921-22 levels to 1935-36 and so is government revenue.

​

In the "Real World" British Government Revenue didn't return to 1921-22 levels until 1939-40 when it was £1,132.2 million and Total Other Expenditure didn't return to 1921-22 levels until 1939-40 as well, when it was £551.8 million.

 

[Scott Kenny]

You will be displeased to know that the Great Depression does happen in this timeline and in spite of that total expenditure (not just defence expenditure) is maintained at 1921-22 levels to 1935-36 and so is government revenue.

View attachment 706277​

In the "Real World" British Government Revenue didn't return to 1921-22 levels until 1939-40 when it was £1,132.2 million and Total Other Expenditure didn't return to 1921-22 levels until 1939-40 as well, when it was £551.8 million.

No, I'm actually rather pleased about total expenditures not massively changing.

Sad that the Depression still happened, but I think that the War would have been significantly delayed without it. More people out of work means more people willing to listen to That Austrian Corporal.

 

[lancer21]

NOMISYRRUC and EwenS, i have a question regarding the RN carriers, i have read in an Osprey booklet on RN WW2 carriers that according to the WNT interpretation, they couldn't lay down (or comission? which would mean not laying them earlier than 1928?) new carriers until 1931 just like for BBs, except the conversions each country was entitled to (the follies, Lexingtons, Amagis etc).

Is this mistaken or there's something to it, or perhaps just applying for UK (since they had so many carriers comissioned or converting by the WNT)? Certainly there were no new carriers laid down by the major powers until 1929 (Ryujo) and 1930 (Ranger).

 

[EwenS]

NOMISYRRUC and EwenS, i have a question regarding the RN carriers, i have read in an Osprey booklet on RN WW2 carriers that according to the WNT interpretation, they couldn't lay down (or comission? which would mean not laying them earlier than 1928?) new carriers until 1931 just like for BBs, except the conversions each country was entitled to (the follies, Lexingtons, Amagis etc).

Is this mistaken or there's something to it, or perhaps just applying for UK (since they had so many carriers comissioned or converting by the WNT)? Certainly there were no new carriers laid down by the major powers until 1929 (Ryujo) and 1930 (Ranger).

I've not got the book so haven't the benefit of seeing your comments in context. So back to the Treaty wording itself.

Article VII of the Treaty limited the carrier tonnage each nation could have.

"The total tonnage for aircraft carriers of each of the Contracting Powers shall not exceed in standard displacement, for the United States 135,000 tons (137,160 metric tons); for the British Empire 135,000 tons (137,160 metric tons); for France 60,000 tons (60,960 metric tons); for Italy 60,000 tons (60,960 metric tons); for Japan 81,000 tons (82,296 metric tons)."

Then Article VIII of the Treaty, with my emphasis:-

"The replacement of aircraft carriers shall be effected only as prescribed in Chapter II, Part 3, provided, however, that all aircraft carrier tonnage in existence or building on November 12, 1921, shall be considered experimental, and may be replaced, within the total tonnage limit prescribed in Article VII, without regard to its age."

So for the RN, Argus, Eagle, Hermes and Furious, for Japan, Hosho and for the USA, Langley could all be replaced at any time regardless of age so that a nation stayed within its overall limit should it decide to build new carriers.

Then the rules on replacement:-
"(a) Capital ships and aircraft carriers twenty years after the date of their completion may, except as otherwise provided in Article VIII and in the tables in Section II of this Part, be replaced by new construction, but within the limits prescribed in Article IV and Article VII. The keels of such new construction may, except as otherwise provided in Article VIII and in the tables in Section II of this Part, be laid down not earlier than seventeen years from the date of completion of the tonnage to be replaced, provided, however, that no capital ship tonnage, with the exception of the ships referred to in the third paragraph of Article II, and the replacement tonnage specifically mentioned in Section II of this Part, shall be laid down until ten years from November 12, 1921."


I think your question arises from the interaction of these various clauses.

By the time Britain had completed Courageous & Glorious it had 115,350 tons of carriers against a total allowance of 135,000 tons. So to gain a new ship it either had to be less than 19,650 tons standard displacement OR they had to give up an earlier ship covered by Article VIII, which they could do at any time. During the second half of the 1920s the RN drew up many plans for a new ship but the finances did not allow construction. A fresh round of design work began again around 1931 and Ark was finally laid down on 16 Sept 1935 and completed on 16 Nov 1938.

So to build Ark Royal, officially registered under the Treaty as 22,500 tons (not the 22,000 tons usually stated) it was decided that Argus would have to be given up as a carrier. But rather than scrap her she was converted into an "auxiliary" as a training carrier & "Queen Bee" target drone tender. That was agreed on 23 May 1936 and work began immediately and continued until 30 July 1938. The Treaty came to an end on 31 Dec 1936. I know she still looked like a "carrier" but officially she wasn't. After that exercise Britain's carrier tonnage was 123,400 tons.

The same thing happened in the USA. In order to build CV-7 Wasp ordered 19 Sept 1935, laid down 1 April 1936 and completed 25 April 1940, and remain within the total Treaty carrier tonnage, the CV-1 Langley had to cease to be a "carrier". In her case she was converted in 1936/37 into a seaplane carrier and was redesignated AV-3. But again that could have been done earlier had the US wanted to do so.

There is another point that is usually missed about the conversions carried out by each nation. Again it is worth referring to the wording of the Treaty Article IX:-

"No aircraft carrier exceeding 27,000 tons (27,432 metric tons) standard displacement shall be acquired by, or constructed by, for or within the jurisdiction of, any of the Contracting Powers.

However, any of the Contracting Powers may, provided that its total tonnage allowance of aircraft carriers is not thereby exceeded, build not more than two aircraft carriers, each of a tonnage of not more than 33,000 tons (33,528 metric tons) standard displacement, and in order to effect economy any of the Contracting Powers may use for this purpose any two of their ships, whether constructed or in course of construction, which would otherwise be scrapped under the provisions of Article II. The armament of any aircraft carriers exceeding 27,000 tons (27,432 metric tons) standard displacement shall be in accordance with the requirements of Article X, except that the total number of guns to be carried in case any of such guns be of a calibre exceeding 6 inches (152 millimetres), except anti-aircraft guns and guns not exceeding 5 inches (127 millimetres), shall not exceed eight."

Note:-
1. Each nation could build up to 2 new ships exceeding 27,000 tons
2. The conversion of up to 2 existing hulls "whether constructed or in the course of construction, which would otherwise be scrapped" could be used "in order to effect economy" for this purpose.


So all the nations had a choice to build two new 33,000 ton carriers if it so wanted. Britain didn't have any capital ships under construction whose hulls could have been used in the same way as Lexington, Saratoga, Kagi & Akagi, so that option didn't apply.

C & G weren't covered by this clause for several reasons. Firstly they didn't exceed 27,000 tons (they were 22,500 tons when converted as carriers and lighter prior to that) and secondly they were not due to be scrapped under the 1922 Treaty. Strange as it may seem and even though they were originally armed with 15" guns they were not considered "capital ships" but rather "large light cruisers".

RN plans going back before the Washington Conference took place were to convert Furious from her original configuration (she had actually been stripped down prior to the Conference but rebuilding did not start until after it) AND either C or G. In 1923/24 the Admiralty decided to convert both ships. At the same time new construction carriers were also being considered in the range of 17,000 to 25,000 tons.

As for other countries carrier procurement, it is worth looking at the completion dates of the various ships. The Lexingtons didn't complete until the end of 1927 until which time the only US experience was with the converted collier Langley. Design studies had gone on throughout the 1920s to design the next ship. For Japan Akagi & Kaga commissioned in 1927 & 1929 respectively, but agan the Japanese had been looking at the future carrier designs for a while. Their problem was the lesser ttonnage available to them.

These were the early days of carrier aviation and everyone was playing around with designs trying to discover what they felt was the sweet spot, which wasn't necessarily the same for all countries.

I hope this helps your understanding a bit. It may be worth rereading that part of the text to see if it makes a difference.

 

[lancer21]

Hi EwenS, many thanks for your comprehensive explanation. In italics below is the quote from the Osprey British Aircraft Carriers 1939-45 booklet, which i did found unusual, hence my question here. Most likely then, it's a mistake.

One of the conditions of the 1922 Washington Treaty was that Great Britain would refrain from building any new aircraft carriers for ten years, althoughit could convert existing warships within the tonnage limits imposed by the treaty.

 

[EwenS]

Replacement terms were laid out in Part 3 as follows:-

“The replacement of capital ships and aircraft carriers shall take place according to the rules in Section I and the tables in Section II of this Part.

SECTION I.-RULES FOR REPLACEMENT

(a) Capital ships and aircraft carriers twenty years after the date of their completion may, except as otherwise provided in Article VIII and in the tables in Section II of this Part, be replaced by new construction, but within the limits prescribed in Article IV and Article VII. The keels of such new construction may, except as otherwise provided in Article VIII and in the tables in Section II of this Part, be laid down not earlier than seventeen years from the date of completion of the tonnage to be replaced, provided, however, that no capital ship tonnage, with the exception of the ships referred to in the third paragraph of Article II, and the replacement tonnage specifically mentioned in Section II of this Part, shall be laid down until ten years from November 12, 1921.”


Note the clause starts by setting out the lifespan of capital ships AND aircraft carriers at 20 years, except for those experimental ships. Then that replacement ships can’t be laid down until 17 years.

So far so good.

BUT the final part of the section refers only to capital ships not being laid down until 12 Nov 1931 (10 years from 12 Nov 1921, which was the date on which the Washington Conference began). No mention in that part of aircraft carriers.

I have to admit that the various Naval Treaties are not easy to follow and I say that as someone with a legal background used to reading, and hopefully understanding, legislation! The problem is that we often approach them with a number of preconceptions from reading various secondary sources over the years or assumptions developed from the apparent similarities between what each navy did. And then we carry that forward into our reading of the actual Treaty and see what we want to see.

Nowhere is that clearer in that C&G were not capital ships despite carrying those big guns. The ships considered “capital ships” are included in the Treaty by name, either as ships to be retained or to be scrapped. C&G do not appear on either list.

 

[Scott Kenny]

I have to admit that the various Naval Treaties are not easy to follow and I say that as someone with a legal background used to reading, and hopefully understanding, legislation! The problem is that we often approach them with a number of preconceptions from reading various secondary sources over the years or assumptions developed from the apparent similarities between what each navy did. And then we carry that forward into our reading of the actual Treaty and see what we want to see.

Good to know that it's not just me getting a headache from trying to read those treaties! Buy you a beverage if/when we meet in person to make up for the pain.

 

[riggerrob]

Five crippled battleships
Three crippled cruisers
Two destroyers sunk
98,000 tons of shipping sunk in one month alone from Maltese bases (average was 50,000 tons monthly in 1941)
14 U-boats sunk

Not too shabby at all.
What did the TBD Devastator get, one carrier....
There is no reason to suppose the Swordfish would have performed better just by having a monoplane wing (see the Skua).

Time and place matter, the Swordfish was still operating against E-Boats at night in 1945. Even a dated aircraft can score successes, Swordfish were ideal for nocturnal raids and in operations outside the range of land-based fighters.

Fairey Swordfishs’ biggest advantage was its slow landing speed which allowed it to fly from even the smallest of escort carriers. That is why Swordfish served until the end of WW2.
Early in WW2, U-boats learned avoid any convoy escorted by aircraft - even ponderous USN blimps. Even if blimps were not fast enough to drop depth- barges on marauding U-boats, they could use their radios to call in escorting corvettes and destroyers to rain depth-charges.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Fairey Swordfishs’ biggest advantage was its slow landing speed which allowed it to fly from even the smallest of escort carriers. That is why Swordfish served until the end of WW2.

Ah, I had wondered about that.

Early in WW2, U-boats learned avoid any convoy escorted by aircraft - even ponderous USN blimps. Even if blimps were not fast enough to drop depth- barges on marauding U-boats, they could use their radios to call in escorting corvettes and destroyers to rain depth-charges.

You might be about to outrun the cop, you can't outrun his radio...

 

[riggerrob]

Yes!
Definitely assign greater roles to the “white” colonies.

In an alternative timeline: “Royal Canadian Navy ‘46” during the late 1930s, the RCN is ordered to resume their WW1 role of convoy escort in the North Atlantic.
As in the original timeline, Canadian shipyards build dozens of Flower Class corvettes and a handful of destroyers. All those ships receive radar and sonar and hedgehog mortars earlier than OTL.

Canadian Car and Foundry never build any Hurricanes or Helldivers. Instead, CCF continues building Grummans under license. After completing the Goblin biplane order, they start building Grumman Wildcats, then TBM Avengers (heavy on the Avengers), followed by Hellcats, etc. Many CCF built airplanes are promptly transferred to the RN FAA. CCF built airplanes fill the gap left by limitations to Lend-Lease as the USA tries to remain neutral. On many occasions, entire trainloads of engines, propellers, .50 calibre machineguns, etc, “go missing” near Fort William.
Odd!

Similarly, USN and USMC records show dozens of airplanes crashed in the Great Lakes. Oddly, the USN and USMC host few funerals. Pilots from the squadrons that lost airplanes all seem to vacation at Niagara Falls.
Odd!

As in OTL, escort carrier HMS Nabob is still crewed by mostly RCN sailors, but after she is damaged, she is replaced by HMS Puncher and 3 sister ships.

A “laker” bulk career is modified with a rudimentary flight deck to teach RCAF/RCN pilots the basics of landing-on. These inter-war RCAF pilots are versatile fellows accustomed to landing on short, rough bush strips surrounded by trees and mountains. They soon begin to “cheat” and develop the angled flight deck a decade or so so before OTL.

Mid-war HMS Puncher is fitted with an extra elevator, amid-ship on the port side. When the elevator jams - in a North Atlantic storm - no one seems to care and repairs are postponed until the end of the war.
Odd!

 

[EwenS]

Fairey Swordfishs’ biggest advantage was its slow landing speed which allowed it to fly from even the smallest of escort carriers. That is why Swordfish served until the end of WW2.
Early in WW2, U-boats learned avoid any convoy escorted by aircraft - even ponderous USN blimps. Even if blimps were not fast enough to drop depth- barges on marauding U-boats, they could use their radios to call in escorting corvettes and destroyers to rain depth-charges.

There is a bit more to it than that in relation to the continued use of the Swordfish.

A quick look around the quotes figures around 50 mph for the stall speed of the Swordfish (46 - 53mph in various sources). But the figure for its successor, the Albacore, is given as 54mph.

Looking at Swordfish production, Fairey stopped building them in late 1939 / early 1940. Their Hayes factory was then turned over to Albacore production with Fireflies succeeding those in 1942/43. From mid-1940 to mid 1943 the Albacore became the principal torpedo bomber on the fleet carriers as they entered service or refitted. Illustrious was the last to use the Swordfish in that role when she returned from the Indian Ocean in Jan 1943.

In 1939 the Admiralty was seeking a second source for Albacore production and settled on a shadow factory run by Blackburn to build them. But it wanted aircraft, any aircraft, ASAP. So the contract was switched to Swordfish which used less strategic materials. It was also thought that production start up would be quicker because Fairey could transfer jigs and some machinery and expertise no longer required at Hayes to Blackburn. That proved optimistic and the first "Blackfish" didn't come off the production line until Nov 1940. It then became the sole source of Swordfish production with more orders being placed as the war went on.

So with Albacore production limited and targetted towards the fleet carrier squadrons, FAA expansion to equip the escort carriers beginning to arrive in service from late 1941 (Archer completed in the USA in Nov 1941) relied on Swordfish production. Then after early 1943 with Albacore production ceasing at Hayes, and the pool of airframes becoming an ever diminishing asset, why disrupt production of Blackfish to get a more comfortable aircraft.

The last front line squadron to operate the Albacore was 119 RAF which finally gave them up in Feb 1945. Their replacement was the Swordfish Mk.III !!!

So but for a decision made in late 1939, it could have been the Albacore that achieved fame operating from those small flight decks.

Edit:- from mid 1943 it was the Avenger that was intended to become the main ASW aircraft in the FAA as it couldn't carry British torpedoes. While it could operate from the US built escort carriers it was too large for the MAC ships, while the British built escort carriers also continued to use the Swordfish to the end of the war. 1945 also saw the Barracuda begin operations from the escort carrier Puncher.