Alternative Royal Navy during the Interwar period

[Username666]

If you could redesign the Royal Navy at that time, what would you do?

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Are we allowed to spend more money? And if we are... How much more?

 

[Username666]

Are we allowed to spend more money? And if we are... How much more?

It's supposed to be more than real history, but I didn't think about the exact amount.

 

[Pirate Pete]

Are the various International Limitation Treaties still applicable?

 

[Username666]

Are the various International Limitation Treaties still applicable?

It is assumed that the treaty was broken for some reason.

 

[uk 75]

We have the advantage of hindsight in planning and building a Royal Navy between WW1 and WW2.
Contemporaries did not know that battleships even with added AA guns would be so vulnerable to air and torpedo attack.
The lack of decent aircraft for the RN carriers would be critical in wartime. The problem was solved by adopting a range of US types but returned once WW2 ended.
WW1 had shown the importance of convoy escort ships. We could never build enough of these. WW2 added escort carriers converted from merchantmen or supplied by the US. Various long range aircraft were needed and developed to protect the N Atlantic routes.
The massive Singapore naval base was the subject of much expenditure between the wars. Without adequate air power and ground forces it fell to Japan easily.
The 1922 cancelled Battle Cruisers and Battleships (G3 and N3) might have been more impressive in service then the two Nelsons and four KGVs but unless the 1920s had been a period of unparalleled economic growth we could not have afforded them.
From 1933 you have to balance the needs of the Royal Air Force (Bombers, close air support and air defence) and the Army (armoured forces for France and Egypt, garrisons in Asia) with the RN. Again, the UK's poor economic and industrial capacity (need to import steel and tools as well as optics and raw materials) do not go away by magic.

 

[Dilandu]

Well, refitting the "Nelsons" with a new compact powerplant, DP guns and bow armor would be a quite good start. Those guys could be made good for at least 26 knots.

 

[EwenS]

Well, refitting the "Nelsons" with a new compact powerplant, DP guns and bow armor would be a quite good start. Those guys could be made good for at least 26 knots.

Nelson had the horizontal bow armour fitted in her 1937/38 refit. War broke out before the same could be done to Rodney.

 

[Pirate Pete]

My (initial) ponderings…
IF the Naval Treaties are not in place (say, never introduced due to non agreement between the various nations…
Royal Navy (allowing for the fact that some ships were heavily worked during the ‘Great War’…
5 Queen Elizabeths
5 Revenge
4 Iron Duke
4 Orion
3 King George V
2 Lion
Tiger
Hood
2 Renown

I think all 12-inch gunned ships would be ‘retired/sold’ as now totally outclassed.
4 G3 to be built - probably replacing Orions/KGV’s.
I cannot see the ‘N’ class (18-in armed) battleships being built - not so much due to finances, more to do with the blast effects (the 18-in gun on Furious had demonstrated that).

I can still see Furious/Glorious/Courageous becoming carriers as they are pretty useless for much else!

I do not for-see the armour plate and gun production shortage as per real world, as, with no Limitation Treaties, these industries will continue.

I would anticipate a steady replacement programme for the oldest battleships and battle-cruisers - with a ‘hybrid’ (proper) fast battleship design…
Carriers, probably much as real world, but a steady trials and development programme going ahead (Ark Royal ‘type’ appearing earlier?)
Cruisers: basis taken as Hawkins class (7.5-in guns) - still towards a ‘County’ type, but better protected and 6-in cruisers along the lines of Arethusa’s and Ajax types…

I’m not sure about the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. In the real world the treaty was abrogated under Washington, but, with the expansion of the Japanese Navy, I can see it failing anyway. I can see Singapore being built, but closer to original design with Multiple dry docks and enclosed basin…

As I said, just initial ponderings….

 

[Pirate Pete]

More ‘musings’ on this subject - variations of which have previously been discussed on here…
To expand on the ‘Terms of Reference’ regarding this.
Although the British (Empire) economy took a hit as a result of ‘The Great War’, the country was not actually penniless. One ir two things need to change a little as opposed to ‘real world’…
Re-establishing their overseas market position is important to adjusting the financial timeline…
I think (and I nay be wrong here), France didn’t honour the complete repayment of loans extended to them by Britain, so, although it may not be ‘gazillions of pounds’, it all helps…
I think that Versailles needs to be approached differently - sorry Mademoiselle France, but swingeing reparations and the destruction of the German Economy and Military should be re-visited, as well as the removal of tracts of German European territory (the Polish corridor No, No, NO!)…
By all means, their military should be reduced, but I would principally aim at the Army. The Airforce, not wipe it out, but severely reduced. As for the Navy, I would leave them with three Nassau and three Ostfriesland dreadnoughts, and various of their more recent lighter vessels - NOT reduce it to Pre-Dreadnoughts and ancient light cruisers…
Their Navy was a luxury anyway…
France and Italy’s Navies are pretty much as real world, pretty out-of-date - if they want to complete partially finished ships or build new, so be it.
U.S. and Japan…
The U.S. Navy was just a out at its (then) limit (as regards their Politico’s) - Complete the Lexingtons and South Dakotas, and, that will, at least for a while be it…
Japan - I see the Amagi and Tosa classes completing, but not the so-called 13-16 class - Japanese economy and industry was very stretched by this time.

Back to the principal subject - Britain (and the Empire)…
Take Jellicoe’s Empire Tour recommendations for an Eastern Fleet, based on Royal and Dominion fleets.
This could also be ‘mixed’ with Admiral Henderson’s proposal for the Australian Navy…
Revive the pre-war proposal for three Canadian battleships- bearing in mind the expected enemy will be Japan, and it helps protect Canada’s Pacific coast. Also the idea of an ‘Imperial’ (flying) Squadron comes into being with other Dominion contributed ships.

It’s all a BIG ask, and, of course, there will be the usual objections from the ‘Pacifists’, but, security is obtained through strength….

Let’s get creative folks!

 

[Pirate Pete]

This is from Jellicoe’s report - for a ‘recommended’ Eastern Fleet:

 

[1635yankee]

If you could redesign the Royal Navy at that time, what would you do?

1) Establish a true reserve.
2) Improve access to officer ranks for all subjects and for other ranks.
3) Spend some money to develop diesels for MTB and higher efficiency, more compact steam plants for large warships. (they may want to talk to the US about this)
4) Establish construction and repair facilities in India and Australia.
5) Work on developing a dual-purpose gun. The 4.5 in may be a good starting point. The goal is for the RN to have one medium caliber gun, not the mix of 4, 4.5, 4.7, and 5.25 in guns.
6) Complete the modernizations on all the capital ships.
7) Do more planning and exercises for civil, vs military, convoys.

 

[Hood]

4) Establish construction and repair facilities in India and Australia.

I've been having some thoughts along these lines recently, I'd include Canada in that too. Canada attempted to kickstart a naval dockyard pre-WW1 but it never happened. It didn't really get into its stride until 1939 onwards. Canada's Navy was only formed in 1910 (Royal status in 1911) so that may have stifled attempts to grow, although they nearly did supply funds for three QE-class battleships.

Australia's shipbuilding capacity was insufficient given its defence needs of the time, it wasn't until into WW2 that they really got into their stride with destroyers, frigates and minesweepers. The Navy itself, formed in 1901 (Royal title in 1911) grew fairly rapidly.
It seems odd to me that Canada and Australia both selected the Tribal-class destroyer as the basis for their home-grown projects given the size and complexity of that design, most of their home-built Tribals didn't complete until near the end of the war. Something smaller like the J-class might have been better perhaps?

India seems a mystery to me. The Royal Indian Marine played a support role in WW1, but wasn't even given combatant status until 1928 and didn't become the Royal Indian Navy until 1934. It was a tiny force, though with 5 modern sloops in 1939. Indian construction seems to have begun around 1940, mostly lower-end minesweepers and trawlers, with a lot of those contracts begin cancelled eventually, presumably as the war outpaced construction. Even in 1945 it was still exclusively a sloop and frigate force with quite a large collection of landing craft to support the 14th Army. 250,000 personnel in 1945 sounds a lot but compared to the Army it was miniscule (the Indian Air Force was also quite small, they did have problems finding enough qualified officer candidates, which have impacted naval recruitment as well).
I find it odd that given how India was perceived as 'jewel' and used as justification for holding the Suez Canal (and the Med in general) and Singapore as bastions on either side that comparatively little attempt was made to grow a larger trade protection force sooner or that the British Raj wasn't leant on to provide more cash to the Admiralty. Even Malaya clubbed together to buy a QE-class battleship and India was far richer. Perhaps the rather labyrinthine administration of India (which did not get Dominion status until 1947) prevented that?
But imagine if the RIN had funded a trio of light cruisers in the 1930s, or even another pair of 8in cruisers?

 

[1635yankee]

4) Establish construction and repair facilities in India and Australia.

I've been having some thoughts along these lines recently, I'd include Canada in that too. Canada attempted to kickstart a naval dockyard pre-WW1 but it never happened. It didn't really get into its stride until 1939 onwards. Canada's Navy was only formed in 1910 (Royal status in 1911) so that may have stifled attempts to grow, although they nearly did supply funds for three QE-class battleships.

Australia's shipbuilding capacity was insufficient given its defence needs of the time, it wasn't until into WW2 that they really got into their stride with destroyers, frigates and minesweepers. The Navy itself, formed in 1901 (Royal title in 1911) grew fairly rapidly.
It seems odd to me that Canada and Australia both selected the Tribal-class destroyer as the basis for their home-grown projects given the size and complexity of that design, most of their home-built Tribals didn't complete until near the end of the war. Something smaller like the J-class might have been better perhaps?

India seems a mystery to me. The Royal Indian Marine played a support role in WW1, but wasn't even given combatant status until 1928 and didn't become the Royal Indian Navy until 1934. It was a tiny force, though with 5 modern sloops in 1939. Indian construction seems to have begun around 1940, mostly lower-end minesweepers and trawlers, with a lot of those contracts begin cancelled eventually, presumably as the war outpaced construction. Even in 1945 it was still exclusively a sloop and frigate force with quite a large collection of landing craft to support the 14th Army. 250,000 personnel in 1945 sounds a lot but compared to the Army it was miniscule (the Indian Air Force was also quite small, they did have problems finding enough qualified officer candidates, which have impacted naval recruitment as well).
I find it odd that given how India was perceived as 'jewel' and used as justification for holding the Suez Canal (and the Med in general) and Singapore as bastions on either side that comparatively little attempt was made to grow a larger trade protection force sooner or that the British Raj wasn't leant on to provide more cash to the Admiralty. Even Malaya clubbed together to buy a QE-class battleship and India was far richer. Perhaps the rather labyrinthine administration of India (which did not get Dominion status until 1947) prevented that?
But imagine if the RIN had funded a trio of light cruisers in the 1930s, or even another pair of 8in cruisers?

I suspect that encouraging Indian industry would also have the benefit of weakening the antipathy many Indians felt towards the Raj. Imagine if India could supply vehicles and weapons, including artillery and aircraft, to the Commonwealth air and ground forces in Burma and Malaya or the RIN and RIAF could fight in the Pacific and CBI theaters.

 

[EwenS]

4) Establish construction and repair facilities in India and Australia.

I've been having some thoughts along these lines recently, I'd include Canada in that too. Canada attempted to kickstart a naval dockyard pre-WW1 but it never happened. It didn't really get into its stride until 1939 onwards. Canada's Navy was only formed in 1910 (Royal status in 1911) so that may have stifled attempts to grow, although they nearly did supply funds for three QE-class battleships.

Canada's problem is the two coasts spread far apart.

Until 1905 Britain maintained Royal Navy Dockyards on both east (at Halifax) and west (at Esquimalt) coasts. Both were transferred into Canadian hands between 1905 & 1907. The latter certainly had a dry dock c700ft long.

Then in 1924 The Canadian Govt funded construction of the Esquimalt Graving Dock across the harbour from the Navy Yard. This was to cash in on the refit market for the larger passenger ships beginning to operate in the Pacific, so that they didn't have to head south to the USA. It was capable of taking the largest ships then able to use the Panama Canal and is still in use today. RMS Queen Elizabeth docked there in Feb 1942.

Ian Johnston published a short article in Warship 2017 about plans he unearthed in the Fairfield archives in Glasgow, for a new Canadian shipbuilding yard dating to 1910/11. 3 plans of steadily increasing size ending up in one to cover 140 acres. To put that in context, the largest yards in Britain did not exceed 100 acres. It was to have had 11 building berths of 1,000ft, 800ft, 600ft and 6 of 500ft and a large dry dock. This may have been intended to be a collaborative effort between Fairfield, John Brown and Cammell Laird who had already formed Coventry Ordnance Works in Britain to compete with Vickers. It would have needed substantial orders to be viable. But this was a time of worry about Germany perhaps outbuilding Britain.

Around the same time Vickers began works on a much smaller yard at Montreal.

Australia's shipbuilding capacity was insufficient given its defence needs of the time, it wasn't until into WW2 that they really got into their stride with destroyers, frigates and minesweepers. The Navy itself, formed in 1901 (Royal title in 1911) grew fairly rapidly.

It seems odd to me that Canada and Australia both selected the Tribal-class destroyer as the basis for their home-grown projects given the size and complexity of that design, most of their home-built Tribals didn't complete until near the end of the war. Something smaller like the J-class might have been better perhaps?

Friedman in "British Destroyers and Frigates The Second World War and After" wrote:-

"The Australians expected to have to deal with raiders in any future war, and their cruiser fleet was limited, and so they may well have emphasised the quasi-cruiser role. In February 1936 the Admiralty advised the RAN to build a unit of four large destroyers, and in June the Australian Naval Staff chose the 'Tribal' class. The Government postponed any decision, but in October 1938, with war clearly imminent, it approved a programme including three 'Tribals' (later reduced to two) plus 12 MTBs. The MTBs were later eliminated in favour of two more 'Tribals', only one of which, Bataan was built."

Australia ordered its first pair of Tribals in January 1939, over a year before the Canadians. That pair, Arunta & Warramunga, completed in 1942. A third ship, Bataan (ex Kurnai) ordered in Dec 1939 didn't complete until May 1945.

In May 1939 the Australian Chiefs of Staff were recommending acquisition of a further 4 Tribals as part of an RAN expansion plan, but that did not proceed. By 1943 however RAN interest had shifted to the Battle class.

Canada chose the Tribals because of its heavier gun armament accoding to John English in "Afridi to Nizam" or as Friedman put it "for their cruiser-like qualities". Friedman again:-

By November 1936 the RCN force goal was a total of eighteen modern destroyers, but until January 1939 the Canadian Government agreed only to buy six. At that time, with war clearly imminent, the government proposed to lay down two 'Tribals' in Canada in each of the next six years, as well as numerous smaller units. The first major Canadian building programme was approved on 19 September, soon after Canada entered the war. A three-year programme approved in October 1939 called for completion of the first two years' worth of ships, including four destroyers, during the first year and a half. Two more destroyers would be ordered in each of the following two years, for a total of eight."

The original plan was to build them in Canada but Canadian yards did not then have the capacity to do so. So a bit of horse trading went on. Britain ordered 10 corvettes in Canada which was supposed to equate to the cost of 2 Tribals. The Admiralty then acted as agent for the Canadian Govt, placing orders with Parsons in April 1940, with the hulls subcontracted to Vickers Armstrong. A second pair were ordered in the same way on 1 March 1941. They completed Dec 1942-Sept 1943.

After some indecision about what to build, April 1941 saw a pair of Tribals ordered from Halifax Shipyards but it was over a year until they could be laid down. Initially their machinery was to be built in Britain but when the final pair were ordered in 1942 it became economic to have the machinery for all 4 built in Canada. The first, Micmac, didn't complete until Sept 1945.

India seems a mystery to me. The Royal Indian Marine played a support role in WW1, but wasn't even given combatant status until 1928 and didn't become the Royal Indian Navy until 1934. It was a tiny force, though with 5 modern sloops in 1939. Indian construction seems to have begun around 1940, mostly lower-end minesweepers and trawlers, with a lot of those contracts begin cancelled eventually, presumably as the war outpaced construction. Even in 1945 it was still exclusively a sloop and frigate force with quite a large collection of landing craft to support the 14th Army. 250,000 personnel in 1945 sounds a lot but compared to the Army it was miniscule (the Indian Air Force was also quite small, they did have problems finding enough qualified officer candidates, which have impacted naval recruitment as well).
I find it odd that given how India was perceived as 'jewel' and used as justification for holding the Suez Canal (and the Med in general) and Singapore as bastions on either side that comparatively little attempt was made to grow a larger trade protection force sooner or that the British Raj wasn't leant on to provide more cash to the Admiralty. Even Malaya clubbed together to buy a QE-class battleship and India was far richer. Perhaps the rather labyrinthine administration of India (which did not get Dominion status until 1947) prevented that?
But imagine if the RIN had funded a trio of light cruisers in the 1930s, or even another pair of 8in cruisers?

India is a bit of a mystery to me as well. From my reading it was run almost as a completely separate entity, with only a light touch from London. It funded its own existence and armed services and supported a British presence of about 60,000 troops interwar IIRC. Until 1937 India included Burma, after which the latter became a separate Crown Colony reporting direct to Whitehall. And of course it had nothing to do with Malaya or the other colonies, except for providing some troops as time went on.

For the Indian Government the threat interwar continued to be that of the 19th century - the tribesmen of the North West Frontier and the threat of the "Russian Bear" via Afghanistan. So a navy was of little use to them. And look at the geography. Singapore was about 1,500 miles from Rangoon and 1,800 miles from Calcutta. The developing threat from Japan was even further away. If you are simply defending your patch then contributing to the defence of the larger Empire is not your job.

The problem in India was that although it had a huge population, the bulk of it was very poorly educated if at all. So the output from the technical schools was rapidly absorbed into the local economy. I've seen it put this way as regards the IAF (it didn't become the RIAF until March 1945) - what would a technically qualified person rather do in 1920/30s India? Sign up for the IAF and serve on the inhospitable and dusty North West Frontier against tribesmen looking to kill you, or take a civilian job, which probably paid better, on something like the Indian Railways where there were good hopes of promotion. Interwar the role the RAF developed for itself was keeping the local tribes around the Empire in check. And it was a more cost effective way of doing so than deploying a large army. And it didn't want to start losing that role.

I've read somewhere that by the 1930s, India was no longer the jewel in the crown and was actually becoming a drain on the Empire's finances. And the whole point about the Empire was to use it as a source of raw materials to keep British manufacturing thriving with a ready and almost captive market for its goods. So you don't want to encourage the locals to compete with home business. And when it came to raw materials Malaya and the colonies in Borneo had become far more valuable, supplying tin, rubber, oil etc to Britain. But India, and especially Ceylon, was a necessary stepping stone to get to those further flung corners of Empire.

When it came to the naval vessels, India proved capable of building 4 Bangor class minesweepers (completed Oct 1943-March 1945) and 22 Isles class trawlers (completed 1942-44) but much of their machinery was supplied from Britain. Another 23 Isles class were cancelled, mostly in 1945, despite orders for them having been placed as far back as Sept 1941. Below that it was ML/HDML types and landing craft of mainly wooden construction.

The expansion of the RIN in WW2 in terms of its larger ships came from Britain in the shape of 6 Black Swan class sloops, 9 Bangor class minesweepers and 4 Modified Flower class corvettes, plus 2 River class frigates transferred for RIN manning in summer 1945. Australia also contributed 4 Bathhurst class dual purpose AS/MS vessels.

 

[Hood]

Thankyou EwenS for putting more detail onto my bare bones argument.
I had Ian Johnston's Warship 2017 article in mind when I wrote my post. Probably also of relevance is David Boursnell's article in the same book on Armour Plate Pool and the shady goings on there. So yes plenty of vested interests in not spreading shipbuilding too far across the Empire (especially in view of the overcapacity only a decade later which lasted into the 1930s).

I can see some justification for building Tribals in those contexts, but probably still not the most sensible way to create a domestic industry around them.

You make a good point about skilled Indian middle-class labour (let's face it most pilots in that era were middle class or above) seeking other, non-hazardous and more profitable employment elsewhere. Also serving in the armed forces probably wasn't a popular move for all the political implications that brings in terms of upholding the rule of the Raj.

 

[atpollard]

As long as we are going to speculate and employ 20/20 hindsight ... why not open it up to "precognitive hindsight" and posit 'A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court' alternative history. What would you build starting at the end of WW1 to prepare to fight WW2 using what you know of tactics at the end of WW2? Battleships have been discarded and Carriers and Cruisers rule the sea today, so would a Carrier/Cruiser strategy have worked at the start of WW2 if you knew WHICH ships and planes to build in numbers?

[As a 'Yank', I am at a disadvantage discussing specifics of the RN in ANY period.]

 

[Pirate Pete]

With reference to John Jordan’s article in Warship 2017, could anyone elaborate on the ‘proposals’?
Unfortunately I do not have a copy of, or access to a copy for that year and Amazon are asking an absurd amount for that particular year!

 

[Pirate Pete]

As atpollard quite rightly says, this subject can easily wander into the realms of fantasy, however, the following come from Friedmans British Carrier Aviation and British Battleships 1906-45…they give the initial Admiralty ‘plans’ for a post-war fleet - Capital ships and Carriers at least…
I will have to consult his British Cruisers, Two World Wars and after, plus his other tomes for ‘lesser’ vessels…

 

[Scott Kenny]

New carrier aircraft (sorry, the Swordfish is hideously obsolete!)

Standardize on one caliber of DP gun, use it on EVERYTHING, much like the US did with the 5"/38. Doesn't matter which caliber, though I'd suggest something in the middle like either the 4.5" or 4.7". Or maybe steal the design for the US 5"/38, but I know Not Invented Here.

 

[Pirate Pete]

New carrier aircraft (sorry, the Swordfish is hideously obsolete!)

Standardize on one caliber of DP gun, use it on EVERYTHING, much like the US did with the 5"/38. Doesn't matter which caliber, though I'd suggest something in the middle like either the 4.5" or 4.7". Or maybe steal the design for the US 5"/38, but I know Not Invented Here.

You’ve just shown how ‘difficult’ this subject is going to be…
Yes, the Swordfish was ‘hideously obsolete’, BUT, that was when it made it to frontline service in the Real World.
Don’t forget, up until, was it 1937ish? aircraft procurement was very much controlled by tge R.A.F., and the Navy’s requirements were very much second fiddle.
As regards medium guns…
In the immediate post ‘Great War’ period I would look at the 4.7in as the weapon to for…
It was light enough for manual loading (destroyers etc), and, it was flexible enough for A.A. fire - hence it’s selection for the real world Nelson and Rodney.
What MIGHT come later for Capital Ships could be something more akin to semi-automatic/powered turrets, like the 4.5in design fitted to Renown etc, etc, BUT, sticking with the 4.7 calibre.
It’s going to be difficult to avoid claims that it’s not heavy enough to stop later Destroyer designs, but…THAT is yet another rabbit hole to try to avoid.

 

[Hood]

New carrier aircraft (sorry, the Swordfish is hideously obsolete!)

Five crippled battleships
Three crippled cruisers
Two destroyers sunk
98,000 tons of shipping sunk in one month alone from Maltese bases (average was 50,000 tons monthly in 1941)
14 U-boats sunk

Not too shabby at all.
What did the TBD Devastator get, one carrier....
There is no reason to suppose the Swordfish would have performed better just by having a monoplane wing (see the Skua).

Time and place matter, the Swordfish was still operating against E-Boats at night in 1945. Even a dated aircraft can score successes, Swordfish were ideal for nocturnal raids and in operations outside the range of land-based fighters.

 

[Pirate Pete]

Five crippled battleships
Three crippled cruisers
Two destroyers sunk
98,000 tons of shipping sunk in one month alone from Maltese bases (average was 50,000 tons monthly in 1941)
14 U-boats sunk

Not too shabby at all.
What did the TBD Devastator get, one carrier....
There is no reason to suppose the Swordfish would have performed better just by having a monoplane wing (see the Skua).

Time and place matter, the Swordfish was still operating against E-Boats at night in 1945. Even a dated aircraft can score successes, Swordfish were ideal for nocturnal raids and in operations outside the range of land-based fighters.

I agree with your recap of the Swordfish’s achievements, and admit that my description did rather unfairly write-it-off. Whilst it was (technically) obsolete by the time it entered front-line service it served with distinction for a LONG time

 

[Scott Kenny]

You’ve just shown how ‘difficult’ this subject is going to be…
Yes, the Swordfish was ‘hideously obsolete’, BUT, that was when it made it to frontline service in the Real World.
Don’t forget, up until, was it 1937ish? aircraft procurement was very much controlled by tge R.A.F., and the Navy’s requirements were very much second fiddle.

So our alternate timeline needs a carrier aircraft champion, someone with enough oomph to their awards and status to get Navy requirements made more important.

While I don't have a name, I'm thinking about anyone from the RNAS that was an ace, and/or a significant medal winner, and/or a noble.

As regards medium guns…
In the immediate post ‘Great War’ period I would look at the 4.7in as the weapon to for…
It was light enough for manual loading (destroyers etc), and, it was flexible enough for A.A. fire - hence it’s selection for the real world Nelson and Rodney.
What MIGHT come later for Capital Ships could be something more akin to semi-automatic/powered turrets, like the 4.5in design fitted to Renown etc, etc, BUT, sticking with the 4.7 calibre.
It’s going to be difficult to avoid claims that it’s not heavy enough to stop later Destroyer designs, but…THAT is yet another rabbit hole to try to avoid.

4.7" is plenty big, and as long as the post-war powered gun turret has a similar rate of fire as the 4.5in in our timeline, that's perfectly acceptable. 20rpm with a shell weight between 45 and 70lbs.

Five crippled battleships
Three crippled cruisers
Two destroyers sunk
98,000 tons of shipping sunk in one month alone from Maltese bases (average was 50,000 tons monthly in 1941)
14 U-boats sunk

Not too shabby at all.
What did the TBD Devastator get, one carrier....
There is no reason to suppose the Swordfish would have performed better just by having a monoplane wing (see the Skua).

Time and place matter, the Swordfish was still operating against E-Boats at night in 1945. Even a dated aircraft can score successes, Swordfish were ideal for nocturnal raids and in operations outside the range of land-based fighters.

Still a biplane with a 690hp engine, still obsolete. And when talking about carrier aircraft, you also need to include the work of the dive bombers. Could also include any level bombers, too, but level bombers generally suck for naval targets and are primarily used against ground targets, so I am not including level bombers.

Between the SBD and TBD,
10 carriers sunk or damaged,
14 cruisers sunk or damaged,
6 destroyers sunk,
15 transport or cargo ships sunk,

And I'm not going to get into the SB2C and TBF scores, they're at least 2 generations ahead of the Swordfish.

 

[EwenS]

Hhhhmmmmm

SBD-1 service entry was late 1940 with USMC, SBD-2 to USN in early 1941 with SBD-3 later that year.

In the second half of the 1930s the USN dive bombers were SB2U Vindicator (from Dec 1937), BT-1 (from 1938) and the biplane SBC (from mid 1937). These were replacing earlier biplane dive bomber types. The SBC-4 was still in front line service in 1942 on the Hornet before she went to the Pacific.

As for the USN and torpedo bombers, the torpedo was out of favour as a weapon in the early 1930s. At one point there was only a single biplane TB squadron in the USN. The Ranger completed in 1934 without any provision at all for carrying torpedoes, a situation that persisted until 1941/42. Design of the TBD only began in 1934 with service entry in 1937.

 

[Pirate Pete]

I know this is jumping from ‘Capital’ to ‘Minor’ ships…Cruisers and Destroyers will follow…
These are from Friedman’s British Submarines in Two World Wars…They give an indication if original Admiralty Plans (hopes)…

 

[EwenS]

This might help save people some work.

Royal Navy Organisation and Ship Deployment, Inter-War Years 1919-1939

It goes down to the level of each ship in service as you scroll down the page or click on the links.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

It's supposed to be more than real history, but I didn't think about the exact amount.

In that case and if it was up to me I'd implement as much of the Admiralty's 10-Year Plan of 1924 as the extra money would allow.

This was the plan according to Volume 1 of "British Naval Policy Between the Wars" by Stephen Roskill.

Submarines

80 all to be built within the next ten years.​

The building rate suggests that in 1924 the service life of a submarine was set at 10 years.​

There would be:​

8 fleet submarines​

12 cruiser submarines​

60 overseas patrol submarines​

Aircraft Carriers

4 of 17,000 tons to be built over 10 years.​

They would be laid down at the rate of one every 3 or 4 years, take 3 or 4 years to build and be completed 1928-38.​

In 1938 there would be 7 fleet aircraft carriers consisting of these ships, plus Courageous, Glorious and Furious.​

3 of 10,000 tons for trade protection in narrow seas.​

Battleships

Sufficient capacity to produce armour, shells and guns for two capital ships per annum in 1931 and later years should be maintained.​

Cruisers

70 of which 10 could be more than 15 years of age (which would require an average building rate of 4 per year) but:​

8 ships to be laid down in the years 1924, 1925 and 1926, which were to be completed by 1929.​

4 ships to be laid down in each succeeding year.​

The 4 extra cruisers in 1924, 1925 & 1926 were required to have a total of 70 cruisers in 1929. Of which 59 would be underage and 11 would be overage.​

31 would be for fleet work.​

39 would be for trade defence. This includes the 11 overage ships.​

Destroyers

15 flotillas, each of 9 ships for a total of 135.​

At this time the service life of a destroyer was 12 years. This suggests that 12 flotillas were intended to screen the capital ships and 3 were for local defence.​

2 prototypes to be ordered 1924​

10 flotillas to be built at a rate of 2 per year 1926-30​

5 flotillas to be built at a rate of 1 per year 1931-35​

Minor War Vessels

1 experimental anti-submarine vessel. 100 were needed in the event of a war with France.​

40 fleet minesweepers by 1939.​

Auxiliaries

2 minelayers​

2 tanker-netlayers​

5 destroyer depot ships​

4 submarine depot ships​

1 depot ship for the Mobile Naval Base​

There was a requirement for a considerable number of armament, victualing store issue ships and fleet repair ships similar to the USN Fleet Train.​

Cost

£262½ million was the original estimate.​

 

[Pirate Pete]

Nomisyrruc - An excellent suggestion, the only criticism I would gave is that the 1924 Programme was subject to Treaty Qualitative limitations on vessel sizes.
In this ‘Other World’, I for-see the G3’s being built, but not the N3’s with their 18-in guns…
I think a combination of the Admiralties original Post-War ‘wish list’ and the 1924 plan being what we’re looking for here…
The idea of the Dominions contributing to an ‘Empire’ Fleet definitely has merit. This was an idea very much in vogue post war.

The ‘big’ cruisers, I see being ‘updates’ of the ‘Hawkins’ class, and using the 7.5-in gun -
Smaller Cruisers, still using 6-in guns (the idea of using 5.5-in guns as per Hoods secondaries and the ‘appropriated’ Greek cruisers (in the R.N. Birkenhead and Chester) would just overly complicate supply matters).
Destroyers etc, use the 4.7-in as already suggested - it would also make for a decent Secondary and D.P. gun for cruisers and big ships.

People have referred to the so-calked ‘White’ Dominions already, and, with a change of Political will, I think that the later 1930’s ‘Government of India Act’, with a bit of tweaking (sorry Establishment Whitehall and Raj Mandarins) would result in proper Dominion status for India, thereby avoiding, or at least very much stifling, the ‘Brits out’ movement.

 

[Pirate Pete]

Also…
By all means introduce the ‘10 Year Rule’, but NOT have the absurdity of it becoming self-perpetuating. Like post WW2 and the idea of the ‘Year of Greatest Danger’ - 1957 - make it as originally planned as 1928.
This gives a reasonable date to work towards for initial planning purposes.
Suggestions must be kept realistic, so, apart from the Navy keeping control if its Air Service (it’s very tempting to smother the RAF as a third force at birth, and keep the Army’s RFC and the Navys RNAS) THAT might be step too far?!

 

[Scott Kenny]

Hhhhmmmmm

SBD-1 service entry was late 1940 with USMC, SBD-2 to USN in early 1941 with SBD-3 later that year.

In the second half of the 1930s the USN dive bombers were SB2U Vindicator (from Dec 1937), BT-1 (from 1938) and the biplane SBC (from mid 1937). These were replacing earlier biplane dive bomber types. The SBC-4 was still in front line service in 1942 on the Hornet before she went to the Pacific.

As for the USN and torpedo bombers, the torpedo was out of favour as a weapon in the early 1930s. At one point there was only a single biplane TB squadron in the USN. The Ranger completed in 1934 without any provision at all for carrying torpedoes, a situation that persisted until 1941/42. Design of the TBD only began in 1934 with service entry in 1937.

Right. But the problem was that the carriers and carrier aircraft had no champion to push for replacement in the RN, so the RN spent much of WW2 using 1930s aircraft instead of 1940s aircraft.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Part of Post 24.

So our alternate timeline needs a carrier aircraft champion, someone with enough oomph to their awards and status to get Navy requirements made more important.

While I don't have a name, I'm thinking about anyone from the RNAS that was an ace, and/or a significant medal winner, and/or a noble.

I suggest Arthur Longmore who was one of the first four naval officers to be selected for pilot training.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Nomisyrruc - An excellent suggestion, the only criticism I would gave is that the 1924 Programme was subject to Treaty Qualitative limitations on vessel sizes.
In this ‘Other World’, I for-see the G3’s being built, but not the N3’s with their 18-in guns…
I think a combination of the Admiralties original Post-War ‘wish list’ and the 1924 plan being what we’re looking for here…

My idea is to make the Point of Departure (POD) around 1921-22. That is have the same Washington Treaty as the "Real World" but don't have the Geddes Axe.

Total Defence Spending in the Financial Year 1921-22 was £189.4 million and didn't return to that level until 1936-37 (the first Financial Year of full scale rearmament) when it was £186.1 million. It was reduced to £111.0 million in 1922-23 and the average for the 14 Financial Years 1922-23 to 1935-36 was £113.64 million.

The figures for Naval Expenditure were £80.8 million in 1921-22 and didn't return to that level until 1936-37 when it was £81.1 million. It was reduced to £56.2 million in 1922-23 and the average for the 14 Financial Years 1922-23 to 1935-36 was £55.8 million.

So depending upon how it's done Naval Expenditure was.

• About £24 million or 30% less in the period 1922-23 to 1935-36 than it had been in 1921-22 and would be in 1936-37.
• About £24 million or 43% more in 1921-22 and 1936-37 than it had been in the 14 financial years 1922-23 to 1935-36.

In the 1921-22 Financial Year Total Government Expenditure was £1,079.2 million, but Total Revenue was £1,124.9 million so there was a Surplus of £45.7 million which was 4.2% of Revenue.

In 1922-23 Expenditure was reduced to £812.5 million and Revenue was reduced to £914.0 million producing a Surplus of £101.5 million which was 12.5% of Revenue.

However, there was a further reduction in Revenue in 1923-24 to £837.2 million and a further reduction in Expenditure to £788.8 million which produced a surplus of 48.3 million which was 6.1% of Revenue.

For the next 12 Financial Years (1924-25 to 1935-36) Total Revenue fluctuated between about £800 & £860 million and Total Expenditure fluctuated between about £780 & £880 million. During this period the maximum Surplus was £31.1 million (4.0% of Revenue) in 1933-34 and the maximum Deficit was £36.7 million (4.4% of Revenue) in 1926-27.

The averages for the 14 Financial Years 1922-23 to 1935-36 were £832.7 million for Revenue, £825.7 million for Expenditure with an average Surplus of £7.0 million which was 0.8% of the average Revenue.

In 1936-37 the first Financial Year of full scale rearmament Total Revenue and Total Expenditure were £896.6 million and £902.2 million respectively. Both were about £50 million more than the previous financial year. This was not surprising because Total Defence Expenditure was about £50 million more than 1935-36 (£186.1 million v £136.9 million). What was surprising was that although Defence Spending had returned to pre-Geddes Axe levels, Revenue and Expenditure had not. They were £228.3 million and £177.0 million less than 1921-22 respectively.

That was in part due to the cost of servicing the National Debt. In 1921-22 the Total National Debt Service was £332.3 million and in 1935-36 it was £224.0 million. There had been no reduction in the National Debt because according to my source it was £7,720.5 million at 31st March 1922 and £7,901.6 million at 31st March 1936. However, there had been a refinancing of the National Debt in the early 1930s. The average Total National Debt Service for the 11 financial years 1922-23 to 1932-33 was £350.8 million, but for the next 4 years (1933-34 to 1936-37) it was £224.0 million, which is a reduction of about £125 million.

To summarise, the Post-War ‘wish list’ remains a wish list in this "version of history" and there is the same Washington Naval Treaty. However, most of the 1924 Plan is implemented because there Geddes Axe didn't happen with the result that Total Government Revenue and Expenditure remain at 1921-22 levels until the middle of the 1930s.

If there was a First London Naval Treaty in this "version of history" the tonnage quotas for cruisers, destroyers and submarines would have to be considerably larger for the British Commonwealth on account of the extra ships built by the UK during the second half of the 1930s and the British Delegation would want enough tonnage for 70 cruisers (including a larger number of heavy cruisers due to the extra County class that were built) instead of 50 and enough tonnage for at least 16 flotillas of destroyers (which is what the Admiralty wanted) instead of enough for 12 flotillas (which is what it got). However, it would also mean that the USA and Japan would also have larger tonnage quotas for cruisers, destroyers and submarines in order to maintain the ratios between these nations.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Post 2.

Are we allowed to spend more money? And if we are... How much more?

Post 3.

It's supposed to be more than real history, but I didn't think about the exact amount.

Is what I've proposed in Post 33 acceptable?

That is Total Defence Expenditure is maintained at 1921-22 levels for the 14 Financial Years 1922-23 to 1935-36. For the Royal Navy this means an increase in average spending from about £56 million a year to about £80 million, which is £24 million or 43% more per annum.

 

[Pirate Pete]

Nomisyrruc…
Your suggestion is excellent. As you say, the Admiralty’s ‘wish list’ is going to be their ideal, but, in all reality a pipe-dream.
With no Geddes Axe, and no perpetual ten-year rule, the Royal Navy should be able to reach a balanced and up-to-date fleet.

 

[EwenS]

Right. But the problem was that the carriers and carrier aircraft had no champion to push for replacement in the RN, so the RN spent much of WW2 using 1930s aircraft instead of 1940s aircraft.

No champion?

As for carriers, Britain had the largest fleet going into the 1930s and laid down more carriers than the USN before the end of 1939 (8 v 5) or for that matter the Japanese. Rear Admiral Henderson, appointed Rear Admiral Aircraft Carriers in 1931, was responsible for much development through the 1930s of RN carrier tactics, with which the USN only caught up on after it entered WW2, and later in design of the ships themselves. Unfortunately he was forced to retire through ill health in March 1939 before dying 2 months later before he saw his work come to fruition.

The Swordfish entered service in 1936. The Specs for its replacement began to be issued later that year and were consolidated into Spec 41/36 issued 11/2/37. Various monoplane & biplane options were offered by the aircraft companies before the biplane offering from Fairey that led to the Albacore was accepted. But for various reasons its production was delayed.

Within a year, on 6 Jan 1938, Spec S24/37 was issued for what became the Barracuda. Had an unfortunate sequence of events not occurred, like WW2 breaking out, It would have been produced between April 1941 & April 1942. Instead the start of production was delayed by a year and due to a very slow buildup, service entry was delayed until Jan 1943. And by 1940 there were signs of the Admiralty looking to the next generation.

So the start of the replacement cycle wasn't the problem. Whether those were the right choices as replacements at the times they were made is a different question. This was peacetime so aircraft did not go through the accelerated development cycles that became the norm once war broke out. And many of the delays were unavoidable given the outbreak of WW2 and the changing priorities

But was the USN any better? After the TBD Devastator (developed 1934-37) the next TB ordered was the TBF Avenger in 1940 off the drawing board.

After the SB2U/BT-1/SBC dive bombers that entered service in 1937/38, (developed 1934-38) The SBD emerged in 1938 as a heavily modified BT-1 with production starting in April 1940 and initial sevice entry as noted in my earlier post. The SB2C began development in mid-1939 with production beginning in late 1942.

The dispute between the RN and the RAF started in the late 1920s grew immeasurably worse in the early 1930s until finally the Inskip report published in mid-1937 recommended handing control of the FAA back to the RN, something that didn't finally occur until May 1939. But in the period after 1937, co-operation on a technical level actually improved with many more meetings of the technical committees occurring than had done in the first part of the decade. But not having control of its own air arm, and not being able to talk to industry about what was possible during a period of rapid aircraft development, meant that the Admiralty had , with hindsight, an overly conservative approach to aircraft selection as the decade went on (e.g. in selection of the Albacore over a monoplane design). Once it had full control it is remarkable just how quickly things began to change. For example out went the turret fighter concept and in came a request to develop a 400mph fighter in Jan 1940. The USN had only requested development of the Vought F4U about 18 months earlier.

But quite frankly the US naval aviation benefitted immeasurable from an extra 2 years of peace. Had it gone to war in 1939 just look at what it would have been flying, and the ships that it would have been flying them from. It was in 1940 that the Essex class design grew from the initial 20k tons to the final 27.5k tons. Then add to that US industrial might with which no country in the world could compete with.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

The sources for this were the Navy Estimates 1931-32 and 1939-40.

 

[Scott Kenny]

No champion?

You know, no "person of sufficient skill and stature that their recommendations couldn't be ignored." Someone to push for newer designs. Less conservative designs.

As for carriers, Britain had the largest fleet going into the 1930s and laid down more carriers than the USN before the end of 1939 (8 v 5) or for that matter the Japanese. Rear Admiral Henderson, appointed Rear Admiral Aircraft Carriers in 1931, was responsible for much development through the 1930s of RN carrier tactics, with which the USN only caught up on after it entered WW2, and later in design of the ships themselves. Unfortunately he was forced to retire through ill health in March 1939 before dying 2 months later before he saw his work come to fruition.

Having the most carriers doesn't help when the aircraft you're flying off them are just as old as the carriers.

The dispute between the RN and the RAF started in the late 1920s grew immeasurably worse in the early 1930s until finally the Inskip report published in mid-1937 recommended handing control of the FAA back to the RN, something that didn't finally occur until May 1939. But in the period after 1937, co-operation on a technical level actually improved with many more meetings of the technical committees occurring than had done in the first part of the decade. But not having control of its own air arm, and not being able to talk to industry about what was possible during a period of rapid aircraft development, meant that the Admiralty had , with hindsight, an overly conservative approach to aircraft selection as the decade went on (e.g. in selection of the Albacore over a monoplane design). Once it had full control it is remarkable just how quickly things began to change. For example out went the turret fighter concept and in came a request to develop a 400mph fighter in Jan 1940. The USN had only requested development of the Vought F4U about 18 months earlier.

lolwut?!?

The UK was that (all the expletives deleted) stupid?

Explains a lot.

 

[EwenS]

Go back and read a bit of British history in WW1. 1917 the Smuts Report. Recommended the merger of the Royal Naval Air Service and the Royal Flying Corps. Result? Formation of the Royal Air Force on 1 April 1918. It seemed like a good idea at the time, especially given everything the RNAS was involved in, other than just flying from carriers.

History of the Royal Air Force - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

https://openeclass.panteion.gr/modules/document/file.php/TME135/Smuts%20Report.pdf

This was still the very early days of aviation. Your clearly ill informed comment incorporates a great deal of 20/20 hindsight.

Remind me when was the USAF formed? 1947.

And has its history with those elements of aviation it did not gain control of always been smooth? No.

H-0178-1 The Revolt of the Admirals

H-Gram 078, Attachment 1 Peter C. Luebke, PhD, NHHC History Advisory Group March 2023

www.history.navy.mil

 

[Scott Kenny]

Go back and read a bit of British history in WW1. 1917 the Smuts Report. Recommended the merger of the Royal Naval Air Service and the Royal Flying Corps. Result? Formation of the Royal Air Force on 1 April 1918. It seemed like a good idea at the time, especially given everything the RNAS was involved in, other than just flying from carriers.

History of the Royal Air Force - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

https://openeclass.panteion.gr/modules/document/file.php/TME135/Smuts%20Report.pdf

This was still the very early days of aviation.

What books do you recommend, then?

Your clearly ill informed comment incorporates a great deal of 20/20 hindsight.

Remind me when was the USAF formed? 1947.

And has its history with those elements of aviation it did not gain control of always been smooth? No.

H-0178-1 The Revolt of the Admirals

H-Gram 078, Attachment 1 Peter C. Luebke, PhD, NHHC History Advisory Group March 2023

www.history.navy.mil

IMO, forming the USAF was one of the greatest mistakes the US has ever done. Or at least giving the USAF control of fighters and light bombers was a mistake. Army needs to directly control the aviation assets used to support it tactically and maybe operationally.