Alternative Montana Class Design with 8in Secondaries

I disagree going from the historical record. There is only about 30 battleship on battleship encounters. Every one of them shows big guns are most dangerous at range whereas all large caliber guns above even 5" diameter are potent when within effective ranges. No warship ever could withstand constant hits from any large caliber weapon. In almost every engagement in the era it was hits by cruisers that set up kills by big guns, mines, aircraft, or torpedoes. The biggest guns could surely lay waste with fewer shell strikes, but the lesson is the results of scoring actual hits quickly cause crippling injuries that then set up hits for kills. No battleship can protect itself from every hit, especially even more true when applied to the vast majority of warships falling below a battleship in size. While a 5" shell may not penetrate a 12 inch belt, there were plenty of instances where a 5" impact killed the command or knocked out steering or a boiler, none of which could be repaired at sea.
 
MadRat said:
I disagree going from the historical record. There is only about 30 battleship on battleship encounters. Every one of them shows big guns are most dangerous at range whereas all large caliber guns above even 5" diameter are potent when within effective ranges. No warship ever could withstand constant hits from any large caliber weapon. In almost every engagement in the era it was hits by cruisers that set up kills by big guns, mines, aircraft, or torpedoes. The biggest guns could surely lay waste with fewer shell strikes, but the lesson is the results of scoring actual hits quickly cause crippling injuries that then set up hits for kills. No battleship can protect itself from every hit, especially even more true when applied to the vast majority of warships falling below a battleship in size. While a 5" shell may not penetrate a 12 inch belt, there were plenty of instances where a 5" impact killed the command or knocked out steering or a boiler, none of which could be repaired at sea.
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How many of those BB-on-BB fights had two ships with all or nothing protection?
 
I'm not understanding your question. Seems a bit of a misdirect. All of these engagements in the Pacific theater involved fleet actions, and were not one on one battles. The bulk of Atlantic engagements tended to be much different especially after WW1. Atlantic engagements tended to involve smaller groups, mostly involving combinations of a consistently smaller number of battleships, battlecruisers, and cruisers with support from a smaller pool of destroyers. It was probably due in part to the primary strategy in the Pacific being to engage with overwhelming firepower upon an enemy.

The Atlantic engagements were more similar to cat and mouse games where the combatants were looking for even the smallest advantage to justify an engagement. Take the HMS Hood loss, its position and failure to reach the necessary speed to achieve its goal left it open to the German countermove that ultimately led to its demise. Like I said earlier, its companion was essentially crippled by an 8" hit, not shells from the Bismarck. If POW did not disengage then it would have suffered the same fate as the Hood.
 
Scott Kenny said:
25mm AA guns? Should I start laughing now?
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Rate of fire helps. There are currently about a dozen CIWS gun systems around that fire 20mm - 30 mm shells.
Goalkeeper, Phalanx, AK630 to name three. Those cheat with rotary guns.
Goalkeeper uses HEI, API, MPDS, FMPDS ammunition.
 
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MadRat said:
The Atlantic engagements were more similar to cat and mouse games where the combatants were looking for even the smallest advantage to justify an engagement. Take the HMS Hood loss, its position and failure to reach the necessary speed to achieve its goal left it open to the German countermove that ultimately led to its demise. Like I said earlier, its companion was essentially crippled by an 8" hit, not shells from the Bismarck. If POW did not disengage then it would have suffered the same fate as the Hood.
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Prince of Wales was not crippled at all, and she was hit multiple times by 15" shells from Bismarck. Prinz Eugen made a total of three hits on Prince of Wales, none of which appear to be notable.

Prince of Wales initially disengaged at 0605 on the 24th of May, but re-engaged Bismarck in concert with Norfolk and Suffolk at 1816 that afternoon, and and at 0100 the following day. Not exactly the actions of a crippled ship.
 
Indeed Prince of Wales took hits from Prinz Eugen after Hood was sunk, one 8in shell penetrated down to the shell/cartridge chamber under the aft 5.25 in turrets but failed to explode. That would have been a serious hit if it had exploded.
The only thing that crippled Prince of Wales was her own main turret problems - though luckily she broke off the engagement just before coming within range of Prinz Eugen's torpedoes.

There were only two Pacific battleship Vs battleship battles. Both took place at night and involved radar fire-control on US ships and oddly both were against a single Japanese battleship (being effectively a 1v1 and 5v1).

At the Second Naval Battle of Guadalcanal Kirishima had fired on South Dakota without much impact from her 14in shells, the medium calibre hits from Kirishima and her accompanying cruisers and destroyers were largely on to the superstructure, which destroyed radio and radar and other electrical system but did not materially threaten the ship other than to leave it without fire-control and thus vulnerable. Washington fired on Kirishima from 5,800yd yards. Kirishima was hit by at least 20 16in and 17 5in shells, but at that range it was practically point blank. In daylight the chances of Washington sneaking up that close were nil.

At Surigao Strait West Virginia struck Yamashiro at 22,800yd and scored hits from the first salvo. West Virginia fired a total of 93 shells, California 63, Tennessee 69 , Maryland 48 and Mississippi 12 (the last battleship Vs battleship salvo ever). A total of 285 heavy calibre shells. The cruisers fired over 2,000 rounds of 6in and 8in (Louisville alone firing 333 rounds). It was a pretty one-sided fight and Yamashiro was already slowed by 1 or 2 torpedo hits but it took another 2 torpedoes to actually sink the ship - which at that point had been attempting to accelerate to get out of the maelstrom so was still in some sense operational even if wrecked topside.
Given the one-sided battering its hard to determine who was having the most effect, no lone battleship is going to walk out of facing nearly 2,500 shells heading its way in good condition!

Any hit of any calibre is going to cause some kind of damage and by their very nature of being crowded with operational spaces, optical and electronic equipment - superstructure hits are more likely to hit something vital, even if its only splinters flying around. Ironically the advantages radar brought in fire-control accuracy were paradoxically flimsy and thus easier to knock out.
 
A Tentative Fleet Plan said:
Prince of Wales was not crippled at all, and she was hit multiple times by 15" shells from Bismarck. Prinz Eugen made a total of three hits on Prince of Wales, none of which appear to be notable.

Prince of Wales initially disengaged at 0605 on the 24th of May, but re-engaged Bismarck in concert with Norfolk and Suffolk at 1816 that afternoon, and and at 0100 the following day. Not exactly the actions of a crippled ship.
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She took hits from both Bismarck and Prinz Eugen, but it was the smaller weapons that got on target. One punctured 6 meters below her water line and the other damaged a 5.25" turret, the former causing some flooding. The latter would have likely caused a serious fire had it exploded. If those insignificant 8" shells actually exploded either event would have completely turned the tide of events. While Bismarck did some damage, none of the hits were effective. So much for the big guns being more accurate theory. The 8" guns were more effective simply due to having move opportunities to land hits due to their much higher rate of fire.

You can make it sound like every battle is at 30,000 meters but the truth is Hood received her kill shots well inside of 15,000 meters. And had POW not ran she would have received a torpedo broadside from Prinz Eugen. You may think that 8" hit below her waterline was incidental but it could have easily been the straw that broke the camel's back.
 
MadRat said:
She took hits from both Bismarck and Prinz Eugen, but it was the smaller weapons that got on target. One punctured 6 meters below her water line and the other damaged a 5.25" turret, the former causing some flooding. The latter would have likely caused a serious fire had it exploded. If those insignificant 8" shells actually exploded either event would have completely turned the tide of events. While Bismarck did some damage, none of the hits were effective. So much for the big guns being more accurate theory. The 8" guns were more effective simply due to having move opportunities to land hits due to their much higher rate of fire.
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Prinz Eugen made three hits, Bismarck in comparison managed four. If anything the 8" guns come off worse given their higher rate of fire.

MadRat said:
You can make it sound like every battle is at 30,000 meters but the truth is Hood received her kill shots well inside of 15,000 meters. And had POW not ran she would have received a torpedo broadside from Prinz Eugen.
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At the time Prinz Eugen planned to make her torpedo attack, Prince of Wales was sailing towards the German formation, not exactly an easy target. Plenty torpedo attacks were made in fleet actions during the Second World War, the vast majority did not hit.

MadRat said:
You may think that 8" hit below her waterline was incidental but it could have easily been the straw that broke the camel's back.
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I doubt it would be the straw that broke the camel's back, because none of the hits that Prince of Wales received, bar the 15" shell through the bridge, caused any serious damage.

The fuses of the shells that made the underwater hit on Prince of Wales had functioned correctly, they likely would have detonated underwater well before reaching the ship's sides. To take advantage of the diving effect, longer fuse delays were required.
 
If you want to see what light calibre hits do to a battleship you have to look at 1st Guadacanal and Hiei
 
Arjen said:
Rate of fire helps. There are currently about a dozen CIWS gun systems around that fire 20mm - 30 mm shells.
Goalkeeper, Phalanx, AK630 to name three. Those cheat with rotary guns.
Goalkeeper uses HEI, API, MPDS, FMPDS ammunition.
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Yes. But 25mm doesn't have the range to stop either dive bombers or torpedo bombers, and doesn't really have the ability to deal with glide bombs as used at the tail end of WW2. And even now, the desire is to replace Phalanx CIWS with RAM (or SeaRAM, for a completely independent launcher).

Remember that the USN was dropping Bofors 40mm for 3"/50 automatics at the end of the war, aiming at a "2 for 1" swap replacing a singe Bofors quad mount with a twin 3"/50 mount.
 
MadRat said:
I disagree going from the historical record. There is only about 30 battleship on battleship encounters. Every one of them shows big guns are most dangerous at range whereas all large caliber guns above even 5" diameter are potent when within effective ranges. No warship ever could withstand constant hits from any large caliber weapon. In almost every engagement in the era it was hits by cruisers that set up kills by big guns, mines, aircraft, or torpedoes. The biggest guns could surely lay waste with fewer shell strikes, but the lesson is the results of scoring actual hits quickly cause crippling injuries that then set up hits for kills. No battleship can protect itself from every hit, especially even more true when applied to the vast majority of warships falling below a battleship in size. While a 5" shell may not penetrate a 12 inch belt, there were plenty of instances where a 5" impact killed the command or knocked out steering or a boiler, none of which could be repaired at sea.
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During WW 2 there were about a dozen, if that, battleship on battleship actions. In almost every one of them, the most important aspect was the winning side had two or more battleships present versus one ship and the side that got rounds on target first usually won quite handily.

However, by early 1944, it was recognized, at least in the US and Royal Navies that the threat wasn't the gun, but the emerging use of missiles and other guided weapons. Naval planners could see the big gun had become an evolutionary dead end and had no future in naval warfare other than possibly some niche use like shore bombardment.
 
For a brief period, 1948-54, the concept of rapid-fire medium calibre guns to smash up topsides and all the fire-control equipment contained within does seem to have been a concept - for example the RN's Cruiser-Destroyer concept. This was probably a direct result of the naval actions of WW2 that seemed to imply that swarming over the enemy with mass of firepower paid off.

But the snag was always that you needed to ensure that you always had 2v1 or 3v1 scenarios to allow you to get in relatively close. And of course the danger was the enemy might develop automatic ~8in turrets like the Des Moines and then you would be in trouble. It soon became clear that using a couple of carrier-based bombers with ASMs (pref nuke-tipped) or ship-launched missiles (or even submarines) was a much cheaper option in terms of manpower and ships required and much less likely to result in serious losses.

The USN found itself in a rather unique position, the Kamikaze had such a psychological shock that it wanted to ensure maximum stopping power with a shell that could destroy an incoming aircraft - or first-generation missile - with one hit by allowing the use of VT. Everyone else did come to the same conclusion eventually - but again, after a brief 10-15 year window the SAM proved the better bet - especially as stand-off weapons meant that aircraft didn't have to approach within gun range anymore (though as the Falklands showed the era of dumb bomb attacks was by no means over until well into the 1990s).
The Soviets of course did invest in quad 45mm and 57mm mounts that were pretty impressive - though their service lives were quite short.
 
Hood said:
For a brief period, 1948-54, the concept of rapid-fire medium calibre guns to smash up topsides and all the fire-control equipment contained within does seem to have been a concept - for example the RN's Cruiser-Destroyer concept. This was probably a direct result of the naval actions of WW2 that seemed to imply that swarming over the enemy with mass of firepower paid off.

But the snag was always that you needed to ensure that you always had 2v1 or 3v1 scenarios to allow you to get in relatively close. And of course the danger was the enemy might develop automatic ~8in turrets like the Des Moines and then you would be in trouble. It soon became clear that using a couple of carrier-based bombers with ASMs (pref nuke-tipped) or ship-launched missiles (or even submarines) was a much cheaper option in terms of manpower and ships required and much less likely to result in serious losses.

The USN found itself in a rather unique position, the Kamikaze had such a psychological shock that it wanted to ensure maximum stopping power with a shell that could destroy an incoming aircraft - or first-generation missile - with one hit by allowing the use of VT. Everyone else did come to the same conclusion eventually - but again, after a brief 10-15 year window the SAM proved the better bet - especially as stand-off weapons meant that aircraft didn't have to approach within gun range anymore (though as the Falklands showed the era of dumb bomb attacks was by no means over until well into the 1990s).
The Soviets of course did invest in quad 45mm and 57mm mounts that were pretty impressive - though their service lives were quite short.
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I can agree with most of this, but with the SAM and ASM's the period mentioned was the one in which they were under development. The first really viable ones started into operational service about 1955, give or take a couple of years. Gun armament was simply a stop-gap holdover from WW 2 until those systems could be put into service. The Soviet Navy in this period was more focused on developing anti-ship guided weapons than a SAM, so it follows they'd invest more into new AA gun systems.
The US (Talos / Terrier / Tartar) and RN (Sea Slug) were pushing SAM systems--which shortly after being introduced gained a secondary capacity as ASM's as their primary threat was aircraft, not ships.
 
Hood said:
For a brief period, 1948-54, the concept of rapid-fire medium calibre guns to smash up topsides and all the fire-control equipment contained within does seem to have been a concept - for example the RN's Cruiser-Destroyer concept. This was probably a direct result of the naval actions of WW2 that seemed to imply that swarming over the enemy with mass of firepower paid off.

But the snag was always that you needed to ensure that you always had 2v1 or 3v1 scenarios to allow you to get in relatively close. And of course the danger was the enemy might develop automatic ~8in turrets like the Des Moines and then you would be in trouble. It soon became clear that using a couple of carrier-based bombers with ASMs (pref nuke-tipped) or ship-launched missiles (or even submarines) was a much cheaper option in terms of manpower and ships required and much less likely to result in serious losses.

The USN found itself in a rather unique position, the Kamikaze had such a psychological shock that it wanted to ensure maximum stopping power with a shell that could destroy an incoming aircraft - or first-generation missile - with one hit by allowing the use of VT. Everyone else did come to the same conclusion eventually - but again, after a brief 10-15 year window the SAM proved the better bet - especially as stand-off weapons meant that aircraft didn't have to approach within gun range anymore (though as the Falklands showed the era of dumb bomb attacks was by no means over until well into the 1990s).
The Soviets of course did invest in quad 45mm and 57mm mounts that were pretty impressive - though their service lives were quite short.
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I think that was more a matter of the USN et al pursuing relatively large caliber rapid fire guns as the interim solution until the SAMs developed enough to be serviceable in the mid-late 1950s.

So while it's a little OT from this post, I see the proper 1960s modifications of the Iowas and Des Moines as replacing most of their 3"/50 and 5"/38 mounts with SAMs of various types, and had the Montanas been built I would expect that to apply to them as well.
 
Scott Kenny said:
I think that was more a matter of the USN et al pursuing relatively large caliber rapid fire guns as the interim solution until the SAMs developed enough to be serviceable in the mid-late 1950s.

So while it's a little OT from this post, I see the proper 1960s modifications of the Iowas and Des Moines as replacing most of their 3"/50 and 5"/38 mounts with SAMs of various types, and had the Montanas been built I would expect that to apply to them as well.
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Rather than that, they simply went ahead with gun designs that were already in the pipeline to cover the gap. The twin 3"/50 was slated to replace the 40mm Bofors from 1945-ish as the preferred anti-Kamikaze AA gun for example. The 5"'/54 was the preferred weapon from even before WW 2, the Navy just being unable to get a dual purpose version in a workable form at the time. The 5"/38 was the compromise between the extant 5"/25 AA gun and 5"/51 surface action gun. It's design was to increase its effectiveness as a surface weapon, not an AA gun.
 
Don't forget the 3"/70. That was very much a new design in response to the Kamikazes and Guided Missiles.
 
The 3/70 doesn't seem to have been successful though.
At least in the RN it was passed over several times in favour of the 4.5in Mk.VI because its higher RoF meant that for smaller ships not enough ammunition could be stowed to make it worthwhile for air defence. That seems a bit paradoxical! I wonder what duration of fire the RCN hoped to achieve on their frigates?
 
MadRat said:
An interesting bit on a revival of an 8" gun on USS Hull.

USA 8"/55 (20.3 cm) Mark 71 - NavWeaps

www.navweaps.com www.navweaps.com
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Yes, for a while it was planned to replace many of the Sprucans 5" gun with the Mk71. Never did happen, as it was not much of an improvement in range, only 2nmi. Much bigger shell, of course, which may have been useful for some jobs.
 
Considering they offered a Paveway version, it was a capability that 5" did not match.
 
MadRat said:
Interesting. Which ones?
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Experimental, never deployed. Sadly. Basically a 5" Copperhead with a blast-frag warhead, IIRC. Made in the 1970s, again in the 1980s in a different program, again in the 1990s IIRC, and finally Excalibur N5 which still hasn't been adopted.

Though as a side note, I'd want a different seeker than SAL for a precision guided artillery. You're always going to be fighting in weather that either greatly degrades the laser or makes it inoperable due to heavy particulate matter in the air. The triple mode seeker of the SDB2 is likely the best option, though not available in the 1970s.
 
I know they had a 5"Paveway test article in 1979, but the USS Hull program was 1971.
 
Here is the source: http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNUS_8-55_mk71.php

Design was 1971 and included laser-guided rounds from day 1. The USS Hull was earmarked early on and before any mounting could take place the engineers did preliminary study of its hull. T(he ship had been around long enough they knew where stress would affect the hull, but you still have oi know its baseline form before and after installation.) Live test firings on land to prove the concept were underway in 1973. Test mount began firings on the USS Hull in 1975. Cancelled 1978. Final removal another year later. Honestly, I believe it would have been handy in Bierut in 1984.
 
MadRat said:
Here is the source: http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNUS_8-55_mk71.php

Design was 1971 and included laser-guided rounds from day 1. The USS Hull was earmarked early on and before any mounting could take place the engineers did preliminary study of its hull. T(he ship had been around long enough they knew where stress would affect the hull, but you still have oi know its baseline form before and after installation.) Live test firings on land to prove the concept were underway in 1973. Test mount began firings on the USS Hull in 1975. Cancelled 1978. Final removal another year later. Honestly, I believe it would have been handy in Bierut in 1984.
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Probably would have been a good idea to swap all the Sprucans to the 8" gun, and maybe even the Flight 2 Burkes. (I think the Ticos were still planning on using the 5" for anti missile work, loaded with either timed or proximity frag.)
 
Scott Kenny said:
Probably would have been a good idea to swap all the Sprucans to the 8" gun, and maybe even the Flight 2 Burkes. (I think the Ticos were still planning on using the 5" for anti missile work, loaded with either timed or proximity frag.)
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Why? If you need a heavier gun to take out a specific target, then use a guided missile instead. One shot, one hit, target neutralized. For NGFS, a field artillery sized round is all you need, but you also need lots of ammunition. On a ship, resupply of that isn't as readily handled as for field artillery where a constant stream of ammunition is possible. So, it's likely that more rounds onboard with a slightly smaller gun is a better deal than less rounds and a bigger gun.

On the other hand, and I could see some interservice rivalry and peacock strutting keeping it from happening, using a 155mm round (6") that is common to both the Navy, Marines, and Army, might not be a bad alternative. That simplifies production and lowers ammunition costs per round.
 
T. A. Gardner said:
Why? If you need a heavier gun to take out a specific target, then use a guided missile instead. One shot, one hit, target neutralized. For NGFS, a field artillery sized round is all you need, but you also need lots of ammunition. On a ship, resupply of that isn't as readily handled as for field artillery where a constant stream of ammunition is possible. So, it's likely that more rounds onboard with a slightly smaller gun is a better deal than less rounds and a bigger gun.
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My understanding of the Mk71 turret was that it had just as many rounds as the 5" Mk42, some 600 rounds in storage. Though admittedly it's about 120 rounds less than a single day's worth of shooting from a 155mm artillery battery.

I'd make it an 800rd magazine, and the last 80 rounds are the big 335lb projectiles for anti ship work (or bunkers), like the US used in WW2. Making them some form of precision guided would be really nice.

I'm assuming that shells are stored in the magazine of a ship with the fuses out. Today, we could use the GPS Precision Guidance Kit fuse, not sure that there was any option in the 1970s other than the SAL-GP. Anyways, there'd be a couple of Gunner's Mates down in the magazine fitting fuses onto the shells as they advanced into the shell hoist.



T. A. Gardner said:
On the other hand, and I could see some interservice rivalry and peacock strutting keeping it from happening, using a 155mm round (6") that is common to both the Navy, Marines, and Army, might not be a bad alternative. That simplifies production and lowers ammunition costs per round.
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The problem is that Naval guns tend to be fixed ammunition using a brass case like a rifle, while Army guns use separate bagged charges. It's a fire safety thing.

You could definitely still use the same projectiles, but it'd take a special case for the naval guns. You couldn't just drop the M1299 ERCA gun mount onto a ship, you'd need to design an automatic loader and gunhouse, plus a much heavier water-cooled barrel for the rate of fire a single tube needs to be doing MRSI shots all day at charge Super.
 
Scott Kenny said:
The problem is that Naval guns tend to be fixed ammunition using a brass case like a rifle, while Army guns use separate bagged charges. It's a fire safety thing.
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You can do separate charges for naval guns, it was proposed for the British 155mm TMF. Rate of fire suffers, since you have to ram the projectile and charge separately, and you can't do modular charges like Army guns.

Or you do what the big guns used to do and use bagged charges anyway. That can be done tolerably safely, provided Beatty isn't running things, but is a pain with fully mechanised ammunition handling.
 
Yellow Palace said:
You can do separate charges for naval guns, it was proposed for the British 155mm TMF. Rate of fire suffers, since you have to ram the projectile and charge separately, and you can't do modular charges like Army guns.

Or you do what the big guns used to do and use bagged charges anyway. That can be done tolerably safely, provided Beatty isn't running things, but is a pain with fully mechanised ammunition handling.
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The 8"/55 Mk16 automatic guns used brass cases, the Mk14 semi-automatics used separate bags. The Mk16 guns were the largest guns to use brass cases, because anything bigger ends up too heavy and long for the mechanical loading of a single piece ammunition. The total length of powder bags for the 16" guns is something like 12ft and the projectile is another 6 feet long.

The 5" guns used brass cases, the 6"/47 automatic guns on the CLs used brass cases.
 

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