Alternative fighter for Argentine AF & Navy during Falklands war.

MiG-21MF/bis vs Sea Harriers ?

  • Sea Harriers would have complete air superiority.

  • Sea Harriers would have had some losses.

  • Sea Harriers would have been blasted out of the sky.

  • None of the two aircraft would have gained air superiority.

Results are only viewable after voting.
in another alternative what if... why not LTV A-7 Corsair II? they had excellent range...MTOW....
 
And i prefer the alternative with MB326/ 339... why? Because you not change the true and reallity eftects off Daggers, Mirage and A-4 battles ocurred, but aded many others situations and targets , missions using insular fighters that not ocurred. You sum new missions whit togheter the missions results ocurred
 
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MCLOS and LG AS-30s were extremely differents in brute efficiency... just like R-530 and Super 530D (and F too).
 
Archibald said:
MCLOS and LG AS-30s were extremely differents in brute efficiency
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Certainly. That said the AS-30 CEP was still advertised as 10m, meaning 50% chance of hitting a target within that radius. Against a small land target like a bunker that might have been problematic but against a ship it should have been fine.
 
Scott Kenny said:
Did they make ~2000L tanks for the Mirage/Dagger (and could they carry that much weight on the pylons)?

If so, that would give the Mirage/Daggers space for an AS30 on the centerline with a little more fuel than 3x1300L tanks.
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Hi Scott
the biggest tank for the M-III / M-V (Dagger) was the 1700lts.
I think the 2000 lts are for the M-2000.
The F-1 have the 1300lts and the big central pylon tank ( i dont remember the capacity)
 
The FAA had previously evaluated the Nord AS.30 when it purchased Canberras. One of the Aerospacio magazine articles shared that the FAA tested the command guided AS.30 in live-fire exercises after the war on the ex-Peruvian Mirage 5 against ground & simulated naval target on a bombing range. The results were very poor. What's more survivable: 1.) Trying to manually guide a missile in terrible South Atlantic weather, at high speed and a predictable flight path deep within the Sea Dart envelope while also scanning the sky for enemy CAP, all while trying to not hit the deck, or 2.) One pass & haul ass. Don't forget that some of these fighter units had already devised tactics flying against Argentina's own Type 42.

The FAA/COAN pilots proved quite adept at putting dumb iron on targets; what they needed was better ESM, ECM, and navigation equipment.
 
alejandrogrossi said:
Hi Scott
the biggest tank for the M-III / M-V (Dagger) was the 1700lts.
I think the 2000 lts are for the M-2000.
The F-1 have the 1300lts and the big central pylon tank ( i dont remember the capacity)
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Thank you!

That's unfortunate, I'm sure having an extra 600L of fuel onboard would have given more options for the flight routes.
 
batigol said:
The FAA had previously evaluated the Nord AS.30 when it purchased Canberras. One of the Aerospacio magazine articles shared that the FAA tested the command guided AS.30 in live-fire exercises after the war on the ex-Peruvian Mirage 5 against ground & simulated naval target on a bombing range. The results were very poor. What's more survivable: 1.) Trying to manually guide a missile in terrible South Atlantic weather, at high speed and a predictable flight path deep within the Sea Dart envelope while also scanning the sky for enemy CAP, all while trying to not hit the deck, or 2.) One pass & haul ass.
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Interesting. Would be nice to have more details… I suspect the Mirage 5Ps’ equipment was not as suitable as Etendard IVMs for sea-skimming attacks (though on paper they were very similar) or the pilots not using the right techniques.

In theory this is how a low altitude anti-ship attack should work. It should not be that different from a bombing run:
- Fly in under the Sea Dart envelope, using the radio-altimeter’s low altitude mode to maintain 50-100ft (The Etendard IVM has green/red/yellow lights to help maintain a preset altitude).
- Target detection in open water at 15-20nm using the Aida radar. It counts down range and triggers an in-range sound cue around 9-12km.
- The missile pops up after launch so the pilot can fire the missile and maintain course straight, fast and low level (even down to 50-100ft) as if on a bombing run.
- The hard part is guiding the missile with the right hand during the ~20s flight, while keeping an eye on the radio-altimeter warning lights and giving small altitude control inputs with the left hand. The AS-30 is very stable and flies straight like a rocket so the amount of guidance adjustments shouldn’t be huge
- The missile will hit while still 3-4km from the target, allowing the pilot to break and maintain a stand-off range of 2km+

All this can be done at low altitude with more chances of success and surviving than any bomb run. Firing an AS-30 against a ship in such a fashion with the benefit of radar alignment should be much easier than against a land target, which is small and hard to detect. Interception by CAP is not a problem once you are within 10-15km of target (30s flight time) and anyway unlikely at high speeds (500+ knots).

The biggest question in my mind is pilot training and proficiency but the good news is the Etendard HUD has a training mode to allow simulated AS-30 attacks where a pilot could practice all these steps against a real ship target.
 
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You'd still need a terminal pop up into the Sea Dart WEZ to ensure the weapon doesn't smack into the water and then guide the thing. Not to mention, Argentine pilots made extensive use of terrain masking when available to expose themselves as briefly as possible (see San Carlos sorties). In any case, even before the war started the real solution had already been found: SUE + AM.39. They simply had not ordered (and received) enough missiles to make a real difference.
 
batigol said:
You'd still need a terminal pop up into the Sea Dart WEZ to ensure the weapon doesn't smack into the water and then guide the thing. Not to mention, Argentine pilots made extensive use of terrain masking when available to expose themselves as briefly as possible
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This discussion is really about the best way to conduct open water attacks prior to San Carlos, to force the task force to stand off and thus prevent the landings from happening.

I was under the impression that the AS30 operated similar to its predecessors the SS11/AS11 and AS12, which were launched from the ground or helicopters at low altitude, against much smaller targets. So the low altitude launch & guidance challenges against a ship might be about the same. The claimed success rate of 50% was not perfect but much better than bombs.

(The greatest challenge for the pilot, I believe, might not be the manual guidance as much as keeping the aircraft trimmed for straight & level flight at ~50-100ft (or a very very shallow climb), i.e. ensuring hands-free piloting for the crucial 10-20s needed to focus on correcting the missile’s flight path… however with good operational testing & training these piloting tasks and trim parameters should be predictable enough for a good pilot to learn).
 
H_K said:
Interesting. Would be nice to have more details… I suspect the Mirage 5Ps’ equipment was not as suitable as Etendard IVMs for sea-skimming attacks (though on paper they were very similar) or the pilots not using the right techniques.

In theory this is how a low altitude anti-ship attack should work. It should not be that different from a bombing run:
- Fly in under the Sea Dart envelope, using the radio-altimeter’s low altitude mode to maintain 50-100ft (The Etendard IVM has green/red/yellow lights to help maintain a preset altitude).
- Target detection in open water at 15-20nm using the Aida radar. It counts down range and triggers an in-range sound cue around 9-12km.
- The missile pops up after launch so the pilot can fire the missile and maintain course straight, fast and low level (even down to 50-100ft) as if on a bombing run.
- The hard part is guiding the missile with the right hand during the ~20s flight, while keeping an eye on the radio-altimeter warning lights and giving small altitude control inputs with the left hand. The AS-30 is very stable and flies straight like a rocket so the amount of guidance adjustments shouldn’t be huge
- The missile will hit while still 3-4km from the target, allowing the pilot to break and maintain a stand-off range of 2km+
Click to expand...

At a talk given by one of the SHAR pilots he described the air defence over the task force ships as follows;-

Sea Dart was the main airspace denial weapon, with a detection range of over 100km and engagement at 60km max, in the shape mushroom centred on the launcher, but it’s low level performance was horizon line of sight limited and the denser air reduced the engagement range to about 40km. There were a few ships with NATO link 11/14 so a larger air picture could be assembled but the limited assets/data meant it had holes.

The SHAR would fly at 20-25kft, approx 50-60km forwards of the Sea Dart ship and point their Blue Fox tangentially to the horizon. By doing this it was possible to pick up in coming aircraft at very low level without obscuring surface returns, another 30-40km up threat, which was just enough time to figure out its nature, the risk it posed and so what to do about it.

Another factor which gradually got more reliable as the campaign progressed, was advanced warning of a raid departing one of the three airbases. This allowed SHAR to be more effectively positioned on the more worrisome likely threat approaches.

Overall the system had holes, was far from ideal, but it was just good enough to present a pretty formidable challenge to the Argentine pilots that had to breach it.
 
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I will die on that hill until my last breath (d'uh)... The RN most infuriating missed opportunity was the Gannet AEW.3. Even more with HMS Hermes in the fight. But the catapults were gone, and the ski jump stood in the way.

en.wikipedia.org

Fairey Gannet AEW.3 - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org en.wikipedia.org

The sole operational Gannet squadron, 849 NAS had over the course of its time operating the aircraft a total of four operational flights plus the HQ flight. The HQ flight was stationed at three Fleet Air Arm air stations over the period of Gannet operation, while the majority of the operational flights were assigned to more than one aircraft carrier over the course of the Fleet Air Arm's use of the aircraft, with five RN carriers operating Gannet AEW flights.

HQ Flight – RNAS Culdrose (1960–1965); RNAS Brawdy (1965–1970); RNAS Lossiemouth (1970–1978)
A Flight – HMS Ark Royal (1960); HMS Centaur (1961–1963); HMS Victorious (1963–1967); HMS Hermes (1968–1970)
B Flight – HMS Victorious (1960–1962); HMS Hermes (1962–1967); HMS Ark Royal (1970–1978)
C Flight – HMS Hermes (1960–1962); HMS Ark Royal (1962–1966)
D Flight – HMS Eagle (1964–1971)
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So - 44 were build. Last retired December 15, 1978. I would really like to set the record straight about a few elements

- when and where were the Gannet AEW.3 scrapped, from 1979 ?
- did they looked whether a few of them had survived, by April 1982 ?
- was there a plan to operate the from HMS Hermes, whatever the risk and limits ?
 
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Google books is a formidable tool if used correctly. It is possible to "bracket" specific dates. So I did exactly that with that 849 NAS squadron and its Gannet AEW.3.


Naval Aviation News, 1979 tells the last hurrah of the Gannets, in February 1979.

And much more puzzling: to spoof Yoda "There was another one !" Look at that: https://www.google.fr/books/edition/Armed_Forces/nnlTAAAAYAAJ?hl=fr&gbpv=1&dq="849+naval"&pg=PA104&printsec=frontcover

At least one Gannet AEW.3 had survived the breakers (probably in unflyable condition, unfortunately) .

Now I want to track down the serials of those 44 Gannets. You british aviation spotters are quite maniacals, so we shall see. Prepare to read me blowing a fuse if I find a list and see that a decent part of the 44 fleet wasn't scrapped by 1982. :D:D:D

Edit: didn't took too long. Whew. http://www.ukserials.com/results.php?serial=XL
 
Archibald said:
I will die on that hill until my last breath (d'uh)... The RN most infuriating missed opportunity was the Gannet AEW.3. Even more with HMS Hermes in the fight. But the catapults were gone, and the ski jump stood in the way.

en.wikipedia.org

Fairey Gannet AEW.3 - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org en.wikipedia.org



So - 44 were build. Last retired December 15, 1978. I would really like to set the record straight about a few elements

- when and where were the Gannet AEW.3 scrapped, from 1979 ?
- did they looked whether a few of them had survived, by April 1982 ?
- was there a plan to operate the from HMS Hermes, whatever the risk and limits ?
Click to expand...

There was an investigation into using Gannet AEW3 on a one shot bases to cover critical operations. It was deemed just about possible to perform a free deck take off from Hermes, missing the ski ramp, and after a few hours, the plan was to hit the silk or ditch. Three Gannets were identified as serviceable, crews volunteered but the amount of space they would have taken up was considered to be better used with more SHAR’s and Helo’s.
 
H_K said:
The claimed success rate of 50% was not perfect but much better than bombs.
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Ok, so we've warmed somewhat to the potential of AS.30's... What's the scope for Argentina gaining access to laser guided bombs (LGB's), to give stand off range and accuracy.

Regards
Pioneer
 
Pioneer said:
Ok, so we've warmed somewhat to the potential of AS.30's... What's the scope for Argentina gaining access to laser guided bombs (LGB's), to give stand off range and accuracy.
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I don’t think LGBs are viable as they need to be launched from altitude which puts the launch aircraft squarely in Sea Dart’s engagement enveloppe. Hence the need for a missile that can be launched at low altitude and be available in more numbers than Exocet…
 
H_K said:
I don’t think LGBs are viable as they need to be launched from altitude which puts the launch aircraft squarely in Sea Dart’s engagement enveloppe. Hence the need for a missile that can be launched at low altitude and be available in more numbers than Exocet…
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True for the Pave Spike system if an aircraft was being used as the designator. The other problem in the Falklands would be the weather. Can the designator see the target to guide the bomb? Could the available aircraft carry both the designator pod and the lgb?

LGB development work on prototypes

This page is about the development work and prototypes
sgspires.tripod.com

This link shows the attack procedure for the F-111 and the Pave Tack introduced in 1982.

Pave Tack and the GBU-15 Greatly Expand RAAF Strike Capabilities

AVQ-26, Pave Tack, GBU-15
www.ausairpower.net

Harrier GR3 was used to toss lgb at targets designated by ground troops. Some info here from those who were there.
www.britmodeller.com

Harrier GR.3 Falklands LGB Attack Profile

I'm building a GR.3 which I want to show dropping a Paveway LGB. I've read in Air War South Atlantic that the Harriers 'tossed' the bombs in to the laser designation, rather than the drop from high altitude we became used to seeing during the first Gulf War and after. One of the pilots is quoted ...
www.britmodeller.com www.britmodeller.com

Unlikely therefore that Argentina could have acquired let alone used this tech in 1982.
 
Thanks for your valid point re exposure time to Sea Dart's H_K, but as EwenS denotes, I too had toss bombing in mind....

Was there any scope of Argentina purchasing a quantity of AGM-12 Bullpup's when they purchased their A-4 Skyhawk's? I appreciate for all intent and purposes that the AGM-12 was dog of a missile, but as H_K correctly stated earlier "not perfect but much better than bombs."

Regards
Pioneer
 
Would be a bit old and vulnerable no ? Note that Cameroon Presidential Guard (welcome to Françafrique...) retired its ex-French, ex-American Skyraiders in 1983... and a Skyraider pilot, manoeuvering intelligently and close to the ground, kicked the ass of a Vautour jet bomber over Algeria, in 1961... in a friendly DACT exercise, obviously. Also the SPAD was used very late into the Vietnam war despite murderous NVAF air defenses. Finally, no problem to launch from 25 de Mayo, whatever its speed and catapult issues.

Crap, was the Skyraider the ideal attack aircraft for Argentina in '82 ? :eek::eek::eek::eek::eek::eek:
 
Un-be-lie-va-ble, isn't it ? Skyraider never dies ! :D:D:D:D:D

Then add some Exocets under the wings... and an Agave radar on a pod underwing, like the early radar-equiped USN interceptors: Hellcat, Corsairs... and a Turboméca turboprop in place of ye ole R-3350...

Nah, just kidding. :cool::cool::cool::cool:
 
F.L. said:
What is your source ?
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A french magazine. Think it was Air Fan, on French Skyraiders. Which had a very interesting post-Algeria-1962 life: another decade of life than ended in Djibouti - where they were replaced by F-100s, then Jaguars in 1974.
 
H_K said:
In theory this is how a low altitude anti-ship attack should work. It should not be that different from a bombing run:
- Fly in under the Sea Dart envelope, using the radio-altimeter’s low altitude mode to maintain 50-100ft (The Etendard IVM has green/red/yellow lights to help maintain a preset altitude).
- Target detection in open water at 15-20nm using the Aida radar. It counts down range and triggers an in-range sound cue around 9-12km.
- The missile pops up after launch so the pilot can fire the missile and maintain course straight, fast and low level (even down to 50-100ft) as if on a bombing run.
- The hard part is guiding the missile with the right hand during the ~20s flight, while keeping an eye on the radio-altimeter warning lights and giving small altitude control inputs with the left hand. The AS-30 is very stable and flies straight like a rocket so the amount of guidance adjustments shouldn’t be huge
- The missile will hit while still 3-4km from the target, allowing the pilot to break and maintain a stand-off range of 2km+
Click to expand...

Some more details on the AS-30 in the anti-shipping role… all in all, I think this confirms that it was a suitable weapon which could have benefited the Argentinians.

- Typical low altitude flight profile (Aeronavale Etendard IVM) was to ingress at 100ft / 420 knots, with the pilot flying using the 3 guide lights next to the HUD (green: on altitude, red: too low, yellow: too high). This was the most fuel efficient speed (15nm per 100kg). Max speed on the deck with stores was 580+ knots.

- Bundesmarine F-104Gs would attack at 200ft / 480 knots. Once the attack started, the pilot would not touch the throttle and use their left hand to keep the plane steady and right hand to guide the AS-30 missile using the small joystick on the right armrest. Results were good after lots of simulator practice; the targets were small (4 x 10 meters) and the shallow angle made it hard to aim and the missiles would sometimes end in the water in front of the target

- SAAF Buccaneers fired 12 AS-30 at a tanker target and got 7 hits, slightly better than the advertised 50% hit rate
 
The problem with the SUE Etendard was their very low quantity. The attrition rate would soon wipe out existing planes. A minimum number of aircraft capable of withstanding the rate of losses incurred is necessary, such as the A4 and Daggers. This, combined with the persistence of the AS-30 with a low hit rate at its time, does not seem feasible.

It has to be something similar to the budget capacity of the country, because otherwise, the alternative reality is far from reasonable. They are small changes in key points that are really capable of changing the course of history.
 
The MB-326 or MB-339 were still the best candidates, either for the number they could compose in the Argentine air force, or for the supplier Brasil Italia, or for the versatility operating from the islands and even after each loss, fully capable of being replaced. The British weak point was the insufficient amount of caps, on the islands or on the fleet. The effective addition of these mb326 in the islands would saturate what was already saturated, as they would add to the real history occurred by the attacks of A4 and Daggera coming from the mainland. They don't represent an element of uncertainty trying to replace the A4...they add to the successes that have taken place. It was a lightning-fast war of attrition that the British fought against the clock before their strength was exhausted. Do not think about the most comfortable, because the most comfortable is not accessible. another example that would be very interesting would be another aircraft of the same category as the MB339, although not available at that time, it would be the Boeing Skyfox....it had 2.7 tons of external cargo with a huge autonomy of 2300 km with internal fuel . I find exercises that much more interesting because they break the conventional and orthodox...get out of the comfort zone where budget for equipment is enough to solve dilemmas...you gain a challenge by doing more with less resources.
 
cutaway-boeing-skyfox-jpg.565548
 
the mb-326 or mb-339 are often questioned as a weapon of attack, but the truth is that those who used it, used it very well with South Africans and Brazilians and not just these. Although some time after the Malvinas, Aermacchi believed enough to launch an MB-339K Veltro version capable of launching anti-ship missiles Marte MK II. Why is this information relevant? It is relevant because despite the technological package released years later, the aircraft itself had the same flight envelope as the first versions and the MB-326.

Therefore, it was the cheapest fighter, within the Argentine reality, possible to exist in large quantities surviving the loss rates of that conflict, and which could operate on the islands. These qualities of this product, although inferior, allowed a correction of primary errors in the middle of conflict. Had they actually been there as the main body, they would have been able to alter the battle, incredible as it may seem.


187715.jpg
 
carvalho2008 said:
the mb-326 or mb-339 are often questioned as a weapon of attack, but the truth is that those who used it, used it very well with South Africans and Brazilians and not just these. Although some time after the Malvinas, Aermacchi believed enough to launch an MB-339K Veltro version capable of launching anti-ship missiles Marte MK II. Why is this information relevant? It is relevant because despite the technological package released years later, the aircraft itself had the same flight envelope as the first versions and the MB-326.

Therefore, it was the cheapest fighter, within the Argentine reality, possible to exist in large quantities surviving the loss rates of that conflict, and which could operate on the islands. These qualities of this product, although inferior, allowed a correction of primary errors in the middle of conflict. Had they actually been there as the main body, they would have been able to alter the battle, incredible as it may seem.
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But the Argentinian Navy started the war with 7 MB326GA originally delivered 1969-72 and 10 MB339AA delivered 1980/81. The former had already been camouflaged back in 1978 in anticipation of use in the crisis with Chile but were retained on the mainland in 1982.

The latter were camouflaged in 1982 with the intention that they were to be used. The Argentinians determined that 30mm cannon & 5” rockets would be the best weapon load. The MB339s were deployed to Stanley, eventually 7 serving there but only about 2-3 at a time. One was shot down by a Blowpipe missile, one crashed in a landing accident and 3 were left unserviceable and captured by the British (a composite of 2 of those now resides at the South Yorkshire Air Museum at Doncaster U.K.)

One of the problems faced was parking space, which had to be improvised for them given that the apron area had to be reserved for the heavy transport aircraft coming and going.

So there was a lot more involved than simply having them.
 
carvalho2008 said:
Aermacchi believed enough to launch an MB-339K Veltro version capable of launching anti-ship missiles Marte MK II
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What kind of radar were they planning to use for target designation?
EwenS said:
One of the problems faced was parking space, which had to be improvised for them given that the apron area had to be reserved for the heavy transport aircraft coming and going.
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Yes, which is exactly why I explained earlier in this thread that the choice for Port Stanley had to be for quality over quantity - ie. the best fighter-bomber that could operate from the short runway in limited numbers (6-8 max) and tough conditions.

… a carrier based aircraft being inherently well suited to these constraints.
 
Argentina did not have the MB-326 or 339 model as part of its main parts, as illustrated by Brazil, which had 126 of them. Argentina had 46 pucaras, some of which were allocated to the Islands. In this alternative reality, if the MB-326 were in the place of the Pucaras, the whole scenario in small never changes its figure. I have already proven here that operating from the islands, the MB326 would be able to carry out the same missions as the A-4 coming from the mainland, I have demonstrated that the speed would be very similar. There remains the question of how many departed from the islands and the inversion of their success compared to the failure of the few MB-339s. Well, the 339 did not have the importance of paper in the Argentine squadrons, they were few units and in March/82, they had an availability rate of 40%... they were practically not operational and they had a lot of effort to leave 10 units in flying condition . Had it been a vector of greater numbers within the balance of Air Force units, it would have had a much better level of maintenance and availability, as was the national Pucara project, considered one of the pillars of the force. This implies that the deployment of only 6 units of the MB-339 to the islands was already extremely precarious in its origin. Added to this, and as proof of the lack of available units, the Argentine deployed 4 Turbo Mentors these added to another 16-24 Pucaras on the islands, divided into the 3 airfields there. Still added to these, two B-200 and 01 Skywan + 20 helicopters. That is, in addition to the natural difficulties of deploying to the island, all maintenance and logistics were divided and sectioned, obviously causing difficulty in parts and support, which would be minimized if the fixed wing fraction were nified and concentrated in all of them being MB-339 or MB-326. We know what attrition rates do and the importance of even having available units for cannibalizing parts during emergencies. Finally, the Pucara did not have any possibility of naval action. This made it possible for the fleet to approach. When the SAS infiltrated, the HMS Hermes approached a very dangerous 40 miles....The numbers indicate that in an alternative reality, without prejudice to the number of 20 helis parked there, the island would hold from 16 to 24 MB326/339. Unquestionably, many would be destroyed in air combat and by the SAS, but the difference is that, unlike the Pucaras, each MB-339/326 destroyed they would be replaced by new units coming from the mainland



foto-2-1.jpg
 
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