Alt 60s US Navy

[CV12Hornet]

Those frigate numbers are... ambitious.

 

[Volkodav]

Well, this was the wishlist in 1958.

APPENDIX

THE NAVY OF THE 1970 ERA​

A. TENTATIVE ACTIVE FLEET OBJECTIVES

52 MISSILE-LAUNCHING SUBMARINES, ALL NUCLEAR POWERED

40 with POLARIS or a successor, 1500-mile or greater range

41 for freedom, check.

12 with smaller missiles, 1000-mile or greater range

12 SSGNs, if only Tomahawk was around they could have done the same as they did with the older Ohios. Unless they mean something more like Pershing.

87 SHIPS IN SURFACE STRIKING FORCES

12 Modern Attack Carriers (6 with Nuclear Power)

6 Enterprise class, as planned. 4 Forrestals and 2 Kitty Hawks make up the other 6. I thought the number should be 13, but I didn't realize America wasn't laid down until 1960, so 12 is right.

3 Large Training Carriers

Presumably the Midways,

18 Guided Missile Cruisers (12 with Nuclear Power)

12 Long Beach? I presume the other 6 would be the converted WW2 cruisers, but I thought there were more so I'm uncertain why there are only 6.

54 Guided Missile Frigates (18 with Nuclear Power)

That would result in 6 nuclear groups of 1 Enterprise, 2 Long Beach, and 3 DLGNs, and 6 conventional groups of 1 supercarrier, 1 cruiser, and 6 DLGs. You could create all nuclear task forces of 2 or more carriers which would have enormous tactical mobility in a theater.

398 SHIPS IN ANTI-SUBMARINE FORCES

9 Anti-submarine Aircraft Carriers

Presumably Essex class. Replacements were in the planning stages, but didn't result in anything.

75 Submarines (65 with Nuclear Power)

There were only 3 Barbels, so the plan may have been to build more. If they were envisaging the possibility of a long war having the capability to build large numbers of SSKs would be helpful, but I'm not sure 10 would do it. It would have to be more like the Japanese practice of building 1 sub per year, perhaps 2 in the case of the U.S., to keep a couple yards in practice so there is a pool of expertise to draw on if an expansion of production is deemed necessary. Although Dilandu's argument for leaving SSKs to allies makes a lot of sense, in which case why plan on building more SSKs?

72 Destroyers

That doesn't seem enough for this size fleet.

60 Ocean Picket Ships

I don't know what these would be in an ASW sense. Unless they refer to radar pickets, perhaps armed.

182 Ocean Escorts

The Garcia class is about right, with DASH (and later SH-2s), but they would pretty much need to be new builds.

I suppose they might be looking at ASW groups composed of a CVS, with DDGs (Adams, Farragut/Coontz) for air defense and DEs armed with ASROC and DASH for ASW. Nine CVSs would not need 8 DDGs and 20 DEs each, so my guess is the extras would supplement CVA groups in time of war and maybe do the presence mission in peacetime. Or perhaps the intent would be to have the bulk of the DEs manned by naval reserve personnel.

90 SHIPS IN AMPHIBIOUS FORCES

18 Helicopter Assault Ships

Iwo Jima and Tarawa are a ways off, so presumably these would be Essex and Casablanca/Commencement Bay class ships.

58 Assault Transports and Landing Ships
14 Command and Support Ships

110 MINE WARFARE AND SMALL PATROL SHIPS

190 AUXILIARIES

50 Fast Underway Replenishment Ships

50 Sacramento and Wichita class AOE/AOR would be quite the replenishment fleet.

140 Tenders, Tugs, Repair and Supply Ships

927 [Total Ships]

The total is in line of the size of the Navy at the time.

SHIPS WITH NUCLEAR POWER............................................150-Plus

Subs, CVANs, CGNs, and DLGNs. I count 153..

SHIPS WITH LONG RANGE SURFACE MISSILES................52-Plus

The 52 missile subs.

SHIPS WITH AIR DEFENSE MISSILES...................................200-Plus

72 cruisers and DLs, plus 72 destroyers?, plus the 12 Carriers would leave you short by quite a bit. Perhaps they are counting the 60 Picket ships?

SHIPS WITH ANTI-SUBMARINE MISSILES...........................450-Plus

That seems off. I count 410 surface combatants.

SHIPS WITH ANTI-SUBMARINE AIRCRAFT.........................150-Plus

There are only 21 carriers, and I don't think any other class ship has helicopter hangars at this time. The only other option would be a lot of DASH capable ships, unless they had DDs and DEs in planning stages with helicopter hangars.

I believe the 12 nuclear powered escorts were meant to be for the two planned CVANs. Can't remember the exact details but believe it was discussed in a Conway Book on navies in the nuclear age.

 

[bobtdwarf]

Mk 71 out into the fleet or develop dedicated bombardment monitors

Not really needed to be honest. The USN had 16 Heavy Cruisers either in active service or in reserve up through the 70s with 3 remaining in reserve up until 1991. Plus you have 10 battleships in reserve at the start of 1960 with that dropping to 8 in June, 1960 and to 4 by June, 62. If you really need heavy gunfire support, just keep the battleships in reserve longer and/or pull some of the CAs back into service.

Hamilton class Cutter as a FRAM DD replacement?

That's a possibility, but the first one wasn't laid down until 1965, the same time at the Knox-class. Which would have the exact same mission in the Navy. So going with the Hamiltons means no Knox. Either or here choice here. Maybe if you combine the power plant of the Hamilton with the larger hull of the Knox you'd have a winner for the Navy.

Continue development of diesel submarines for coastal defenses against Soviet SSG/SSGNs.

Not really a need. The Navy did not plan to engage Soviet subs in American Littorals. They planned to engage them in deep water as they crossed the SOSUS line. For that mission, nuc boats were the better option.

Mk. 71 certainly would be useful for needs beyond a reasonable call back window for the old BBs and CAs and on more cost effective platforms


EDIT: All of this was addressed by others after this so this post should be ignored...

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

4 Lafayette class SSBN (no hull numbers were assigned) and one Simon Lake class Submarine Tender (AS-37) were deleted from the FY1965 building programme. Had they been built, it's likely that they would have been completed 1967-68 & been armed with Polaris A-3 missiles. The USN would have had 45 SSBNs organised into 5 squadrons of 9 boats with 6 AS (the rebuilt Proteus, 2 new Hunley class & 3 new Simon Lake class) to support them (one per squadron and one spare).

The deletion of these ships reduced the SSBN force to "only" 41 SSBN organised into 4 squadrons of 10 or 11 with 5 AS (the rebuilt Proteus, 2 new Hunley class & 2 new Simon Lake class) to support them (one per squadron and one spare).

As far as I know the four squadrons formed in the 1960s were:

Submarine Squadron 14 - Holy Loch, Scotland​

Submarine Squadron 15 - Apra Harbor, Guam​

Submarine Squadron 16 - Rota, Spain​

Submarine Squadron 18 - Charleston, South Carolina​

Is that correct?

If the fifth squadron had been formed, where would it have been based?

I know about Submarine Squadron 17 at Bremerton, Washington, but that doesn't count as it wasn't formed until January 1981 and as far as I know was for the Ohio class. That is, unless, that's where the fifth Polaris submarine squadron was to have been based.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Does anyone know when and where SSBN 608 USS Ethan Allen had her Polaris A-2 missiles replaced by A-3s?

The other 4 ships of the class were rearmed between 1972 and 1976.

6 Lafayette class (SSBN 612-617) were built between the fourth Ethan Allen (SSBN 611 John Marshall) and the fifth and final boat of the class (SSBN 618 Thomas Jefferson). Does anyone know why she wasn't built as a Lafayette?

Edit 12.04.23.

As remarked by @RLBH "down thread" the submarine hull numbers 612-617 include 4 Thresher class SSN which took the numbers 612-615.

 

[isayyo2]

“45 for Freedom” doesn’t quite have the same ring to it.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

“45 for Freedom” doesn’t quite have the same ring to it.

If I remember correctly from reading Friedman a force of 60 SSBNs was planned for a time.

Is "Sixty for Freedom" better or worse for you?​

In the "Real World" the "Forty-One for Freedom" were ordered in the following Fiscal Years:

• FY58 - 3 George Washington class.
• FY59 - 2 George Washington class.
• FY60 - 4 Ethan Allen class.
• FY61 - 1 Ethan Allen class & 9 Lafayette class - Total 10.
• FY62 - 10 Lafayette class.
• FY63 - 6 Lafayette class.
• FY64 - 4 Lafayette class.
• FY65 - 4 Lafayette class were planned (but they were deleted before they were assigned hull numbers) so the total built was 41.

My guess is that the 19 extra boats would have been added to the FY63 to FY65 Building Programmes.

• FY63 - 4 extra Lafayette class for a total of 10.
• FY64 - 5 extra Lafayette class for a total of 11.
• FY65 - 10 Lafayette class.

The 41 SSBN that were built in the "Real World" were laid down 1957-65, launched 1959-66 and completed 1959-67.

• Only one (George Washington completed on 30.12.59) was the only Boat completed in 1959.
• The 12 Boats ordered under the FY63 & FY64 Building Programmes in the "Real World" were:
• Laid Down 1963-65. However, only one was laid down in 1965, Will Rodgers on 20.03.65.
• Launched 1964-66.
• Completed 1965-67. However, only one was completed in 1967, Will Rogers on 01.04.67.

Therefore, my guess is that the 19 extra Boats would have been laid down 1963-66, launched 1964-67 and completed 1965-68, with the last Boat completed before the end of March 1968.

I think the "Sixty for Freedom" would have been organised into 6 squadrons of 10 Boats with 7 Submarine Tenders (including one spare to cover refits) to support them.

All 19 Boats would have been of the Lafayette and Benjamin Franklin classes increasing the total from 31 to 50. They 19 extra boats would have been armed with Polaris A-3 missiles, which means that in 1968.

• 13 Boats armed with Polaris A-2 and 47 armed with Polaris A-3. Ratio: 13:47.
  • Instead of.
• 13 Boats armed with Polaris A-2 and 28 armed with Polaris A-3. Ratio: 13:28.

The 19 extra Boats would be rearmed with Poseidon C-3 in the 1970s, which means that in 1978.

• 10 Boats armed with Polaris A-3 and 50 armed with Poseidon C-3. Ratio: 10:50.
  • Instead of.
• 10 Boats armed with Polaris A-3 and 50 armed with Poseidon C-3. Ratio: 10:31.

So the qualitative improvement would have been even greater than the quantitative improvement.

In the "Real World" 12 out of 31 Lafayette class were rearmed with Trident C-4 1978-82. However, that does not necessarily mean that 20 of out 50 Lafayette class would have been rearmed with Trident in this "version of history". If the US Government was prepared spend the money required to maintain an SSBN force of this size, it's more likely that more Ohio class Boats would have been built instead of rearming some of the existing Boats.

My ideal is to have 10 Ethan Allen class built (instead of 5 George Washington class and 5 Ethan Allen class) which would have larger missile tubes so they could have been rearmed with Poseidon missiles too. However, I think that could not have been done because Polaris was a crash programme and they were trying to get as many boats as possible in service as soon as possible.

Note.

At this time the US Fiscal Year began on 1st July and ended on 30th June. Therefore, FY58 was the Fiscal Year ending 30th June 1958, FY59 ended on 30th June 1959 and so on until FY65 which ended on 30.06.65.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

“45 for Freedom” doesn’t quite have the same ring to it.

If I remember correctly from reading Friedman a force of 60 SSBNs was planned for a time.

Is "Sixty for Freedom" better or worse for you?​

I hadn't remembered correctly.

The paragraph that straddles Pages 196 & 197 of "U.S. Submarines Since 1945" says.

• The navy planned to begin with one squadron of 9 SSBNs.
• Senator Henry M. Jackson publically called for a force of 100 SSBNs.
• The VCNO, Adm. Harry D. Felt, talked of 40 to 60 SSBNs. [Which, why I though 60 SSBNs were planned for a time.]
• In 1960, the Long Range Objectives Group cited a navy targeting [I despise the misuse of target as a verb] suggesting that 45 SSBNs could serve as the primary U.S. survivable deterrent force; 37 would deal with Soviet targets and 8 with Chinese targets, and they would cover 80 per cent of Soviet industrial targets as then known.

Footnote 25 on Page 265 says that in 1957, the projected force was 6 submarines (2 or 3 always on station), each carrying 3 to 10 missiles. By 1957, the criterion had changed from the number of submarines that could fit within a larger naval force to the number of targets that the deterrent force has to keep constantly within range: 200 (i.e., 400 missiles, or 25 submarine loads). Admiral Burke wanted to maintain 30 submarines on station (total force, 45 to 50).

 

[Yellow Palace]

I know about Submarine Squadron 17 at Bremerton, Washington, but that doesn't count as it wasn't formed until January 1981 and as far as I know was for the Ohio class. That is, unless, that's where the fifth Polaris submarine squadron was to have been based.

I've given this some thought in the past. Looking at US intermediate-range missile actual and proposed bases could be instructive: Thor was actually deployed in the UK, with bases in Alaska, Okinawa and Spain considered. Jupiter was actually deployed in Italy and Turkey, with France considered. There's some similarity there with Polaris bases. I think the key question is - would the fifth squadron be in the Atlantic or in the Pacific?

If in the Pacific, Bremerton was the Polaris missile maintenance facility for the boats of SUBRON 15, which also used Pearl Harbor as a rear base in support of the squadron at Guam. The limited range of Polaris would probably argue against Bremerton as an operating base. My guess is that a second Pacific squadron would replicate this arrangement, with a suitable forward base somewhere. I'm assuming that Japan is out on political grounds, and because of proximity to the USSR. Cavite or Kodiak, both of which were US Naval Bases in the early 1960s, would be obvious candidates.

If in the Atlantic, there's more flexibility. A second CONUS operating base might make sense; perhaps using the existing bases at New London or Norfolk to provide basic infrastructure. Alternatively, a forward base might be prefered, in which case I'd be looking at Italy - La Maddelena seems like an obvious candidate. Turkey is almost certainly too close to the USSR for comfort.

Taking the Long-Range Objectives Group's figures, I'd guess the breakdown would be two squadrons in the Pacific (one mostly covering China, the other almost exclusively the USSR), and three in the Atlantic. Keeping the boats at Guam covering China, but able to swing north to the USSR, putting the fifth squadron in southwest Alaska would give best time on station IMO.

 

[Yellow Palace]

6 Lafayette class (SSBN 612-617) were built between the fourth Ethan Allen (SSBN 611 John Marshall) and the fifth and final boat of the class (SSBN 618 Thomas Jefferson). Does anyone know why she wasn't built as a Lafayette?

It doesn't look like THOMAS JEFFERSON was particularly late. 612-615 were THRESHER class fast attack submarines, and LAFAYETTE was laid down only two weeks before THOMAS JEFFERSON. It's not entirely unusual when doing incremental improvmeents to a design like this for the first of a new batch to be ordered from a trusted lead yard (Electric Boat) to work out the kinks whilst the last of the old batch are being built at a second yard.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

6 Lafayette class (SSBN 612-617) were built between the fourth Ethan Allen (SSBN 611 John Marshall) and the fifth and final boat of the class (SSBN 618 Thomas Jefferson). Does anyone know why she wasn't built as a Lafayette?

It doesn't look like THOMAS JEFFERSON was particularly late. 612-615 were THRESHER class fast attack submarines, and LAFAYETTE was laid down only two weeks before THOMAS JEFFERSON. It's not entirely unusual when doing incremental improvements to a design like this for the first of a new batch to be ordered from a trusted lead yard (Electric Boat) to work out the kinks whilst the last of the old batch are being built at a second yard.

Firstly, I saw that I'd screwed up over 612-615 after uploading Post 45. However, I didn't correct it because it didn't alter my argument.

Secondly, this is a list of the 14 SSBNs in the FY60 & FY61 Building Programmes.

​

Normally, I would expect the first ship of the a Fiscal Year's order to have been of the old class and the others to be of the new class.

Then I saw that Thomas Jefferson was laid down the day after Sam Houston was launched (03.02.61 v 02.02.61) and that James Monroe was laid down 16 days after John Marshall (31.07.61 v 15.07.61).

My guess is that building Thomas Jefferson as a Lafayette instead of an Ethan Allen would have delayed her laying down and therefore completion. As this was a crash programme that required as many Boats as possible to be completed as soon as possible that delay was considered unacceptable and she was built as an Ethan Allen to maintain the momentum.

That's a pity because if the 4 Boats planned for FY65 had been built it would have been possible to organise the 45 Boats into one squadron of 9 Boats armed with Polaris A-3 missiles and four squadrons of 9 boats armed with Poseidon C-4 missiles.

 

[Yellow Palace]

That's a pity because if the 4 Boats planned for FY65 had been built it would have been possible to organise the 45 Boats into one squadron of 9 Boats armed with Polaris A-3 missiles and four squadrons of 9 boats armed with Poseidon C-4 missiles.

One option is to build 46, and decomission GEORGE WASHINGTON early. It was a bit of an odd boat compared to the rest of the class.

You've also got a dozen SSGNs to fit in somewhere, presumably after the Polaris boats, and armed with... something. When the paper in question was published, I believe it was intended that the PERMIT class would fill this niche, with three in FY 58, one in FY 59, and seven more to follow. Realistically, they'd have been pushed out by the Polaris programme, and wouldn't be ordered until after the Polaris boats. By then - FY 64 at the earliest - Regulus is decidedly long in the tooth, and the Perseus/Tomahawk line isn't even a glint in the eye of its designers.

 

[Hood]

Alternatively, a forward base might be prefered, in which case I'd be looking at Italy - La Maddelena seems like an obvious candidate. Turkey is almost certainly too close to the USSR for comfort.

Which makes a possible case for Italy to get a deal on the base - perhaps Alfa would still be dead given US pressures to avoid proliferation (i.e. non-US missile tech rivals) but perhaps a couple of Italian Polaris subs too?

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

That's a pity because if the 4 Boats planned for FY65 had been built it would have been possible to organise the 45 Boats into one squadron of 9 Boats armed with Polaris A-3 missiles and four squadrons of 9 boats armed with Poseidon C-4 missiles.

One option is to build 46, and decommission GEORGE WASHINGTON early. It was a bit of an odd boat compared to the rest of the class.

Noted, but I think finding a way to make Thomas Jefferson a Lafayette instead of an Ethan Allen is the more elegant solution. Perhaps it could be made hybrid ship, i.e. an Ethan Allen class with Lafayette missile tubes.

You've also got a dozen SSGNs to fit in somewhere, presumably after the Polaris boats, and armed with... something. When the paper in question was published, I believe it was intended that the PERMIT class would fill this niche, with three in FY 58, one in FY 59, and seven more to follow. Realistically, they'd have been pushed out by the Polaris programme, and wouldn't be ordered until after the Polaris boats. By then - FY 64 at the earliest - Regulus is decidedly long in the tooth, and the Perseus/Tomahawk line isn't even a glint in the eye of its designers.

The entry on USS Tunny (APSS 282) in Jane's 1968-69 says that when Regulus Submarine Force was phased out in 1964 there were 5 Regulus Boats.

• Tunny (SSG 282) which became a Transport Submarine (APSS 282) to replace Perch (APSS 313). She served in this role until 28.06.69 (having been relieved by Growler) and was struck from the register on 30.06.69.
• Barbero (SSG 317) which was decommissioned on 30.06.64 and struck from the register the next day.
• Greyback (SSG 574) and Growler (SSG 575) which were paid off.
  • The plan was that both would be converted into Transport Submarines as the long-term replacements for Perch and Sealion (APSS 315).
  • However, only Growler was converted and she re-commissioned on 09.05.69.
• Halibut (SSGN 587) which became a Nuclear Attack Submarine (SSN) but she was decommissioned on 30.06.76 and struck from the register on 30.04.86.

It also says that 4 additional nuclear powered Regulus Boats were cancelled to provide funds for Polaris. That corresponds with what you wrote about why more SSGNs weren't built.

With hindsight, I would have built Greyback, Growler & Halibut as Attack Submarines and converted 3 additional old submarines to Regulus Boats. Similarly, I would have built Sailfish, Salmon & Triton as Attack Submarines and converted 3 additional old Boats to Radar Picket Submarines (SSR).

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

That's a pity because if the 4 Boats planned for FY65 had been built it would have been possible to organise the 45 Boats into one squadron of 9 Boats armed with Polaris A-3 missiles and four squadrons of 9 boats armed with Poseidon C-4 missiles.

One option is to build 46, and decommission GEORGE WASHINGTON early. It was a bit of an odd boat compared to the rest of the class.

Noted, but I think finding a way to make Thomas Jefferson a Lafayette instead of an Ethan Allen is the more elegant solution. Perhaps it could be made hybrid ship, i.e. an Ethan Allen class with Lafayette missile tubes.

With hindsight, I would have built Greyback, Growler & Halibut as Attack Submarines and converted 3 additional old submarines to Regulus Boats. Similarly, I would have built Sailfish, Salmon & Triton as Attack Submarines and converted 3 additional old Boats to Radar Picket Submarines (SSR).

Except ...

If Greyback & Growler were built as Attack Submarines they wouldn't be available for conversion into Transport Submarines so 2 new APSS would have to be built to replace Perch and Sealion.

Or ...

• If a 36th Lafayette was built to replace George Washington early, then the redundant George Washington would have been available for conversion into a Nuclear Transport Submarine (APSSN) in place the OTL conversion of Growler.
• Furthermore, as there was a requirement for 2 Transport Submarines it would make sense to build a 37th Lafayette which would allow a second George Washington to be come the second APSSN.

I think this is plausible because the Ethan Allen class Sam Houston & John Marshall were converted to SEAL Carriers in the early 1980s and they were in turn were replaced by the Lafayette class Kamehameha & James K Polk in the 1990s.

 

[Yellow Palace]

Which makes a possible case for Italy to get a deal on the base - perhaps Alfa would still be dead given US pressures to avoid proliferation (i.e. non-US missile tech rivals) but perhaps a couple of Italian Polaris subs too?

Notably, it seems that one of the conditions that the Italian government set in 1963 for the withdrawal of Jupiter missiles was that the Polaris submarines which replaced them wouldn't be based in Italy. The Turkish government, meanwhile, believed that some of the submarines would have wholly Turkish crews - a belief that the US soon disabused them of!

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

The following A-2 armed ships were rearmed with A-3. Does anyone know when and where?

• Ethan Allen.
  • I think it was sometime between 1972 & 1975.
  • This is because the other 4 Boats of the Ethan Allen class were rearmed during the period 1972-75.
• Nathan Hale, Woodrow Wilson and Henry Clay.
  • Jane's 1972-73 says they were 3 of 5 Polaris A-2 armed Lafayette class that were rearmed with the A-3 missile during overhauls-fuellings 1968-70.
  • The other two were John Adams & James Monroe and I have the details for them.
  • These 5 boats were amongst the last of the Lafayette class to be rearmed with Poseidon.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

As far as I know the USN had a requirement for enough 20-knot amphibious shipping to lift two Marine Amphibious Forces? (one in the Atlantic and one in the Pacific) since the late 1940s.

However, there was only enough 20-knot ships to lift 1.15 MAFs in 1981. The "600-Ship Navy" included enough amphibious shipping to lift one MAF and one Marine Amphibious Brigade (the equivalent of one-and-a-third MAFs), but if I remember correctly not until 1992 or 1994 depending upon how much money was spent.

Do we also get the 30 Fast Deployment Logistics (FDL) ships? Late 1960s editions of Jane's say they were to work with 14 squadrons of C-141 Starlifters and 6 squadrons of C-5 Galaxies. The USAF already had the Starlifter squadrons, but only 4 of the 6 C-5A squadrons were formed because 81 were bought instead of the 115 that were required. Therefore, if we do get the 30 FDL ships do we also have another 34 Galaxies?

 

[Yellow Palace]

As far as I know the USN had a requirement for enough 20-knot amphibious shipping to lift two Marine Amphibious Forces? (one in the Atlantic and one in the Pacific) since the late 1940s.

However, there was only enough 20-knot ships to lift 1.15 MAFs in 1981. The "600-Ship Navy" included enough amphibious shipping to lift one MAF and one Marine Amphibious Brigade (the equivalent of one-and-a-third MAFs), but if I remember correctly not until 1992 or 1994 depending upon how much money was spent.

Do we also get the 30 Fast Deployment Logistics (FDL) ships? Late 1960s editions of Jane's say they were to work with 14 squadrons of C-141 Starlifters and 6 squadrons of C-5 Galaxies. The USAF already had the Starlifter squadrons, but only 4 of the 6 C-5A squadrons were formed because 81 were bought instead of the 115 that were required. Therefore, if we do get the 30 FDL ships do we also have another 34 Galaxies?

Playing around with some broadly-contemporary figures (which I think are from Friedman's US Amphibious Ships, but can't confirm just now), the 1958 paper seems to suggest 1.5 MAF lift. The requirement for one MAF would be:

• 12 helicopter assault ships
• 9 amphibious transport docks
• 9 dock landing ships
• 18 tank landing ships
• 3 fast amphibious transports
• 6 assault fire support ships
• 5 attack cargo ships
• 1 headquarters ship

That actually tracks with the number of NEWPORT class tank landing ship ordered: 27 were planned, but only 20 were completed. Similarly, 15 amphibious transport docks and 13 dock landing ships were completed in the 1960s and early 1970s, all corresponding broadly to 20-knot shipping for a 1.5 MAF lift capability.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

1 the Playing around with some broadly-contemporary figures (which I think are from Friedman's US Amphibious Ships, but can't confirm just now), the 1958 paper seems to suggest 1.5 MAF lift. The requirement for one MAF would be:

• 12 helicopter assault ships
• 9 amphibious transport docks
• 9 dock landing ships
• 18 tank landing ships
• 3 fast amphibious transports
• 6 assault fire support ships
• 5 attack cargo ships
• 1 headquarters ship

That actually tracks with the number of NEWPORT class tank landing ship ordered: 27 were planned, but only 20 were completed. Similarly, 15 amphibious transport docks and 13 dock landing ships were completed in the 1960s and early 1970s, all corresponding broadly to 20-knot shipping for a 1.5 MAF lift capability.

I've got my copy of Jane's 1968-69 out. The United States Navy section was compiled and edited by Norman Polmar and the Amphibious Warfare Ships sub-section begins with this paragraph.

The US Navy seeks to provide 20-knot amphibious lift capability for 1.5 Marine Corps division/wing teams plus sufficient slower amphibious left for another half of a division/wing team. (A Marine Corps division/wing team numbers some 35,000 to 40,000 enlisted men.)

That's a total of 2 division/wing teams and I think the long-term goal was to have enough 20-knot amphibious lift capability all of that force instead of 75% of it.

At this stage.

• 8 Amphibious Force Flagships (AGC) completed, under construction or planned.
  • 3 Blue Ridge class were under construction or planned, with the first to completed in 1970.
  • 5 older & slower ships of the Mount McKinley class. According to the Strength of the Fleet table on Page 332 all 5 were active.
• 6-9 Amphibious Assault Ships (LHA) were planned with the first to complete in 1972.
• 10 Amphibious Assault Ships (LPH).
  • According to the Strength of the Fleet table on Page 332 - one was building and the other 9 were active.
  • 7 Iwo Jima class.
    • The sixth (New Orleans) was to complete in 1968.
    • There was no completion date for the seventh (Inchon).
  • 3 converted Essex class, which were still in service.
• 15 Amphibious Transport Docks (LPD) of the Raleigh, Austin & Cleveland classes were building or under construction.
  • According to the Strength of the Fleet table on Page 332 - 6 were building and 9 were active.
  • The entry on the Austin & Cleveland classes says that the last ships of these classes would complete in 1970.
  • LHA-16 in FY66 was deferred in favour of the LHA programme.
  • None had so far been converted to flagships.
• 32 Landing Ships Dock (LSD).
  • According to the Strength of the Fleet table on Page 332 - 5 were building and 27 were active.
  • 13 Thomaston & Raleigh classes were building or under construction with the last to complete in 1970.
  • 19 older & slower ships of the Ashland & Cabildo classes.
• 24 Attack Cargo Ships (AKA).
  • According to the Strength of the Fleet table on Page 332 - 5 were building, 18 were active and one was in reserve.
  • 6 AKA of the Charleston & Tulare classes. All of the Charleston class were to be completed by the end of 1969.
  • 18 older & slower ships of the Andromeda & Rankin classes.
• 26 Attack Transports (APA). Except that I counted 20 and think 26 is a typo for 20.
  • According to the Strength of the Fleet table on Page 332 all 26 were active, but I think that's a typo for 20.
  • 2 APA of the Paul Riviere class.
  • 18 older & slower APAs of the Bayfield, Cresent City & Haskell classes.
• 15 High Speed Transports (APD).
  • They were converted World War II Destroyer Escorts.
  • 6 were active and 9 were in reserve, according to the Strength of the Fleet table on Page 332.
• 85 Landing Ships Tank (LST).
  • 20 Newport class to be completed 1968-71. It doesn't mention a requirement for 27, but I think the next edition does.
  • 65 older & slower LSTs. According to the Strength of the Fleet table on Page 332 all 65 were active.
    • 7 Suffolk County class - 17 knots.
    • 15 Terrebonne Parish class - 15 knots.
    • 1 Talbot County class - 14 knots. The other ship of the class had been converted to an Advance Aviation Base Ship (AVB) and is listed in the Fleet Support Ships section.
    • 40 LST 511-1152 class - 11.6 knots.
    • 2 LST 1-510 class - 10.8 knots.

That's a grand total of 218 ships completed, building or planned.

• Of which 159 were active, 49 were building or planned and 10 were in reserve.
• And (not including the APDs) includes 78 twenty-knot ships (29 active & 49 building or planned).

I'll see what my copy of Jane's 1969-70 says after I've done some housework.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Those frigate numbers are... ambitious.

58 over 5 Fiscal Years (FY78-82) at an average of 12 per year. 30 were actually built at an average of 5 per year.

However, the 46 Knox class were ordered over 4 Fiscal Years (FY64-67) which was an average of 11.5 a year.

 

[Yellow Palace]

Those frigate numbers are... ambitious.

58 over 5 Fiscal Years (FY78-82) at an average of 12 per year. 30 were actually built at an average of 5 per year.

However, the 46 Knox class were ordered over 4 Fiscal Years (FY64-67) which was an average of 11.5 a year.

This is not a frigate. It is an ocean escort:

When the US Navy in the 1950s or 1960s is talking about a frigate, they mean something like this:

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Those frigate numbers are... ambitious.

58 over 5 Fiscal Years (FY78-82) at an average of 12 per year. 30 were actually built at an average of 5 per year.

However, the 46 Knox class were ordered over 4 Fiscal Years (FY64-67) which was an average of 11.5 a year.

This is not a frigate. It is an ocean escort:

When the US Navy in the 1950s or 1960s is talking about a frigate, they mean something like this:

It was from June 1975 and it's a valid comparison.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Those frigate numbers are... ambitious.

58 over 5 Fiscal Years (FY78-82) at an average of 12 per year. 30 were actually built at an average of 5 per year.

However, the 46 Knox class were ordered over 4 Fiscal Years (FY64-67) which was an average of 11.5 a year.

For what it's worth.

51 Oliver Hazard Perry class (originally Patrol Frigates (PF) and then Guided Missile Frigates (FFG)) were built.

They were authorised (according to Jane's 1986-87) as follows:

FY73 - 1​

FY74 - 3​

FY75 - 6​

FY76 - 6​

FY77 - 8​

FY78 - 8​

FY79 - 8​

FY80 - 5​

FY81 - 6​

FY82 - 3​

FY83 - 2​

FY84 - 1​

​

They were completed 1979-89. The exact dates (according to Conway's 1947-95) were from 30.11.79 (Oliver Hazard Perry) to 05.08.89 (Ingraham).

Edit: Except that the editions of Jane's that I've been quoting and Wikipedia say Perry commissioned on 17.12.77.

However, for a time, it was planned to build 74 of them.

These notes I made form the copies of Jane's held by my local public libraries long before Internet Archive and Scribd existed.

Jane's 1973-74 - Patrol Frigate (PF).

• 50 planned to complete 1977-85.
• The first ship was to complete in 1977.
• Follow-ons were to complete 18 months after the first.
• Additional ships to complete at the rate of 12 per year.

Jane's 1974-75 - Patrol Frigate (PF).

• 50 to complete 1977-83.
• Lead ship to cost $193M in 1973 Dollars.
• Others to cost $100M in 1973 Dollars.

Edit. The copy of Jane's 1974-75 on Internet Archive says.​

• 50 to complete 1977-83.
  • The first ship to be completed 1977.
  • The 49 follow-on ships to be completed 1979-83.
• To be ordered.
  • 1 approved FY73
  • 7 proposed FY75
  • 11 planned FY76
  • 31 planned FY77-79
• Costs
  • The FY73 New Construction Programme provided $193M to complete the design, fund "start up" efforts for ship equipment, and fund the lead ship.
  • The estimated cost of follow-on ships in 1973 Dollars was $50M.

Jane's 1975-76 - Patrol Frigate (PF).

• 1 approved FY73.
• 3 approved FY75.
• 11 proposed FY76.
• 10 planned FY77.
• 31 planned FY78-80.
• That's a total of 56 ships.

Edit: The copy of Jane's 1975-76 on Internet Archive says.​

• 56 ships to be ordered as above.
• However, they're Guided Missile Frigates (FFG) not Patrol Frigates (PF).
• Perry was re-designated FFG-7 (from PF-109) on 01.07.75.

Edit: The copy of Jane's 1976-77 on Internet Archive says.

50 Guided Missile Frigates (FFG) "Oliver Hazard Perry" class.​

• 10 approved, 8 proposed and 32 planned.
• 1 approved FY73 to complete mid-1977.
• 3 approved FY75
• 6 approved FY76
  • The 9 ships approved in FY75 & FY76 were to be completed 1980-81.
• 8 proposed FY77
• 8 planned FY78
• 8 planned FY79
• 8 planned FY80
• 8 planned FY81

Jane's 1977-78 - Oliver Hazard Perry class.

• 1 approved FY73 to complete 1977.
• 3 approved FY75
• 6 approved FY76 reduced from 9 that were requested.
  • The 9 ships authorised in FY75 & 76 were to be competed 1980-81.
• 64 FY77-82 Programmes including 8 approved in FY77.
• Building time 2 years for the first 10.
• That's a grand total of 74 ships.
• It also mentions the FFGX with one planned for FY81 & one planned for FY82.

Edit: There isn't a copy of Jane's 1977-78 to check the above against. However, it does have a copy of Jane's 1978-79 which says.

1 + 17 + (56) Guided Missile Frigates (FFG): "Oliver Hazard Perry" class [74 ships].​

• Of the 74 ships
  • 18 ships approved and to complete 1977-82.
    • Perry was commissioned on 17.12.77.
    • 7 ships to complete 1980.
    • 8 ships to complete 1981.
    • 2 ships to complete 1982.
  • 56 ships approved, requested or planned in the FY78-84 programmes.
• The full details were.
  • 1 approved FY73
  • 3 approved FY75
  • 9 approved FY76 by Congress, but cost escalation permitted the construction of only 6 ships.
  • 8 approved FY77
  • 8 approved FY78
  • 9 requested FY79
  • 8 planned FY80
  • 8 planned FY81
  • 8 planned FY82
  • 9 planned FY83
  • 6 planned FY84
• It also says that 1 FFGX was planned for FY83.

I don't know which Jane's these notes came from.

Patrol Frigate (PF).​

• 1 FY73 to complete 1977.
• 7 FY75
• 11 FY76
  • The 18 ships in FY75-76 were to complete 1980-81.
• 10 FY77
• 9 FY78
• 12 FY79
  • The 31 ships in FY77-79 were to complete 1982-83.
• 12 FY80
• 12 FY81
  • The 24 ships in FY80 & 81 were to complete 1984-85.
• That's a total of 74 ships to complete 1977-85.

And I don't know which Jane's these notes came from either.

Perry class​

• 18 to complete 1977-82. (First 1977 and the rest 1979-82).
• 56 to be ordered FY78-84.
• Total 74 ships.
• Edit: these notes may have come from Jane's 1978-79.

 

[Yellow Palace]

It was from June 1975 and it's a valid comparison.

My mistake - I'd forgotten that the 1970s proposal was knocking about in this thread! That being the case, do carry on.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Part of Post 64.

However, for a time, it was planned to build 74 of them.

The copy of Jane's 1979-80 on Internet Archive says.

2 + 24 + (33) Guided Missile Frigates (FFG): "Oliver Hazard Perry" class [59 ships].​

• Of the 26 ships completed, building or authorised.
  • Perry commissioned on 17.12.77.
  • 1 ship to complete in 1979.
  • 6 ships to complete 1980.
  • 8 ships to complete 1981.
  • 8 ships to complete 1982.
  • 2 ships to complete 1983.
• The 59 ships in this edition were to be ordered in the same Fiscal Years as the 74 ships in Jane's 1978-79.
  • 1 approved FY73
  • 3 approved FY75
  • 9 approved FY76 by Congress, but cost escalation permitted the construction of only 6 ships.
  • 8 approved FY77
  • 8 approved FY78
  • 8 approved FY79 [Jane's 1978-79 says 9 were requested.]
  • 6 proposed FY80 [Jane's 1978-79 says 8 were planned.]
  • 6 proposed FY81 [Jane's 1978-79 says 8 were planned.]
  • 6 proposed FY82 [Jane's 1978-79 says 8 were planned.]
  • 4 proposed FY83 [Jane's 1978-79 says 9 were planned.]
  • 3 proposed FY84 [Jane's 1978-79 says 6 were planned.]
• However, in the preamble to the Frigates Section says that 74 Perry class ships were planned and the text of the entry on the Perry class says that 74 ships were planned.
• The preamble to the Frigates Section mentioned the FFGX, but didn't say when the first ship was planned to be requested.

The copy of Jane's 1980-81 on Internet Archive says.

3 + 31 + (55) Guided Missile Frigates (FFG): "Oliver Hazard Perry" class [55 ships].​

• The 3 completed ships were commissioned on.
  • 17.12.77 - Oliver Hazard Perry.
  • 19.11-79 - McInerney.
  • 08.03.80 - Wadsworth.
• Of the 31 ships building or authorised.
  • 5 to complete 1980.
  • 9 to complete 1981.
  • 8 to complete 1982.
  • 8 to complete 1983.
  • 1 to complete 1984.
• The 55 ships in this edition were to be ordered in the same Fiscal Years as the 74 ships in Jane's 1978-79.
  • 1 approved FY73
  • 3 approved FY75
  • 9 approved FY76 by Congress, but cost escalation permitted the construction of only 6 ships.
  • 8 approved FY77
  • 8 approved FY78
  • 8 approved FY79 [Jane's 1978-79 says 9 were requested.]
  • 6 approved FY80 [Jane's 1978-79 says 8 were planned.]
  • 4 requested FY81 [Jane's 1978-79 says 8 were planned.]
  • 4 proposed FY82 [Jane's 1978-79 says 8 were planned.]
  • 3 proposed FY83 [Jane's 1978-79 says 9 were planned.]
  • 4 proposed FY84 [Jane's 1978-79 says 6 were planned.]
• The preamble to the Frigates Section says that the FFGX mentioned in the previous edition has been dropped.
• However, there is now an FFX with one planned in FY83, 4 in FY85 and more to follow. FFX which was intended primarily for the Naval Reserves and was to be capable of fulfilling naval requirements such as convoy escort in low threat areas.

Jumping forward to my personal copy of Jane's 1986-87

48 + 3 "Oliver Hazard Perry" class: Guided Missile Frigates (FFG) [51 ships].​

• The 51 ships were approved FY73-84 as follows.
  • 1 approved FY73
  • 3 approved FY75
  • 9 approved FY76 by Congress, but cost escalation permitted the construction of only 6 ships.
  • 8 approved FY77
  • 8 approved FY78
  • 8 approved FY79
  • 5 approved FY80 [Jane's 1980-81 says 6 were approved.]
  • 6 approved FY81
  • 3 approved FY82
  • 2 approved FY83
  • 1 approved FY84
• Oliver Hazard Perry commissioned on 17.12.77.
• Ingraham (the 51st ship) was to commission on 3.12.89. According to Wikipedia and Conway's 1947-95 she actually commissioned on 05.08.89.
• There's no mention of the FFX in the preamble to the Frigates Section.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

1 the Playing around with some broadly-contemporary figures (which I think are from Friedman's US Amphibious Ships, but can't confirm just now), the 1958 paper seems to suggest 1.5 MAF lift. The requirement for one MAF would be:

• 12 helicopter assault ships
• 9 amphibious transport docks
• 9 dock landing ships
• 18 tank landing ships
• 3 fast amphibious transports
• 6 assault fire support ships
• 5 attack cargo ships
• 1 headquarters ship

That actually tracks with the number of NEWPORT class tank landing ship ordered: 27 were planned, but only 20 were completed. Similarly, 15 amphibious transport docks and 13 dock landing ships were completed in the 1960s and early 1970s, all corresponding broadly to 20-knot shipping for a 1.5 MAF lift capability.

These are some quotes from Chapter 1 of my copy of Freidman.

Page 10.

In the aftermath of World War II, inter-service rivalry intensified. The U.S. Army promoted service unification. Among its goals was the elimination of the Marines: if the services were all brought under a single executive department, the Marines would no longer have any special service alongside the navy. As a separate service, the Marine Corps survived; the fight actually strengthened its hand. In 1947 the Marine Corps gained statutory authority over amphibious operations. By lay, the Marines were mandated to maintain two active divisions and their associated air wings, with a third in reserve. Implications for the navy included a requirement for a full Marine division and air wing for amphibious assault. That had been the goal in 1941, when the Marines first formed two full divisions. In later terms, the division and associated air units, including air wings, formed a Marine Amphibious Force (MAF). As ship and assault technology changed during the post-1945 period, the great question was whether sufficient new amphibious shipping for the required two-MAF lift would be built.

Pages 11 and 12.

There were several alternative measures of adequate amphibious forces. The bare minimum was the supping to support the two floating BLTs, each about a ninth of a full division. During the 1950s and 1960s it took at least three ships in service to maintain one forward-deployed ship. Thus merely to maintain the two floating battalions required at total of about two-thirds of a divisional lift. In an emergency much larger Marine forces had to be deployed from the United States, so in theory the entire two-division lift had to be maintained in service. Surviving World War II amphibious ships were more than sufficient for the two-division lift, but throughout the 1950s they became obsolescent. At the end of the Eisenhower administration active amphibious lift amounted to a full division equivalent in the Pacific and half a division equivalent in the Atlantic. During the 1961 Berlin crisis enough ships were activated to increase the Atlantic lift to a full division, and in a 6 October 1961 memorandum the secretary of state of defence recommended that the two-division force be maintained indefinitely. As a measure of the increase involved, 111 amphibious lift ships were active at the end of FY 61 (30 June 1961) compared to 131 at the end of FY 62 (30 June 1962).

Page 13.

By the mid-1960s the earlier requirement for two-divisional lift had translated into two divisions of modern 20-knot ships. They were so expensive, however, that Robert S. McNamara mandated that modern ships be bought only for the assault echelons of one and a half divisions; the rest could use slower ships. One rationale was that slower ships could cover the short distances in the Atlantic as quickly as fast ones could cross the Pacific. As funds became tighter, numbers were cut further. In 1969 the Nixon administration called for one and two-thirds divisions lift (fast only); and in May 1970 the U.S. Navy proposed a cut to one and one-third divisions. In the late 1970s President Carter cut lift further, to 1.15 divisions.

These are some quotes from Chapter 12 The Bomb and Vertical Envelopment.

Part of the fifth paragraph on Page 369.

The last pre-Vietnam thinking on amphibious assault tactics was reflected in a February 1963 long-range ojbectives group report (LRO-74] for the period through 1974.

Second paragraph on Page 370.

The full marine expeditionary force (MEF), that is the full division air/wing assault echelon, was set at 3 AGC (overall commander, vertical and over the beach), 8 LPH, 5 AKA, 13 LSD, 13 LPD, 20 LST, and 2 tankers. The follow-on force, arriving on D+5, would be about 35 MSTS or chartered ships (e.g., 4 transports, 28 cargo ships, and 3 tankers). It would have required nearly all the fast amphibious lift ships built over the next decade.

Fourth paragraph on Page 370.

At this time the navy's force goal for FY 76 [01.7.75 to 30.06.76] was two 20-kt MEF-level forces: 6 AGC, 16 LPH, 10 AKA, 26 LSD, 26 LPD, 40 LST, and 4 tankers, plus ancillary ships such as 6 APD and 2 APSS. McNamara supported both 20-kt capability and the ability to mount a full divisional attack. With limited rather than general war in view, 20 kts no longer seemed so important as protection against submarines. In a world full of crises, however, it offered valuable flexibility. a 20-kt force in the Eastern Pacific could deploy to many areas in the Atlantic about as quickly as a 13-kt force based in the Atlantic.

This is the information in the second paragraph on Page 370 in an easier to read format.

The full marine expeditionary force (MEF), that is the full division air/wing assault echelon, was set at.

• 3 AGC (overall commander, vertical and over the beach),
• 8 LPH,
• 5 AKA,
• 13 LSD,
• 13 LPD,
• 20 LST, and
• 2 tankers.

The follow-on force, arriving on D+5, would be about 35 MSTS or chartered ships (e.g., 4 transports, 28 cargo ships, and 3 tankers).

That's a total of 62 amphibious ships and 2 tankers in the full division/air wing assault echelon.

This is the information in the second paragraph on Page 370 in an easier to read format.

At this time the navy's force goal for FY 76 [01.7.75 to 30.06.76] was two 20-kt MEF-level forces:

• 6 AGC,
• 16 LPH,
• 10 AKA,
• 26 LSD,
• 26 LPD,
• 40 LST, and
• 4 tankers,
• plus ancillary ships such as 6 APD and 2 APSS.

McNamara supported both 20-kt capability and the ability to mount a full divisional attack. With limited rather than general war in view, 20 kts no longer seemed so important as protection against submarines. In a world full of crises, however, it offered valuable flexibility. a 20-kt force in the Eastern Pacific could deploy to many areas in the Atlantic about as quickly as a 13-kt force based in the Atlantic.

That's a total of 132 amphibious ships and 4 tankers. That's similar to the fleet for 1975 as projected in 1967 which included 137 amphibious ships. See Post 38.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

1 the Playing around with some broadly-contemporary figures (which I think are from Friedman's US Amphibious Ships, but can't confirm just now), the 1958 paper seems to suggest 1.5 MAF lift. The requirement for one MAF would be:

• 12 helicopter assault ships
• 9 amphibious transport docks
• 9 dock landing ships
• 18 tank landing ships
• 3 fast amphibious transports
• 6 assault fire support ships
• 5 attack cargo ships
• 1 headquarters ship

That actually tracks with the number of NEWPORT class tank landing ship ordered: 27 were planned, but only 20 were completed. Similarly, 15 amphibious transport docks and 13 dock landing ships were completed in the 1960s and early 1970s, all corresponding broadly to 20-knot shipping for a 1.5 MAF lift capability.

Link to Post 67 which was my notes from Norman Friedman about the plans to have enough amphibious shipping to lift 2-MAF/MEF.

This is a continuation of the above.

Chapter 12 The Bomb and Vertical Envelopment - Part 1

I thought that the plan was to convert 6 Essex class to LPH, but all I could find when I skimmed through the chapter was that, "By 1958 it had been decided to covert two ships, Boxer and Princeton, into austere LPH, supplementing 7 new construction LPH. A third, Valley Forge, was later added. A fourth, Lake Champlain, was dropped from the program due to manning problems", on Page 359. The next page says that all 3 ships were subject to FRAM II modernisation, with the plan at 19.12.38 for them to be funded in FY61 and FY62.

Page 363 says that the long-range objective group (Op-93) proposed building 16 LPH in October 1958 and Page 365 says that Op-93 proposed building 28 LPH in October 1958 as follows:

​

Page 373 & 374 say that in February the 1966 the 2 MEF FY67-FY71 building plan was at follows:

​

Notes.

• The ships in the LSD.28 and FY58 to FY66 had been approved.
• The ships in the LSD.28 column were the 8 Thomaston class that were approved under the FY52 to FY55 building programmes.
• The ships in the Conv. column were the 3 Essex class converted to LPHs and the 3 Mariner ships converted into 20-knot amphibious ships in the second half of the 1950s.
  • AKA-112 Tulare was in the FY54 conversion programme.
  • APA-248 Paul Rivere was in the FY57 conversion programme.
  • APA-249 Francis Marion was in the FY59 conversion programme.
• Only 48 of the 49 ships approved FY52-FY66 were built because LPD-16 in FY66 was deferred.
• The Total column is all the ships converted, approved and planned.
• The Req. column is the 2 MAF/MEF requirement for LPH, LPD, LSD, LST & LKA/AKA at 1964.

It's peculiar that only 2 AKA were in the FY67-FY71 plan, because it only produces a total of 8 ships, when 10 were required and the plan included enough of the other types to meet requirements. I suspect that this is a typo and that there were 4 AKA in FY69 or that the other 2 AKA were to be build in another Fiscal Year.

The same paragraph that straddles Pages 373 & 374 concludes by saying that cutting to 1½ MEF would cut the total requirement as follows:

• 12 LPH (2 required) - I think the 3 converted Essexes and the 7 Iwo Jimas approved to FY66 plus 2 extra ships.
• 20 LPD (4 required) - I think the 16 ships approved to FY66 plus 4 extra ships.
• 20 LSD (8 required) - I think the 8 Thomastons and 4 Anchorages approved to FY66 plus 8 extra ships.
• 30 LST (10 required) - I think the 9 Newport class approved in FY65 & FY66 and the 11 ships proposed for FY67 (which were approved) plus 10 extra ships.
• 7 AKA (none required) - I don't know how they worked that out.
  • At February 1966, there were six 20-knot AKA completed, building or approved.
  • They were Tulare (the converted Mainer ship) and the 5 Charlestons that were approved FY65 & FY66.
  • "None required" may be a typo for "One required".

To be continued.

Edit 10.04.23.

• The sentence beginning "It's peculiar that only 2 AKA were in the FY67-FY71 plan, ... " had been amended.
• Everything between that and "To be continued." is new. I thought it fitted better as the end of this post than as the beginning of the next.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Link to Post 59 which is @RLBH's estimate of the forces required to lift 1.5 MAF.

Link to Post 67 which was my notes from Norman Friedman about the plans to have enough amphibious shipping to lift 2-MAF/MEF.

Link to Post 68 which was a continuation of Post 67.

This starts where Post 68 ended. It's about the rise of the LHA and how it altered the numbers.

Chapter 12 The Bomb and Vertical Envelopment - Part 2

The story of the LHA began on Page 370. By 1965, both fleets, having used LPHs, were complaining that it was at least, awkward for troops to disembark from an LPH onto landing craft supplied by another ship. This produced proposals for ships that evolved into the Tarawa class LHA. Meanwhile, in November 1964, the CNO had asked the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) for a study of amphibious force requirements through 1980, which resulted in "Amphibious Assault Shipping in the Mid-Range Period" (NAVWAG 44). In January 1965, CNA asked BuShips for feasibility studies of an LPD with an enlarged hangar and ALPS (amphibious landing platform slipway), an LPD with a marine railway to launch craft. ALPS, was a compromise between LSD and LPD, with greater helicopter operating capacity because its flight deck could extend over the slipway. At this time CNA suggested merging the LPH and LPD.

Page 372 says that the CNA asked BuShips to sketch a large amphibious ship or general-purpose amphibious ship on 23.02.65 and it reported on 31.03.65. It could carry a BLT's worth of marines, a considerable load of vehicles and combined LPH, AKA, LSD & even LST features.

Then were return to the paragraph that straddled Pages 373 & 374. It began by saying that NAVWAG 44 (completed in April 1966) strongly supported the general-purpose amphibious ship as the ideal building block for future amphibious forces. The next sentence was that by this time the lift goal had been cut from two 20-kt MEF lifts to one-and-a-half, based on the theory that the Atlantic Fleet could make to with half an MEF lift of slower ships because it covered shorter distances. Then it details the two-MEF building plan at February 1966 and the reduced requirements for a one-and-a-half 20-kt MEF already elucidated in Post 68.

The second paragraph on Page 374 says that too many AKAs were needed simply to provide the vehicles LPHs could not carry. LPDs did not carry enough helicopters. However, the new ship would greatly simplify the situation. It would replace the LPH and LPD as well as some AKAs. Building fewer larger ships would cut the construction and manning costs.

The third paragraph says the new ship was designated LHA―an assault (A) helicopter (H) ship. It would land a Marine amphibious unit (MAU), successor to the old BLT, supported by at least two more ships, preferably an LST and an LPD (both of which existed in sufficient numbers). The navy now decided that the LHA would be the centrepiece of the 20-kt amphibious force; procurement of LPH and LPD would cease.

• The navy and JCS estimated that 4 LHA, 3 LSD and 9 LST, for a total of 16 ships, ...
• ... could replace 39 older ones: 5 APA, 2 AKA, 10 LSD and 22 LST.

It appeared that 6 LHA and 7 LST would complete the one-and-a-half MEF objective, because there were already 6 LPH [actually 10] and 20 fast LST. Secretary of the Navy Paul Nitze became a strong supporter; on 23 June he ordered procurement of the LPH and LPD stopped in favour of the LHA, which would become the primary element of the planned one-and-a-half MEF lift.

This, is presumably, when LPD-16 in FY66 was deferred. My guess is that LPH-12 Inchon which was also in the FY66 building programme was too far advanced to cancel. As this ship was the seventh Iwo Jima class LPH the 6 LPH in the first sentence of this paragraph may refer to the first 6 ships of the class.

The fourth paragraph on Page 374 says that the NAVWAG 44 conclusions were incorporated in a 22.08.66 draft presidential memorandum on the amphibious assault ship issued by the secretary of defense. To reach the one-and-a-half MEF capacity by FY72, all necessary ships would be funded by FY69; the decision on the last half MEF would be deferred. Three LHA would be built in each year of FY68 and FY69, together with seven LST and the third AGC. A LHA project was formally established in July 1966.

The next few pages are about how the design of SCB 409.68 (the Tarawa class) evolved. The .68 in SCB 409.68 meant that it was to be approved in the FY68 building programme, however, it wasn't.

We return to the "story of the numbers" in the paragraph that straddles Pages 377 & 378. Friedman wrote that the 9th February 1968 presidential memorandum (DPM) on amphibious forces deferred the purchase of the one-and-a-half fast MEF force to FY71. It approved the building of one LHA ($153 million) and the long-lead items for three more, as recommended by the navy. It also deferred the accompanying seven LST from FY69 to FY70. By April 1968, with the winning design not yet selected, plans called for a lead ship in FY69, three in FY70, and two in FY71. The contract would be on a multiyear basis; soon one of the FY70 ships was deferred to FY71. These LHA would replace 18 previously approved ships: 2 LKA, 2 LPH, 4 LPD, 7 LSD, and 3 LST. The six-ship plan would actually bring navy forces beyond the one-and-a-half MEF, as a step toward the desired two MEF (one per ocean) force.

However, I don't know what the 18 previously approved ships were. The only ship that was approved by Congress was LPD-16 in FY66. The closest thing I can find in the book is the requirements for a 1½ MEF in February 1966 on Pages 373 & 374 which is in Post 68.

• 12 LPH (2 required) - I think the 3 converted Essexes and the 7 Iwo Jimas approved to FY66 plus 2 extra ships.
• 20 LPD (4 required) - I think the 16 ships approved to FY66 plus 4 extra ships.
• 20 LSD (8 required) - I think the 8 Thomastons and 4 Anchorages approved to FY66 plus 8 extra ships. However, a fifth Anchorage was approved in FY67 which would require 7 extra ships.
• 30 LST (10 required) - I think the 9 Newport class approved in FY65 & FY66 and the 11 ships proposed for FY67 (which were approved) plus 10 extra ships, which were reduced to 7 extra ships by the LHA programme so this is probably where the 3 deferred LST come from.
• 7 AKA (none required) - I speculated in Post 68 that "none required" was a typo for "one required" because 6 fast AKA had been approved to FY66 (Tulare and 5 Charleston class). It could be that it was a typo for "two required" i.e. 2 additional Charlestons and if it was they would be the 2 LKA referred to by Friedman in the second paragraph of Page 378.

Or put another way 2 LPH + 4 LPD + 7 LSD + 3 LST + 2 LKA = the 18 previously approved ships that the 6 LHA replaced.​

The first paragraph on Page 378 begins by saying that extending the production run to ten ships would reduce the unit cost by about 5 per cent, and would provide enough for the ultimate two MEF goal and that OpNav therefore asked for the extension. It continued by saying that it would be necessary to replace the 3 Boxer class (converted Essex) LPHs by FY76-FY77 and that these ships were already very expensive to maintain ($20-22 million per year for the Boxers vs. $11-12 million for the LHAs); replacing them with three more LHAs would save about 5,000 personnel. The secretary of defense rejected the ten-ship program, but did agree to buy three ships to replace the Boxers, for a total of nine LHA. The resulting total of 9 LHA would provide a total of 16 large decks which would support the assault echelons of one-and-two-thirds MAF (actually, 16 rather than the 15 required MAU). This program was embodied in a national security memorandum (NSDM-27), which required the capacity to handle one major and two minor contingencies (respectively, one MAF and one third MAF).

This was the new programme in the same format as the tables in Post 69.

​

LPD-16 approved for the FY66 building program has been removed. There were also 2 LHA in FY72 and 2 more in FY73 for a total of 9 LHA and a grand total of 82 ships.

So far Friedman hadn't written anything about discarding the 2 Mariner class APA/LPA, so there would have been enough ships (9 LHA, 7 LPH & 2 LPA) to lift 18 battalions (2 divisions worth) when LHA-9 was completed. However, two of the 18 would have to be Battalion Landing Teams (BLT) rather than Marine Amphibious Units (MAU).

I also think that 36 LST would be required for 2 MAF/MEF if 27 LST were required for 1½ MAF/MEF. That's 4 less than the 40 required when the 2-MAF/MEF force was built around 16 LPH instead of a mixture of LHA & LPH.

To be continued.

 

[Archibald]

I never quite understood the Iwo Jimas. What was their exact mission ? commando carriers ?

 

[Arjen]

Helicopter carriers for the USMC. LPH for amphibious operations:

Landing platform helicopter - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

 

[Yellow Palace]

The 60 picket ships probably covers the various DERs, Guardian class AGRs and the radar picket submarines (e.g. Triton and the Sailfish class plus the converted WW2 boats). The DEW Line extension operations didn't start to be wound down until FY61 and it wasn't until the W2F/Hawkeye really got operational that the picket role for carrier groups started to go away. At that point the Navy was reporting 36 DERs in addition to the 16 AGRs and the submarines, so 60 is about right. I doubt these would have been Brookes, more likely the existing ships and/or some hypothetical replacements. The Brookes, or rather what became them, likely constituted a large part of the "Ocean Escort" category alongside other Destroyer Escort types.

Referring to Friedman's US Aircraft Carriers sheds some light here. The Navy in the 1970 Era was based on the LRO-56 report, which called for a picket force of:

• An ocean barrier of 35 to 40 PBGs armed with Terrier missiles, presumably split between the Atlantic and the Pacific
• An outer offshore barrier of twelve CVHG 'barrier escorts' with helicopters (and presumably Terrier) in the Atlantic, and 12 to 15 additional PBGs in the Pacific
• An inner contiguous barrier of 16 to 26 PBGs or AGRs

All would have air surveillance roles, and some (particularly in the Atlantic) would also have interceptor control duties. The total is 12 CVHG, 62 to 81 PBG, and possibly some number of AGRs.

While the numbers aren't quite the same, the 1955 LAMP LIGHT study identified a need for 52 ocean pickets covering 21 stations, with US Coast Guard weather ships covering three additional stations. LAMP LIGHT also gives a total of 195 AEW&C aircraft, compared to 180 in The Navy in the 1970 Era.

LRO-56 also called for ten SSRs to operate with five carrier task forces, and 50 SSKs for the ASW ocean barrier. If that corresponds to the 65 nuclear submarines from The Navy in the 1970 Era, it leaves 15 nuclear submarines for carrier task force work, i.e. three per task force.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

I never quite understood the Iwo Jimas. What was their exact mission ? commando carriers ?

Helicopter carriers for the USMC. LPH for amphibious operations:

Landing platform helicopter - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

What @Arjen said. Plus.

• LPH = Amphibious Platform Helicopter.
  • L = Amphibious
  • P = Platform (or Personnel Transport)
  • H = Helicopter.
• They were successors to the World War II Attack Transports (APA) which were the USN equivalent to the British Landing Ships Infantry (LSI).
  • A = Auxiliary
  • P = (Personnel) Transport
  • A = Attack.
• Circa 1969 remaining APAs were re-designated Amphibious Platforms Assault (LPA).
  • L = Amphibious
  • P = Platform (or Personnel Transport)
  • A = Assault.
• An LPH was effectively an APA/LPA with a hangar for helicopters and on top of that a full-length flight deck.

Edit 12.04.23.

So, yes the Iwo Jimas (and Essex class LPHs) were commando carriers. The RN and USN gave different names to ships that did the same job. Another example is that in the 1960s the USN had attack carriers and the RN had strike carriers, but they did the same job.

 

[Archibald]

Thank you both !

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Part of Post 54.

With hindsight, I would have built Greyback, Growler & Halibut as Attack Submarines and converted 3 additional old submarines to Regulus Boats. Similarly, I would have built Sailfish, Salmon & Triton as Attack Submarines and converted 3 additional old Boats to Radar Picket Submarines (SSR).

This fits better in an ALT-1950s US Navy, but here goes.

Sailfish & Salmon were approved in FY52, Greyback & Growler were approved in FY53 & FY55 respectively. I think they should have been built as submarines of the Tang or Darter classes. The former were approved FY47-49 and the latter in FY54. With hindsight, I also think that the 3 Barracuda class SSK (approved FY48 & 49) should have been additional boats of the Tang class and in their place 3 additional old boats converted to SSKs. That would increase the number of Tang & Darter type submarines from 7 to 14.

Halibut & Triton were approved in FY56 and so were the last pair of Skates, Skipjack & the 3 Barbels. I'd like them to be built as additional Skate class SSN (and as this appears to be a "money no object" thread) have another 3 Skipjacks built instead of the Barbels. That would increase the number of Skipjack class from 6 to 11. I'd also like 4 additional Skipjacks to be built instead of the Skates, but the only way (that I know of) to achieve that is build Albacore at least 2 years earlier and I think that's a "wank" too far.

The one-off SSKN Tulibee was approved in FY58. However, Thresher was approved in FY57 and with hindsight I think she should have been an additional Thresher which would increase that class from 14 to 15 boats.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

This is another one that would be better in an ALT-1950s USN, but here goes.

• As I understand it No. 1 - The USN's post-war "ideal destroyer" was the Mitscher and the 4 ships of that class which Congress approved originally had hull numbers in the DD-series.
• As I understand it No. 2 - The Forrest Sherman class was designed because Congress wouldn't approve more ships of the Mitscher type.

If both statements are correct and this is a "money no object" thread would we have had 18 extra Mitscher class or 18 all-gun versions of the Farragut class built in place of the 18 Forrest Sherman class and a mix of 23 Farragut, Leahy and Belknap class ships built instead of the 23 Charles F. Adams class?

In the "Real" 1960s the plan was to convert all 22 ships of the Mitscher and Sherman classes to guided missile ships, but due to the cost of the conversions only 2 Mitschers and 4 Shermans were converted. (I suspect that the cost of Polaris and the poor reliability of the 3-T missiles before they "got well" were also factors.) The Mitschers were downgraded from DL to DDG because they had Tatar/Standard MR instead of the Terrier/Standard ER that armed the succeeding Farragut class and the Shermans had one SPG-51 tracking radar white succeeding Adams class had 2 so it could only engage one target at a time instead of 2.

Therefore, if this is a "money no object" thread, all 22 ships would have been converted to DDGs in the 1960s. Furthermore, if 18 additional Mitscher class had been built instead of the Sherman class their combined AAW "firepower" would have increased from being able to engage 26 targets at once to 44.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

It just occurred to me that if Congress had given the US Navy the money to build 73 ships of the Mitscher, Farragut, Leahy & Belknap classes instead of 32 of them and 41 ships of the Sherman & Adams classes and been designated destroyers (DD) instead of frigates (DL) it may have been easier to justify the cost of the Spruance class.

That is because the the difference in cost & displacement between the Spruance and the preceding destroyer class would not have been as great because the preceding destroyer design would have been the Belknap class instead of the Adams class.

These are the light displacements of the classes in question according to Conway's 1947-95.

2,734 tons Forrest Sherman class​

3,277 tons Charles F. Adams class​

3,331 tons Mitscher class​

4,167 tons Farragut class​

5,146 tons Leahy class​

5,409 tons Belknap class​

5,826 tons Spruance class (and Kidd class)​

​

However, if this is a "money no object" thread, it's of no consequence.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

In the same vein as Post 76.

According to my copy of Conway's 1947-95, the Dealay class DE was felt to be too expensive and the Claud Jones class was an attempt to produce a minimum cost ocean escort.

However, as I'm regarding this as a "money no object" thread, the USN would go straight to the Bronstein class which (according to my copy of Conway's 1947-95) was in effect a Dealey with the new SQS-26 sonar, ASROC & DASH, with one of the original four 3in/50 guns traded for greater ASW effectiveness.

Or they might go straight to the Brooke class. The Tatar armed Brooke would make sense as the Claude Jones class was built around the time the US started "mass production" of guided missile frigates (of the DLG variety) & guided missile destroyers. Therefore, it would make sense that the USN would start building guided missile ocean escorts (of the DEG variety) in a "money no object" situation.

Regardless of what's built instead of the Claude Jones class, it's very likely that all 64 ships of the SCB-199 family & the one-off Glover built in the "Real World" would have been DEGs armed with Tartar in this "Version of History" instead of just the 6 ships of the Brooke class. The whole SCB.199 family probably gets a single 5in/54 gun too, which may mean a slightly larger hull and in turn a larger hangar & flight deck for the LAMPS helicopter that replaced the DASH.

• The Brooke class had a 5in/38 gun, Tatar/Standard MR and helicopter facilities,
• the Knox class had a 5in/54 gun, Sea Sparrow & helicopter facilities,
• however the Tatar/Standard MR armed version of the Knox class built in Spain, had a 5in/54 gun, but Standard MR in place of the Sea Sparrow & helicopter facilities.

That's why I think a SCB-199 with a 5in/54 gun, Tatar/Standard MR & helicopter facilities may need a larger hull.

The SCB-199 family should have run to 74 ships instead of 64. However, the 10 ships in FY68 were deferred in favour of the DX which became the Spruance class. As I'm regarding this as a "money no object" thread the USN will be able to "have its cake and eat it" so it gets 74 SCB-199 ships and all the Spruance class that it wanted.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Those frigate numbers are... ambitious.

You haven't read anything yet!

Link to Post 63 which began, "This is not a frigate. It is an ocean escort:"

@RLBH please NB too.

54 Guided Missile Cruisers, Frigates (of the DLG variety) and Destroyers were approved FY56 to FY62 against the 104 which were planned in the New Construction Programme of September 1956.

​

Notes

• The source is Page 294 of U.S. Destroyers by Norman Friedman.
• No DDG were in FY56, but the last 7 Forrest Sherman class DD were.
• No DDG in FY59 is peculiar. I've checked the book and that's what it says. 34 over 4 Fiscal Years (59-62) at an average of 8 a year seems better than 34 over 3 Fiscal Years (60-62) at an average of 11 a year.
• The 30 DLG approved include Bainbridge and Truxtun which were nuclear powered. Bainbridge was approved in FY59 and Truxton in FY62.
• Bainbridge and Truxtun may have taken the place of the 2 unbuilt CGN or it may be coincidence.
• The Plan also included 8 Attack Carriers at the rate of one-a-year from FY56 to FY63. All were to be armed with Terrier and the 6 ships would have been nuclear powered. In the event 5 were built as follows:
  • FY56 - Kitty Hawk, which had 2 twin Terrier launchers.
  • FY57 - Constellation, which had 2 twin Terrier launchers.
  • FY58 - Enterprise, which was fitted for (but not with) 2 twin Terrier launchers.
  • FY61 - America, which had 2 twin Terrier launchers.
  • FY63 - John F. Kennedy, which had 3 Sea Sparrow launchers.
• Therefore, if 6 CVAN and 3 CGN had been built it's possible than as many as 15 of the 51 DLG may have been nuclear powered to provide enough escorts for 6 all-nuclear carrier task groups, each consisting of one CVAN and 3 escorts (CGN and/or DLGN).

The reasons for the shortfall were:

• Cost overruns.
• The Polaris programme was given priority for the money that was available.
• The unreliability of the 3-T systems before the "get well" programmes - why spend lots of money on weapons that don't work?
• The Typhon programme - why spend money on ships that will soon become obsolete? Except, that Typhon was cancelled.

However, as I'm regarding this as a "money no object" thread the first two reasons are irrelevant and so is the extra cost of the "get well" programme to cure the reliability problems of the extra ships.

However, "money no object" might mean the number of pre-Typhon guided missile ships is less in this "version of history" rather than more than the "Real World" as the USN has more money to absorb the escalating R&D and production costs. However, I think that Typhon will still be cancelled because "we didn't have the technology" to paraphrase Oscar Goldman. On the other hand, the extra work done, may mean that ASMS which became Aegis, is ready sooner.

If this is a continuation of Post 76 where 22 Mischer class are built instead of 4 Mitschers & 18 Forrest Sherman class then the September 1956 NCP will be for 3 CGN & 101 DLG instead of 3 CGN, 50 DLG & 51 DDG. The numbers actually built might be 3 CGN, 108 DLG and 15 DL because 7 additional Farragut class might be built in FY56 instead of the 7 Mitscher class that would have otherwise been approved in that year's New Construction Programme.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

The Opening Post.

The Royal Navy in the 1960s has been the place for many alternative history threads helped by the excellent books on the subject and the enthusiasm of Brits like me for CVA01 and co. The US Navy offers even more scope for programmes that could have been. Some thoughts to kick things off.
Enterprise was the only nuclear carrier till the 70s. Nukes vs conventional options.
The large cruisers of the 50s reached their zenith with Long Beach. In the 60s frigates like Bainbridge, Truxtun, Belknap and Leahy were the big ships, though to Europeans they were destroyer leaders/cruisers. Typhon was ditched and AEGIS didn't arrive .
Huge numbers of war-built destroyers were converted with ASROC but could have had better helicopters than DASH.
The Knox and then Spruance classes came along, but were they the best answers.

Lots of scope and I haven't even mentioned subs, helicopter carriers etc.

May I have some clarification on the terms of reference of this thread.

1. In my posts so far I've assumed that this is a "money no object" thread. That is new ships, aircraft, weapons, sensors, et al, can be built in the numbers the USN wanted without regard to their cost. Is that correct? (The cost includes the running costs (especially personnel) as well as the R&D and purchase costs.)
2. May I also assume that this is an "on time and at cost" thread. Some of the "Real World" cut-backs and cancellations were because the ships, aircraft, weapons, sensors, et al, were due due to to said ships, et al, costing more than planned and taking longer to develop/build than planned. An example of a programme that wasn't "on time and at cost" is the Tarawa class LHA and I'm going to discussed that in my next post about the USN's Amphibious Warfare Forces.
3. Is the "Point of Departure" (POD) 1955 or 1960? If it's 1955 then it's ships, aircraft, weapons, sensors, et al, that came into service from circa 1960 or would have come into service circa 1960s. If the POD is 1960 then it's ships, et al, whose development and/or procurement began circa 1960. So far I've assumed that the POD is 1955 which is (for example) why I wrote the post about the 1956 New Construction Programme for Guided Missile Cruisers, Frigates (of the DLG variety) and Destroyers.
4. Finally, when does the thread end? Although, the title is "Alt 60s US Navy", I am assuming that it continues through the 1970s and ends in the early 1980s with the "This Timeline" version of the Reagan Navy.