AIRLAND BATTLE 2000 (1982)

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http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a127471.pdf

AIRLAND BATTLE 2000
(1982 Version with Functional Areas)


This document provides the expanded AirLand Battle 2000
concept. It is based on the initial document, dated 4 September
1981, which provided the concept overview and eight functional
area concept statements. The first part of this report is an
unclassified, updated version of the original overview. No
substantative changes have been made except to remove the
classified portions for ease of handling by those interested in
the data contained in the functional areas.

The functional area concepts were produced by combining the
written reports of the TRAWDC proponent task forces and the
scripts developed for presentation of the concepts by the task
force leaders at the NJSA Synposium held at Carlisle Barracks in
May 1982. The document is in the structured writing style to
ewpasize key points. Copies of the more pertinent slides from
the AirLand Battle 2000 briefing have been incorporated as
visual stimuli to assist all who have heard the briefing.

A separate annex for aviation has been added. During the final
stages of development of the functional areas, the aviation
aspects of AirLand Battle 2000 were too transparent and needed
to be set out separately.​
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Ironic that the US Army is still hypothesizing on the very same concepts.
 
Air Defense Artillery PB-44
AIRLAND BATTLE 2000 (More drawings)
http://sill-www.army.mil/ada-online/pb-44/_docs/1983/Winter/winter%201983.pdf
 
Airland Battle future. The evolution of Airland Battle created with the AFV/HFM/ASM vehicles in mind. Related presentations, reports and booklets that I could find on USAHEC. 17 sources about or relating to Airland battle future / 2000 / 2004. I was originally going to post this in the ASM thread before I found this thread. I feel like this fits much better.
[DRAFT] [REPORT] AIRLAND BATTLE FUTURE (HEAVY) CONCEPT SUMMARY 5 Pages

[PRESENTATION] AIRLAND BATTLE-FUTURE (HEAVY) 76 slides

[SLIDES] AIR LAND BATTLE-FUTURE (HEAVY) 28 slides

AIRLAND BATTLE FUTURE, 2004, SPECIAL STUDY GROUP, 1987-1988, FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS Conference ALB-F 115 page Report PT 1

AIRLAND BATTLE FUTURE, 2004, SPECIAL STUDY GROUP, 1987-1988, FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS Conference ALB-F (H) 69 page Report Pt 2

[PRESENTATION SLIDES REGARDING AIRLAND OPERATIONS, THE EVOLUTION OF AIRLAND BATTLE FOR A STRATEGIC ARMY] 30 slides

[PRESENTATION SLIDES REGARDING AIRLAND OPERATIONS, AN UPDATE] 26 slides

ARMY AFTER NEXT, AIRLAND BATTLE 2000, FUTURISTIC CONCEPTS OR JULES VERNE? (from 1998, post-asm) 37 page Study

[DRAFT] [REPORT] US ARMY OPERATIONAL CONCEPT, AIRLAND BATTLE FUTURE-HEAVY 2004] 105 page report

AIRLAND BATTLE 2000 [WITH ATTACHMENTS] (From 1982, an updated version of the original document from September 4th, 1981 that literally started the ALB-F / 2000 idea. Classified parts removed, apparently part one of a series of reports. Wish we could see those ) 138 page Report

[PRESENTATION] "AIR LAND BATTLE-FUTURE CONCEPTUAL UNDERPINNINGS" 104 Slides

Battlefield 2004 systems summary ( Like the name suggests, gives a very brief quick summary of any weapon systems involved in ALB. From the MK 19 AGL to the Block III tank. Sort of interesting, but nothing of substance ) 97 pages

2004 battlefield systems overview ( Like above, but shows very cool image and is much shorter and descriptions much descript) 14 pages

[CORRESPONDENCE FROM MAJOR GENERAL THOMAS C. FOLEY TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL FREDERIC J. BROWN REGARDING A REPORT ON "ARMOR 2000-A BALANCED FORCE FOR THE ARMY OF THE FUTURE" WITH ATTACHMENT][CORRESPONDENCE FROM MAJOR GENERAL THOMAS C. FOLEY TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL FREDERIC J. BROWN REGARDING A REPORT ON "ARMOR 2000-A BALANCED FORCE FOR THE ARMY OF THE FUTURE" WITH ATTACHMENT] AKA THE BEST VERSION OF THIS BOOK I COULD FIND THATS AVAILABLE. A 21 (technically 23) page booklet.

[PRESENTATION] REGARDING AIR LAND BATTLE FUTURE ( basically: AIRLAND BATTLE FUTURE WARFIGHTING CONCEPTS COMMUNICATION ON THE NON-LINEAR BATTLEFIELD ) 17 slides

[DRAFT] [REPORT] AIRLAND BATTLE FUTURE UMBRELLA CONCEPT 87 pages pt 1

[DRAFT] [REPORT] AIRLAND BATTLE FUTURE UMBRELLA CONCEPT PART TWO-STRATEGIC CONTEXT 81 pages pt 2
Screenshot 2023-02-08 150746.jpg Screenshot 2023-02-13 190948.jpg Screenshot 2023-02-13 183829.jpg Screenshot 2023-02-13 185557.jpg
 
Some more background on the origins of Air-Land Battle can be found in the paper below:
Deciding What Has to Be Done: General William E. DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations (July 1988)

Here's a few excerpts:
In addition to the active defense, the 1976 edition of FM 100-5 introduced the term "Air-Land Battle" for the first time. The chapter titled "Air-Land Battle" only described the joint procedures agreed to by the Air Force and Army for cooperating in areas of mutual interest, such as airspace management, air logistics, aerial reconnaissance, and electronic warfare. The use of this term and the dedication of a chapter to its discussion signaled the Army's strong interest in a new concept of theater warfare that recognized the total interdependency of the Army and Air Force and that sought to describe their activities within the theater in a single, unified battle.
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The TAC Connection and Air-Land Battle

Less important to the publication of FM 100-5 in 1976 than the German connection, but of lasting significance to the Army's emerging vision of future war, was the relationship General DePuy established with the Tactical Air Command of the U.S. Air Force. The relationship gave currency to the term "Air-Land Battle," first officially mentioned as the title of chapter 8 of FM 100-5 in 1976 and destined to become the centerpiece of U.S. Army doctrine. Here again, DePuy carried out the directions of Army Chief of Staff Abrams, who ensured through agreements with the Air Force chief of staff that TAC would be as eager for the relationship to prosper as was the Army.23

General Abrams' desire for closer relations with the Air Force emanated from his service in Vietnam and from his perception that, in a period of fiscal retrenchment, the two services must avoid internecine quarrels that could jeopardize each other's budget. As recently as 1972, Congress had stopped funding the Army's development of the Cheyenne advanced attack helicopter because the Air Force insisted that it was to perform the Air Force mission of close air support of ground troops.24 The Army saw the Cheyenne as vital to its ability to shift antitank combat power rapidly on the battlefield and made a similar helicopter one of its "Big Five" procurement priorities for 1973 and beyond. General Abrams did not want that helicopter cut from the budget, nor did he want to suffer the professional embarrassment of arguing openly with another service in a public forum. Fortunately, Abrams' Air Force counterpart, General George S. Brown,agreed. General Brown's career included service in all Air Force missions (strategic bombardment, air superiority, close air support, and military airlift), and most significantly, he had served as General Abrams' deputy for air operations in Vietnam.25 He was therefore familiar with Army operations and priorities and was likely to welcome greater collaboration between the two services.

Achieving such collaboration was among the initial missions that General Abrams gave General DePuy as TRADOC's first commander. Assisted by the close proximity of their respective headquarters at Fort Monroe and Langley Air Force Base, both in Virginia, DePuy and General Robert J. Dixon, the TAC commander, brought their two commands into close cooperation, if not complete doctrinal harmony. The Air Force never challenged the basic ground combat doctrine of FM 100-5 and, therefore, was able to contribute to Army doctrine in many marginal areas such as electronic warfare, airspace management, and air logistics. More important, TRADOC-TAC cooperation sprang from a realization, greatly enhanced by the 1973 October War, of the mutual interdependence of the two services.
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TAC-TRADOC collaboration reflected the two services' recognition of their mutual interdependence in modern warfare and their need to establish commonly understood procedures for cooperation in a variety of tactical functions. An important first step was to develop a common vision of the future battlefield, a step taken as the Air Force participated with the Army in developing scenarios at Fort Leavenworth. Implicit here was the growing realization that combat on land was not an autonomous activity sometimes supported by air operations but that ground and air operations were integral, inseparable parts of the whole effort to apply force against and defeat the enemy. Inspired by Major General Cushman, who wrote about air-ground integration as early as 1965, officers at Fort Leavenworth began to use the terms "air-land" and "air-land battle" to express this idea. While the component parts of air-land battle (air defense, tactical air support, and airspace management) were not new problems to officers of either service, a heightened consciousness of their importance and the difficulties inherent in synchronizing them with traditional missions of both services suggested the need for a new, three-dimensional concept of the battlefield. Thus, Major General Cushman included a chapter titled "Air/Land Operations" in the draft of FM 100-5 that he prepared for the first meeting at Fort A. P. Hill, implying that this new concept was as important to the Army's thinking about warfare as were the concepts of offense, defense, and intelligence, the subjects of other chapters. Cushman described the inherent problems of the air-land battle concept: "The basic problem facing the air and land commanders is to work together so that each part of the air/land force can operate to its full potential without needlessly restricting the operations of any other part. The combined air/land battle force that solves this problem best will most likely prevail."32

Major General Cushman's version of FM 100-5 did not survive that first meeting, but ideas about air-land battle did. Using a team composed of officers from the USACGSC student body, CACDA, and the TAC liaison office to CAC, Cushman prepared a briefing on the air-land battle concept and presented it to TAC and TRADOC staff officers in March and April 1975. The concept posited a corps-size Army element with appropriate Air Force support in a scenario set in the Middle East and attempted to portray a "conceptualization of the integrated Air-Land tactical battle." Despite some initial misgivings by the TAC staff members, Major General Cushman and his team briefed Generals DePuy and Dixon on 10 April 1975.33

DePuy and Dixon expressed reservations about the concept. They believed the concept implied a misuse of tactical air support assets, calling for flights of two aircraft for missions requiring a hundred. Furthermore,they doubted that the joint combat operations center called for in the briefing would work. They sent the briefing team back to Fort Leavenworth with a new set of instructions for developing the concept further and postponed staff work on a proposed joint memorandum of agreement on air-land battle.34

Major General Cushman's concept of air-land battle did not become an agreed-on doctrine of the U.S. Army and Air Force in the spring of 1975, but the reasons transcend Generals Dixon and DePuy's reservations expressed at the briefing. First, the TAC staff officers who heard the pre-briefing were not enthusiastic about the concept from the beginning. They believed it dealt with too many specific details, required decisions from the TAC commander that he was not yet prepared to make, and reflected a misunderstanding of the current Air Force Air-Ground Operations System. These misgivings, combined with the reservation that the concept misused tactical aircraft, suggested considerable Air Force opposition to the concept.

Second, Cushman did not have DePuy's full confidence in the spring of 1975. One almost feels the clash of the two men's personalities in the brief notes recording the instructions given the briefing team after their presentation: "Reorient [the] effort to align with substantive problems: Winning the war tomorrow ... Europe present forces ... Limited to defense suppression. "Finally, what Cushman suggested to DePuy and Dixon was a substantive change in doctrine, and they had agreed to coordinate procedures only, not doctrine.

This last point is a fine one because, as we have seen, all parties agreed on the component issues of air-land battle. However, Major General Cushman was urging that both services agree that these issues constituted the core of battle as it would occur in the foreseeable future. Purely air or ground roles would be the exception and would take second priority to articulating the doctrine and equipping, training, and fielding the forces necessary for the air-land fight. For this reason, a joint task force commander of either service needed his own combat operations center with which to control the unified battle on the ground and in the air, to include controlling the assets of both services. Neither service was yet willing to go that far because, to do so, could require significant redefinition of service roles and apportionment of assets. By rejecting Cushman's air-land battle concept, Generals DePuy and Dixon agreed on a safer, more productive approach: tacit acceptance of two arenas of battle, one on the ground and one in the air, each the primary province of a respective service, and explicit acknowledgment that the two arenas are mutually interdependent, leading to procedural, but not doctrinal, collaboration. Rather than serving as a platform for doctrinal revolution, the TAC-TRADOC dialogue of the mid-1970s reflected an unprecedented degree of Army-Air Force cooperation in peacetime.
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