AGM-88 HARM

would say this broadly equates to good air superiority but is slightly short of full air supremacy due to the minor losses. Either way it's a level Russia would dream of having in Ukraine.

Of course and it is to be expected because Ukraine is :
-7 times the area of Serbia. lots of room to flee.
-Generations ahead in SAM's Even 1978 S-300PT's 5N63 have average sidelobe level of about -40.7 dB. It's kinda hard to detect in the first place.
-Buk which you cannot compare with 2K12 Kub Serbia has. as each launcher have its own 9S35 radar (Except the transloader but that can launch missile too provided a 9S35 is available from nearby launcher) 1 of it and a disciplined crew can wreak havoc to anyone.

Now imagine Serbia with S-300PS and Buk and with their disciplined Emcon.



Is it ? because someone else credit this to a TB-2. I noticed this trend of people crediting myriad amount of weapons for every Russian equipment kills which kinda weird.
 
Of course and it is to be expected because Ukraine is :
-7 times the area of Serbia. lots of room to flee.
-Generations ahead in SAM's Even 1978 S-300PT's 5N63 have average sidelobe level of about -40.7 dB. It's kinda hard to detect in the first place.
-Buk which you cannot compare with 2K12 Kub Serbia has. as each launcher have its own 9S35 radar (Except the transloader but that can launch missile too provided a 9S35 is available from nearby launcher) 1 of it and a disciplined crew can wreak havoc to anyone.

Now imagine Serbia with S-300PS and Buk and with their disciplined Emcon.
If Ukraine is bigger then it is harder to cover with radar.

SEAD is also generations ahead of what it was in 1999. AGM-88C is hardly comparable to AGM-88G, plus the range of MALDs that come out since then.

Was that the radar that was hit by a HIMARS rocket?



Is it ? because someone else credit this to a TB-2. I noticed this trend of people crediting myriad amount of weapons for every Russian equipment kills which kinda weird.
Being killed by a HARM is one thing but if a Bayraktar sized drone got close enough to bomb it, well... That's hardly something better is it now?
 
If Ukraine is bigger then it is harder to cover with radar.

SEAD is also generations ahead of what it was in 1999. AGM-88C is hardly comparable to AGM-88G, plus the range of MALDs that come out since then.

and harder to find mobile SAM launchers which give Russians the same problem as US-co had in Serbia. I dont really think advances in Decoys or new ARM's will really address problem of Scout and shoot system. Especially if the enemy also move forward. Low sidelobe phased arrays, Better countermeasures, better target discriminations.


and the radar is Podlets a low altitude early warning radar which works in S-band. 5N63 is Flap Lid which works in X-band. The S-300/400 is not realy using that instead they use either 5N66 or 76N6 "Clamshell" or 96L6 "cheese board"

Podlets is hardly an ABM nor Space tracking (As what "OSINTTechnical" tried to portray) The thing doesnt even have sector scan capability which is needed if one wish to do ABM or counterbattery task. and of course no CRAM covers or capability.

What's the consequences of the destruction ? Well increased probability of low speed UAV to penetrates. One feature of Podlets was apparently it has low speed treshold for target detection (about 50-100 km/h minimum target speed) Thus allows detection of slow and low flying target. and the result we see in Crimea. but that's beyond the topic of the thread.


Being killed by a HARM is one thing but if a Bayraktar sized drone got close enough to bomb it, well... That's hardly something better is it now?

The thing is.. How do you know if it's Harm or TB-2 ? This is not a question on what's better but a question on how do you know what killed what.
 
You find mobile SAMs by using ESM techniques. They certainly will solve the problem, because they won't be able to be in use without being hit. In fact terminal MMW homing can even hit them if they switch off and start moving. With hunter-killer decoys target discrimination won't mean anything. They can turn off and keep moving to avoid destruction but then it's not really an air defence anymore, hence suppressed. Sidelobes is old hat. Modern ESM uses phase interferometry to geolocate, the missile is then sent using GPS/INS plus data-link and homes using both PRH and active MMW radar.

Wow, sounds like it needs a million different radars to do one job properly. Still beggars the question of where the radar(s) supposed to be doing that were.

Because most reports are saying that is was a HARM, and that makes the most sense.
 
Last edited:
Sidelobes is old hat. Modern ESM uses phase interferometry to geolocate, the missile is then sent using GPS/INS plus data-link and homes using both PRH and active MMW radar.

Are you serious here ? Interferometer still needs those Lobe thingy to detect be it sidelobes or mainlobe. How do you think ESM works BTW ? or in general how an antenna works.

Sidelobe detection is paramount because sidelobe Emit to the direction OTHER than the antenna mainlobe is pointing. Therefore if it left big then it will be detectable and the radar become vulnerable. You can properly attack radar with anti radiation weapon from the direction other than radar is pointing.

Thus why we have phased arrays everywhere because it can minimize it. Then it left you with Mainlobe which the strongest. Problem is that when you are in mainlobe, you are being illuminated and therefore you are prone to detection or missile is.

I suggest you refrain from using techsavvy terms before understanding the principles behind it.

Wow, sounds like it needs a million different radars to do one job properly. Still beggars the question of where the radar(s) supposed to be doing that were.
I am not sure you are trying to be serious or plain trolling.

Harm on Su-27. Interfaced via emulation of R-27EP?
That make sense. Tho i wonder where the designation coming from unless somehow it can also emulate Iron Hand.
 
Sidelobes is old hat. Modern ESM uses phase interferometry to geolocate, the missile is then sent using GPS/INS plus data-link and homes using both PRH and active MMW radar.

Are you serious here ? Interferometer still needs those Lobe thingy to detect be it sidelobes or mainlobe. How do you think ESM works BTW ? or in general how an antenna works.

Sidelobe detection is paramount because sidelobe Emit to the direction OTHER than the antenna mainlobe is pointing. Therefore if it left big then it will be detectable and the radar become vulnerable. You can properly attack radar with anti radiation weapon from the direction other than radar is pointing.

Thus why we have phased arrays everywhere because it can minimize it. Then it left you with Mainlobe which the strongest. Problem is that when you are in mainlobe, you are being illuminated and therefore you are prone to detection or missile is.

I suggest you refrain from using techsavvy terms before understanding the principles behind it.

Wow, sounds like it needs a million different radars to do one job properly. Still beggars the question of where the radar(s) supposed to be doing that were.
I am not sure you are trying to be serious or plain trolling.

Harm on Su-27. Interfaced via emulation of R-27EP?
That make sense. Tho i wonder where the designation coming from unless somehow it can also emulate Iron Hand.
Well of course an interferometer needs some lobe, but which lobe doesn't matter, only that the radar emissions are reaching it. And if the radar emissions aren't reaching it then it's not of essential interest for now.

Yeah sure, if the side lobes are huge then it leaves the radar more vulnerable from distance even when it isn't pointing in the direction of the attacking aircraft. But if it's not pointing at the attack package, well, it's not much bloody use is it?

The problem there is that the radar emissions are infinitely more detectable than radar reflections at range. 1/R^2 vs 1/R^4. This problem is further compounded by the stealth aircraft vs very non-stealthy SAM radar emissions issue and/or jamming. Detection of the ARM is not a problem, a SAM system shooting down ARMs will run out of missiles very fast.

Yeeaahhh. Okay.

Nah, deadly serious really. Of course ESM detection is not even required if the SAR technology being used is sufficiently effective, or if other intelligence assets have found the SAM and the ARM has GPS and MWR. SAMs have a tough job these days.
 
Well of course an interferometer needs some lobe, but which lobe doesn't matter, only that the radar emissions are reaching it. And if the radar emissions aren't reaching it then it's not of essential interest for now.
The problem there is that the radar emissions are infinitely more detectable than radar reflections at range. 1/R^2 vs 1/R^4. This problem is further compounded by the stealth aircraft vs very non-stealthy SAM radar emissions issue and/or jamming. Detection of the ARM is not a problem, a SAM system shooting down ARMs will run out of missiles very fast.

I suggest you do a read on David Adamy's EW-101 or 102 series. To see how actually antenna lobes detection matters. and you think as if SAM's will not do a search or even not having other means for early warning.

Because you can expect when it's already putting mainlobe on you, you either already been detected and missiles might already been airborne to you.

Nah, deadly serious really. Of course ESM detection is not even required if the SAR technology being used is sufficiently effective, or if other intelligence assets have found the SAM and the ARM has GPS and MWR. SAMs have a tough job these days.
Yeah and realtime SAR ? If no then the battery may no longer be there.
 
Well of course an interferometer needs some lobe, but which lobe doesn't matter, only that the radar emissions are reaching it. And if the radar emissions aren't reaching it then it's not of essential interest for now.
The problem there is that the radar emissions are infinitely more detectable than radar reflections at range. 1/R^2 vs 1/R^4. This problem is further compounded by the stealth aircraft vs very non-stealthy SAM radar emissions issue and/or jamming. Detection of the ARM is not a problem, a SAM system shooting down ARMs will run out of missiles very fast.

I suggest you do a read on David Adamy's EW-101 or 102 series. To see how actually antenna lobes detection matters. and you think as if SAM's will not do a search or even not having other means for early warning.

Because you can expect when it's already putting mainlobe on you, you either already been detected and missiles might already been airborne to you.

Nah, deadly serious really. Of course ESM detection is not even required if the SAR technology being used is sufficiently effective, or if other intelligence assets have found the SAM and the ARM has GPS and MWR. SAMs have a tough job these days.
Yeah and realtime SAR ? If no then the battery may no longer be there.
Radars work by sending RF waves your way. The elements of interferometric receivers examine the phase separation between EM radiation incident on each adjacent element and from that they can determine the direction and geolocate the source. A missile like an AGM-88E is then launched towards a GPS co-ordinate, using PRH if the radar is still on, if not then it flies to the GPS point and searches using MWR to find the target(s).

First a radar has to detect you, this comes before tracking, which comes before targeting. As soon as any lobe comes on you interferometic recievers can determine the location. Basically a detection radar has to wait twice as long to receive any information about the plane as the plane has to wait to receive information about it. Then the same is true for the tracking radar and targeting. The plane has umpteen opportunities to locate the radar(s) before they have a targeting lock, assuming the latter is even possible for a plane of a given RCS at a given range with a specific jamming package.

And all this assumes they aren't dealing with and expending missiles on disposable hunter-killer decoys at the same time, which they will be, and maybe even some cruise missiles too.
 

AFA 2022 — It took only a “couple of months” for defense contractors to equip the Ukrainian air force’s Soviet-era MiG-29 and Su-27 fighters with American-made AGM-88 High Speed Radiation Missiles, the head of US Air Forces in Europe said today.

“It was quite the effort,” said Gen. James Hecker during a roundtable at the Air Force Association’s Air, Space Cyber conference. “We have some early smart contractors that were able to make this happen. Now, is it as integrated as it is on an F-16? Of course not. So it doesn’t have all the capabilities that it would on an F-16.”

On the battlefield, Russia is able to thwart the use of HARM missiles by turning off its radars. But that can benefit Ukraine as well, Hecker said. “Even though you don’t get a kinetic kill … you can get local air superiority for a period of time where you can do what you need to do.”
 
How long does it take to generate a SAR map?

Depending on the resolution you need. a high resolution spotlight map SAR in X-band can be generated in 10 seconds for 1 m resolution. But a Realtime one (which implies 1 seconds or less) may only produces 16 m resolution map.
 
How long does it take to generate a SAR map?

Depending on the resolution you need. a high resolution spotlight map SAR in X-band can be generated in 10 seconds for 1 m resolution. But a Realtime one (which implies 1 seconds or less) may only produces 16 m resolution map.
If I understand correctly, the resolution of SAR scale with distance that the aircraft travel. Does that mean you just have to travel twice as fast to reduce SAR generation time?
 
1. It emits - ESM geolocates it.
2. It doesn't emit but is stationary - SAR locates it.
3. It moves, MTI locates it.
 
How long does it take to generate a SAR map?

Depending on the resolution you need. a high resolution spotlight map SAR in X-band can be generated in 10 seconds for 1 m resolution. But a Realtime one (which implies 1 seconds or less) may only produces 16 m resolution map.

Surely for a non moving target, 10+ seconds is acceptable to find and identify a target?

How long does an MTI mode take to ID moving targets? It might be worth applying both to an small area of interest that just emitted or fired something, assuming what was fired wasn’t headed directly at you…
 

Like stealthflanker, I frequently wonder about claims that a specific weapons system destroyed some wreck or other. Unless you were there to witness it, how would you know? This is a particularly good case in point, in that it probably wasn't the work of a HARM missile at all, for all the reasons discussed earlier in this very thread regarding the peculiarities of its warhead!

I mean, some of the kills Oryx marks as having been destroyed by TB2 are designated as such based on no more compelling evidence than that "the damage seems to be on top". Well, last time I checked Javelin typically flies a top-attack and 155mm shells do not travel underground either. Sure, it *could* be a TB2 kill, but with so many perfectly plausible alternatives, you've got to be able to come up with a better justification to make the call, right?

Obviously that was an "export model" operated by untrained conscripts.

Well, the war experience has raised legitimate doubts about previous assumptions on the standard of training in the Russian armed forces. At the same time, this very war experience probably means the surviving personnel is likely to be rather battle-hardened and liable to give a complacent foe a very rude shock indeed. Much like the Ukrainian armed forces did to the Russians...

Regarding the capabilities of Russian equipment in general and air defence systems in particular, Twitter OSINT presents a grossly distorted picture. It's not necessarily dead wrong, but often woefully incomplete. Analysis by real experts who went to the country, examined the evidence on the ground and interviewed people actually taking part in the fight tells a more nuanced story. Justin Bronk (not one known for glowing assessments of Russian hardware, to put it mildly) in his paper on the early course of the air war is almost at pains to emphasize at every turn how the equipment generally did what it says on the box.

Same story with the re-taking of Snake Island by Ukraine - watching the Twitter videos, you get the sense that hapless AD systems were basically bombed into oblivion by TB2s. Yet recently it was revealed that it was only once the island could be targeted with artillery fire that things truly began to go South for the Russians, with the Tors and Pantsirs happily taking down both Tochka TBMs (!) and UAVs. That TB2 which washed up in Romania is probably but the tip of the iceberg, the source says they were mostly forced to stand off outside AD range. Somehow that doesn't make for nice footage though.

None of which should be surprising, given the excellent performance of Ukrainian AD which has depended (and mostly still does) on older Soviet-era variants of the systems Russia is using, after all. Yeah, Iris-T-SLM, Gepard and NASAMS... well, the first Iris-T-SLM arrived in Ukraine in October, the first NASAMS in November. Whatever Ukraine's successes were throughout 2022, they were hence mostly achieved with Buks, S-300Ps/Vs and Tunguskas - if they perform well, why would more modern versions (as used by Russia) not?

The picture which emerges is that the (fortunately) dismal performance of the Russians has more to do with catastrophically flawed ideological premises, shockingly poor planning and communications as well as obsolete intelligence than equipment failures. We need to be realistic in our assessments, complacent dismissal is going to be a very costly mistake to make.
 
Last edited:
with the Tors and Pantsirs happily taking down both Tochka TBMs (!) and UAVs.

And yet TORs has been taken out by HIMARS.

Is there definitely a documented case of that? Also that could be for any number of reasons - unit not operating, incoming not detected for whatever reason, multiple HIMARS overwhelming the single launcher, etc.
 
The picture which emerges is that the (fortunately) dismal performance of the Russians has more to do with catastrophically flawed ideological premises, shockingly poor planning and communications as well as obsolete intelligence than equipment failures. We need to be realistic in our assessments, complacent dismissal is going to be a very costly mistake to make.
All true. It also has a lot to do with incredibly poor and corrupt leadership, from the top down to the NCOs.
Which is MUCH more difficult to fix. Replacing fifty generals or even a dictator is not so difficult. Replacing/retraining/de-corrupting every sergeant, lieutenant, captain, administrator, etc is an undertaking for a decade at best.

In my opinion, it's not so much "catastrophically flawed ideological premises" as "catastrophically flawed morals" in a kleptocracy with populist-nationalist veneer for the plebes. Which will be even more difficult to fix in a culture that never had a real experience of a functioning democratic law-and-order. See third world appalling examples aplenty.

I'm so fortunate I don't live near that region. My sympathy to the unfortunate civilized souls who do.
 

Like stealthflanker, I frequently wonder about claims that a specific weapons system destroyed some wreck or other. Unless you were there to witness it, how would you know? This is a particularly good case in point, in that it probably wasn't the work of a HARM missile at all, for all the reasons discussed earlier in this very thread regarding the peculiarities of its warhead!

I mean, some of the kills Oryx marks as having been destroyed by TB2 are designated as such based on no more compelling evidence than that "the damage seems to be on top". Well, last time I checked Javelin typically flies a top-attack and 155mm shells do not travel underground either. Sure, it *could* be a TB2 kill, but with so many perfectly plausible alternatives, you've got to be able to come up with a better justification to make the call, right?

Obviously that was an "export model" operated by untrained conscripts.

Well, the war experience has raised legitimate doubts about previous assumptions on the standard of training in the Russian armed forces. At the same time, this very war experience probably means the surviving personnel is likely to be rather battle-hardened and liable to give a complacent foe a very rude shock indeed. Much like the Ukrainian armed forces did to the Russians...

Regarding the capabilities of Russian equipment in general and air defence systems in particular, Twitter OSINT presents a grossly distorted picture. It's not necessarily dead wrong, but often woefully incomplete. Analysis by real experts who went to the country, examined the evidence on the ground and interviewed people actually taking part in the fight tells a more nuanced story. Justin Bronk (not one known for glowing assessments of Russian hardware, to put it mildly) in his paper on the early course of the air war is almost at pains to emphasize at every turn how the equipment generally did what it says on the box.

Same story with the re-taking of Snake Island by Ukraine - watching the Twitter videos, you get the sense that hapless AD systems were basically bombed into oblivion by TB2s. Yet recently it was revealed that it was only once the island could be targeted with artillery fire that things truly began to go South for the Russians, with the Tors and Pantsirs happily taking down both Tochka TBMs (!) and UAVs. That TB2 which washed up in Romania is probably but the tip of the iceberg, the source says they were mostly forced to stand off outside AD range. Somehow that doesn't make for nice footage though.

None of which should be surprising, given the excellent performance of Ukrainian AD which has depended (and mostly still does) on older Soviet-era variants of the systems Russia is using, after all. Yeah, Iris-T-SLM, Gepard and NASAMS... well, the first Iris-T-SLM arrived in Ukraine in October, the first NASAMS in November. Whatever Ukraine's successes were throughout 2022, they were hence mostly achieved with Buks, S-300Ps/Vs and Tunguskas - if they perform well, why would more modern versions (as used by Russia) not?

The picture which emerges is that the (fortunately) dismal performance of the Russians has more to do with catastrophically flawed ideological premises, shockingly poor planning and communications as well as obsolete intelligence than equipment failures. We need to be realistic in our assessments, complacent dismissal is going to be a very costly mistake to make.
Don't forget Russia's atrociously bad logistics especially in the first phases of the war. An all-singing-all-dancing Pantsir is simply very expensie scrap metal, if its tyres are rotten in the sun, it runs out of fuel with a refill expected in a few days and no hope of getting bombed up after expending one's initial ammunition loadout. I do also wonder how big a problem defective parts due to corruption or negligence in maintenance have been in Russian air defence systems during the war. Based on what I have read during the last year, this has been a major problem for Russia's tank force.
 
Like stealthflanker, I frequently wonder about claims that a specific weapons system destroyed some wreck or other. Unless you were there to witness it, how would you know? This is a particularly good case in point, in that it probably wasn't the work of a HARM missile at all, for all the reasons discussed earlier in this very thread regarding the peculiarities of its warhead!

I mean, some of the kills Oryx marks as having been destroyed by TB2 are designated as such based on no more compelling evidence than that "the damage seems to be on top". Well, last time I checked Javelin typically flies a top-attack and 155mm shells do not travel underground either. Sure, it *could* be a TB2 kill, but with so many perfectly plausible alternatives, you've got to be able to come up with a better justification to make the call, right?
Difficult to know for sure. Based on other videos, it may well just be the result of a generally poor standard of driving.
 
In my opinion, it's not so much "catastrophically flawed ideological premises" as "catastrophically flawed morals" in a kleptocracy with populist-nationalist veneer for the plebes.

That is certainly also an apt way of putting it. I fear we digress though.

Don't forget Russia's atrociously bad logistics especially in the first phases of the war.

Absolutely, that's definitely one of the symptoms of the poor planning I was talking about.
 
Lots of them were captured in various states early war (the drive on Kiev). It looked like a lot of the BTGs from that axis used that as their attached SAM battery(s).
 
and harder to find mobile SAM launchers which give Russians the same problem as US-co had in Serbia. I dont really think advances in Decoys or new ARM's will really address problem of Scout and shoot system. Especially if the enemy also move forward. Low sidelobe phased arrays, Better countermeasures, better target discriminations.
A stand in jammer like MALD-J could very well make the SAM engagement range reduced to near visual range, I think it really help with SEAD/DEAD missions. In fact, I think stand in jamming decoys are the most important SEAD assets
 
That may be a disaster waiting to happen, if the Russians have compromised them.
 

Similar threads

Please donate to support the forum.

Back
Top Bottom