Aero Business: Last Man Standing...Natural Selection? or...

[Hood]

Like alterken I have often pondered just how much the Dash 80 was a pure PV. Saying that Boeing was exactly broke with plenty of DoD Dollars flowing into the bank account.

Reading American Secret Projects Vol.2 its clear how vital USAF interest was in spurring the development of long-range jet airliners - and piston airliners too. There were few long-range airliners that owed all their origins purely to civilian requirements, even the DC-6 and DC-7 owed something to wartime DC-4 developments for the USAAF. Arguably Britain had the most fresh sheet civilian airliners off the back of the Brabazon programme, not that that really paid much dividend. Lockheed didn't do especially well on the Electra, and post-war sales of piston-props were coming to keep those lines profitable and so kicking the turbojet down the line, much like today with continued revamps of 737s and A320s rather than taking commercial risks with a new design.
Boeing were probably more ready to take risks, they cooked up the B-52 we know today in a weekend when a turboprop bomber looked like a bad idea. The took the Dash 80, took the risk to widen it for the KC-135 and then took another risk to widen it again for the commercial 707. Everybody else wanted to get it right first time and lost time trying to marry military and commercial needs - that killed off the L-193 and the V.1000. Perhaps Douglas never really got the most from the DC-8 airframe, it was stretched and re-engined later but never had the multitude of variants to match the 707 line-up and of course the US Armed Services steered clear of it too. Once Boeing built up critical mass in sales it was hard to fight back.
I always get the sense that commercial aircraft post-1950 were something of an afterthought for Lockheed, they never really had a massive airline presence other than the Constellation (Orions and Electra etc. were much closer to feedliners in today's parlance). Therefore the Jetstar probably seemed a better bet for its target market. Same with Convair, never a well-known company to airlines and trading purely on speed over economics was never going to garner mass sales.

 

[royabulgaf]

Well, as far as the Electra goes, airliners that fall down go boom are as the Ferengi say "bad for business" Lockheed sold no more Electras after two fatal crashes. The Boeing 707 first flew within a couple weeks of the Electra, and was clearly a more advanced aircraft.

 

[alertken]

There were 3 points, 1966-69, when UK might have exited design-led Aero if Ministers had not done what they did:

1. Option 50 F-111K, 4/65. DoD had pocketed the C-130E/F-4D package but extended the credit/price package to F-111A and offered a $400M. offset deal.
That would do well for Elliott (HUD, A-7E, F-16) and RR (Spey-as-TF41, A-7E), bad for HP, who thought they would sell 300 C-10A Jetstreams, but...
McNamara reined in his dogs pitching for SAAD - a total support package as Saudi Arabian Air Defence Scheme. "We could not have made the offer, .
never mind won (without US help)” Healey, SoS/Def: R.W.Howe,Weapons,Sphere,80,P687. This was won 28/3/66 (and continues to gush, today).

No-contest award of AFVG to BAC, 17/5/65 might not have been made if Ministers thought UK had no chance for (Lightning-driven) SAAD. Northrop was already in-country and had track record on infrastructure management - bricks and bogs. BAC did not.

UK chopped F-111K, 16/1/68, but US did not wade in to rock the Saudi boat. If they had prised it from BAC..owners would have invited Nationalisation.

If we had given AFVG to HSAL - just as well able to handle it as BAC was, then:

2. When, 5/66, we were reading the Study Reports by BAC and HSAL on the Euro-Big Twin, we might have taken pity on empty BAC (if not yet extinct) and given them the job that went to HSAL, 10/66 as A300. The only reason they survived death of AFVG, 29/6/67, was SAAD (UKVG was nonsense). BAC had pitched Sud/Dassault Galion. When, broke again, we decided we could not afford Launch Aid for A300B, so left it, 16/4/69, then with or without SAAD, BAC would not have been able to self-fund any% of the wing. Owners RR/Vickers/GEC had better things to do with their capital capacity.

UK out. Sud+(Messerschmitt+Dornier+VFW, to be DASA, 5/70) would either have quit, too, or taken the wing elsewhere. But:

3. Ministers had given A300 to HSAL, who on 16/4/69 were doing good things and stated to UK Ministers willingness to continue to fund half-ish A300B wing cost. Treasury shrugged, don't care. The salving Minister...was not Brit, but was FRG Finance Minister F-J.Strauss.., who did not know his doom to be unemployed 29/9/69. He chose to keep UK-in-A300B as means of keeping UK interested in trying again to gain Membership of the EEC, balance to France.

He used his commitment to create UK exports-to-FRG as offset to the DM drain of BAOR/RAFG. He replaced Treasury Launch Aid for the wing. 25/5/69 FRG+France launched A300B, HSAL as Associate (like CASA). If he had not bothered...and if FRG+France Govts. had been minded to fund ANOther, then A300B would have proceeded without UK involvement. At some point soon after...HSAL might have quit Aero, too..unless they had been put on MRCA, 17/7/68. If UK had not climbed onboard that, but had taken an F-something workshare, then..no indigenous UK design industry.

 

[zen]

No: the whiff is...what if a further enhancement as Super Vautour had been funded by U.S instead of Mystere IV, which was a straight duplication of existing US off-the-shelf types.

Could not a Vantour development have secured the Canberra spot in the US?

 

[Zoo Tycoon]

No the Canberra’s key selling point was its altitude performance which was unmatched in the early to mid 50’s. It was this feature that got it noticed not only by the US but also Nikita Khrushchev who specifically mentioned he would shoot down the next Canberra that over flew the USSR. Of course he didn’t but he take down a U2 by way of a consultation prize.