(Ref 301, pg 138) There is some anecdotal evidence the the Air Force began working on a stealthy loitering system in the late 1970's (perhaps as an extension of COMPASS COPE), but no supporting documentary evidence was found. Donald C. Latham, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control and Communications, and Intelligence from 1981-1988 thought AARS may have dated back to the late 1970's. Donald C. Latham, interview, 9 April 1999.
(pg 139).... Edward C. "Pete" Aldridge, Jr. began the preliminary design explorations on such a UAV soon after taking office in August 1981 (Ref 304). That UAV program became AARS. As John McLucas said, "Pete Aldridge brought aircraft back [into the NRO]. He obviously didn't think, as I did, that we should divest NRO of airborne assets". (Ref 305)
(Ref 304, pg 139) Aldridge was in a position to manage both NRO and USAF "black" projects in his position as NRO Director and Undersecretary (later Secretary) of the Air Force...
(Ref 305, pg 139) McLucas interview. It is entirely possible that, in addition to AARS, the USAF/NRO/CIA airborne reconaissance investments included at least one supersonic, manned SR-71 replacement project.
(pg 139/140).... and after several studies investigating the concept, the Air Force accepted design proposals from seven US aerospace companies for the big, covert surveillance UAV (Ref 306).
(Ref 306, pg 140) A 1995 report on the stealthy DarkStar UAV, a direct descendant of AARS, said "Most of the design was developed in technology work conducted over the last decade or more." Michael A. Dornheim, "Mission of Tier 3- Reflected in Design." Aviation Week & Space Technology 19 June 1995.
[mr_london_247: discussion of the initial intended AARS mission takes place here: to specifically loiter and track SS-24 & SS-25 rail and road-mobile missiles]
(Ref 307, pg 140) SDI spawned a number of UAV projects that overlapped AARS. SDI contractors proposed long-dwell UAVs as a possible platform for carrying the airborne optical adjunct (AOA) for tracking warheads in flight. Early designs for AOA UAVs were very high altitude, large (240 foot wingspan) airplanes with long loiter capability. A fleet of 20 air vehicles was projected to cost $10 Billion. Frederick Seitz. et al., "Report of the Technical Panel on Missile Defense in the 1990's," Washington, DC: George C. Marshall Institute....
(pg 141).... in the end the Air Force/NRO/CIA consortium opted for a leap-ahead system and awarded competitive UAV contracts to aerospace giants Lockheed and Boeing, probably in late 1984 or early 1985.
(Ref 306, pg 141).... It is possible that AARS had a much higher standard of stealth than either the F-117 or B2....
(pg 142).... As one CIA engineer said in an anonymous interview, this project was "the cat's pyjamas," and "the single most fun project I ever worked on" becuase it stretched every conceivable technology area. The Soviet mobile missile threat loomed large and the Reagan administration kept the black money flowing. The big UAV had different codenames that still remain secret, but the characteristically bland cover name for it was the Advanced Airborne Reconaissance System (AARS). (Ref 312).
(Ref 312, pg 142) Aerospace reporter John Boatman was told by unnamed government officials that the name for the AARS started with the letter "Q." the letter insiders used as the shorthand name for the program. Boatman's report remains the best single open-source account of the AARS program although it made no splash at the time. John Boatman, "USA Planned Stealthy UAV to Replace SR-71," Jane's Defence Weekly 17 December 1994: 1. AARS may have been associated with the codename TEAL CAMEO, reportedly a highly secret program to replace the U-2. "Eyes in the Sky," Newsweek 17 November 1986.
(pg 144) .... AARS was, indeed, planned to be the ultimate surveillance UAV, one of the most ambitious Cold War aircraft programs ever. In an exclusive interview for this study, the last AARS program manager emerged from the shadows.... David Kier, now the deputy director of the NRO, disclosed that the large, stealthy high altitude reconassiance bird resembles a substantially scaled-up version of DARPA's DarkStar.... Kier acknowledged that AARS had a long history dating to the early 1980s, "maybe even the 1970s,".... "There was one do-all platform that was very, very expensive, then another scaled-down version that only did a few things," he said. In fact, a Lockheed engineer disclosed in 1995 that over 50 shapes were analyzed for AARS, with the eventual shape, the very odd "flying clam," always showing better stealth characteristics for the high altitude loiter mission.
(pg 145) When Congress directed unified management of conventional Department of Defense (DOD) UAV projects in late 1987, they also ordered centralized control of secret, "national" airborne reconaissance projects through a new agency called the Airborne Reconnaissance Support Program (ARSP) in the National Reconnaissance Office. ARSP was essentially a resurrection of the NRO's "Program D," which had been disbanded in 1974.
(Ref 323 pg 145).... Kier's dates [circa 1987] are confirmed by reports of the Air Force's interest in an SR-71 replacement at that time. The Air Force was apparently looking at various manned platforms for that mission - this article mentions the manned Lockheed Aurora project as one possible competitor. Studying the various competitors for AARS probably ate up valuable time, ultimately making it more vulnerable when the post-Cold War budget cuts came in 1992. Jane Callen. "Air Force Battle Brews Over Using Unmanned Vehicles for Coveted Spy Mission," Inside the Pentagon 9 June 1989.
(pg 147).... ARSP considered three UAVs for the SR-71 replacement role, two DARPA UAVs called AMBER and CONDOR, and a "Lockheed candidate," which was undoubtedly AARS. As previously mentioned, the underlying reason for the Air Force's interest in the AARS program was the mobile missile threat, but it also helped them justify how the very expensive and controversial B-2 stealth bomber might hold those missiles at risk. The B-2 could not find those missiles by itself and satellites did not provide constant surveillance.
(Ref 331, pg 148).... "Kier's Bird," as some called it, lacked a quality called "time-to-station," or sheer intercontinental speed in the event of a crisis. A military official interviewed in 1994 said another very fast alternative to AARS was dropped in the 1980s, possibly the enigmatic Aurora. Boatman, "USA Planned Stealthy UAV".
(pg 149).... Kier said the large version of AARS, which according to some reports had a wingspan of 250 feet, cost less than a B-2, but more than $1 billion a copy. Reportedly, the production plan called for only eight vehicles at a cost of $10 billion, each of the vehicles capable of an amazing 40 hours on station after flying to the area of interest. Air Force officials were so leery of the UAV's autonomous flight concept (no pilot had moment-to-moment control) that they reportedly insisted the flying prototype carry a pilot in order to handle in-flight anomalies, and that the final design include a modular, two-place cockpit insert to make it optionally piloted.
(pg 151).... Kier mentioned that several other concepts for manned alternatives to AARS popped up in the early 1990s, including a minimalist design called the TR-3 that he derisively called a "Cessna 172 compared to a 747 [AARS]." (Ref 341)
(Ref 341 pg 151) A likely candidate for a program fitting Kier's description was a moderately stealthy (all-composite) high altitude German airframe called Egrett.... Egrett was an optionally piloted 55,000 foot loitering aircraft that went by the codename SENIOR GUARDIAN....
(pg 152).... the State Department dealt AARS a mortal blow. In the latter half of 1991 they ruled that AARS would not get overflight clearance until hostilities were imminent (Ref 344)
(Ref 344 pg 152) anonymous source.
(pg 152).... AARS was kept alive by other agencies until finally terminated by intelligence community executives in mid-December 1992....
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