A-X all over again - USAF pushes for A-10 replacement

[jsport]

Howze Board - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Under earlier agreements, the Army could only operate aircraft under certain weight and size restrictions. There were also limits placed on arming such aircraft. The Air Force focused its objections on Army fixed wing aircraft (the OV-1 Mohawk and Caribou), and the Caribou was transferred to the Air Force in 1966. Before the Howze Board "the Caribou and the Mohawk were the two major symbols of Army-Air Force disagreement and more time was devoted to these systems than to the entire mobility concept itself."[3]

 

[Desertfox]

What needs to happen is a compromise, the USAF gets to replace the A-10s however they want (more F-35's probably) and can drop the CAS mission, meanwhile the Army takes over the CAS mission and gets to replace the A-10 as they see fit (including fast movers). The Navy, Marines and heck even the Coast Guard get to operate jets, its backwards that the Army is under these restrictions.

 

[GTX]

For those who constantly role out this BS about the USAF not wanting to support the US Army in CAS or other roles, I point you to the following quote from General Mark Milley, United States Army general and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

“We fight with the Navy, Marines and Air Force. Our soldiers have never heard an Air Force pilot say ‘I can’t fly into that low-altitude area,’ These guys take incredible risk. If there are troops on the ground, they are rolling in hot,”

The fact is that the A-10 is old and increasingly unable to perform its role in a modern battlefield. It is also not cost effective to keep them in service, especially when it means doing so at the detriment of other more modern, survivable and capable platforms. Moreover, one might well argue that those arguing for keeping the A-10 are actually doing the troops on the ground a disservice by insisting they keep relying on old, less effective weapon systems.

 

[jsport]

It is all about how close the enemy is to the troops on the ground! Technically CAS can and has been done by strategic bombers using precision guided weapons.

Yes, and those weapons cannot be used on the enemy if they are closer than X without significant risk of fratricide. Recent conflicts have shown the enemy is often much closer than X when troops are in contact and need CAS.

Weapons that can be used safely in close proximity to friendly forces are useful for CAS.

https://www.aiaa.org/docs/default-source/uploadedfiles/education-and-careers/university-students/design-competitions/ind3rdplace.pdf?sfvrsn=c3a0c4e6_0

once again
as budgets afford less TACAIR and threats like the PLA expand there will be fewer aircraft even available for CAS

the idea the Pilot promotion culture wants slow planes and thus slow careers is a lark in the current context.

 

[_Del_]

Unless things have changed substantially in the intervening years, nothing (neither A-10 nor F-16 or anything else) was allowed below 20,000' if there were even semi-credible.reports of MANPADs in the area.
Not to mention the more recent freak-out over the Iranian 358 in appearing in Iraq and brief directives to only fly in the daylight over certain areas (where flight crew can see the smoke trails).
You can probably measure the Pentagon's current enthusiasm for sending A-10's down in the weeds littered with modern IADS accordingly.

The desire to go low-and-slow to accurately lay ordinance danger-close is gone, regardless if the idea remains popular in some (mostly, but not entirely, on-line) circles.

They should divest the A-10 fleet, and get something cheap and capable to operate in permissive environments. Something like the Scorpion with good ISR capabilities and endurance, that can also carry ordinance. For more dangerous environments, like it or not, the answer will be attritable drones or LO aircraft employing precision weaponry from altitude. Even if you hold an increasingly less tenable opinion that CAS has to be done in the weeds, there is no stomach for doing it with multi-million dollar aircraft with crews who need rescuing.

 

[Ainen]

Russian continued use of the Su-25 is due the absence from their inventory of anything capable of doing that role as well, given their lack of properly modern targeting pods (even the Su-34s internal targeting equipment isn’t up to scratch in this context), and lack of usable smaller precision weapons. The Su-25 pilots pay the price in their losses for this lack of capability; others on the ground pay their own price for the lack of equivalent accuracy as Western aircraft with the latest generation of targeting pods and role-suitable smaller precision weapons.

Both Russia and Ukraine continue to heavily use su-25s because they generate much more sorties per plane(1) per given time(2), with faster and simpler service between the missions(3) and better readiness record(4). Their service record even at constant low-altitude missions, with battle damage, and with heavy use of forward airstrips(5). Neither country had good contested CAS-specific PGMs before the war, frogfoot or not; both are now doing emergency work on satellite-guided PGMs, which can be used for some CAS; and those can be adapted to su-25s no worse than to others.

Key point is it's CAS - you'll have to do those missions regardless. Frogfoot in this sense does quite nice (no worse than their fixed-wing AF respective level, but much more) - and can be improved no worse than others.

Both Su-34(RuAF) and Su-24M(UkrAF, Vagner) are very difficult aircraft to maintain; many doubt Ukrainian ones are even fully working. Their sorties are mostly too valuable for CAS use (Ukraine and Vagner don't have too much to spare, Su-34s have a lot of other job beyond strike), and their service rates dropped naturally simply because of the nature of the long conflict.

As a nice bonus - su-25s are still remarkably survivable (or at least give their pilots excellent chances) to the manpad ambushes, and reasonably agile at low altitudes.

Unless things have changed substantially in the intervening years, nothing (neither A-10 nor F-16 or anything else) was allowed below 20,000' if there were even semi-credible.reports of MANPADs in the area.
Not to mention the more recent freak-out over the Iranian 358 in appearing in Iraq and brief directives to only fly in the daylight over certain areas (where flight crew can see the smoke trails).
You can probably measure the Pentagon's current enthusiasm for sending A-10's down in the weeds littered with modern IADS accordingly.

In the context we're talking about (contested high-end CAS), flying near the line of contact at medium altitudes or higher is outright suicidal: you're in the field of view of (non-emitting) MRSAM TELARs. Given how those engagements happen - neither heavy EW nor LO really matter against a point-blank ambush.

 

[kaiserd]

Russian continued use of the Su-25 is due the absence from their inventory of anything capable of doing that role as well, given their lack of properly modern targeting pods (even the Su-34s internal targeting equipment isn’t up to scratch in this context), and lack of usable smaller precision weapons. The Su-25 pilots pay the price in their losses for this lack of capability; others on the ground pay their own price for the lack of equivalent accuracy as Western aircraft with the latest generation of targeting pods and role-suitable smaller precision weapons.

Both Russia and Ukraine continue to heavily use su-25s because they generate much more sorties per plane(1) per given time(2), with faster and simpler service between the missions(3) and better readiness record(4). Their service record even at constant low-altitude missions, with battle damage, and with heavy use of forward airstrips(5). Neither country had good contested CAS-specific PGMs before the war, frogfoot or not; both are now doing emergency work on satellite-guided PGMs, which can be used for some CAS; and those can be adapted to su-25s no worse than to others.

Key point is it's CAS - you'll have to do those missions regardless. Frogfoot in this sense does quite nice (no worse than their fixed-wing AF respective level, but much more) - and can be improved no worse than others.

Both Su-34(RuAF) and Su-24M(UkrAF, Vagner) are very difficult aircraft to maintain; many doubt Ukrainian ones are even fully working. Their sorties are mostly too valuable for CAS use (Ukraine and Vagner don't have too much to spare, Su-34s have a lot of other job beyond strike), and their service rates dropped naturally simply because of the nature of the long conflict.

As a nice bonus - su-25s are still remarkably survivable (or at least give their pilots excellent chances) to the manpad ambushes, and reasonably agile at low altitudes.

Unless things have changed substantially in the intervening years, nothing (neither A-10 nor F-16 or anything else) was allowed below 20,000' if there were even semi-credible.reports of MANPADs in the area.
Not to mention the more recent freak-out over the Iranian 358 in appearing in Iraq and brief directives to only fly in the daylight over certain areas (where flight crew can see the smoke trails).
You can probably measure the Pentagon's current enthusiasm for sending A-10's down in the weeds littered with modern IADS accordingly.

In the context we're talking about (contested high-end CAS), flying near the line of contact at medium altitudes or higher is outright suicidal: you're in the field of view of (non-emitting) MRSAM TELARs. Given how those engagements happen - neither heavy EW nor LO really matter against a point-blank ambush.

There appears to be a common underlying logical fallacy in most of these comments.

That because Russia is doing something a certain way then that must be the best way of doing it, or that others don’t have significantly different capabilities, contexts and options.

The fact that Su-25’s availability and sustainability in relatively high temp wartime conditions is better than a Su-34 is really a very limited compliment when the Su-34’s availability is rather awful.

The comments on the “survivability” of the Su-25 in this context could almost be taken as a sarcastic dark joke; by any reasonable measure the Su-25 actual survivability in the low level role against even remotely well equipped opponents isn’t remotely acceptable. I’m sure your comments will be greatly appreciated by those required to (ultimately unnecessarily) loose their lives due the Russian airforces poor equipment and resulting necessitated doctrine/ tactics.

Thankfully Western airforces generally have significantly superior equipment (targeting pods, precision weapons, data sharing/ transfer, SEAD capabilities, etc. etc.) that mean they have other better ways of getting the equivalent job done. It is these very developments that also leave the A-10 as somewhat overtaken by events and not necessarily greatly missed when it bows outs.

There is a certain irony in seeing Russian and other posters feeling they have to defend the A-10 because they are seeing it as a proxy to defend the Su-25 and the Russian use of the Su-25 when if the Russian airforce actually had the equivalent capabilities and options of Western airforces the Su-25 would probably have already been retired.
The same goes for the Ukrainian airforce.

 

[Ainen]

The fact that Su-25’s availability and sustainability in relatively high temp wartime conditions is better than a Su-34 is really a very limited compliment when the Su-34’s availability is rather awful.

3 other key heavy strike aircraft of today - F-35, F-15E, and J-16 - aren't exactly serviceability/ availability stars either.
All 3 are maintenance-heavy aircraft.

The comments on the “survivability” of the Su-25 in this context could almost be taken as a sarcastic dark joke; by any reasonable measure the Su-25 actual survivability in the low level role against even remotely well equipped opponents isn’t remotely acceptable. I’m sure your comments will be greatly appreciated by those required to (ultimately unnecessarily) loose their lives due the Russian airforces poor equipment and resulting necessitated doctrine/ tactics.

All other strike aircraft in the Ukrainian conflict either do low-level approach (to ascent&launch/release point), or perform stand-off attacks (not exactly CAS type).
Everything else sooner or later gets some sort of a flying pole. This includes tactical recon drones - aircraft with signatures across different bands well below LO aircraft. But those at least are attritable.

Leisure, routine operations in the clear sky shouldn't be expected, stealth/escort jamming or not. Especially for aircraft, intended to provide CAS to an average Joe when he needs it. incredible strike package flying over the corpses is a nice honor guard, but a really bad optics.

Thankfully Western airforces generally have significantly superior equipment (targeting pods, precision weapons, data sharing/ transfer, SEAD capabilities, etc. etc.) that mean they have other better ways of getting the equivalent job done. It is these very developments that also leave the A-10 as somewhat overtaken by events and not necessarily greatly missed when it bows outs.

(1)"Western airforces" is an unnecessary wide generalization of "we(stern world) and that guy" (commonwealth troops syndrome). There are exactly two we-air forces with a degree of validity to this claim - USAF and USN. An argument can be made, that the 3rd place also shouldn't be discounted - Marine Air is impressive, too. All other "we" count for something only when added to the big two; Unlikely any of them (or even a combination of) would've been able to breach even the very same outdated Ukraine.
They have neither SEAD/DEAD training, nor equipment, nor PGM stocks - "even" compared to RuAF. Only we-bravado.

(2)Ambushing MRSAMs have very clearly shown, that all the superior equipment employed from medium altitudes, against a near-peer/peer opponent with a proper AD, goes down. In flames. Limiting Ambush opportunities & LOS time exposure to those systems & forcing SAMs to work against clutter is absolutely necessary, even for stealth aircraft. Ahead-of-the-curve LO a/c (NGAD, B-21) won't be there for troops.

Yes - essentially all we-forces are better than RuAF in targeting. Better of them, also, in their current survivability level. Nonetheless, RuAF survivability level is modern, and represents average/better than average for a general western AF; no, average western aircraft isn't AARGM-ER/SDB-breathing F-35.
As for the betters - well, yes, but their opponents aren't stuck in the late 1980s, like Ukraine, either. Ukraine has nothing remotely similar to SA-27 surprise capability.

Conclusion: near-peer/peer conflict CAS shall be expected to operate against an unsuppressed SAM network.

There is a certain irony in seeing Russian and other posters feeling they have to defend the A-10 because they are seeing it as a proxy to defend the Su-25 and the Russian use of the Su-25 when if the Russian airforce actually had the equivalent capabilities and options of Western airforces the Su-25 would probably have already been retired.

It isn't about A-10, which by itself is clearly outdated. It's about dismissing the best available experience since at least 1991 because it doesn't look the way we like. Those trenches and machine guns, superior élan will clearly overcome them .
It's a dismissal of basic qualities, which in no way contradict modern LO, sensory, and information capabilities.

A-X isn't a thread about how immortal A-10 is. It's about a need for a new peer conflict CAS aircraft.

 

[FighterJock]

A stealthy subsonic A-X is what I am currently thinking about with modern and future stand of missiles and bombs especially the SDB 2 Stormbreaker.

 

[kaiserd]

The fact that Su-25’s availability and sustainability in relatively high temp wartime conditions is better than a Su-34 is really a very limited compliment when the Su-34’s availability is rather awful.

3 other key heavy strike aircraft of today - F-35, F-15E, and J-16 - aren't exactly serviceability/ availability stars either.
All 3 are maintenance-heavy aircraft.

The comments on the “survivability” of the Su-25 in this context could almost be taken as a sarcastic dark joke; by any reasonable measure the Su-25 actual survivability in the low level role against even remotely well equipped opponents isn’t remotely acceptable. I’m sure your comments will be greatly appreciated by those required to (ultimately unnecessarily) loose their lives due the Russian airforces poor equipment and resulting necessitated doctrine/ tactics.

All other strike aircraft in the Ukrainian conflict either do low-level approach (to ascent&launch/release point), or perform stand-off attacks (not exactly CAS type).
Everything else sooner or later gets some sort of a flying pole. This includes tactical recon drones - aircraft with signatures across different bands well below LO aircraft. But those at least are attritable.

Leisure, routine operations in the clear sky shouldn't be expected, stealth/escort jamming or not. Especially for aircraft, intended to provide CAS to an average Joe when he needs it. incredible strike package flying over the corpses is a nice honor guard, but a really bad optics.

Thankfully Western airforces generally have significantly superior equipment (targeting pods, precision weapons, data sharing/ transfer, SEAD capabilities, etc. etc.) that mean they have other better ways of getting the equivalent job done. It is these very developments that also leave the A-10 as somewhat overtaken by events and not necessarily greatly missed when it bows outs.

(1)"Western airforces" is an unnecessary wide generalization of "we(stern world) and that guy" (commonwealth troops syndrome). There are exactly two we-air forces with a degree of validity to this claim - USAF and USN. An argument can be made, that the 3rd place also shouldn't be discounted - Marine Air is impressive, too. All other "we" count for something only when added to the big two; Unlikely any of them (or even a combination of) would've been able to breach even the very same outdated Ukraine.
They have neither SEAD/DEAD training, nor equipment, nor PGM stocks - "even" compared to RuAF. Only we-bravado.

(2)Ambushing MRSAMs have very clearly shown, that all the superior equipment employed from medium altitudes, against a near-peer/peer opponent with a proper AD, goes down. In flames. Limiting Ambush opportunities & LOS time exposure to those systems & forcing SAMs to work against clutter is absolutely necessary, even for stealth aircraft. Ahead-of-the-curve LO a/c (NGAD, B-21) won't be there for troops.

Yes - essentially all we-forces are better than RuAF in targeting. Better of them, also, in their current survivability level. Nonetheless, RuAF survivability level is modern, and represents average/better than average for a general western AF; no, average western aircraft isn't AARGM-ER/SDB-breathing F-35.
As for the betters - well, yes, but their opponents aren't stuck in the late 1980s, like Ukraine, either. Ukraine has nothing remotely similar to SA-27 surprise capability.

Conclusion: near-peer/peer conflict CAS shall be expected to operate against an unsuppressed SAM network.

There is a certain irony in seeing Russian and other posters feeling they have to defend the A-10 because they are seeing it as a proxy to defend the Su-25 and the Russian use of the Su-25 when if the Russian airforce actually had the equivalent capabilities and options of Western airforces the Su-25 would probably have already been retired.

It isn't about A-10, which by itself is clearly outdated. It's about dismissing the best available experience since at least 1991 because it doesn't look the way we like. Those trenches and machine guns, superior élan will clearly overcome them .
It's a dismissal of basic qualities, which in no way contradict modern LO, sensory, and information capabilities.

A-X isn't a thread about how immortal A-10 is. It's about a need for a new peer conflict CAS aircraft.

Again you comments betray the same underlying assumptions/ reflex to (arguably mis-) represent the capabilities and performance of the Russian airforce as “good” and directly equivalent to standard “western”/ NATO airforces when they are not.

The best equipped Russian strike aircraft in terms of targeting ability etc. (the Su-34) is notable inferior than a bog-standard Air-National Guard F-16 with its Sniper targeting pod. And the average National Guard pilot has significantly more training experience/ hours of using those targeting systems effectively versus all but a tiny handful of experienced elite Russian pilots (essentially their instructor core of pilots).
Even in more permissive environments the Su-34 can’t accurately attack small and/ or mobile targets from anything other than low altitude because otherwise they can’t find/ see/ target it. Essentially the Russian airforce tactical doctrine is at least as shaped by its own targeting/ accuracy limitations as by the threats they are facing.

With respect a theoretical US or Coalition involving the US equivalent air campaign targeting the Ukraine would have been very different and many times more effective because their conventional airpower is very different and in the round far more powerful and effective than the Russian airforce.

The Russian airforce has, in comparison with average Western/ NATO airforces, weird specific peculiarities and weaknesses - for example like comparatively up to date and competitive fighters like the Su-30sm and the Su-35 not having remotely adequate targeting pods and targeting capabilities in the air to ground role, etc. Hence, even leaving aside potential wider leadership and governance issues, its capabilities performance can’t really be readily taken and validly applied more widely outside its own very specific context.

There are of course lessons Western/ NATO airforces will need to learn from the Ukrainian conflict; need for greater SEAD capabilities following arguable complacency re: the capabilities of potential adversary SAM systems (the F-35s very existence would suggest that’s not entirely true), the underlying of the need for/ utility of more survivable aircraft like the F-35 when facing such threat environments, general over reliance on the US for related niche capabilities, etc. But these lessons aren’t about following what the Russian airforce ended up having to do because of its own very specific weaknesses and limitations. For Western/ NATO airforces the Russian airforce’s experience of the Ukrainian conflict is simply not the “best available experience since at least 1991”.

And relating back to the A-10 and the A-X the Russian airforces experience in Ukraine is of very limited applicability in that context (it certainly doesn’t remotely justify some kind of manned low-altitude operating stealthy son-of-A10).

And in any case I would suggest querying with an admin if this topic title should really be changed; the idea of a new manned “A-X” appeared then disappeared relatively quickly in 2016 and is firmly very much dead (if it was ever really alive in the 1st place). The US airforce never really “pushed for” it and certainly haven’t done so for many years.

 

[jsport]

The A-X moniker should very much survive in order to push back and maintain memory of original and forgotten mission. Dismissing and forgetiing is exactly the cultural bias being suffered.

Any abandonment of low altitude infil for CAS/BAI and even in some instances deep strike is at your air force's peril. "Rogue" operational pilots have expressed the problem of abandoning low level infil in the literature. VG and or morphing wings still need to be a thing..unmanned and potentially even manned.

DEW pods can render even close low altitude SAMS a low threat likewise worthy modern composites withstanding the odd stray AAA that gets a lucky shot is a thing. Even the F-22 fuselage has some autocannon resilience. A low altitude fast mover option should always be on the option table.

 

[DrRansom]

Any argument for more F-35s or F-35 all-aspect stealth aircraft has to deal with the observed fact that the USAF can't get availability metrics above 50-60%. Getting higher availability will probably come at the cost of even greater CPFH - beyond the already borderline unaffordable levels. A less-capable A-X offers a chance to get mass and sortie numbers up at some affordable level.

A forward-stealthy A-X variant could be designed to low-cost, high-availability metrics, perfect for sub-peer conflicts, but I am skeptical about manned CAS in high-intensity conflicts.

 

[FighterJock]

Make the stealthy A-X unmanned then DrRansom, if you are worried about manned CAS in high intensity conflicts. Problem solved.

 

[Jeb]

I always considered the Harrier more of an army plane, because it can operate like a helo.

That's stretching it.

Marines are "army".

WARNING: Don't tell anyone who has or is serving with either the army or the marines that.

Well, my point was more about how utterly un-helicopter-like a Harrier is in anything but airshow mode, but your warning fits nicely as well.

 

[Ainen]

Make the stealthy A-X unmanned then DrRansom, if you are worried about manned CAS in high intensity conflicts. Problem solved.

An unmanned (or remotely piloted) contested airspace platform as of 2020s(and, probably, at least for a couple of decades to come) is objectively inferior to a manned one.
Nowhere near the same situational awareness.

One may include unmanned stand-in sensor component, but this is an adjustment, not a replacement. Unless there will be some sort of a neural link interface revolution, of course, but that sounds, mildly speaking, premature.

 

[bobbymike]

New ‘Power Projection Wing’ to Replace A-10s at Davis-Monthan

Air Force leaders recently briefed Arizona lawmakers about plans to replace the A-10s at Davis-Monthan with a new flying mission under AFSOC.

www.airandspaceforces.com

 

[Desertfox]

Make the stealthy A-X unmanned then DrRansom, if you are worried about manned CAS in high intensity conflicts. Problem solved.

An unmanned (or remotely piloted) contested airspace platform as of 2020s(and, probably, at least for a couple of decades to come) is objectively inferior to a manned one.
Nowhere near the same situational awareness.

One may include unmanned stand-in sensor component, but this is an adjustment, not a replacement. Unless there will be some sort of a neural link interface revolution, of course, but that sounds, mildly speaking, premature.

There are very easy ways to increase situational awareness in a UCAV that you can't do with a manned aircraft. Its not hard to have 4 guys watching screens for a single UCAV back in a trailer. Is it the same? No. Does it have its advantages? Absolutely.

 

[1635yankee]

Given the recent USAF aircraft development programs, this A-X would be ready for service around 2060.

 

[Ainen]

Make the stealthy A-X unmanned then DrRansom, if you are worried about manned CAS in high intensity conflicts. Problem solved.

An unmanned (or remotely piloted) contested airspace platform as of 2020s(and, probably, at least for a couple of decades to come) is objectively inferior to a manned one.
Nowhere near the same situational awareness.

One may include unmanned stand-in sensor component, but this is an adjustment, not a replacement. Unless there will be some sort of a neural link interface revolution, of course, but that sounds, mildly speaking, premature.

There are very easy ways to increase situational awareness in a UCAV that you can't do with a manned aircraft. Its not hard to have 4 guys watching screens for a single UCAV back in a trailer. Is it the same? No. Does it have its advantages? Absolutely.

Screens won't match the qualities of a simple glass cockpit with an ever-evolving AR(augmented/artificial) overlay*. They aren't really competing methods, just parallel ones. This probably is a big reason why large, purpose-built RPVs aren't proliferating - instead, producers and customers choose either full-on manned, or attempt to get to true autonomous UAVs.

P.s. screens behind the front lines can assist a manned asset no worse than an unmanned one.

*to be fair, it's an order of magnitude harder and more expensive technology.

 

[TomcatViP]

The Air Force 422nd Test and Evaluation Squadron at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, recently tested modified A-10s with 16 of the bombs.

Weapon pylons on the A-10 that previously carried one 500-pound bomb can now carry four Small Diameter Bombs, according to Air Force officials. The 250-pound, satellite-guided SDB can glide much farther than the heavier 500-pound weapons. An A-10 dropped a live Small Diameter Bomb for the first time during a February test.

And there are plans to push the loadout to 24, Grynkewich said.

In addition to combat missions in Syria and Iraq, Air Forces Central plans to use the A-10 in exercises with partners in the region.

Grynkewich’s command is also responding to a call from CENTCOM’s Kurilla to be more innovative. Air Forces Central aims to experiment with the A-10’s ability to shoot down enemy drones. Since the A-10 lacks a radar, officials plan to use a network of U.S. and allied radars to guide the attack jets to their uncrewed targets. The Warthog could then use its infrared targeting pod to engage a drone with heat-seeking missiles or laser-guided rockets, Grynkewich said.

“We're in the experimentation phase, but conceptually, we think there's a fair amount of promise,” he said. “The A-10 is going to be flying at a slower speed, which has a lot of advantage for when you're going against one of these [drones]. We think that just that added capacity might provide us something really exciting in the space.”

A-10s Return to Middle East with a New Mission, and a New Weapon

Tensions with Iran, Russia have CENTCOM calling upon the venerable Warthog once again.

www.defenseone.com

 

[jsport]

What the US should do with its A-10 Thunderbolt

Let's kill two birds with one stone.

www.defensenews.com

 

[jsport]

Air Force Warthogs patrol Middle East waters in response to Iranian actions

A-10 Thunderbolt II “Warthog” jets are part of an increased rotation of U.S. aircraft and ships in the Strait of Hormuz, off Iran’s coast, U.S. 5th Fleet said.

www.stripes.com

 

[publiusr]

just the thing to unzipper their drone carrier.

 

[jsport]

New special ops wing planned for Tucson’s Davis-Monthan base

Tucson’s Davis-Monthan Air Force Base will become home to a new special-operations wing as its A-10 “Warthog” ground-support jets are finally retired over the next few years, under a new Air Force plan.

www.stripes.com

 

[donnage99]

How about a very stealthy subsonic mothership aircraft that delivers cheap unstealthy drones from safe distance to provide CAS.

Or a stealthy AC-130 type gunship flying at optimal altitude away from heat and optical seeking threats with gun firing BAE hypervelocity projectiles to make up for the increased distance

 

[isayyo2]

Whoever thought you'd see these three flying in formation?

Bright Star 23 formation flight

A U.S. Air Force F-16 Fighting Falcon and an A-10 Thunderbolt II fly in formation with Pakistan Air Force JF-17 Thunder aircraft off of the wing of a U.S. Air Force KC-10 Extender during exercise Bright Star 23 over Egypt, Sept. 14, 2023. Bright Star 2023 is a multilateral U.S. Central Command...

www.dvidshub.net

 

[yasotay]

Who thought they would ever see Ka-52 and AH-64 in the same formation as well. Bright Star exercises are always an international airshow.

 

[uk 75]

If memory serves the AX requirement originated in the use of the Skyraider in Vietnam because it had better loiter time and more ordinance under its wings than the F4 Phantom.
In the 1980s the A10 still served alongside A7 squadrons in the USAF line up. But the A10 had acquired a key role in stopping Soviet armour in Europe and the Gulf.
UAVs now deploy with Hellfires and can loiter as well as strike without risking a pilot.
The conflict in Ukraine has seen the rise of the mini UAV or drone as a killer of armoured vehicles. They do so in an environment where the Su25 takes high casualties.
The use of long range precise guided munitions from F35 or allied Typhoons and F16s would seem to make the A10 less relevant.

The classic COIN role will still be relevant in conflicts where ground forces have no Air Defence systems.

 

[TomcatViP]

There is some limitations though, micro-UAS have been absent in fluid situation where armored Corps are shaping the battlefield. Their range is often limited and they require operators close to the FLOT, unable to participate in any other task.
Hence, anti-mircro UAS defense rests with the traditional blitzkrieg.

 

[Ainen]

UAVs now deploy with Hellfires and can loiter as well as strike without risking a pilot.

Loitering UCAVs outright can't, they have no survivability. In conditions where they can operate freely, you may as well deploy a Hellfire Zeppelin...

Perspective fast ones can strike a target seen by forward observer, but in this case they aren't more than a delivery vehicle, and aren't independent (basically don't represent much added value over HIMARS)

Beyond that is arguably too far away in the future.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Pardon me, binged the whole thread.

Of course, it's very unlikely that a clean sheet CAS design developed today would carry a 30mm Gatling. A 25mm would offer more than enough terminal effect -- actual tanks can be dealt with in many other ways.

The purpose of the gun is to be able to fire when the enemy is within 50m of friendlies.

And going to the 25mm would mean that any base that can re-arm an F-35 could re-arm the A-10 Replacement (which is one of the USAF complaints about the A-10).

A ceramic gun barrel?

Ceramic chamber liner, Stellite superalloy rifling, carbon fiber wrap.

Dont introduce such logic into a discussion about the A- 10.

Rockwell (NAA) and Boeing have all done post stealth studies into a CAS/BAI aircract that have been made public. Both were high subsonic speed flying wings with lots of fuel and big weapons bays. Loitering, hard to spot birds with great eyes able to swoop in fast and agile to hit hard and be tough enough to take anything in return. Kind of a cross between an A-10 and an F-111.

Got a link? I'd like to see those!

So pretty much the way the F-35B is going to operate with the USMC then right?

Not quite. F-35B is still better at doing battlefield interdiction beyond the front lines than dancing on top of the front lines.

Wouldn't the availability and use of low collateral precision weapons like the laser guided rockets (APKWS) and UK Brimstone result in less reliance on/ relax the associated specifications for a CAS platforms gun or guns?

http://www.baesystems.com/en/product/apkws-laser-guided-rocket

http://www.raf.mod.uk/equipment/brimstone.cfm

And I would query the affordability and realism of fielding a very "stealthy" (apologies for the use of this glib broad term) dedicated CAS playform given the clear overlap/ duplication versus the F35 and limited US defense budgets.

If a true new A-X was to emerge far more likely to be something along the lines of a composite A-10 crossed with a Reaper - low cost in development and operation trumping any ambitions for deep penetration survivability.
Not likely to be anything like as ambitious as a A-12 Avenger.....

The gun is for when the bad guys are within 50m of friendlies. Everything else in the inventory has a minimum safe distance of 100+m, even APKWS rockets.

Funny, troops on the ground actually want the A-10 but we are force feeding the mission of the A-10 to the F-35, unmanned, aircraft and other much Less capable aircraft. When did the A-10 mission become irrelevant, low tech and Brutish? Technology can help in amazing ways, that's why a true A-10 replacement would really benefit from the systems used on the f-35, pilotless aircraft, and other small payload, high altitude, bomb trucks that can't really get close to troops and combat on the ground.

Adding F-35 tech to a plane drives the cost up pretty significantly, though.

Why not just use an F-35 then? It has most of the advantages of what you mention. If the problem is that there aren't dedicated personnel familiar with the mission, upgrade the A-10 squadrons with F-35s and keep them CAS focused in terms of training, the way F-16CJ squadrons are SEAD focused. I don't see CAS as a role that needs a new aircraft, and if anything I think the fire support role might be delivered in a more timely manner in a contested environment with organic drones and/or artillery.

Doesn't have the loiter time, or more than 2 bursts with the gun. Also doesn't really have the capacity when relying on internal bays only. Can only use APKWS if flying in Beast Mode.

Probably a better question is, what do we need out of a hypothetical A-10 replacement/s? And who should be in charge: USAF/Army? Can the F-35/FARA/UAV combo do the job? What holes are left? Do we need something like an AT-7, AT-6, Scorpion, Ares?

Well, the Key West agreement says that the Air Force is supposed to be in charge.

Per the original A-X studies that led to the A-10, the ideal CAS plane has a long loiter time, high bomb capacity, and a powerful gun with enough ammunition for multiple passes. It also needs to be highly survivable and able to operate from short, rough/damaged airfields.

Currently the USAF is planning to have the type in inventory through 2028-29, so it’s hardly a pressing problem. As someone else noted, perhaps the biggest advantage (I’d argue about the only advantage) of A-10 equipped units is that they can focus on CAS as their equipment isn’t suitable for anything else. That skill set might be lost if the community switches to multi role aircraft (or is simply broken up and reassigned, more likely). I don’t have a solution to that training problem but I’m not a fan of solving doctrinal problems with unique equipment, especially dated, unsurvivable equipment.

6 years is barely enough time to run a competition for a new design and get it flying, it's better to assume at least decade to design, compete and get the first squadron to IOC. If we started RIGHT NOW, we might be able to get the first Replacement squadron in 2035.

 

[Josh_TN]

I don’t think a replacement is required. Such an aircraft is two vulnerable and specialized. Within a couple years the Army will be able to put precision ordnance much more cost effectively out to a hundred km.

 

[Ainen]

Adding F-35 tech to a plane drives the cost up pretty significantly, though.

But does it?
F-35 by itself isn't terribly expensive, it's tech development is already paid for, and we're skipping the most expensive parts of the paycheck.

 

[Scott Kenny]

But does it?
F-35 by itself isn't terribly expensive, it's tech development is already paid for, and we're skipping the most expensive parts of the paycheck.

The "systems" part is ~35% of the F-35As cost, airframe ~50% and engine ~15%. Call it ~$30mil of an $88mil total.

 

[yasotay]

While a great fan of the A-10 I too am beginning to think its utility is coming to an end. Frankly I suspect that the U.S. Army has given up (at the tactical level) on USAF providing CAS at all, especially in major combat operations. Besides they have their own close support aircraft. It appears that the Army is counting on loitering muntions and UAS linked with artillery in the future to deal with the traditional threats expected of CAS. Although going through 7,000 to 10,000 UAS a month (RUSI report on the European conflict) and an ungodly amount of artillery ammunition is a pretty hefty logistics requirement.

 

[TomcatViP]

Add a directed energy weapon (area denial)
Replace 30mm setup with a laser (unlimited magazine and precision targeting)
Add effectors
Use high bypass turbofans to generate electricity
Use the a-10 as a recovery/Tom-Tom aircraft (loitering coupled)

 

[Josh_TN]

While a great fan of the A-10 I too am beginning to think its utility is coming to an end. Frankly I suspect that the U.S. Army has given up (at the tactical level) on USAF providing CAS at all, especially in major combat operations. Besides they have their own close support aircraft. It appears that the Army is counting on loitering muntions and UAS linked with artillery in the future to deal with the traditional threats expected of CAS. Although going through 7,000 to 10,000 UAS a month (RUSI report on the European conflict) and an ungodly amount of artillery ammunition is a pretty hefty logistics requirement.

I think the Army is contemplating using artillery vice air strikes. Previously artillery didn't necessarily have the range or precision of air delivered munitions. But now the Army's portfolio of Long Range Precision Fires (and existing Excalibur and GPS guidance fuses) could reasonably be expected to hit most CAS targets with near equal precision, likely with a much better response time. While they also are working with long range loiter munitions, these are not useful in a CAS context (though observation UAVs most definitely are).

 

[H_K]

I think the Army is contemplating using artillery vice air strikes

Also perhaps FARA can substitute for A-10s in a way that previous helicopters couldn’t - with added speed, range and ALEs (air launched effects) doing route opening which should increase survivability

 

[yasotay]

Most of the long range fires efforts appear to be taking on what we used to call battlefield interdiction (not supporting troops in contact), against long range fires and air defenses. CAS is there to support troops in contact. So it is likely that the venerable Apache will fullfill that role. They are suppose to be testing a JAGM missile that has 16KM range which would let them attack from behind the forward formations without getting into the range of enemy air defenses.
An interesting point is that the reason Hellfire missiles were designed for 8KM range is that an Apache hovering at ~60 feet can see out to 8KM. Sitting 3KM behind the front line they theoretically can hit targets 5KM in front of friendly forces without ever getting into the range of threat air defenses. Theoretically.
FARA will be lobbing Air Launched Effects into the depths of the threat area for the artillery to be able to target the "deep" targets. So FARA will be supporting air interdiction more than CAS.

 

[TomcatViP]

I see relying on Apaches only for CAS as an idiosyncrasy of a Boeing exec. Apaches are very limited in range when tomorrow battlefield will spread over entire continents. Only an Aircraft would be able to achieve such mission effectively.

Apache are useful for concentrated air power in restricted area where an effect is sought locally. Not to sustain a defense/offense line spread over a thousand miles.

IMOHO, A-10 are still useful. Not for their guns but because they are a fleet, adapted to the mission, trained, with appropriate ressources and sustainability chain.
They only need new employment concepts with more efficient weapons for the conditions they will face conducting the same mission they have done before.

It's just a classic upgrade that is needed. The new systems are high tech but that is about it.