Well, afaik 50mm autocannon have really hard hitting recoil. So i don't think that's good idea, which no wonder why no fighter have cannon bigger than 37mm afaik.
I think most mission will be done with either AGM, laser guided bomb, or/and laser guided rocket (or if you Russian, lofting rocket too), so putting EOTS will be more impactful than big gun. The 25mm gun is only for just in case situation. If you think its too small, maybe its time to bring back Aden gun or adapting M230 on fixed wing platform.
Well, idea was basically that shell will always be much smaller than a guided missile of given destructive power (rapidly burning powder in chamber is simply more efficient than burning it over time in a rocket). Thus 57mm gun with reasonable ballistics may be a nice sweet spot for the current state of precision-guided technology.
Basically, if you're ready to devote enough volume to your offensive system(which is normal for a dedicated CAS plane), gun+ammo combination from a certain volume onwards gives you more and more shots than a rocket-based solution. So there will be quite a lot of shots for all normal battlefield targets(at a much higher tempo of their engagement, no such thing as one target per pass); for everything else - just bring normal aviation PGMs(SPEARs, SDBs, bombs and so on), one stupidly oversized penetrating gun was more than enough.

If rounds are guided - and there is a whole bunch of guided 57mm rounds in advanced stages of development in US, UK and Russia, - it turns into a perfect tool for precise close-in support from a significant standoff(and with significant freedom of maneuver and course after the shot).Thus it is not [in place] of the EOTS ball(we live in 21th century), but together with it instead.
 
Honestly, if you want something that can be inexpensive, keeps your pilots safe, can be dedicated to task and able to do the job, even if it means its own destruction the answer is something like a UCAS well integrated into a networked environment that also allows effects based warfare to be undertaken using everything from the infantry and/women with a mortar/shoulder launched weapon through to artillery, tanks, fighters, bombers, and ship/sub-launched missiles...
 
a UCAV A-10 w/ DEW pod to defeat SAMs as a standoff AT muntion/uav bombtruck would be more survivable than a Frogfoot. A new dedicated standoff AC-130, A-10 replacement is needed.

The F-35 alone will leave many dead US/Allied ground troops, as so few would even be dedicated to CAS. Given the current culture it is a dodgy prospect any would be dedicated to CAS outside the USMC.
 
And iirc Scorpion joint the T-X program although withdrew pretty early.
Official entries were only T-100 aka M-346, T-50 and T-X.
Textron did not develop the Scorpion for T-X. It was also never a submission.
They briefly floated a swept-wing variant to submit, but that was before the requirements were set. Once the requirements were set, it was obvious the Scorpion would not be able to meet them.
 
The F-35 alone will leave many dead US/Allied ground troops, as so few would even be dedicated to CAS.
Based upon what?
..have ask the same of you. assure us the USAF would actually show...the USAF support for Army operations ie genuine joint operations have always been fraught. If there is genuine a Pacific range problem while being severly outnumbered as a cdr, I wouldnt trust they show up. not hyperbole.

Start a 2:46


View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ACZy2CPE-oQ
 
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Well, idea was basically that shell will always be much smaller than a guided missile of given destructive power (rapidly burning powder in chamber is simply more efficient than burning it over time in a rocket). Thus 57mm gun with reasonable ballistics may be a nice sweet spot for the current state of precision-guided technology.
Basically, if you're ready to devote enough volume to your offensive system(which is normal for a dedicated CAS plane), gun+ammo combination from a certain volume onwards gives you more and more shots than a rocket-based solution. So there will be quite a lot of shots for all normal battlefield targets(at a much higher tempo of their engagement, no such thing as one target per pass); for everything else - just bring normal aviation PGMs(SPEARs, SDBs, bombs and so on), one stupidly oversized penetrating gun was more than enough.

If rounds are guided - and there is a whole bunch of guided 57mm rounds in advanced stages of development in US, UK and Russia, - it turns into a perfect tool for precise close-in support from a significant standoff(and with significant freedom of maneuver and course after the shot).Thus it is not [in place] of the EOTS ball(we live in 21th century), but together with it instead.
I think 57mm round vs rocket will be depend on the how you use it. If you in VKS, obviously you would prefer 80mm or 122mm rocket pod rather than 57mm gun. It has flexibility to use it in standoff manner launch it like MLRS or in direct strike. 57mm gun can't be used like that. But it has good argument in western doctrine against rocket pod. Just need to solve the recoil issue.
 
Honestly, if you want something that can be inexpensive, keeps your pilots safe, can be dedicated to task and able to do the job, even if it means its own destruction the answer is something like a UCAS well integrated into a networked environment that also allows effects based warfare to be undertaken using everything from the infantry and/women with a mortar/shoulder launched weapon through to artillery, tanks, fighters, bombers, and ship/sub-launched missiles...
I think some people here concern on how good UCAS in battlefield filled with jamming signal. Also there some opinion that drone is not flexible in adapting what happened in the battlefield when it fly, due to reduced situational awareness and control delay (or lag). But that not negatively effecting the flight mission if it only fly, launch the stand off package, go home and do nothing else.
 
With Lynx SAR, the MQ-9 (which I am using as a placeholder benchmark - other systems are available at a retailer near you) might have superior situational awareness in some respects to many manned platforms with it's GMTI.

I also don't believe any lag to be critical. Even a manned platform would most likely have to receive confirmation/authorization from a FAC, AWACS or other to engage a target. That necessary back-and-forth would rule out any kind of "quickdraw" engagement that any lag could possibly mess up. It is unwise for a CAS bird to engage in isolation. Friendlies get everywhere!
 
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The F-35 alone will leave many dead US/Allied ground troops, as so few would even be dedicated to CAS.
Based upon what?
..have ask the same of you. assure us the USAF would actually show...the USAF support for Army operations ie genuine joint operations have always been fraught. If there is genuine a Pacific range problem while being severly outnumbered as a cdr, I wouldnt trust they show up. not hyperbole.

Start a 2:46


View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ACZy2CPE-oQ
And ask any United States Marine how confident they are that the USN will be there for them. You will get a one word response; "Guadalcanal." That was almost 80 years ago. I just posted elsewhere (Military) that the UAS panacea seems not to be doing as well it was. They will still be of value, but not THE solution. No one has answered my question yet "If a UAV receives a lawful order (within its parameters) to attack friendly forces then crash into them, while accepting no further orders, what will it do?" A human will 9/10 times ask for clarification. To be clear this is not me declaring unmanned systems dead. However the forward edge of any battle is the most dynamic of human endeavors. Seeing what must be done, and doing it, does not have time for debate around the coffee table at the back of the air conditioned trailer likely on a different continent.

The comment in the video clip I have heard a hundred times. Soldiers trust soldiers. "It should work" translates into Infantry-speak as "This will probably get you and your squad killed."
 
There is not one single solution - there will be multiple different systems providing in combination a range of solutions for different scenarios.
Hence this argument for a “new” manned A-10 equivalent/ replacement is just misconceived.

And with respect it is critical to remember that humans also make mistakes in the CAS role and people die.
A-10 pilots don’t necessarily have a brilliant reputation in that regard.

Rather like self driving cars there is an argument that unmanned options are likely to be considerably safer overall but they will have different types of accidents/ incidents than their manned equivalents and our own prejudices/ selective perceptions are in danger of fixating on the novelty of the new problems rather than recognising and rationally weighing the reduction of the old ones.
 
Does that not work both ways? The "New ways are always better" view is just as flawed.
 
Does that not work both ways? The "New ways are always better" view is just as flawed.
In a field of rapid technological advancement, unless an almighty mistake has been made along the way, the newer more evolved way when well applied is probably better.

And this evolution has already caught up with the A-10.
For the vast majority of its use it is now a medium altitude smart munition bomb truck using its advance targeting pod (just like the F-16, and the F-15, or even the B-52 or B-1B when they are tasked with this role). Except it is less survivable in that role than it’s direct contemporaries and much less so than the F-35.
It’s continued survival owes a lot to trying to keep dedicated experience pilots together (a legitimate idea but this is probably not the best way to do it sustainably) and pandering to those who have an exaggerated and out of date view of the A-10 and the CAS role.
Low altitude straffing A-10s aren’t the best way of doing the CAS role and that’s before considering the casualty rate of the A-10s against any half-decent defences if undertaking those kind of mission profiles.

The “old way” in that sense is already dead against all but the most incapable potential opponents.
The “new way” is already here and doesn’t particularly need the A-10.
Now personally, everything else being equal, I’d favour retaining and slowly running down a reduced A-10 fleet as it would still have its (limited) uses against low-threat-level opponents. But everything else is probably not equal.
 
An unmanned cheap version of the Scaled Composites Ares, is what I would have in mind for an A-10 replacement. Maybe have a manned two-seat FAC version for low threat environments.
 
1 new A10 or a hundred trucks loaded with switchblade. As an infantry squad leader, which would you choose?
 
It still hangs in the balance for me, not having seen a decent showing from active defence so far. Remembering that the major loss from Op Granby was an A-10 on a troop of Warrior IFV.
 
For the vast majority of its use it is now a medium altitude smart munition bomb truck using its advance targeting pod (just like the F-16, and the F-15, or even the B-52 or B-1B when they are tasked with this role). Except it is less survivable in that role than it’s direct contemporaries and much less so than the F-35.
well, at least in a certain current conflict medium-altitude bomb truck thing doesn't seem to work.
Much can be said that Russian command doesn't understand that enemy AA=bad (hard to get tracks out of head), but battlefield oversaturated by integrated survivable SAMs is still here.
 
For the vast majority of its use it is now a medium altitude smart munition bomb truck using its advance targeting pod (just like the F-16, and the F-15, or even the B-52 or B-1B when they are tasked with this role). Except it is less survivable in that role than it’s direct contemporaries and much less so than the F-35.
well, at least in a certain current conflict medium-altitude bomb truck thing doesn't seem to work.
Much can be said that Russian command doesn't understand that enemy AA=bad (hard to get tracks out of head), but battlefield oversaturated by integrated survivable SAMs is still here.
The Russians are far less well equipped in this regard with even the best Russian equipment - the likes of the Su-34’s targeting equipment - being greatly inferior to even a standard Sniper targeting pod carried by Air National Guard F-16s.
And the Russians clearly lack large stocks of precision weapons so have been forced to use “dumb” bombs and/ or other unsuitable weapons (Tu-22Ms fired AS-4 Kitchens - intended as as anti-ship missiles - that hit that shopping centre, use of land based missiles, largely indiscriminate use of heavy artillery etc.).
And the Russians haven’t successfully suppressed threats or undertaken sufficient SEAD (again from a lack of capability etc.)
And even flying low (which they had to do given their targeting limitations and continuing vulnerability to Ukrainian defences) saw the Russian airforce take eye watering losses, even when using their best most survivable equipment (Su-34’s, Su-30sm’s etc.).
And I’ve yet to see any reliable indication that Su-25s have bucked this trend.

The only scenario in which the Russian airforce appears to have more freedom of movement and can become more involved again is in the Donbas offensives where the Russians appear to have had more success in breaking down Ukrainian air defence systems via pressure/ attacks on the ground (via advancing and forcing them to retreat, heavy artillery inflicting losses, etc.)
And the lack of effective equivalents to US/ NATO/ Western targeting pods and lack of capacity to undertake the large majority of CAS missions from medium altitude (which the US/ NATO can but the Russians proved they can’t) would have delayed and limited the Russian airforce re-involvement and support even in this specific scenario.
 
Don't forget the now ubiquitous botched targeting: from rocket lobbing from helo, to horizontal sprint bomb drops with half of them even missing an entire island (!), Russians pilots don't aim anymore (and I guess then, semantically, they don't miss!).

Poor Vasily, how ashamed he must be!
 
Don't forget the now ubiquitous botched targeting: from rocket lobbing from helo, to horizontal sprint bomb drops with half of them even missing an entire island (!), Russians pilots don't aim anymore (and I guess then, semantically, they don't miss!).

Poor Vasily, how ashamed he must be!
Poor Vasily did not get the training needed to be proficient. If there is one take away from this horrid war, if you are going to be a world power you have to have a world class ability to remain so. That said, I note that the Russian helo force has started doing more night operations with precision weapons. They can do this because they now have the training in the most demanding of environments

@Fluff - "1 new A10 or a hundred trucks loaded with switchblade. As an infantry squad leader, which would you choose?" I have actually asked an infantry platoon leader and company commander a very similar question. There answer was pretty much that they didn't care as long as whatever was trying to kill them got killed. It was also pointed out they did not want to have to be the operator as it took away from them killing the people trying to kill them and their unit.
 
The Russians are far less well equipped in this regard with even the best Russian equipment - the likes of the Su-34’s targeting equipment - being greatly inferior to even a standard Sniper targeting pod carried by Air National Guard F-16s.
Targeting pod doesn't change that much when lamppost-sized missile darts at you at Mach 6. You either find a way to get out of its way or youre' dead.
While RuAF is far less efficient in general, the question of how any AF can operate in such an environment is still not an easy one.
And the Russians clearly lack large stocks of precision weapons
Frankly speaking, I am already almost tired of how they clearly used almost everything for 4 months by now. Yet missiles just fly and fly every day.
Most European stocks would've ended by now several times over - that's true, but with Russia there is suspicion that for at least key positions Russia can operate like this simply from the production line.
 
That said, I note that the Russian helo force has started doing more night operations with precision weapons. They can do this because they now have the training in the most demanding of environments

Oh yeah, NV sensors is such a sweet topic to raise:
since 2015. These include thermal visors and avionics, worth EUR 152 million ($158 million). This figure was corroborated by Investigate Europe, and puts France in an awkward position of being responsible for 44% of European weapon exports to russia – the very same weapons that are now used against Ukraine. According to Disclose, France has supplied thermal visors for over 1,000 Russian tanks, on top of navigation systems and infrared sensors for russian fighter jets and helicopters.

It's not only Vasily, but also Rene, Joseph, Jean ou encore Pierre...

 
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Just stumbled upon this in another A-10 thread:

CAS is a inefficient mission compared to interdiction and would be true in the current war as well. The frontline is a Verdun, with trenches and highly dispersed squad level infantry struggles, while a dozen kilometers behind the front lies giant traffic jams of thousands plus vehicles, consistent array of unprotected artillery and so on, and a few dozen kilometer behind that lies unprotected ammo dumps and transport ships where thousands tons of equipment can go up from a single rocket hit.

Deep strike capability is just highly valuable. If opponent does not take defensive posture behind the front, he is vulnerable to massive losses. If the opponent do take combat posture at the rear, he is slowed down immensely as combat maneuvers is order of magnitude slower than movement at top speed.

As such air forces really shouldn't be interested in CAS aircraft except as part of budget battles with the army. The great advantages of air power is the ability to bypass the frontline and strike at the weakness of the opponent, not get tied down fighting at the least vulnerable forces naturally arrayed at the frontlines. The opponent is to be destroyed before reaching the front. The firepower of a fancy helicopter or jet is no more than a truck in any case, which can mount many of the fancy long range missiles, rockets and lies, if now tow a artillery piece for massive sustained firepower throughput.

If is only with very small wars where a squad of infantry fighting another is a "battle", where super precise and controlled support fire is so in demand. In a war where grids gets erased on the front regularly, maximizing destructive power on the opponent is far more important than a small reduction in friendly fire risk.
 
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The brilliance of armchair experts on combat continues to confound.
The number of armored combat vehicles lost in this current horrid affair is staggering, yet no one is declaring them dangerously antiquated. We excitedly point at the video's of both sides precision attack with UAV directed artillery, overlooking the shell pocked landscape around the target and the fact that both sides control the released media. It is not in either combatants interest to show failure. We espouse the end of era's with little or no analysis beyond what a sales brochure turned simulation (garbage in, garbage out) provides.
Trucks need roads and bridges (many recent pictures of failure there) and have to contend with all the other trucks moving on those roads. UAV need bandwidth to provide kill vision to their operators. Bandwidth that is restricted by international law, enemy countermeasures, and even other friendly forces.
A-10 can carry how many Maverick missiles of various sort? How far can a Maverick missile go? And that is so 20th Century. Why is Rafael of Israel falling all over itself putting new long range air launched missiles on the street. Why is the US Army buying Spike NLOS with a follow-on missile in the works for attack helicopters? Both platform types can prepare for operations outside of all but the most long range of artillery, move to points on the battlefield far faster than any truck without concern for roads, bridges and paths through the mountains. They no longer have to attack from within line of sight of the target or operate at altitude. They can, and often do, conduct missions without communications. In these days of precision, do you want something, that if not in the right place at the right time might take hours or days to move, or something that can reposition in tens of minutes?
Is BAI more important? Probably so. Sadly major combatants have figured that out and have these Integrated Air Defense networks, with redundant communications and systems, very much focused on everything from cruise missiles to stealth bombers. How much BAI has either side done in the current war to date? Interestingly CAS is doctrinally done in support of troops in contact, where BAI (old 20th century term by the way) is against forces and formations out of contact, but able to immediately join the fight (thus the 'battlefield' part ). At least the US Army attack helicopters are moving toward capabilities to not only support troops in contact, but to attrite enemy tactical air defenses, artillery, and command post from stand-off.
But I am old and clearly set in my ways. Ironically, I have been part of putting UAV into the hands of combatants. I find them useful. Just not the wonder weapons.

Very good thesis sited by the way. I actually know some of the folks involved.

I note the final paragraph of the paper: " There are, however, situations for which CAS is the best, perhaps the only answer. CAS may be required to compensate for a lack of artillery or attack helicopters. It is ideally suited to perform as an economy of force fire support system. In the larger picture, however, "close support must be the exception rather than the rule."
 
So, more BAI, less CAS.
Which is what the F-35 is built for.

If there's anything that the A-10 is worth holding on for, it's the Sandy role for CSAR operations. It'll do a better job of staying with the helicopters and actually can use its loiter time and lots of pylons for lots of options to keep away enemy ground forces while the pararescues run an extraction.
 
I have actually asked an infantry platoon leader and company commander a very similar question. There answer was pretty much that they didn't care as long as whatever was trying to kill them got killed.
This is why I think there's a big element of a combination of BS and fanboyism about how much the grunts love A-10s. You wanna tell me that they'd rather wait 30 minutes for a Hog to get overhead if they can get F-16s there in 15?
 
I have actually asked an infantry platoon leader and company commander a very similar question. There answer was pretty much that they didn't care as long as whatever was trying to kill them got killed.
This is why I think there's a big element of a combination of BS and fanboyism about how much the grunts love A-10s. You wanna tell me that they'd rather wait 30 minutes for a Hog to get overhead if they can get F-16s there in 15?
No one is sure F-16s will come in a big war.
Over Ukraine stand-in medium-altitude platforms just don't live over the denied airspace. And, as poster has brilliantly explained a few posts before, AF doesn't see supporting grunts as efficient in the first place - only as an ugly necessity of budget battles.
If they can somehow avoid it without army air asking for something instead (1960s all over again) - they will.
 
The F-35 alone will leave many dead US/Allied ground troops, as so few would even be dedicated to CAS.
Based upon what?
..have ask the same of you. assure us the USAF would actually show...the USAF support for Army operations ie genuine joint operations have always been fraught. If there is genuine a Pacific range problem while being severly outnumbered as a cdr, I wouldnt trust they show up. not hyperbole.

Start a 2:46


View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ACZy2CPE-oQ
So you are looking for a hardware solution to an organizational problem? What of the F-35s that are owned by the USMC and USN?
 
I have actually asked an infantry platoon leader and company commander a very similar question. There answer was pretty much that they didn't care as long as whatever was trying to kill them got killed.
This is why I think there's a big element of a combination of BS and fanboyism about how much the grunts love A-10s. You wanna tell me that they'd rather wait 30 minutes for a Hog to get overhead if they can get F-16s there in 15?
No one is sure F-16s will come in a big war.
Over Ukraine stand-in medium-altitude platforms just don't live over the denied airspace. And, as poster has brilliantly explained a few posts before, AF doesn't see supporting grunts as efficient in the first place - only as an ugly necessity of budget battles.
If they can somehow avoid it without army air asking for something instead (1960s all over again) - they will.
As previously stated there hasn’t been any particularly (at least re: targeting) capable medium-altitude platforms over Ukraine given the limitations of the Russians equipments (even their best).

And generally speaking it is “easier” (though still far from easy) to reduce/ degrade/ suppress the threats in the medium altitude band as the lower altitude threats are probably too many and too hard to equivalently reduce/ degrade/ suppress.
Western airforces have successfully applied this for decades, evolving technology like more capable targeting pods with advanced optics to better enable this approach.

And if the defences are that capable that this isn’t going work (and, say, F-35 can’t penetrate) then the A-10 equivalent likely has an even lower chance of penetration and survival. Unless that A-10 equivalent is unmanned and the relevant airforce is willing to more readily risk it even with those lower odds because it is unmanned.
 
As previously stated there hasn’t been any particularly (at least re: targeting) capable medium-altitude platforms over Ukraine given the limitations of the Russians equipments (even their best).
But there are some of the best(if not the best) mobile land air defense systems around - operating exactly how they shall. This alone must draw attention.
p.s. strictly speaking, best russian planes are okay at targeting. But there are just a few of them.
And generally speaking it is “easier” (though still far from easy) to reduce/ degrade/ suppress the threats in the medium altitude band as the lower altitude threats are probably too many and too hard to equivalently reduce/ degrade/ suppress.
Western airforces have successfully applied this for decades, evolving technology like more capable targeting pods with advanced optics to better enable this approach.
It's also much easier to be shot down by large systems when your aircraft is exposed against the sky. And be killed, too - large warheads take no prisoners.
Average Buk-m3 battery has just about enough ammo (adjusted for Pk) to wipe out a medium-sized European airforce in one salvo - thus decent targeting systems may not get a chance to be used in precisely the same way they were used against those who can't shoot back.
There is, in the end, a basic reason why everyone preferred to deal with low-altitude threats instead of modern med/hi ones before the war on terror.

And if the defences are that capable that this isn’t going work (and, say, F-35 can’t penetrate) then the A-10 equivalent likely has an even lower chance of penetration and survival. Unless that A-10 equivalent is unmanned and the relevant airforce is willing to more readily risk it even with those lower odds because it is unmanned.
A-10 predates F-16, thus comparing its survivability with F-35 is somewhat pointless.
If USAF doesn't want to do this inefficient mission, they may just stop blocking the army from doing it themselves.
Imagining a modern ground attack airplane isn't exactly inconceivable - this role can benefit from all the same advances that informed JSF, FARA, and so on.
 
Higher altitude exposes an aircraft to longer ranged systems, but there tend to be less of these and they tend to be less mobile. It is hard to imagine how a low altitude platform would be dramatically more survivable when exposed to pop up attacks that could come from individual infantrymen. The experience in Ukraine doesn't seem to indicate this is particularly friendly place for helos or Su-25s and it seems unlikely any more modern replacement would be dramatically more survivable when visual and IR play such a big role in acquisition and engagement (as opposed to medium-high altitude where RCS reductions can significantly increase survivability).

I don't see a role for a dedicated CAS aircraft, especially something like an A-10. It isn't survivable and it doesn't fulfill any other role. I suspect the niche gets filled by drones, be they operated by the USAF or Army, and also artillery. The advent of GPS kits for 155mm guns seems to be a better replacement for CAS than any aircraft; ground units can call in organic artillery in a much timely and weather independent fashion than aircraft. Guided 155mm is also dramatically more cost effective; a PGK is <$10,000.
 
I have actually asked an infantry platoon leader and company commander a very similar question. There answer was pretty much that they didn't care as long as whatever was trying to kill them got killed.
This is why I think there's a big element of a combination of BS and fanboyism about how much the grunts love A-10s. You wanna tell me that they'd rather wait 30 minutes for a Hog to get overhead if they can get F-16s there in 15?
F-16 at 20+K are just as likely to miss a target, especially when, God forbid, the F-16 has to be talked onto the target. While the trooper with the rifle may not care about how it happens, battalion commanders are rather skittish about GPS guided weapons in close proximity to their troops. Laser guidance is swell as long as the energy can get to the target. Many of the places are very likely have several layers of cloud cover at the most unfortunate of times. A remarkable thing about heavy combat zones, lots of smoke and dust to contend with. Sometimes the enemy and the friendlies are intermixed. CEP and blast radius are not discriminatory. Of course it is even harder when dodging SAMS.
The grunts love of A-10 comes from two decades of low intensity combat. Ironically most grunts will tell you that any firefight is high intensity. The sound of the GAU alone stopped any number of firefights. The sound of the GAU was a huge moral boost for those on the ground, because it meant firepower superiority had arrived. So BS, fanboyism it is not.
In Large Scale Combat Operations the ability to use the GAU is likely to be much less frequent, but how many JAGM could a A-10 carry? Probably way more than an AH-64E. And they can loiter at <1000 feet for a very long time well back from the front lines. They can come forward at helicopter altitudes and fire JAGM for another targeteer, and go back to the initial point well before the ADA acquisition radars are cued, let alone the track radar. I suppose you could turn an A-10 into a UAS.
Artillery is likely to remain the ground commanders preferred solution because he owns it. Next comes attack helicopters cause he owns them. CAS comes and goes at the whim of people far away from the battlefield.
 
Higher altitude exposes an aircraft to longer ranged systems, but there tend to be less of these and they tend to be less mobile.
Well, whole Ukrainian front is literally covered in their overlapping engagement bubbles, on both sides. Buk batteries are just as mobile as, for example, Thor ones.

The experience in Ukraine doesn't seem to indicate this is particularly friendly place for helos or Su-25s and it seems unlikely any more modern replacement would be dramatically more survivable when visual and IR play such a big role in acquisition and engagement (as opposed to medium-high altitude where RCS reductions can significantly increase survivability).
But in the end both sides prefer to deal with low-altitude threats than with missiles from the upper category. Sometimes it ends badly, but overall sortie:loss ratio apparently became pretty sustainable, at least for VKS.
Though, worth saying, as far as i understand, at least VKS partially flies med altitude.
I don't see a role for a dedicated CAS aircraft, especially something like an A-10.
Well, it shouldn't be A-10 anymore than NGAD is F-15A...

even from more or less OTS(!) technology, we can get:
- F-35-esque visibility(EOTS/EODAS, helmet, etc), connectivity(including connectivity with drones), and SA;
- good/very good level of radio band stealth;
- superb level of IR masking(airframe, B-21 tech);
- good active protection suite, including optical/laser countermeasures;
- exceptional control, maneuverability(1980s demonstrators->ATF), and mishap prevention at the tree level(FARA solutions);
- excellent small/medium precision munitions with sufficient depth of magazine and standoff(SDB, JAGM, APKWS, ALAMO/ORKA, etc);
- excellent STOL(M/ATD), maybe even VTOL(JSF again).
...and still give it reasonable chances to bring the pilot back alive if something goes wrong on top(advances in flight control and armor ceramics).

We are talking about A-X here in the end, not how A-10s are absolutely essential for stopping imperial walkers at Hoth.
 
Higher altitude exposes an aircraft to longer ranged systems, but there tend to be less of these and they tend to be less mobile.
Well, whole Ukrainian front is literally covered in their overlapping engagement bubbles, on both sides. Buk batteries are just as mobile as, for example, Thor ones.

The experience in Ukraine doesn't seem to indicate this is particularly friendly place for helos or Su-25s and it seems unlikely any more modern replacement would be dramatically more survivable when visual and IR play such a big role in acquisition and engagement (as opposed to medium-high altitude where RCS reductions can significantly increase survivability).
But in the end both sides prefer to deal with low-altitude threats than with missiles from the upper category. Sometimes it ends badly, but overall sortie:loss ratio apparently became pretty sustainable, at least for VKS.
Though, worth saying, as far as i understand, at least VKS partially flies med altitude.

I don't think the lack of SEAD on the part of either side is especially indicative of how the USAF would ever operate. In terms of weapons, doctrine, and training the Russians (let alone the Ukrainians) lag far beyond US suppression efforts and techniques. Presumably with things like the RQ-180 and F-35 (which is an out of the box SEAD specific platform masquerading as a fighter) that gap will only continue to increase. Were this a NATO vs Russia battle I think medium-high altitude would be a much friendlier place than down low.
 
I don't see a role for a dedicated CAS aircraft, especially something like an A-10.
Well, it shouldn't be A-10 anymore than NGAD is F-15A...

even from more or less OTS(!) technology, we can get:
- F-35-esque visibility(EOTS/EODAS, helmet, etc), connectivity(including connectivity with drones), and SA;
- good/very good level of radio band stealth;
- superb level of IR masking(airframe, B-21 tech);
- good active protection suite, including optical/laser countermeasures;
- exceptional control, maneuverability(1980s demonstrators->ATF), and mishap prevention at the tree level(FARA solutions);
- excellent small/medium precision munitions with sufficient depth of magazine and standoff(SDB, JAGM, APKWS, ALAMO/ORKA, etc);
- excellent STOL(M/ATD), maybe even VTOL(JSF again).
...and still give it reasonable chances to bring the pilot back alive if something goes wrong on top(advances in flight control and armor ceramics).

We are talking about A-X here in the end, not how A-10s are absolutely essential for stopping imperial walkers at Hoth.

Why not just use an F-35 then? It has most of the advantages of what you mention. If the problem is that there aren't dedicated personnel familiar with the mission, upgrade the A-10 squadrons with F-35s and keep them CAS focused in terms of training, the way F-16CJ squadrons are SEAD focused. I don't see CAS as a role that needs a new aircraft, and if anything I think the fire support role might be delivered in a more timely manner in a contested environment with organic drones and/or artillery.
 
I don't think the lack of SEAD on the part of either side is especially indicative of how the USAF would ever operate. In terms of weapons, doctrine, and training the Russians (let alone the Ukrainians) lag far beyond US suppression efforts and techniques.
They're however far ahead in actual mobile ground defenses.
Few western militaries have something comparable in the first place.

So while VKS is nowhere near USAF in terms of suppression capability - it's still a unique case when more airforce is fighting against more or less modern, well-developed air defenses. At the very least - secondary western&non-western air forces shall pay attention.

At worst - USAF itself too shall consider a plan B - what to do in case it won't be able to get that ability get the freedom it is used to through day 1 operations. It thinks it can. Russia thought like this, too.
Were this a NATO vs Russia battle I think medium-high altitude would be a much friendlier place than down low.
Maybe?
Or maybe a couple NATO air forces would've got into a couple of massacres while other would be looking for ways to refill empty stand-off stocks.
Russia also thought that there won't be a serious fight. Problem is that Europe(including Russia) really forgot how serious battles actually look in the first place - there wasn't a single one here since 1945.
 
If your air force is compromised by your enemy's IADS, then a dedicated CAS seems even less useful to me. Spend the money on more stand off munitions instead.
 
Why not just use an F-35 then?
Just a suboptimal mix of qualities and weapons. It can - the same way F-16 can do A-10 low&slow, but:

-it's restricted with some of cheap PGMs mentioned - they don't work with F-35 bays(APKWS, for example) or with its 25mm cannon (still too small).
-it's IR stealth is relative, but we're in an environment where it's paramount;
-F-35 isn't really supposed to be hit - and we're in an environment where we will be hit, sooner or later;
-it's a big, fast jet - too big, too fast for what we're trying to do here.

Basically - idea is to get a different package of already available technologies - many of them indeed F-35 ones. Probably half as light, too.
 
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