pathology_doc
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Sferrin and Void, I think in combination you've got it right. Void in particular, the parameters are duly noted, with thanks.
marauder2048 said:Congressman says F-35s could take down North Korea’s missiles in boost phase
November 02, 2017 |Justin Doubleday
A congressman on the House Armed Services Committee claimed today F-35 Joint Strike Fighters could shoot down North Korea’s ballistic missiles in their boost phase
and faulted the Missile Defense Agency and the Pentagon for failing to come up with a timely solution to Kim Jong Un’s nuclear warhead program. Rep. Duncan Hunter
(R-CA) said he has seen analysis from Los Alamos National Laboratories and other research outfits to support his claim that an F-35 could take out a ballistic...
https://insidedefense.com/daily-news/congressman-says-f-35s-could-take-down-north-korea%E2%80%99s-missiles-boost-phase
marauder2048 said:Congressman says F-35s could take down North Korea’s missiles in boost phase
November 02, 2017 |Justin Doubleday
A congressman on the House Armed Services Committee claimed today F-35 Joint Strike Fighters could shoot down North Korea’s ballistic missiles in their boost phase
and faulted the Missile Defense Agency and the Pentagon for failing to come up with a timely solution to Kim Jong Un’s nuclear warhead program. Rep. Duncan Hunter
(R-CA) said he has seen analysis from Los Alamos National Laboratories and other research outfits to support his claim that an F-35 could take out a ballistic...
https://insidedefense.com/daily-news/congressman-says-f-35s-could-take-down-north-korea%E2%80%99s-missiles-boost-phase
DrRansom said:This article sounds like a Representative looking for a cheap technical fix to a long-term strategic problem.
marauder2048 said:Which is funny given the previous administration's view that boost phase interceptors carried by stealthy
aircraft were strategically destabilizing.
I was hoping that since MKV was cancelled and then resurrected as MOKV
that the AWL would be resurrected as AOWL..but alas it's still AWOL.
DrRansom said:In either case, I agree that the potential deployment of boost-phase interceptors by ULO stratospheric UAVs would be potentially massively destabilizing.
Scott, has there been any studies on 'tail chase' missile technologies from an air launched platform that includes missile size, weight, speed, etc. requirements. I know a lot would depend on range from target and many other factors but curious if you've seen anything?sferrin said:"he idea of airborne missile defense systems has become more popular in recent months,
with members of Congress pushing the Pentagon on such ideas as arming drones with lasers
that, in theory, could take out a just-launched ICBM. "
When I read this I can't help but think, "if a 747, with it's megawatt+ laser and giant beam director couldn't make the case, what hope does a Reaper-esque drone have?"
bobbymike said:Scott, has there been any studies on 'tail chase' missile technologies from an air launched platform that includes missile size, weight, speed, etc. requirements. I know a lot would depend on range from target and many other factors but curious if you've seen anything?sferrin said:"he idea of airborne missile defense systems has become more popular in recent months,
with members of Congress pushing the Pentagon on such ideas as arming drones with lasers
that, in theory, could take out a just-launched ICBM. "
When I read this I can't help but think, "if a 747, with it's megawatt+ laser and giant beam director couldn't make the case, what hope does a Reaper-esque drone have?"
sferrin said:"he idea of airborne missile defense systems has become more popular in recent months,
with members of Congress pushing the Pentagon on such ideas as arming drones with lasers
that, in theory, could take out a just-launched ICBM. "
When I read this I can't help but think, "if a 747, with it's megawatt+ laser and giant beam director couldn't make the case, what hope does a Reaper-esque drone have?"
DrRansom said:sferrin said:"he idea of airborne missile defense systems has become more popular in recent months,
with members of Congress pushing the Pentagon on such ideas as arming drones with lasers
that, in theory, could take out a just-launched ICBM. "
When I read this I can't help but think, "if a 747, with it's megawatt+ laser and giant beam director couldn't make the case, what hope does a Reaper-esque drone have?"
I think the theory is a largish missile, perhaps PAC-3 size, but mounted on a stealth aircraft orbiting above the mobile missile operating region. I suspect the CONOPs is to surge Boost-Phase-Intercept drones into the enemy airspace while ground attack aircraft seek out the launchers. The missile interceptors give some protection against any launchers that escape the TEL hunt.
sferrin said:Except that by the time the decision to even move drones out of their hangars is made the missiles in question will be GONE.
marauder2048 said:sferrin said:Except that by the time the decision to even move drones out of their hangars is made the missiles in question will be GONE.
The mobile missile threat was so acute in the 80's that the Regan administration authorized overflight of the Soviet Union
prior to the outbreak of hostilities; no reason that authorization couldn't make a comeback.
sferrin said:You'd need something with a lot of stealth and very high speed weapons. And a lot of them.
sferrin said:I never really understood the notion of B-2s flying over the USSR looking for ICBM-carrying trains. The missiles would be long gone before the B-2s arrived, and how much endurance would they have overhead anyway? IMO you either need a long-endurance drone with very high speed, long range AAMs operating at the edge of the country's airspace (and it needs to be a SMALL country), or lasers in space.
sferrin said:I never really understood the notion of B-2s flying over the USSR looking for ICBM-carrying trains. The missiles would be long gone before the B-2s arrived, and how much endurance would they have overhead anyway? IMO you either need a long-endurance drone with very high speed, long range AAMs operating at the edge of the country's airspace (and it needs to be a SMALL country), or lasers in space.
DrRansom said:Or a Mach 3 air launched cruise missile...
No, AARS was meant to do long-range MTI against Topol TELs.marauder2048 said:Wasn't AARS supposed to provide targeting data for depressed trajectory SLBMs (possibly with a terminally guided MaRV) ?
Maury Markowitz said:No, AARS was meant to do long-range MTI against Topol TELs.marauder2048 said:Wasn't AARS supposed to provide targeting data for depressed trajectory SLBMs (possibly with a terminally guided MaRV) ?
I never saw a reference to it being used against SLBMs.
And how would it help against MARV anyway? MARV is a problem for the interceptor and terminal radars, not detection.
marauder2048 said:I think we are in violent agreement as to what AARS was intended to do.
The question is which weapons would be used to prosecute the attacks against the TELs that AARS was tracking.
marauder2048 said:Quick-retargeting of ICBMs (REACT) and SLBMs (SRS) began in the mid-80's.
I would think that it any crisis that motivated the launch of AARS, communications with SSBNs
would be easier.
marauder2048 said:Was the "mobile missile hunting B-2" concept anything more than a fanciful "Save the B-2" effort?
marauder2048 said:While the Regan administration was willing to permit ISR overflights of the Soviet Union
in peacetime (which made AARS viable) I don't think it extended to nuclear armed bombers.
marauder2048 said:Short of a US first-strike (or the mother-of-all tanker chains), I don't see how the the B-2 has much
more than residual capability in the mobile-missile hunting role.
quellish said:SSBNs have (long range) communications when at periscope depth and when submerged. The submerged system is very very low bandwidth. Targets can be sent from STRATCOM over the high bandwidth system. The low bandwidth system can be used to tell the SSBN to go to periscope depth for new orders/targets/pizza/whatever. AARS would be unable to use the low bandwidth system for technical and practical reasons.
quellish said:When SLBMs are retargetted imagine it as loading a new program into the system. The program isn't (and can't be) created on the SSBN.
marauder2048 said:Was the "mobile missile hunting B-2" concept anything more than a fanciful "Save the B-2" effort?
quellish said:It was a primary mission of the B-2 from 81-89.
quellish said:The mission justified much of the stealth, the DMS and ESM, and in particular the radar. The B-2 can hang out for a long, long time over defended territory without much support. That was the idea, and that drove many of the more interesting requirements.
marauder2048 said:There was never an actual SIOP that incorporated these elements.
marauder2048 said:While the Regan administration was willing to permit ISR overflights of the Soviet Union
in peacetime (which made AARS viable) I don't think it extended to nuclear armed bombers.
quellish said:There are many flaws in the above plan.
quellish said:Would it not make a little more sense if AARS was a high speed aircraft rather than a persistent subsonic one?
quellish said:This is how the B-2 and AARS were sold to the people who funded them. Whether this would have worked in practice is another thing.marauder2048 said:Short of a US first-strike (or the mother-of-all tanker chains), I don't see how the the B-2 has much
more than residual capability in the mobile-missile hunting role.
marauder2048 said:The submerged system was not particularly low bandwidth since the BALPARS data set was not small and was sent twice a day.
marauder2048 said:Indeed, GAO in 1992 said that C3 to SSBNs is about a prompt as ICBMs silos and there was no operationally meaningful
difference in time to target for SLBMs.
In any event, the crisis that prompted the launch of AARS would have prompted SSBNs to come shallow.
marauder2048 said:Which is contradicted by:
Welch's congressional testimony in 1989: “finding and striking highly mobile targets is neither the reason for the B-2...."
[/qupte]
Which continued:
"...nor are we likely to accomplish that in the near to mid term with great efficiency unless we make a further big commitment to some other system."
The big commitment to some other system being AARS. This was at the time when USAF was gaining a larger responsibility for that program.
marauder2048 said:GAO, which said in 1992 for the B-2 vis-a-vis SRTs that "no special capability exists or is foreseen"
By 1992 the B-2 mission had changed. Again, the world had changed. STRATCOM had changed. SIOP, as we knew it, was dead.
marauder2048 said:and the declassified NSDD 178 (July 10, 1985) which says that:
"During the development of the ATB, design options will be preserved to ensure that the ATB could ultimately have the capability in conjunction
with other national assets to locate and attack relocatable targets within the Soviet Union and other potential adversaries"
[/qupte]
"Other national assets" here being the very systems we are talking about. AARS and satellites.
As far as the B-2 SRT mission, see attached from "Testing and operational requirements for the B-2" testimony. There are many other examples in the public record of the B-2 SRT mission.
marauder2048 said:You would have needed all of the above and SRAM II just to survive against the mobile SAM systems and to prosecute attacks
against the existing stationary target set protected by terminal defenses.
As you might imagine this problem was studied to death at the time and the outcomes did not agree with that position. The B-2 was more than capable of accomplishing its mission given the current and projected threats at the time.
marauder2048 said:No. Because EO/IR and particularly SAR/ESM/GMTI all like long dwells and low platform speed.
A few SR-71 RSOs would disagree with that.
There is nothing inherent to, say, SAR that dictates a low platform speed.
marauder2048 said:It's clear from all of the declassified documents that the Reagan administration wanted at least residual capabiltiy
against SRTs from all of the elements of the Triad.
STRATCOM had a strategy of cross-targeting at the time. For some targets this was not practical. Not every target was vulnerable to multiple capabilities. Arms control agreements put additional pressure on STRATCOM targeting.