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There have been several discussions about the British aircraft of the 60s since I started here a few weeks ago, apparently it's a never ending topic. They appear to start out technically and end financially and politically in a viscous circle of failure. In the process some interesting and profound stuff has been said.

What I'd like to explore is if a virtuous circle can be produced in the same circumstances. Starting in 1957-58, where support for British products can lead to a cycle of success in the 60s for British industry despite the new political, strategic and financial circumstances Britain found herself in

The decisions that immediately jump out at me are:
  • Not declaring manned fighters obsolescent in the 1957 DWP, whereby the Lightning isn't seen as interim but rather as a 'take it or leave it' centrepiece of the RAFs tactical force.
  • Not allowing BOAC and BEA to demand the shrinking of the Trident and VC10 airliners, so HSA and BAC build these airliners to the specs they thought would sell: Medway sized Trident and VC10 Super 200.
  • Not getting back into the 'fighter' game via the NBMR3/P1154, rather than having a small fleet of P1127 to fill the VTOL niche.
The potential Lighting developments are listed below, but the Trident and VC10 also introduced some innovations. The Trident had the worlds first moving map display navigation system and a blind landing system that was cutting edge if not the world first. The VC10 introduced 'graceful degradation' or 'fail operational' concept in it's systems, IIUC it had 3 autopilots so 1 failure would still leave 2 to fly the plane, this concept was adopted by the TSR2 with it's 2 VERDANs and by the FB111. The MoD asked HS for a quote to build 100 P1127s as early as 1961.

What could the output of British industry be in the 60s if these mistakes, and others like of or those that occurred because of them, were avoided? Could the TSR2 be developed a bit quicker and cheaper? Would the economic health of Britain's 2 big aviation companies lead to better export prospects? Would advances in the civil airliner sphere spill over into the military sphere?

EE/BAC came up with a range of proposals for providing an attack capability in the Lightning, such as the proposal to Australia that included an extended ventral pack providing a weapons bay able to carry 1,000lb bombs, or a recce pack, and a doppler navigator. IOTL the AI.23 was given A2G modes and the Saudi's actually used the type in that role. RAF Lightnings performed low-level intercept missions in both Germany and the UK. The radar was effectively useless at low-level interception but it should have been possible to provide terrain clearance functionality - this was proposed to the Australians.

The multirole pack proposed, developed from 1959 onwards, allowed for carriage of 3 x 1,000lb bombs without using the over-wing or outer-wing pylons. There were porposals for Bullpup and large batteries of 2" rockets (I have seen one configuration proposed with 122 but higher should have been possible).

1959-65 proposals for the Lightning include terrain clearance functionality in AI.23, and a doppler navigator for altitude control. AI.23 would provide ranging and sighting information to feed into the pilots sight for weapons delivery. The INAS/NAVWASS configurations are a bit later but between the space available in the front of the proposed multi-role central pack and the standard Lightning weapons pack under the nose there was plenty of space that could have accommodated additional equipment like the LRMTS.

F4K/F4M at £1.2 million is part of the sales pitch. UK content, quick to service. Expected completion by 1968 and under terms of a US loan.

It all sounds amazing.
Such high performance, far better than any other F4.
McDD was talking up a future US purchase and possible joint exports (UK engines).
A dream come true for Wilson as intelligence was banging the drum on the dangers of Soviet Anti-ship Missiles displayed in '63. There seemed no time for delay....
Everything could work out....

But reality hits incrementally, and so the "frog is boiled", until it's £3.55 per plane, devaluation has eaten chunks of off the loan away and it's not that much of a performer compared to the new F4J, numbers shrink to keep in budget.....oh and Late....
Deliveries start when they were expected to have finished.

And while UK got licensed US gyros for domestic INS, got a deep dive into US radar and AAMs, it pushed off the domestic AI radar effort, killed the domestic AAM effort and achieved zero joint exports of F4K/F4M to anybody.
What a success!

F111K was chopped, with EoS, UK would confine themselves to Europe and the North Atlantic.
And the last hope for domestic capability and independence was whatever could be developed under the cover of international partnerships.

By cancelling F.155 and F.177, no matter the logic, it also cut the spreading of development efforts for new supersonic aircraft and avionics.
As it did Hunter and Javelin successors. Which ultimately still needed replacement.
Leaving only the new OR.339.
And everything had to be carried by this program.
This got worse because that effort still needed to happen and soon had to spread to cover NMBR.3 and OR.346. Only now the case for replacement was becoming more pressing.

In our alterative histories the reorganisation of the aircraft industry takes place 10 years earlier. Would that have resulted in a significant reduction in the amount of tribalism in BAC in the first half of the 1960s?
 
that is one of my favorite time periods in a region thank you for bringing that up the uk reduced military increased economy is how most people like to think about it but how i think about it is the uk shifted its military think to be smaller but to have a smaller but more mobile army for instance the ancestor for the cvrts was around this time with greater air dropping capacity.
 
There have been several discussions about the British aircraft of the 60s since I started here a few weeks ago, apparently it's a never ending topic.
It's been going since before I joined.
They appear to start out technically and end financially and politically in a viscous circle of failure.
No.
People like me want to talk technical and certain other people want to talk politics and finance.
In the process some interesting and profound stuff has been said.
Definitely!
What I'd like to explore is if a virtuous circle can be produced in the same circumstances. Starting in 1957-58, where support for British products can lead to a cycle of success in the 60s for British industry despite the new political, strategic and financial circumstances Britain found herself in
Ok here we go. Good luck!
  • Not declaring manned fighters obsolescent in the 1957 DWP, whereby the Lightning isn't seen as interim but rather as a 'take it or leave it' centrepiece of the RAFs tactical force.
  • Not allowing BOAC and BEA to demand the shrinking of the Trident and VC10 airliners, so HSA and BAC build these airliners to the specs they thought would sell: Medway sized Trident and VC10 Super 200.
  • Not getting back into the 'fighter' game via the NBMR3/P1154, rather than having a small fleet of P1127 to fill the VTOL niche.
No to No manned Fighters, mean when you cancel F.177 and F.155, difficult questions get thrown at you from all sides.
Lightning isn't ideal and even then they know it. But as I've pointed out, the very reason for It's layout is fundamentally undermined with the massive increases in engine power.
What could the output of British industry be in the 60s if these mistakes, and others like of or those that occurred because of them, were avoided?
Define the state of industry, what does it look like in this AH?
Could the TSR2 be developed a bit quicker and cheaper?
A basic system of lower capability could.
Would the economic health of Britain's 2 big aviation companies lead to better export prospects?
Depends on product and politics.
Would advances in the civil airliner sphere spill over into the military sphere?
Medway is obvious. The favourite engine for OR.339 anyway and nearly bought by Sweden. It could also have gained licensed production in France.
 
P.1127 / Harrier will still be the stand out export performer from that list due to offering a niche capability that isn't available elsewhere rather than poorer cost/performance alternatives to existing aircraft
 
People like me want to talk technical and certain other people want to talk politics and finance.

I'm guilty of that, mainly because I find paper planes about as interesting a the spaceships in Star Wars or racing cars that never raced.

No to No manned Fighters, mean when you cancel F.177 and F.155, difficult questions get thrown at you from all sides.
Lightning isn't ideal and even then they know it. But as I've pointed out, the very reason for It's layout is fundamentally undermined with the massive increases in engine power.

I think getting this as right as possible holds the key to success.

From a technical perspective the Lightning isn't ideal, but in an environment where a huge amount of development funding has dried up it basically becomes it or nothing. If this opportunity was seized rather than ignored in 1957-59 would the avionic development contribute to the Buccaneer, P1127 and TSR2? Certainly the AIRPASS radar evolved into the Buccaneer's Blue Parrot and TSR2 radar, but what about the other attack Lightning avionics, will they help the TSR2 development and/or allow the Buccaneer to have more fancy stuff?

Define the state of industry, what does it look like in this AH?

Exactly the same until these decision points.

A basic system of lower capability could.

So an improved industry yields no changes?
 
P.1127 / Harrier will still be the stand out export performer from that list due to offering a niche capability that isn't available elsewhere rather than poorer cost/performance alternatives to existing aircraft

If the RAF gets it early, maybe 1966 without the P1154, then I think it would be picked up more widely on the export market.

That's not to say a developed and supported Lightning and Buccaneer couldn't do significantly better, apparently West Germany showed an interest in both.
 
Actually the politics and finance are a lot easier with this scenario because we know from France, Sweden and the USA that the missiles only decision was a UK-thing.
Changing the BOAC and BEA spec. changing is also not that difficult. There are plenty of airlines in the market place across the world that took a range of decisions.
As nationalised carriers BOAC and BEA are under political pressure to buy British. But its the Board and the technical staff who decide what sort of aircraft they want.
Of course your shopping basket will still have to remember that the balance between the Deterrent (V Force), British forces in Germany, The Fleet and our colonial commitments will still be fought over, even if you rig the outcome to suit.
 
One thing you will have to face up to is that much of the equipment in service, on order, or projected in 1957-8 is inferior to comparable stuff elsewhere from the Sovs to the Swedes leave alone the USA.
But equally, some stuff like the V bombers, Centurion tanks etc is rather good.
 
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The aviation companies were compelled to merge because only Hawkers had the market capitalization to handle contracts of the size of 35 VC10s or 25 Tridents that were signed in 1958. After merging the projects they were working on didn't really take off or were cancelled.

Would things be different if these companies had a lot more work to do? If BAC had to build ~500 lightnings and ~200 VC10s how would that impact the TSR2? Would that reduce the merger caused tribalism?
 
Yes, but both Lightning and VC10 would have to be very different from our time to get those numbers. But then that is one of the reasons for this thread.

Lightning would need a side by side engine layout, two seater cockpit and bigger radar, better armament options in some.

VC10 would need to be bigger and more economical to operate, probably with the podded rather than rear mounted engines.
 
Any AH here must select paths through 3 options in 1956/57:
1. the Bomb. UK chose in 1955 to fund owned H and A Bombs, multiple functions, so plus their delivery platforms.
So: priority for all tech-resources. 1st Team on Medium Bombers, also-rans on everything else: see Avro and Blue Steel;
all Regular, largely Officer Forces, £1,000-a-year men as standard when civilians were not. Defence cost onway to crippling.

2. Military Interdependence, intra-NATO, so attempts to build to Commonality (NBMRs); and to interplay, UK:US, in 2 senses:
- Basic Research: Hood noted Blackburn thinking of expanding Buccaneer's R&D team in 1956 by accessing Hunting's:
Q: why did Ministers in 1955 give RN's strike type to a modest team?
A: area rule, flap blowing, forming strong structure, clever avionics: all, UK and US Research Establishments in harmony, disseminating.
RAE and MoS thought they could, ah, mentor little Blackburn, the tin-basher.
- Role/Theatre Task sharing: e.g: in 1956 UK did much more East of Suez than did US.
UK chose to implement all that with domestic kit. New W.Germany and Japan bought much off-the-shelf, so liberating brain to destroy shoddy Brit mass-consumer products. May we use the word prestige, here? See Concorde, shocking misuse of scarce resources.

3. Civil: Exploitation of what was of interest to open-market Customers. Brabazon in 1943 saw that as turbines, but overlooked pressurisation. Customers do not want Engineering Excellence (VC10 over 707): they want profit. BEAC/BOAC were Instruments of State Policy ("flag carriers"), operating in (wicked) revenue cartels. So, when Big Fans offered lower seat-mile cost, 1965, BEAC (and Air France and Lufthansa) thought they might buy about 6 (to be A300) each for their few dense routes. Civil business outside US was about as desirable as spending a decade to deliver a trickle to RN. So, RR, instead of listening to Boeing, where Medway was 727 Design Case, accepted BEAC's money for a shrink Trident/Spey of no interest to folk who could fill more seats by reducing ticket prices.

Some of this was not Aero-specific: why are there no Vauxhall Veteran Car Clubs? Rotted away. Nor is Decline right: UK Never Ruled the Skies; BAES (precursors) has never been so profitable as it is today.

We can only surmise a virtuous circle if we select, then pursue our sector(s). So: BSEL was bigger than RR, 1960-66, but tried to do Legacy/Sustainment, plus small VTOL, plus large VTOL, plus supersonic dash, plus supersonic cruise, plus (in partnership) Big Civil Fan.
 
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Yes, but both Lightning and VC10 would have to be very different from our time to get those numbers. But then that is one of the reasons for this thread.

Lightning would need a side by side engine layout, two seater cockpit and bigger radar, better armament options in some.

VC10 would need to be bigger and more economical to operate, probably with the podded rather than rear mounted engines.

About 380 Lightnings were ordered and 337 built. If the RAF built it as their fighter-bomber instead of the Hunter 500 would get built, to say nothing of West German interest or other possible customers.

Vickers wanted to stretch the VC10 by 28', which is what the engines and wings could support, but only stretched it 13' which made it less economical than the 707. The full 28' stretch would give the Super 200 VC10 some 212 seat in a single class setup, which would make it the largest trans-Atlantic airliner in the world for about 3 years in the mid-late 60s. Given Boeing delivered 432 707s and Douglas delivered 291 DC-8s 1965-69 changing 150 of those to VC10 Super 200s isn't too outlandish.
 
The Lightning option has been discussed in full elsewhere. It does not become any more realistic just by changing the thread.

Rear engined VC10 has some issues (servicing, flight characteristics) that podded 707s and DC8s dont have. No large rear engined airliners have been built this century so I would still go for a podded VC10.

BOAC and British United plus perhaps Air Canada and Qantas might take up a bigger more economical VC10.
 
So this doesn't work in Abstraction. It needs details and what can e achieved.
------
Lightning as main Fighter imposed 1957 for the next 10 years. Shock at the table, the meeting from hell!

EE prime RAF Fighter provider. Chiefs not happy DH and Avro had better appreciation of systems.

Prime choice before Air Chiefs, continue with 'as is' or revise fusilage for side-by-side engines?
Maintenance, Weapons, and avionics all advocate the change.

Engine options? Fund scaled RB.106?
AAM future?
Is next generation AI set tied to Lightning or Lightning successor?

Avionics Fighter:-
Ferranti AI.23 developments.
Auto-interception system, 'as was' funded but not implemented on aircraft. This must change in this timeline.
INS and radio navigation systems
IRST trial, can we move this to earlier as in 1960?
Red Top and Red Top MkII (liquid motor)?
SARH Illuminator function, integration of radar AAM?
Could new A5 seeker be used in Radar Red Top?

Now the bit that should generate interest and argument.

Attack version (bits of this applicable to MkII or MkIII Buccaneer) circa 200 sets of:-
Assuming two seater aircraft.
1. I've named it 'Green Parrot' (model 127 circa 1961) concept early TFR functionality added to AI.23. IOC maybe '63.

2. Ferranti Miniture Platform INAS IOC 1965 to '66. Type 100 or 200 might be earlier.

3. Moving map display a.k.a TMD Topographical Map Display possible IOC 1963.

4. Blue Study radio guidance (Gee like system) Already in use by '59 on Canberra.

5. TV/IR camera and display system in two seater. Unknown IOC possibly late 60's. Though IRST of relevant, hence my request for early trials in 1960 on the Fighter.

6. OLS Optical Linescan System (EMI developed for IOC to '63), possibly a dedicated pod or pack.

7. P391 Q-band SLAR with MTI. IOC potentially 1965. Either as a pod or pack.

8. Combined OLS and P.391 with conventional cameras for dedicated Reconasense version for 1966.

AS.30, Bulpup, 2.75" rockets, 500lb, 1,000lb and 2,000lb bombs. Plus single TMB Red Beard.

So a great deal of TSR.2 subsystems could apply to Attack and Reconasense Lightnings. P391 served as basis of later UK avionics package for AFVG and MRCA, but was TSR.2 rooted.

Buccaneer with Green Parrot, Verdan computer, TMD, OLS, P.391 SLAR. Would deliver a lot of TSR.2 capability.

Kestrel P.1127.
Gun ranging radar mk5?
TMD
PAS
FMP INAS
 
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My advice for this topic is - don't get too hung up over exports. The government got too hung up worrying about exports before the aircraft had even flown. If it's a great aircraft then sales will follow. If it's not, then they won't. Likewise you have to have wise marketing folks - expecting every ex-colony and protectorate to buy British out of loyalty was misguided (BAE still doing that today - Re: Tempest). Expecting every NATO member to lap up British aircraft when they are trying to build their own industries was never going to work. Most of the big NATO deals involved licence-building deals - just expecting them to buy off the shelf was not on by 1960 (any more than UK industry wanted to buy US off the shelf without tinkering with it first).

As I've said before - and as Alertken also alludes to - pre-war market penetration of British engines far outweighed the penetration of its aircraft and even then, more military than civil. Had WW2 not resulted in ground zero for Western European aviation, its likely that British (and European) manufacturers would have been an afterthought as nobody had anything matching American airliners in 1940 on the drawing boards. By 1955 this gap had narrowed but ultimately the slim British lead in turboprops and Comet was wiped out by a wave of 707s, 727s, DC-8s and DC-9s.
There was a giant gap in British jet airliner development, the Comet first flew in 1949 - the next British jet airliners did not fly until 1962 (Trident January, VC-10 June, 1-11 August 1963) - 13 years of tinkering with getting Comet right and relying on Viscounts.
[for comparison 707-120 Dec 1957, DC-8 May 1958, 720 Nov 1959, 727 Feb 1963, DC-9 Feb 1965, 737 April 1967, 747 Feb 1969, DC-10 Aug 1970, TriStar Nov 1970.
UK post-1963 managed Concorde March 1969, (Airbus A300 Oct 1972), the next all-UK jet was BAe 146 Sept 1981]
 
The cynic in me can't help thinking about two things.

a) Dassault and its Mirage III put the final nail in public companies atempts at fighter planes. Problem solved.

b) De Gaulle took note, and basically controlled public companies, two ways
1-you can design bizjet, airliners, helicopters, missiles and rockets and any kind of military aeroplanes - as long as not a fighter
2-all the airframe manufacturers besides Dassault (and Breguet) being public, then the state could all fold them into just a single entity, easier to control: SNIAC Aerospatiale, 1970.

------------------------------------------

The decisions that immediately jump out at me are:
  • Not declaring manned fighters obsolescent in the 1957 DWP, whereby the Lightning isn't seen as interim but rather as a 'take it or leave it' centrepiece of the RAFs tactical force.

Mirage III was a big success, but every other contemporary - SMB-2, Vautour, Durandal, Trident, Griffon, Leduc, SO-4060, NATO LWFs (Etendard, Taon) was thrown by the window in 1958.

  • Not allowing BOAC and BEA to demand the shrinking of the Trident and VC10 airliners, so HSA and BAC build these airliners to the specs they thought would sell: Medway sized Trident and VC10 Super 200.

Caravelle did better (280 build) but it was no insurance again Concorde (14 sold) nor Mercure (10 built).

  • Not getting back into the 'fighter' game via the NBMR3/P1154, rather than having a small fleet of P1127 to fill the VTOL niche.

Build prototypes, and then: if unworkable or unaffordable, screw them. Balzac V and Mirage III-V VSTOLs totalled three crashes and two pilots killed.

Then again, Mirage III large success made its replacement a very protracted affair - Mirage F1 and Mirage 2000 ended somewhat redundant over the entire 1980's.
Plus AdA RFPs, 1961-1976 were either blue-sky or complete shit.
 
The decisions that immediately jump out at me are:
  • Not declaring manned fighters obsolescent in the 1957 DWP, whereby the Lightning isn't seen as interim but rather as a 'take it or leave it' centrepiece of the RAFs tactical force.
One of the things I've been working on over the years is a thing I call "Carthaginian Secret Projects" - assume the survival of Carthage and its existence as a major power in North Africa, violently opposed to Rome (Italy) and friendly with Rome's enemies/conquests (Spain, Britain, France). One variant of this involves the Carthaginians developing all their own stuff 5-10 years behind the best the West can do; another involves them buying all their aircraft but making significant modifications or improvements to them to suit their own purposes.

One of the crunch decisions in the buy-and-modify timeline is where they go for their missiles. Active homing in the 1950s turns out to be a bust in the original timeline (OTL), but the one that got closest - Red Dean - is huge and unsophisticated, and the carrying aircraft is very large, so the obvious choice is SARH. Where do the Carthaginians go for a SARH missile of reasonable size? Not Britain, that's for sure, because all efforts at Radar Blue Jay historically wind up as dead ends. Sure, there are serious problems with integrating it into Lightning (that centre-body will only hold so much, and an illuminator is a bridge too far), but both Javelin and Sea Vixen should have had more than enough room for it and - being subsonic - an even greater need.

In the OTL, at least Sea Vixen eventually gets Red Top with its limited all-aspect capability, but the subsonic Javelin doesn't even get that and has to soldier on until the end - 1968, IIRC - with a tail-chase IR missile which has long since been overtaken by developments of Sidewinder. Both of them were ideal candidates for a clean-sheet-of-paper airborne interception radar with an illuminator capability but it was never done.

Killing Red Dean and its carriers might be defensible, but the race should have been on from that moment henceforth to give the RAF's subsonic interceptors an in-the-face capability against closing targets that were too fast for them to catch in a tail chase. Development of such a system probably arrives in time to be an off-the-shelf option for an ADV English Electric P.17 and whatever Vickers builds to succeed the Sea Vixen.
 
The Lightning option has been discussed in full elsewhere. It does not become any more realistic just by changing the thread.

Rear engined VC10 has some issues (servicing, flight characteristics) that podded 707s and DC8s dont have. No large rear engined airliners have been built this century so I would still go for a podded VC10.

BOAC and British United plus perhaps Air Canada and Qantas might take up a bigger more economical VC10.

I'd hoped this thread would be to make do and get right what existed from 1957 rather than dream up paper planes.
  • Lightning (without structural changes)
  • P1227 Harrier
  • Buccaneer
  • BAC 1-11
  • HS Trident
  • VC10
  • TSR2 (because of the completed and flying prototypes at cancellation)
I once saw a figure of the real life VC10 seat cost vs the 707 seat cost (something like cost per passenger mile or somesuch) and the 707 was more economical per seat. What I don't know if it compared the regular VC10 or the Super VC10 and how the considerably more capacious Super 200 would compare.
 
Any AH here must select paths through 3 options in 1956/57:
1. the Bomb. UK chose in 1955 to fund owned H and A Bombs, multiple functions, so plus their delivery platforms.
So: priority for all tech-resources. 1st Team on Medium Bombers, also-rans on everything else: see Avro and Blue Steel;
all Regular, largely Officer Forces, £1,000-a-year men as standard when civilians were not. Defence cost onway to crippling.

2. Military Interdependence, intra-NATO, so attempts to build to Commonality (NBMRs); and to interplay, UK:US, in 2 senses:
- Basic Research: Hood noted Blackburn thinking of expanding Buccaneer's R&D team in 1956 by accessing Hunting's:
Q: why did Ministers in 1955 give RN's strike type to a modest team?
A: area rule, flap blowing, forming strong structure, clever avionics: all, UK and US Research Establishments in harmony, disseminating.
RAE and MoS thought they could, ah, mentor little Blackburn, the tin-basher.
- Role/Theatre Task sharing: e.g: in 1956 UK did much more East of Suez than did US.
UK chose to implement all that with domestic kit. New W.Germany and Japan bought much off-the-shelf, so liberating brain to destroy shoddy Brit mass-consumer products. May we use the word prestige, here? See Concorde, shocking misuse of scarce resources.

3. Civil: Exploitation of what was of interest to open-market Customers. Brabazon in 1943 saw that as turbines, but overlooked pressurisation. Customers do not want Engineering Excellence (VC10 over 707): they want profit. BEAC/BOAC were Instruments of State Policy ("flag carriers"), operating in (wicked) revenue cartels. So, when Big Fans offered lower seat-mile cost, 1965, BEAC (and Air France and Lufthansa) thought they might buy about 6 (to be A300) each for their few dense routes. Civil business outside US was about as desirable as spending a decade to deliver a trickle to RN. So, RR, instead of listening to Boeing, where Medway was 727 Design Case, accepted BEAC's money for a shrink Trident/Spey of no interest to folk who could fill more seats by reducing ticket prices.

Some of this was not Aero-specific: why are there no Vauxhall Veteran Car Clubs? Rotted away. Nor is Decline right: UK Never Ruled the Skies; BAES (precursors) has never been so profitable as it is today.

We can only surmise a virtuous circle if we select, then pursue our sector(s). So: BSEL was bigger than RR, 1960-66, but tried to do Legacy/Sustainment, plus small VTOL, plus large VTOL, plus supersonic dash, plus supersonic cruise, plus (in partnership) Big Civil Fan.

For mine with the nuclear weapons I'd love the UK to fluke the right answer in 1960 and go directly to the Polaris. They avoided it for the same reasons as they did everything, short term cost saving of stretching the V bombers with Skybolt. I'd also like to give the whole 10kt bomb limit a miss during the WE177 phase.

Nobody really did much more than pay lip service to NATO standardisation, NBMRs and the like, but Britain did and let it cripple its defence posture and industry. I'd have Britain contribute to NATO standardisation by pushing it's products for export, a couple of examples are the cooperation with West Germany on the SR177, (which appears to have shifted to some interest in the Lightning after cancellation*) and Dutch interest in the Chieftain tank. Choosing domestic kit give Britain a depth in defence that off the shelf buyers don't have, even as late as 1982 Britain was able to lean on it's industry to introduce weapons that were barely dream about 10 weeks earlier.

I have a vague idea that the correct sizing of the Trident and Super VC10 would see sales double/triple. Now ~230 Medway Tridents and ~150 Super 200 VC10s isn't going to set the world on fire with 2,800 727/DC9 and 1,400 707/DC8, but with the BAc 1-11 it does put Britain vastly ahead of the rest of Europe and the only one with a trans-Atlantic airliner. I imagine this would have a big impact on the Plowden Report of 1965, the formation of Airbus and the development of Concorde.
 
Lightning as main Fighter imposed 1957 for the next 10 years. Shock at the table, the meeting from hell!

EE prime RAF Fighter provider. Chiefs not happy DH and Avro had better appreciation of systems.

Prime choice before Air Chiefs, continue with 'as is' or revise fusilage for side-by-side engines?
Maintenance, Weapons, and avionics all advocate the change.

This is about how I see it going down at the start. However when the Service Chiefs start talking about developing the Lightning structurally Minister Sandys reminds them that the Defence budget is having 100 million pounds removed from it every year for the next 5 years.

Avionics Fighter:-
Ferranti AI.23 developments.
Auto-interception system, 'as was' funded but not implemented on aircraft. This must change in this timeline.
INS and radio navigation systems
IRST trial, can we move this to earlier as in 1960?
Red Top and Red Top MkII (liquid motor)?
SARH Illuminator function, integration of radar AAM?
Could new A5 seeker be used in Radar Red Top?

Now the bit that should generate interest and argument.

Attack version (bits of this applicable to MkII or MkIII Buccaneer) circa 200 sets of:-
Assuming two seater aircraft.
1. I've named it 'Green Parrot' (model 127 circa 1961) concept early TFR functionality added to AI.23. IOC maybe '63.

2. Ferranti Miniture Platform INAS IOC 1965 to '66. Type 100 or 200 might be earlier.

3. Moving map display a.k.a TMD Topographical Map Display possible IOC 1963.

4. Blue Study radio guidance (Gee like system) Already in use by '59 on Canberra.

5. TV/IR camera and display system in two seater. Unknown IOC possibly late 60's. Though IRST of relevant, hence my request for early trials in 1960 on the Fighter.

6. OLS Optical Linescan System (EMI developed for IOC to '63), possibly a dedicated pod or pack.

7. P391 Q-band SLAR with MTI. IOC potentially 1965. Either as a pod or pack.

8. Combined OLS and P.391 with conventional cameras for dedicated Reconasense version for 1966.

AS.30, Bulpup, 2.75" rockets, 500lb, 1,000lb and 2,000lb bombs. Plus single TMB Red Beard.

So a great deal of TSR.2 subsystems could apply to Attack and Reconasense Lightnings. P391 served as basis of later UK avionics package for AFVG and MRCA, but was TSR.2 rooted.

Buccaneer with Green Parrot, Verdan computer, TMD, OLS, P.391 SLAR. Would deliver a lot of TSR.2 capability.

That sounds like virtuous circle thinking.

If the RAF picks up ~100-150 more Lightnings for the fighter-bomber role the extra production alone will make things that were not viable in real life viable, indeed necessary. Attack avionics for the Lightning can be put into the Buccaneer, transistorised for the TSR2 then these transistorized pieces can be retrofitted into the Lightning and Buccaneer during their mid-life updates in the 70s. I've read that Ferranti could fit a CW emitter for SARH missiles from the 200th AI23, but of course the miserly govt never dreamed they'd get that far, however with the GR versions of the Lightning they'd get to 200 AI23s about halfway through the production run.
 
About 175 Lightning FGR for MRI mission set plus 25 dedicated two seater trainers. The P1154 numbers that Jaguar comes quite close to.

Adopting 'interim' Buccaneer for OR.339 and badgering DH to fix Gyron Junior gets to the 600nm RoA for certain and 1,000nm with drop tanks. Rather than Spey, BS.75 (scaled Pegasus type) and just enlarge the O-Ring in the main spar.

OLS and P.391 actually formed components of the F4 ventral recce pod. Limited numbers.
TMD actually saw use....In A7 Corsairs.

Buccaneer was offered FLR from TSR.2 I think for the mkIII offering.

Minister would recieve Air Chiefs willingness to cut P.1127 Kestrel in order to fund fusilage change keeping Lightning wing, tail, fin, cockpit and subsystems. This would dramatically increase as the first F1s hit service and maintainers hit reality of the stacked engine arrangement. Which was a difficult time I'm given to understand.
 
Mirage III was a big success, but every other contemporary - SMB-2, Vautour, Durandal, Trident, Griffon, Leduc, SO-4060, NATO LWFs (Etendard, Taon) was thrown by the window in 1958.

The Mirage III was supported by the AdA and French government, bought in numbers as the centrepiece of the ADA force structure and marketed aggressively on the world market. This makes people today overlook it's limitations as if they didn't exist.

In contrast the Lightning was begrudgingly kept in the face of a policy geared toward missiles, deliberately not marketed in its early years, kept on the drip feed for updates and constantly being threatened with withdrawal despite it lasting until 1988. This makes everyone hyper aware of every downside, real or perceived.
 
My main reservation about Lightning in the ground attack role is that it may not be as useful (or cheap) as the Hunter FGA9.
Certainly the P1127RAF was not much of an improvement. It took something like Phantom and Jaguar to add capabilities.
Buccaneer seems to me a better bet. If the S1 is not as bad as I had thought and S2 comes earlier.
Buccaneer ticks a lot of RAF boxes for range and payload. It always performed well at the US Red Flag.
 
I agree with your idea of not going for paper planes and sticking to the limited mods for Trident and VC10.
Sorting out the Boards and technical teams at BOAC and BEA would get you the more realistic aircraft you want.
With the 111 you can get a decent lineup.
Customers are out there even in the US if you can get better at meeting what the Airline wants at the right price.
VC10 is a difficult aircraft to place as it is a premium product compared with 707 and DC8. But if BOAC commits to decent numbers and shows its popularity with customers other airlines might want some too.
 
Range and payload, additional sensors.
As you know I am a fan of the Hunter FGA9 and think it could have stayed in service longer.
 
I agree with your idea of not going for paper planes and sticking to the limited mods for Trident and VC10.
Sorting out the Boards and technical teams at BOAC and BEA would get you the more realistic aircraft you want.
With the 111 you can get a decent lineup.
Customers are out there even in the US if you can get better at meeting what the Airline wants at the right price.
VC10 is a difficult aircraft to place as it is a premium product compared with 707 and DC8. But if BOAC commits to decent numbers and shows its popularity with customers other airlines might want some too.

I think the VC10 Super 200 point of difference is that it has the highest seat capacity of the western 3 until the DC-8 series 61-63, although this had a range of 4,000mn compared to the VC10 5800nm. If the DC-8-61 isn't transatlatic then the VC10 is the biggest until the 747 enters service.

Success breeds success, I think double Trident and triple VC10 production would have positive knock on effects within the companies and possibly elsewhere. They could be significant foreign exchange earners for example.
 
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My main reservation about Lightning in the ground attack role is that it may not be as useful (or cheap) as the Hunter FGA9.
Certainly the P1127RAF was not much of an improvement. It took something like Phantom and Jaguar to add capabilities.
Buccaneer seems to me a better bet. If the S1 is not as bad as I had thought and S2 comes earlier.
Buccaneer ticks a lot of RAF boxes for range and payload. It always performed well at the US Red Flag.

The Lighting will undoubtedly be considerably more expensive than converted Hunters, however they will be vastly more capable and last for 20 rather than 10 years.

The P1127s strength isn't in the air, its on the ground which is a handy niche compliment to a big Lightning force, if it can be done affordably.

The Buccaneer is a good bomb truck, it could do the strike tasks considerably better than an attack Lightning. However it was virtually useless in air to air combat against the Migs that were proliferating around the world from the late 50s.
 
Further to AH AAM option.
A5 seeker contract to GEC is 1959 RRE trials using AI.18 modified with CW injection. Flight trials for monostatic (on the rail) on a Canberra started March '62.
Bistatic (post launch) trials August '62. Some 25 flights and so much information gathered they had to slow doen to let analysis catchup.

Original contract investigation terminated 1963 replaced by ship launched guided weapons.
This then in 1963 is the moment when a decision could be taken to drive the seeker towards a new AAM.

A new radar.
The new AI radar effort carried on despite 1957 and soon dropped the sophisticated development of Orange Cocktail like twin dish FMCW and focused on FMCW via a single dish. Likely this for the OR.346 Fighter and then AW.406

Having P1154 foisted on the RN, the effort continued past the microphony problem of single dish FMCW (1962) and the FMICW effort (flew on Canberra early '64) resolved into EARS and Ferranti X/Q dual band AI set for P.1154B. Treasury funded second phase work from mid 1963.
Work continued past P.1154B cancellation in '64 in favour of F4 and AFVG came to the rescue as a platform.
EARS/Ferranti x-band only effort continued past AFVG as only AI radar effort in the UK, much work on performance over various surfaces and targets. Terminated August '67.

Recommissioned to serve as development tool in 1971 for the new digital FMICW AI set, which we know became AI.24 Foxhunter.
RRE had chosen best elements of MEASL and Ferranti proposals to combine together.....
 
I would still play to strengths:

Hunter FGA9 is very good at working with ground forces with cannon and bombs, rocket pods could be added. It is cheap and easy to operate. At low level it is much more agile than Lightning.

Lightning with modifications is a decent short range interceptor well able to shoot down Migs with Red Top

Buccaneer gives you bomb and ASM capacity plus nuclear.

Airbases in range of the countries we need to protect are available except in a few cases (Falklands as usual).

A deployment of Hunters and Bucs supported by Lightnings gives you a more than adequate force into the 70s. They could all do better in the export market than OTL.

As for transports let Vickers build the C130K under licence and Armstrong Whitworth turn 681 into something closer to the Il76. Let Shorts build F8 Twosaders instead of Belfasts.

P1127 is the way to go on VSTOL so no P1154. Kestrel can be improved gradually, especially when the US Marines join in
 
Vickers wanted to stretch the VC10 by 28', which is what the engines and wings could support, but only stretched it 13' which made it less economical than the 707. The full 28' stretch would give the Super 200 VC10 some 212 seat in a single class setup, which would make it the largest trans-Atlantic airliner in the world for about 3 years in the mid-late 60s. Given Boeing delivered 432 707s and Douglas delivered 291 DC-8s 1965-69 changing 150 of those to VC10 Super 200s isn't too outlandish.
I once saw a figure of the real life VC10 seat cost vs the 707 seat cost (something like cost per passenger mile or somesuch) and the 707 was more economical per seat. What I don't know if it compared the regular VC10 or the Super VC10 and how the considerably more capacious Super 200 would compare.
So, first of all, a Super 200 would be more economical to operate than a regular VC10, because as you note it has the same wings and engines, so the fixed cost of the airplane would be spread over more seats.

Second, the Super 200 having 212 seats on launch is critical, because that puts it in the same capacity bracket as the Super 60 DC-8, which was by far the most popular model due to offering more capacity than any 707 variant. More importantly, the Super 200 would be beating the Super 60 to the market by a good half-decade. There's a real opportunity for the VC-10 to vulture a lot of sales from the DC-8, and a few from the 707 - the -320 model grabbed some sales from people who wanted Super 60s that didn't exist yet. 262 Super 60s were built; that's quite the potential market the Super 200 could grab.

Sadly, the engine location means it won't have the longevity as a cargo plane the DC-8 did; I don't think it could be re-engined with CFM56s. But I don't think the Brits would mind all that much.
 
Further to AH AAM option.
A5 seeker contract to GEC is 1959 RRE trials using AI.18 modified with CW injection. Flight trials for monostatic (on the rail) on a Canberra started March '62.
Bistatic (post launch) trials August '62. Some 25 flights and so much information gathered they had to slow doen to let analysis catchup.

Original contract investigation terminated 1963 replaced by ship launched guided weapons.
This then in 1963 is the moment when a decision could be taken to drive the seeker towards a new AAM.

A new radar.
The new AI radar effort carried on despite 1957 and soon dropped the sophisticated development of Orange Cocktail like twin dish FMCW and focused on FMCW via a single dish. Likely this for the OR.346 Fighter and then AW.406

Having P1154 foisted on the RN, the effort continued past the microphony problem of single dish FMCW (1962) and the FMICW effort (flew on Canberra early '64) resolved into EARS and Ferranti X/Q dual band AI set for P.1154B. Treasury funded second phase work from mid 1963.
Work continued past P.1154B cancellation in '64 in favour of F4 and AFVG came to the rescue as a platform.
EARS/Ferranti x-band only effort continued past AFVG as only AI radar effort in the UK, much work on performance over various surfaces and targets. Terminated August '67.

Recommissioned to serve as development tool in 1971 for the new digital FMICW AI set, which we know became AI.24 Foxhunter.
RRE had chosen best elements of MEASL and Ferranti proposals to combine together.....

Is the SARH missile/seeker the 'radar Red Top' that apparently was mooted as a weapon for the P1154 (I presume the RN version) in about 1962-63? If so could it be carried by the Lightning, perhaps on the outer wing pylons the Saudis had?

Would the AI23 AIRPASS line end with the TSR2 FLR and the tactical aircraft developed from the late 60s to replace the Lightning fleet use a totally new radar development path? If so does pushing the AIRPASS all the way through to the TSR2 FLR give a good enough launching pad for the new radar?
 
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So, first of all, a Super 200 would be more economical to operate than a regular VC10, because as you note it has the same wings and engines, so the fixed cost of the airplane would be spread over more seats.

Second, the Super 200 having 212 seats on launch is critical, because that puts it in the same capacity bracket as the Super 60 DC-8, which was by far the most popular model due to offering more capacity than any 707 variant. More importantly, the Super 200 would be beating the Super 60 to the market by a good half-decade. There's a real opportunity for the VC-10 to vulture a lot of sales from the DC-8, and a few from the 707 - the -320 model grabbed some sales from people who wanted Super 60s that didn't exist yet. 262 Super 60s were built; that's quite the potential market the Super 200 could grab.

Sadly, the engine location means it won't have the longevity as a cargo plane the DC-8 did; I don't think it could be re-engined with CFM56s. But I don't think the Brits would mind all that much.

The VC10 that got a singe RB211 to test that engine had the fuselage bent by the asymetic thrust.

The VC10 Super 200 might not have led to longevity as a cargo plane but I think it might have put BAC in a good position to pursue the 2-11 or 3-11.

I've read the rear engine position made the cargo cabin quiet and made the VC10 popular with passengers, is this true? How much of a difference could that have made on sales if the VC10 wasn't mired in controversy before it entered service?
 
Hunter FGA9 is very good at working with ground forces with cannon and bombs, rocket pods could be added. It is cheap and easy to operate. At low level it is much more agile than Lightning.

Lightning with modifications is a decent short range interceptor well able to shoot down Migs with Red Top

Buccaneer gives you bomb and ASM capacity plus nuclear.

Airbases in range of the countries we need to protect are available except in a few cases (Falklands as usual).

A deployment of Hunters and Bucs supported by Lightnings gives you a more than adequate force into the 70s. They could all do better in the export market than OTL.

That doesn't create a virtuous circle, it creates a stagnant industry unable to produce cutting edge aircraft from the 60s onward. Further it limits the British government to intervene in disputes where a Hunter is good enough, so no all-weather combat and limited operational options when a Mig 21/Mirage III/F104 unit is around.

P1127 is the way to go on VSTOL so no P1154. Kestrel can be improved gradually, especially when the US Marines join in

100%, it's basing makes it so handy that it makes up for it's performance in the air, especially when backed by Mach 2 types.

As for transports let Vickers build the C130K under licence and Armstrong Whitworth turn 681 into something closer to the Il76. Let Shorts build F8 Twosaders instead of Belfasts.

The HS681 and C130K confuse me when the Argosy entered service in 1961 and the Belfast in 1966. Surely these types have enough potential that there is no need to develop a new type or buy American.
 
The VC10 that got a singe RB211 to test that engine had the fuselage bent by the asymetic thrust.

The VC10 Super 200 might not have led to longevity as a cargo plane but I think it might have put BAC in a good position to pursue the 2-11 or 3-11.

I've read the rear engine position made the cargo cabin quiet and made the VC10 popular with passengers, is this true? How much of a difference could that have made on sales if the VC10 wasn't mired in controversy before it entered service?
Yes, the plane was considered very quiet and quite comfortable for passengers. It'd be a nice marketing point, for certain, but I don't expect it to have a huge sales impact.
 

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