Deltafan

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Hi everybody,

I often read that Curtiss-Wright Aviation did not do enough research work during the Second World War to be able to survive its aeronautical branch and face the new markets after the Second World War. It is considered that its production and improvement work on the P-40 (we can add the Helldiver) would have absorbed budget and engineers to the detriment of the future.

Now, when I compare, for example, the production of research/new vehicles by Curtiss and, for example, North American (one of the companies, and maybe the company, which was most successful after the war [Fury, Sabre, Super Sabre] and which also had a massive production of an aircraft, the P-51, during the war [two, if we count the B-25]), I see that, between 1940 and 1945, North American flew only three new types of aircraft, including two derivatives of the P-51 (A-36 and F-82) [The 3rd being the failure XB-28], while Curtiss flew 11 new types of aircraft (including XP-46, P-60, XP-55 canard, XP -62, XF-14C and XF-15C with mixed propulsion).

So what was Curtiss' mistake and what should it have done to avoid being overtaken by the competition?
 
Hi everybody,

I often read that Curtiss-Wright Aviation did not do enough research work during the Second World War to be able to survive its aeronautical branch and face the new markets after the Second World War. It is considered that its production and improvement work on the P-40 (we can add the Helldiver) would have absorbed budget and engineers to the detriment of the future.

Now, when I compare, for example, the production of research/new vehicles by Curtiss and, for example, North American (one of the companies, and maybe the company, which was most successful after the war [Fury, Sabre, Super Sabre] and which also had a massive production of an aircraft, the P-51, during the war [two, if we count the B-25]), I see that, between 1940 and 1945, North American flew only three new types of aircraft, including two derivatives of the P-51 (A-36 and F-82) [The 3rd being the failure XB-28], while Curtiss flew 11 new types of aircraft (including XP-46, P-60, XP-55 canard, XP -62, XF-14C and XF-15C with mixed propulsion).

So what was Curtiss' mistake and what should it have done to avoid being overtaken by the competition?

Maybe you have the problem backwards ? I mean, North American got the Mustang right the first time, when Curtiss blundered again and again and again with the P-36 successor ? P-40 was lucky to stay in production despite subpar performances; and everything else thereafter was garbage ? From memory, they tried at least a dozen of different iterations of the P-40, P-46 and P-60 - in vain, with the notable exception of the P-40Q. C-46 was a good cargo plane but tended to explode because of fuel vapors. And the Helldiver - it was all in the nickname. Again, they were lucky both Helldiver and C-46 got large orders, considering their production flaws.

Curtiss got larger orders of P-40s, C-46s and Helldiver which were not fundamentally flawed planes, ok - but performance and reliability wise, their crews learned to hate them.

Maybe they scattered their energy, funding and credibility over many failed subtypes - when North American concentrated on their few but major "hits" and improved them ?
 
From a couple of old articles in Airpower/Wings magazines Curtiss failed in loosing its resources in the unsuccessful lineage of failed fighter designs which you already mentioned. They specially failed with the XP-46 which was to be a match the most advanced European contemporary designs. It was intended to be an export success to French AF and RAF but, instead, it was a technological failure.

Innability to innovate?.
 
The irony was that, by some unexplainable miracle, the P-40Q proved to be a fine fighter. Alas, it was seating on a mountain of garbage, kinda - it was the tiny tip of a big iceberg of C-W trashy products.
And bad luck for it, it looked like a subpar copy of the Mustang. Too little, too late !

Would have been interesting if the P-40Q had found a home with the Chinese or the Soviets but in the latter case the P-63 was already in the place.

You have to be good when, ahead in the queue are 1) the P-51 2) the P-47 and 3) the P-38.
 
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The irony was that, by some unexplainable miracle, the P-40Q proved to be a fine fighter.

Hold your horses :)
1st - The P-40Q didn't proved to be a fine fighter for a simple reason: it was never used as one.
2nd - A reason why the last XP-40Q was with a much better performance than the previous P-40s because it received a 2-stage supercharged V-1710 - ie. very explainable.
We know that the Spitfire with a 2-stage supercharged Merlin was a far better performer than the versions preceding it that were powered with 1-stage supercharged Merlins. The P-51B, that was powered by a 2-stage Merlin was heads and shoulders over the P-51A, that was powered by a 1-stage V-1710. The Ta 152H/C was a far better performer than the Fw 190D-9 because - you've guessed it - the 2-stage Jumo 213E/DB 603L were better engines than the 1-stage Jumo 213A.
 
About the topic:
C-W needs to invest even more in the jet engine business - after all their jet engines were selling back in the day. Pocahing half a dozen of ex-German engineers to up their game wrt. the sweep-wing aircraft might've also helped.
 
Was there potential in any of the P-60 series? It looks like the final YP-60E might have had decent performance, although not offering much, if anything, over the P-47D despite being a bit lighter. Same problem of being "too little, too late" as with the final P-40Q prototype.

Some of their final projects for the USN seemed to have potential, but there was heavy competition for those late-war contracts and their reputation had plummeted for many of the issues already discussed. Maybe getting a head-start into the jet business somehow could have turned things around, but perhaps things were too far gone by that point. The XF-87 might have had some potential if not for the underpowered engines.

Speaking of Curtiss failures, what exactly did the XP-42 get wrong so badly where it was such a disappointment? How much of it was due to difficulty making a two-stage supercharged Allison V-1790 work and how much was the aircraft itself?
 
Was there potential in any of the P-60 series? It looks like the final YP-60E might have had decent performance, although not offering much, if anything, over the P-47D despite being a bit lighter. Same problem of being "too little, too late" as with the final P-40Q prototype.
The 'too little, too late' phrase certainly rings true for many Curtiss fighters.
If the series production of the P-60A - the one with the turbocharger system to help out the small V-1710 with it's small and slow-turning supercharger - started some time in 1942, it would've made a lot of sense. Lower consumption of the V-1710 would've mean easier transformation into a LR fighter than what would've been the case with the R-2800-powered versions.
Making the P-60 with the 2-stage Merlin or the 2-stage V-1710 would've also helped a lot (same goes with the P-40).

Speaking of Curtiss failures, what exactly did the XP-42 get wrong so badly where it was such a disappointment? How much of it was due to difficulty making a two-stage supercharged Allison V-1790 work and how much was the aircraft itself?

XP-42 was more of an test bed to test out the different layouts of a radial engine installation, rather than a serious attempt to make a next-gen fighter. Engine was the R-1830, not a V-1710.
 
The 'too little, too late' phrase certainly rings true for many Curtiss fighters.
If the series production of the P-60A - the one with the turbocharger system to help out the small V-1710 with it's small and slow-turning supercharger - started some time in 1942, it would've made a lot of sense. Lower consumption of the V-1710 would've mean easier transformation into a LR fighter than what would've been the case with the R-2800-powered versions.
Making the P-60 with the 2-stage Merlin or the 2-stage V-1710 would've also helped a lot (same goes with the P-40).



XP-42 was more of an test bed to test out the different layouts of a radial engine installation, rather than a serious attempt to make a next-gen fighter. Engine was the R-1830, not a V-1710.
Sorry, I had gotten the XP-42 confused with the XP-46. The XP-46 was the one I was wondering about.
 
Two issue that let to downfall of Curtiss-Wright

one: selling defective engines to USAAF during WW2, what DoD took very badly
two: limit amounts on aircraft research and development during WW2 and aftermath.

What they produce during WW2 and Cold War, offering no advantage over other designs already in service.

Had they better research into aerodynamics and getting hands on German research papers would have change history...
 
Sorry, I had gotten the XP-42 confused with the XP-46. The XP-46 was the one I was wondering about.

Superficially looking at the XP-46, it seems like the wing was a bit on the thick side (16.5% at the root, vs. 15% on the P36/-40; Bf 109 was at 14.2% and was physically smaller), cooling system was probably better than what the Hurricane used, but compares no so good vs. what the P-51 used (seems like there was no effort to prevent that the coolant radiator sucks the boundary layer).
Without the 'turbo support', the V-1710s as-is really needed the top-notch aerodynamics to make a competitive fighter out of an aircraft.

one: selling defective engines to USAAF during WW2, what DoD took very badly
two: limit amounts on aircraft research and development during WW2 and aftermath.

Agreed.
Ironically, Wright was the only company that mass-produced the turbochargers with air-cooled turbine blades (a thing that allowed for the installation of the turbo close to the engine, without the turbine disintegrating due to overheating). About a 1000 was produced for the needs of the Curtiss SC floatplane fighter program*, but unfortunately not a single of these survived until today. Eight of these turboes were also slated for the XF2M1...

*the available USN data sheets do not mention these turboes, doh

Curtiss also botched the P-47 production, that they have had the licence.

What they produce during WW2 and Cold War, offering no advantage over other designs already in service.

Had they better research into aerodynamics and getting hands on German research papers would have change history...
+1 on that.
 
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Hi everybody,

I often read that Curtiss-Wright Aviation did not do enough research work during the Second World War to be able to survive its aeronautical branch and face the new markets after the Second World War. It is considered that its production and improvement work on the P-40 (we can add the Helldiver) would have absorbed budget and engineers to the detriment of the future.

Now, when I compare, for example, the production of research/new vehicles by Curtiss and, for example, North American (one of the companies, and maybe the company, which was most successful after the war [Fury, Sabre, Super Sabre] and which also had a massive production of an aircraft, the P-51, during the war [two, if we count the B-25]), I see that, between 1940 and 1945, North American flew only three new types of aircraft, including two derivatives of the P-51 (A-36 and F-82) [The 3rd being the failure XB-28], while Curtiss flew 11 new types of aircraft (including XP-46, P-60, XP-55 canard, XP -62, XF-14C and XF-15C with mixed propulsion).

So what was Curtiss' mistake and what should it have done to avoid being overtaken by the competition?
The United States did not feel threatened by European tensions and devoted its resources to the construction of modern commercial aircraft powered by air-cooled radial engines, a type of power plant considered safer and easier to maintain in the world of civil aviation.

The poor production of American military airplanes did not justify the development of special engines and the latest generation of U.S. biplane fighters: Boeing F4B, Boeing P-12, Curtiss F11C and Grumman F3F was powered by Wright and Pratt & Whitney radial engines.

The same was the case with the first generation of American monoplane fighters: Boeing P-26, Brewster F-2A, Curtiss P-36 and Seversky P-35. None of them exceeded 320 mph or 34,000 ft ceiling at a time when the Messerschmitt Bf 109 E-3 and Supermarine Spitfire Mk.II were fighting 37,200 ft over London, flying at 354 mph.

Curtiss tried to modernize the P-36 by installing an Allison V-12 liquid-cooled engine, but at the time when the P-40 Tomahawk Mk.I entering production, lacking armoured plates and armoured glass protection for the pilot and self-sealing fuel tanks, it was already largely obsolescent by European standards.

The new Curtiss XP-46, with inward-retracting landing gear, automatic leading-edge slots and integral armour, was designed to be the answer for these deficiencies, but their performance fell short of expectations because the underpowered Allison V-1710-39 and the increase of weight.

The Second World War provided a great business opportunity for the U.S. industry when the European countries encountered many difficulties to set supplies of fighters in the international market.

Curtiss was saturated by the enormous orders of H.75 (P-36) and H.81 (P-40) fighters made by French and British.

Then the demand of second-line fighters went to Curtiss-Wright, Seversky, Vultee and North American which achieved great commercial success with the exports of the CW-21, NA-68, P-43, P-64 and P-66 models.

In 1937, Curtiss and Bell proposed the installation of one General Electric exhaust-driven turbo-supercharger to improve the high-altitude performance of the Allison V-1710 engine.

Curtiss build the XP-37 prototype to test the new propulsion system, but the airplane suffered frequent malfunction of the G.E. B-1 turbo-supercharger, resulting in low performance.

The H75 inadequate performance at high altitude was a constant source of concern for the Curtiss Airplane Division staff.

In 1938 one H75 A-1 was modified as the H75 R high-altitude prototype, powered by one R-1830-SC2-G radial engine driving two centrifugal turbochargers, with ventral intercooler. During flight tests conducted in January 1939 the H75R reached a top speed of 330 mph flying at 15,000 ft. The USAAC considered insufficient the increase of performance and the H75 R unsuitable for operational service, due the complexity of the new propulsion system.

Curtiss continuing to perfect the concept, in 1943 the NX 28990 airframe of a H81A was powered by one R-1830-SSC7-G radial engine driving two centrifugal compressors housed in a new streamlined cowling. During flight tests conducted between July and October 1943, the high-altitude prototype reached a top speed of 389 mph and 25,000 ft of ceiling.

On 1 December 1943 the first North American P-51B Mustang, with 440 mph top speed and 42,000 ft ceiling, was delivered to the USAAF and the Curtiss prototype development was discontinued.

In USA the NACA published a report at the beginning of 1939 about the methods to improve the volume of cooling air flowing over radial engines. In February 1939, Seversky performed the first flight tests with the NX2597 AP-4 Lancer prototype, equipped with ducted and non-ducted large propeller spinners. In March, Curtiss decided to experiment with the new technology transforming the P-36A s/n 38-004 into the XP-42 prototype by adding a large propeller spinner and extension shaft and one air intake placed under the R-1830-31 engine, the prototype suffered serious problems of vibrations.

As a result of all this research, however, there was not any significant aerodynamic achievement. The Curtiss XP-42, the Vultee 48, the Kawasaki Ki.45-03 and the Seversky Lancer all encountered insurmountable cooling problems and had to be refitted with conventional cowlings. The A-17 A was turned back to its original configuration and back to operations.

At the time when the Curtiss P-36A entering service, the U.S. fighter was already largely obsolescent by European standards.

In February 1937 the USAAC contracted with Curtiss the installation of one advanced Allison V-1710-11 turbo-supercharged V-12 engine in the H75 B airframe. To make room for the experimental B-1 exhaust-driven turbo-supercharger, including the compressor, the Prestone intercooler and heavy tubing system, the cockpit was pushed very far to the rear, resulting in poor visibility during take offs and landings.

The extensively modified prototype, redesigned XP-37, was flown on April 1937 reaching 340 mph at 20,000 ft, but suffered frequent turbo-supercharger malfunction and tail plane flutter, the performance fell short of expectations.

On 11 December 1937 the USAAC ordered thirteen service test airplanes under the designation YP-37. These pre-production machines were fitted with elongated fuselages and Allison V-1710-21 engines with improved G.E. B-2 turbo-superchargers.

The first YP-37 flew on June 1939.

Although the new turbo-supercharger was quite troublesome, the YP-37 remained in experimental service until 1942.

The development of the P-37 high-altitude interceptor was discontinued in favour of a less complex conversion of the P-36 for the Allison engine.

In July, Curtiss got USAAC permission to install in the P-36A s/n 38-10 one V-1710-19 engine, with single-stage, single-speed engine driven supercharger.

The project had the designation Model 75 P (XP-40).

The prototype XP-40 was first flown on 14 October 1938, only two weeks after the settlement of the Munich crisis. Because of this heritage the plane was relatively easy to produce in large numbers and a total of 13,739 Curtiss P-40 were built.

The V-1710-19 engine proved to be more reliable than the turbo-supercharged V-1710-21, although its performance falling off at higher altitudes up to 32,750 ft.

Despite their lack of power at altitude the Curtiss P-40 was the best U.S. fighter available in large quantities early the Second World War, during 1941 Curtiss expanded its manufacturing area by 400 per cent, with sixty aircraft a day at the peak of wartime production.

When the ex-French fighters Curtiss H81 A-1 were delivered to Britain, in September 1940, the model was already obsolete by European standards. The RAF concluded that these airplanes, supplied without armour or self-sealing fuel tanks, were unsuitable for combat and were used only for training roles under the designation Tomahawk I.

In November 1940 the BK853 airframe was tested at Boscombe Down establishment and satisfactory operations in the tropics was predicted following cooling trial. The second batch of ex-French fighters Curtiss H81 A-2 Tomahawk II was shipped overseas.

In July 1941 the Tomahawk IIA (equivalent to the P-40 B) fitted with British TR-9D radio, armour and self-sealing tanks externally-covered with Linotex, was supplied to the Nº 112 Sqn. of the Desert Air Force.

In the Mediterranean front the Tomahawk IIA performed well against the Fiat C.R. 42 and G.50 bis fighters of the Regia Aeronautica, but it was surpassed in top speed, climb rate and ceiling by the Messerschmitt Bf 109 E-7/trop and F-2/trop fighters of the German JG27.

When the Axis-generated wave of destruction stopped at Midway and El Alamein, the Allied could only count on the Supermarine Spitfire Mk.V, Curtiss Warhawk, Grumman Wildcat and Lockheed Lightning modern fighters.

The P-40 D (Kittyhawk Mk.IA) was extensively redesigned to improve performance with V-1710-39 engine and 6x0.50 cal wing mounted machine guns. The new model was delivered to the Western Desert Air Force in September 1941 and performed well against the Macchi M.C. 200 Italian fighter, but was displaced to the ground-attack role by the more capable M.C. 202 and Bf 109 F-4/trop fighters.

When looking for ways to improve the altitude performance of the Kittyhawk, Curtiss decided to use the 1,300 hp Rolls-Royce/Packard V-1650-1 engine, the Merlin did much to overcome the limitations imposed by the Allison. In order to adjust to the additional torque during low-speed landings and high-speed dives the airplane was fitted with a dorsal fin but without success.

As a result of installing an in-line engine in the P-36 airframe, the P-40 experienced lateral control problems and much effort was expended to improve their longitudinal stability during its development.

Early 1942 one P-40 F-1 was modified as the YP-40 F prototype (41-13600) with a fuselage lengthened 20 inches and a large vertical tailfin.

The solution was sufficient and Curtiss started the production of the P-40 F-5 (Kittyhawk Mk.IIA) with the fuselage lengthened by pushing the tailfin back without altering the tail plane.

Most air combat in the Mediterranean Front took place below 16,000 ft. At low altitude the Bf 109 F-4/Trop was superseded by the P-40 F-5 in horizontal manoeuvres and dive speed, but the German pilots used high-altitude sweeps followed by 'dive-and-climb' tactics to avoid dogfighting.

On November 1942 began operating in Tunisia the new Focke-Wulf Fw 190 A-3 that surpassed all the Allied fighters flying at medium and low altitudes.

From 26 May 1942 the Kittyhawk operated primarily as fighter-bomber role, fitted with underwing bomb racks, under the cover of the Spitfire Mk.V.

Although the P-40 F was superior to the Allison powered series, their top speed was 66 mph inferior to the 430 mph of the North American P-51B Mustang.

In an attempt to streamline the radiator air intake, Curtiss used the P-40 F-1-CU s/n 41-13602 (with short fuselage) under the designation YP-40 F, for experimental tests of a revised cooling system, with the radiator mounted aft enclosed in a Mustang-style ventral fairing. Early flight trials were disappointing and these modifications did not result in series production.

The P-40 never excelled in its high-altitude performance due the excessive weight of its strong structure, included a five-spar wing.

During the development of the airplane, the gross weight increases with each new version, the addition of bullet proof windshields, pilot armour, self-sealing fuel tanks, droppable fuel tanks and bomb racks decreasing the P-40 performance.

On June 1941 the gross weight of the Messerschmitt Bf 109 F-4/trop was 5,260 lbs, the Macchi M.C. 202 weighted 6,636 lbs and the P-40 F-5 9,350 lbs.

The service ceiling of the M.C. 202 was 37,730 ft, the Bf 109 F-4/trop reaching 38,058 ft and the P-40 F-5 34,000 ft only.

Early in 1943 Curtiss introduced weight-saving measures in the P-40 L, the fuel amount was reduced and two of their machine guns were removed to save 250 lbs, but the increase in performance not correspond to the effort.

The Curtiss P-60 A was to have replaced the P-40 L on the production line, but delays in the development of the new model caused USAAF to order the mass production of 7,220 cheap fighters of the K, M and N series. It low cost kept the P-40 in production until the end of 1944.

When the supply of P-40 F and P-40 L airframes exceeded the availability of Merlin engines, the last series were built with Allison power plants. The P-40 K was powered by one V-1710-73 rated at 1,325 hp, the P-40 M with one 1,200 hp V-1710-81 and the P-40 N with one 1,360 hp V-1710-88 engine.

The K, M and N series were used as low-altitude fighters and ground-attack planes in Italy, Soviet Union and South-West Pacific.

The main concern of the ground attack pilots was the German ‘hit-and-run’ tactics and the low rearward view of the P-40 was partially improved in the P-40 N series with the modification of the canopy. In 1944 the P-40 N-25 s/n 43-24571 was modified, as the XP-40 N prototype, with a cut-down rear fuselage, a new windshield and a full-view teardrop canopy.

Another attempt to reduce drag was the installation in the prototype XP-40 K-10-CU s/n 42-10219 of two radiators located in the thickened centre section of the wing. The airplane was powered by one V-1650-1 Merlin engine, with two-stage supercharger.

Curtiss attempted several programmes to increase the performance of the P-40, but all failed in the end.

Early 1943 the P-40 K-10-CU s/n 42-9987 was modified as the XP-40 Q-1, a higher performance version with several aerodynamic refinements and much improved cowl lines, but retaining the partially exposed, rear-folding, landing gear.

The power was increased with the installation of one 1,325 hp Allison V-1710-101 engine, with two-stage supercharger, driving a four-bladed propeller. Two semi-flush low-drag radiators and one oil cooler were enclosed in the central section of the wing. The airplane was flown on 13 June 1943.

By November the prototype had been modified, as XP-40 Q-2, the rear fuselage was cut down and a teardrop canopy, with curved windshield, was installed. The oil cooler and the engine air scoop were moved to the chin position and the two radiators were repositioned in the wings.

The USAAF Air Materiel Command recommended that two additional prototypes be constructed.

In January 1944 the XP-40 Q-2 had its wingtips clipped and one Allison V-1710-121 engine rated at 1,425 hp (1,800 hp with water injection) was installed.

The P-40 K-1 s/n 42-45722 was modified as the XP-40 Q-2A prototype, with more streamlined canopy and flat windshield. The aircraft was flown end of March 1944 and the trials revealed similar performance to those of the XP-40 Q-2.

In April 1944 made its first flight the XP-40 Q-3 (ex-P-40 N-25-CU s/n 43-24571) with modifications and performance similar to those of the XP-40 Q-2.

The aircraft had a smaller canopy with longer windscreen and suffered several engine failures.

Even with these modifications the XP-40 Q was still inferior to the contemporary production North American P-51 fighter and the proposed production version P-40 Q, with six 0.50 cal machine guns or four 20 mm M3 cannons, never built.

On April 1940, in response of the USAAC R-40C specification, Curtiss proposed the Model H-88, a 111 per cent homothetic enlarged version of the YP-40F, with laminar-flow wings, powered by one 1,600 hp Continental XIV-1430-3 engine.

On 1 October 1940 the USAAC ordered the prototype (41-140), under the designation XP-53 and six weeks after the contract signature the Army ordered a second prototype (41-19508), Model 90, under the designation XP-60.

On November 1941 the XP-53 was cancelled because of the excessive delays in the availability of the Continental engine. The prototype never flew and was converted into a static test airframe in support of the XP-60 programme.

The XP-53 was the second attempt to produce a successor of the P-40, after the cancellation of the ‘European-style fighter’ XP-46.

The XP-60 prototype (41-19508) was flown on 18 September 1941. The airplane was fitted with a new inward-retracting landing gear, self-sealing tanks, armoured windshield and six 0.50 cal wing mounted machine guns and powered by one 1,300 hp Packard V-1650-1 (Merlin 28) engine.

During the flight tests it was necessary to increase the surface of the tailfin and the designation was changed to Model 90A.

In August 1942 the prototype was modified with the installation of one 1,350 hp V-1650-3 (Merlin 61) engine driving a four-bladed propeller, the armament were removed and the designation was changed to XP-60D.

The airplane crashed on 6 May 1943.

Because the V-1650 engine was in demand for production of the North American P-51, the P-60 series underwent many modifications to test different available engines.

The Curtiss Model 95A, designated XP-60A prototype (42-79423) was flown on 1 November 1942 powered by one 1,425 hp Allison V-1710-75, V-12, liquid cooled engine, with turbo-supercharger.

These trials revealed that top speed and climb rate were below that guaranteed by the manufacturer and their development was discontinued.

It was planned to install in the XP-60C (42-79424) prototype one Chrysler XIV-2220-11, liquid-cooled, 16-cylinder, inverted ‘V’ engine, driving a four bladed Curtiss Electric C-542 S-A propeller with 3.96 m of diameter.

This 2,500 hp. experimental power plant, with 122 in length and 2,131 lbs weight, it was too heavy for the XP-60C airframe and was replaced by one Pratt & Whitney R-2800-53 radial engine, with General Electric turbo-supercharger, driving a six-bladed contra-rotating propeller. The first flight were performed on 27 January 1943 and revealed poor performance in comparison to those of P-47 and P-51 fighters.

The XP-60E (42-79425) was identical to the XP-60C, with the exception of the reduction gearing and the four-bladed propeller. The prototype was flown on 26 May 1943 and revealed longitudinal stability problems and inferior performance that the XP-60C.

The YP-60E prototype (43-32763) was a redesigned YP-60A with R-2800-18 engine, four-bladed propeller, cut-down rear fuselage and teardrop canopy.

The aircraft was flown on 15 July 1944, after one more flight tests was transferred to Wright Field for storage and crashed in 1947.

On January 1941, Curtiss started the design MX-88, a high-altitude interceptor with 36,000 ft (11,000 m) ceiling, engine-driven pressurised cabin and heavy armament. The new airplane was powered by one 2,300 hp Wright R-3350-17 radial engine, with turbo-supercharger, driving a six-bladed contra-rotating propeller.

The project was submitted to the USAAC on 29 April 1941, as Model 91 proposal.

On 16 May 1941, a letter contract for two prototypes, XP-62 and XP-62A, was approved.

The early Model 91 was fitted with eight 20 mm cannon or twelve 0.50 cal machine guns and laminar-flow wings with combat flaps, but following the mock-up inspection, on 16 December 1941, the USAAF recommended the reduction of weaponry to only four cannons and the elimination of combat flaps to save weight.

On 27 July 1942 the contract for 100 P-62A fighters was cancelled in favour of the mass production of the P-47 G and the B-29.

The prototype 41-35873 was flown on 21 July 1943, without pressure cabin installation.

In 1944 the airplane was used to investigate new pressurization systems.

The XP-62 was cancelled without the prototype having resumed flight tests.

On 22 June 1940 the USAAC signed a contract for preliminary development of the Curtiss CW-24 and construction of a wind tunnel model, under the designation XP-55.

Such a radical configuration required the construction of the CW-24B, a flying testbed to prove the design viability.

On 21 December 1941 the CW-24B made its first flight, at Muroc Dry Lake test center, powered by a 275 hp Menasco C-6S-5 engine.

Despite the strong security measures, intelligence services of the IJN obtained enough information about the project to believe that it was the successor of the Curtiss P-40 fighter. Early in 1943 Lieutenant Commander Masaoki Tsuruno, of the First Naval Air Technical Arsenal, proposed the construction of the canard fighter 18-shi-Otsu J7W Shinden based on the information obtained on the XP-55.

In fact, the definitive Curtiss XP-55 version was not selected by USAAC for production and only three prototypes were built, two of which were destroyed in accidents.

On 10 July 1942 the USAAF ordered three prototypes, the 42-78845 flew on 13 July 1943 powered by one 1,425 Allison V-1710-95, V-12, liquid-cooled engine, with mechanical supercharger, driving a three-bladed (jettisonable) pusher airscrew.

The aircraft was fitted with laminar-flow swept wings angled back 45 degrees and tricycle undercarriage.

USAAF was unimpressed with the 377 mph top speed reached with the Allison engine versus the 507 mph promised with the X-1800 cancelled in October 1940.

The first prototype showed excessive take off run, dangerous stall behaviour, poor longitudinal stability, low-speed handling problems and engine overheating.

On 15 November 1943 the plane was lost, in an inverted spin, when the engine failed.

The second prototype 42-78846 flew on 9 January 1944 suffering from ‘no-warning before stalling’ phenomena. To improve the stall characteristics the nose elevator and the aileron tabs were modified.

The third prototype 42-78847 was flown on 25 April 1944, fitted with wing extensions and modified nose elevator and armed with four 0.50 cal nose mounted machine guns.

On 27 May 1945 the aircraft crashed when the pilot attempted a barrel roll.

Americans were not lucky with the Curtiss XP-55, after four years of flight testing they have not achieved an airplane sufficiently stable to take part in combat operations.

Although it was less sensible to the compressibility buffeting than conventional airplanes, thanks to a NACA 0015 type wing profile, it was also too heavy and slower than the P-47 and P-51 in service.

To replace the F4F Wildcat, the U.S. Navy issued the 23 February 1941 Specification calling for a new carrier-borne interceptor designed for service aboard the 45,000-ton Midway-class carriers.

Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp. proposed an extensively modified Wildcat powered by one Wright XR-2600-10 radial engine without turbo-supercharger.

It was a design suitable to the needs of the U.S. Navy that was built and used with great success under the designation F6F Hellcat.

The only way to compete with Grumman was to propose a fighter with superior performance. Curtiss decided to use a turbo-supercharged liquid-cooled in-line engine with the intention of surpassing Grumman's design in top speed and ceiling.

The U.S. Navy preferred to use air-cooled radial engines, but the F6F had been designed to defend the fleet against the attacks of low level torpedo-bombers and medium-altitude dive bombers and the existence of German bombers with 41,000 ft (12,500 m) ceiling could not be ignored.

On 30 June 1941 the U.S. Navy signed a development contract for a new high-altitude interceptor, under the designation XF14 C-1.

The airplane was powered by one 2,300 hp. Lycoming XH-2470-4, 24 cylinder ‘H’, liquid-cooled experimental engine, with turbo-supercharger, driving a six-bladed contra-rotating airscrew.

Early 1944 the U.S. Navy recommended the installation of one 2,300 hp Wright XR-3350-16 turbo-supercharged radial engine in the XF14 prototype (Bu no.03183) and continue its development under the designation XF14 C-2.

The airplane was flown in July 1944 reaching only 398 mph versus the guaranteed 424 mph. The propeller produced an undesirable vibration and the pressurised cockpit was not yet installed.

When Allied intelligence services discovered that the Japanese had serious difficulty building their own turbochargers, the tactical need for a naval high-altitude interceptor had failed to materialise and further development of the XF14 C-2 was cancelled.
 
That's quite a text :)
A few notes:
Although the P-40 F was superior to the Allison powered series, their top speed was 66 mph inferior to the 430 mph of the North American P-51B Mustang.

P-51B was powered by a far better Packard Merlin than it was the case with what the P-40L had. That was 'responsible' for more than half of the speed difference.

The P-40 never excelled in its high-altitude performance due the excessive weight of its strong structure, included a five-spar wing.

Other aircraft were also heavy (some of them very heavy - see P-47C/D/M/N), yet were just fine at high altitudes because they have had the modern powerplants. The P-40 never received such a powerplant, apart from the -Q prototypes.

In January 1944 the XP-40 Q-2 had its wingtips clipped and one Allison V-1710-121 engine rated at 1,425 hp (1,800 hp with water injection) was installed.
The P-40 K-1 s/n 42-45722 was modified as the XP-40 Q-2A prototype, with more streamlined canopy and flat windshield. The aircraft was flown end of March 1944 and the trials revealed similar performance to those of the XP-40 Q-2.
In April 1944 made its first flight the XP-40 Q-3 (ex-P-40 N-25-CU s/n 43-24571) with modifications and performance similar to those of the XP-40 Q-2.

The best of the -Qs was good for 422 mph. Or, about same as the Fw 190D-9.
 
That's quite a text :)
A few notes:


P-51B was powered by a far better Packard Merlin than it was the case with what the P-40L had. That was 'responsible' for more than half of the speed difference.



Other aircraft were also heavy (some of them very heavy - see P-47C/D/M/N), yet were just fine at high altitudes because they have had the modern powerplants. The P-40 never received such a powerplant, apart from the -Q prototypes.



The best of the -Qs was good for 422 mph. Or, about same as the Fw 190D-9.
To sum up the point, I will say that in my opinion the failure of the Curtiss fighters was due to excess weight and poor aerodynamic characteristics.
 
Curtiss-Wright continues to survive. Currently, its stock is about $350/share.
 
Thank you for all your responses.

I understand that it is wrong to write that Curtiss "did not do research", but rather to write that he did not do it in the right directions compared to the competition.
 
simply they abandoned military aircraft production .
I don't think they so much abandoned aircraft production as being unable --or unwilling -- to stay abreast of current technology. Kind of a poster child for MBAs having too much control
 
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I don't think they so much abandoned aircraft production as being unable --or unwilling -- to stay abreast of current technology. Kind of a poster child for MBAs having too much control
they don't produce aircraft in anymore and they focused their production in others
 
In 1948 Curtiss-Wright sold there Aeroplane Division to North American Aviation.
there were only two aeroplane project like the TDU-12/B Skydart target drone and the X-19 tilt-rotor in 1950s

Then they focus on Aircraft engine refurbishment, maintenance and build jet engine under license
build and sold first flight simulators for commercial aircraft.

Today they build various components for Aircraft, Satellites and
Parts for commercial and naval nuclear power systems, industrial vehicles, and oil-, gas-related hardware.
 
Asiatic tensions, however....
Japan, specifically, as a) US racial politics and b) the historical US interests in China and c) the Philippines.

A lot is made of US isolationism of that time, but it really only applied to Europe. The US was far from isolationist with respect to South and Central America, Haiti, and Mexico.
 
In 1948 Curtiss-Wright sold there Aeroplane Division to North American Aviation.
there were only two aeroplane project like the TDU-12/B Skydart target drone and the X-19 tilt-rotor in 1950s

Then they focus on Aircraft engine refurbishment, maintenance and build jet engine under license
build and sold first flight simulators for commercial aircraft.

Today they build various components for Aircraft, Satellites and
Parts for commercial and naval nuclear power systems, industrial vehicles, and oil-, gas-related hardware.
They are still a pretty significant aerospace company, but they were number one at the start of WWII.
 
simply they abandoned military aircraft production .
It was actually military production that abandoned Curtiss. The USAF never forgave Bell and Curtiss for the poor effectiveness of the P-39 and P-40.

The U.S. Navy never forgave Brewster for Buffalo's poor quality.
 
It was actually military production that abandoned Curtiss. The USAF never forgave Bell and Curtiss for the poor effectiveness of the P-39 and P-40.
and Curtiss Management selling defective engines to USAAF during WW2, what military took very badly...
 
It was actually military production that abandoned Curtiss. The USAF never forgave Bell and Curtiss for the poor effectiveness of the P-39 and P-40.

The U.S. Navy never forgave Brewster for Buffalo's poor quality.
Simply Curtiss-Wright has changed focus. So don't despise P-39 and P-40. The problem of Buffalo was Brewster and its management.
 
Hi
 

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I think Glenn Curtiss needs to not suffer a fatal case of appendicitis in 1930. I don't want to indulge in the "great man theory" of business history, but a lot of what befell Curtiss-Wright after the merger seems to stem from a lack of strong leadership. Wright, as an engine manufacturer, seemed to be perpetually short of engineering talent to get their engines working. As @kmccut says in posts 7 and 10 of this thread, they seemed to be more concerned with securing orders than with fulfilling those orders with a good, reliable product. Curtiss, as an aircraft manufacturer, was certainly productive, but before the P-40, by far the largest production run they had was the P-36 Hawk, followed by the Seagull and the SBC Helldiver. A cheap, no frills radial fighter that was mostly sold to second or third tier military powers and two naval biplanes, to go along with a few dozen here, a handful there of various trainers, experimental fighters and scout planes. These are good numbers to keep your business in the black, but they're hardly the sort of orders that would push a company to maintain an edge in a competitive field in an era where the state of the art is advancing by leaps every two or three years. When the war came, Curtiss-Wright had the production capacity to put a lot of planes in the air, but they didn't have enough engineering ability to really nail down new, advanced designs in the short time frame that the government wanted. They were big enough to be useful, but not sharp enough to be all that useful. Add to that notable well-intentioned failures that might not have been quite so bad as popular opinion holds them, but were nevertheless a fiasco in their own right, and the whole thing looks like an organization that was way too big to be pushed to the sidelines, but nowhere near capable enough to respond adequately when being pulled in so many directions.

This is why I think you need a (for lack of a better term) visionary leader. If we want to imagine a Curtiss-Wright that is competitive with the most advanced aircraft designers and manufacturers in 1939, and stays competitive with same over the course of the war, there's only a few options available. The USAAC wasn't buying huge numbers of fighters until just before the war, so they weren't driving advanced requirements in the 1935-38 time frame that would be needed for an American company to develop these advanced combat aircraft features in step with European counterparts (Japanese, too, but they don't exactly spring to mind when we think about advancement in aircraft armoring and self sealing fuel tanks), so if we want Curtiss-Wright to play at that level, they either have to be extremely proactive about getting observers out to combat areas to see how their products are performing, or what their competitors' planes are doing, which is a dangerous and expensive undertaking, or you need someone who looks at every iteration of aircraft they have in production and says, "Okay, how do we make this better? What's the next step?" and then spends their way towards an answer.

For THAT, you need someone who has a real, deep interest in the aviation industry (not just a financial investment), a reputation that will let them either overawe or just clobber potential resistance in the boardroom when the bill on new research comes due, and a general bloody-mindedness that would let them push and push to get the job done. Glenn Curtiss seemed to be that kind of guy. I mean, he apparently disliked the Wright Brothers so much he tried to fabricate evidence that made it look like Langley had beaten them to the first powered flight. I don't think that guy lets the marriage of Curtiss and Wright devolve into an oversized blob that can't get out of its own way and is slow off the mark in almost EVERY new advancement in the industry.

But it doesn't have to be Glenn Curtiss. You just need someone to actually steer the company towards a goal, rather than someone who just keeps it from running aground as it trundles along making money. No offense to the people who ran the company at the time, of course. I'm sure they were conscientious in their own right. Although not THAT conscientious, as the performance of the Lockland plant in World War 2 bore out.
 
The Thunderbolt failed to escort U.S. bombers and was used in ground attack missions, the Thunderjet failed to combat the MiG-15s and was used in ground attack missions, the F-105 failed as an attack aircraft in Vietnam because of the vulnerability of its hydraulic circuits to DCA, but for some reason the Republic company did not lose the confidence of the USAF.
 
One problem was just bad luck. They were cranking out an obsolescent P=40 that was just OK enough for second tier theatres. The follow up P46 was pretty much a cleaned up P40 and not worth shutting down the line to retool. The P60 went from sort of a parallel P51 prototype that morphed with changing specifications into sort of a P47 clone. Both were prototypes competing against stuff already in production. The USAAF and Navy pressurized prop fighters were deemed unneeded as was the P71 nightfighter, and some gigantic single engine attack aircraft whose name escapes me. For some reason they weren't able to interest the airlines in a civilian C-46s, and the last bid for an airplane that people wanted was the P87 which lost out to the F89. Stuff happensl
 
One problem was just bad luck. They were cranking out an obsolescent P=40 that was just OK enough for second tier theatres. The follow up P46 was pretty much a cleaned up P40 and not worth shutting down the line to retool.

The (X)P-46 was an all-new aircraft, and it offered nothing more than the P-40s already in pilpeline.
Curtiss was in position to produce P-47 under licence, they bothched that, with meager number made in two years. In the same time, in Evansville, people that likely never touched aircraft let alone were making them before, were producing them like hot rolls.
The sorry saga of the Lockland engine factory, where the R-2600B's were made, is shortly described here.
Also here.
Wright managed to make a mess out of a fairly conventional R-3350, that it took many months to debug.
 

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