We've really lost a lot

[Hanse]

TOPIC SPLIT from the JMR (Joint Multi-Role) program topic:
http://www.secretprojects.co.uk/forum/index.php/topic,13812.0.html

I've never understood why "crowd sourcing" was anything more than a buzzword. Seems to me it would be the least efficient way to get something done. Like taking "design by committee" to the nth degree.

.

You are probably right. My real point was that it would be interesting to see a different model for aircraft development and fielding, other than the metastasized process-bound method that currently plagues us.

Seeing the way things are run now it almost defies belief that they were able to accomplish things like Apollo, Pluto, the Blackbird and XB-70 in such short amounts of time without all the fancy design and analytical tools we have today. We've really lost a lot.

 

[Stargazer]

Seeing the way things are run now it almost defies belief that they were able to accomplish things like Apollo, Pluto, the Blackbird and XB-70 in such short amounts of time without all the fancy design and analytical tools we have today. We've really lost a lot.

Couldn't have put it any better. Makes you wonder if these men were made of a better stuff than today's... or if it's because there still remained a bit of common sense in the higher levels of authority...

 

[Aeroengineer1]

Seeing the way things are run now it almost defies belief that they were able to accomplish things like Apollo, Pluto, the Blackbird and XB-70 in such short amounts of time without all the fancy design and analytical tools we have today. We've really lost a lot.

I would say that we have not lost a lot of talent, but we have lost the desire to take risks. The level of complexity that we design to is actually very incredible. We far surpass what was ever done, but the problem is that now we have much more oversight in an effort to ensure that we do it "right". This oversight cost is incredible in both money and schedule. It used to be that we made a few prototypes, and there would be some very major bugs. These would then get worked out quickly as the prototype served as a physical testbed. Now before something makes it to the prototype stage, it is expected to be almost perfect. The problem is that there are uncertanties that you cannot simulate. Then you will have to go to a design review and have 30 people there (half of them were not invited but are there because they felt like getting out of some other activity) all presenting conflicting views. Due to no clear leadership, a single person that can tell all the rest to bug off, we get this set of conflicting actions out of the meeting. Usually the hardest ones to meet are the ones that are from the people that were not originally invited to the meeting. These unforeseen actions cause a few month setback, and then you can do another design review. Because it has been so long since the last one, people forgot why things were changed. They will then argue against the very change that they advocated for in the previous review. This sends you off to do another redesign. Finally a smart person will schedule the design review for a Friday afternoon of a three day weekend. Only the people that need to be there are there. The meeting takes 1/4th the time and it is approved as is. That is the problem today, it is not the tools, not the talent, it is the management of risk and the ability to understand the project as a whole.

 

[F-14D]

Seeing the way things are run now it almost defies belief that they were able to accomplish things like Apollo, Pluto, the Blackbird and XB-70 in such short amounts of time without all the fancy design and analytical tools we have today. We've really lost a lot.

I would say that we have not lost a lot of talent, but we have lost the desire to take risks. The level of complexity that we design to is actually very incredible. We far surpass what was ever done, but the problem is that now we have much more oversight in an effort to ensure that we do it "right". This oversight cost is incredible in both money and schedule. It used to be that we made a few prototypes, and there would be some very major bugs. These would then get worked out quickly as the prototype served as a physical testbed. Now before something makes it to the prototype stage, it is expected to be almost perfect. The problem is that there are uncertanties that you cannot simulate. Then you will have to go to a design review and have 30 people there (half of them were not invited but are there because they felt like getting out of some other activity) all presenting conflicting views. Due to no clear leadership, a single person that can tell all the rest to bug off, we get this set of conflicting actions out of the meeting. Usually the hardest ones to meet are the ones that are from the people that were not originally invited to the meeting. These unforeseen actions cause a few month setback, and then you can do another design review. Because it has been so long since the last one, people forgot why things were changed. They will then argue against the very change that they advocated for in the previous review. This sends you off to do another redesign. Finally a smart person will schedule the design review for a Friday afternoon of a three day weekend. Only the people that need to be there are there. The meeting takes 1/4th the time and it is approved as is. That is the problem today, it is not the tools, not the talent, it is the management of risk and the ability to understand the project as a whole.

I agree with the above for the most part. We are no longer looking for the answers and how to achieve the best and most, now we're looking for the lowest risk, leading to such protracted development times that you end up in production before the testing is complete (an you say, "F-22 & F-35"?). I am also afraid we're losing talent and institutional knowledge. Students don't enter the field as much because whereas previous generations were involved with the wonder of it all, now they face enormous drudgery in an unstable employment environment. Before you might design a whole wing, now you're an assistant to the subcommittee involved with the secondary surge prevention seal.

The other thing we're losing is institutional knowledge and basic skills. Ben Rich talked to me about it in 1990. His concern was that when he was coming up, an engineer got to work on many different projects, broadening their scope of knowledge and also interacting with other design teams. Someone coming in the '40s, for example might work on the F-80, the F-90, F-94, F-104 or C-130, and maybe the S-3. Someone starting today (then) might work on two programs, but most likely only one or none for their entire career. That leads to in, in his words, "...stupid mistakes like routing hydraulic lines over electrical control wires, except it's not that they're stupid, they just never had an opportunity to learn why you don't do that". As the older generation retires, we aren't passing the nuts and bolts knowledge along. Even Boeing has admitted that this lack of institutional knowledge is responsible for some of the 787's problems.

 

[Stargazer]

I would say that we have not lost a lot of talent, but we have lost the desire to take risks. (...)
That is the problem today, it is not the tools, not the talent, it is the management of risk and the ability to understand the project as a whole.

Agreed. Unfortunately this happens at all levels of our society. Governments won't take chances anymore. Banks won't take chances anymore. It has to be 100% sure from the start or they won't invest a dime.

It used to be that we made a few prototypes, and there would be some very major bugs. These would then get worked out quickly as the prototype served as a physical testbed. Now before something makes it to the prototype stage, it is expected to be almost perfect. The problem is that there are uncertanties that you cannot simulate.

Plus think of all the fantastic heritage we can access in our museums. All these prototypes and research vehicles that we can proudly contemplate thinking of all the great designers, engineers, pilots that made it possible. All the inspiration that it can provide to the younger generations who dream of walking in their shoes. With the current processes, 22nd century museums will have nothing to display from our days but for a few CAD images (provided they still have the hardware that's compatible...). Sad.

Finally a smart person will schedule the design review for a Friday afternoon of a three day weekend. Only the people that need to be there are there. The meeting takes 1/4th the time and it is approved as is.

Funny, I have a feeling that this is exactly the way some politicians handle some of the law-making process on certain sensitive issues...

The other thing we're losing is institutional knowledge and basic skills. (...) As the older generation retires, we aren't passing the nuts and bolts knowledge along. Even Boeing has admitted that this lack of institutional knowledge is responsible for some of the 787's problems.

You've nailed it perfectly. I remember reading about some real concern in the 1990 when NASA realized that the passing of Von Braun and his team meant a whole 20-year delay for any new Moon missions because of all the knowledge that hadn't been passed on after the Moon race ended and had to be reacquired through years of hard work.

 

[jsport]

How about some jingoism..

'Truth in engineering' (Audi Commercial)

'Dude, where's my manufacturing Renaissance' (an alternative slogan to 'the new normal')

 

[lantinian]

Now that's like a perfect discution for "the Bar"

 

[Stargazer]

Now that's like a perfect discution for "the Bar"

Topic split.

 

[GTX]

I would say that we have not lost a lot of talent, but we have lost the desire to take risks. The level of complexity that we design to is actually very incredible. We far surpass what was ever done, but the problem is that now we have much more oversight in an effort to ensure that we do it "right". This oversight cost is incredible in both money and schedule. It used to be that we made a few prototypes, and there would be some very major bugs. These would then get worked out quickly as the prototype served as a physical testbed. Now before something makes it to the prototype stage, it is expected to be almost perfect. The problem is that there are uncertanties that you cannot simulate. Then you will have to go to a design review and have 30 people there (half of them were not invited but are there because they felt like getting out of some other activity) all presenting conflicting views. Due to no clear leadership, a single person that can tell all the rest to bug off, we get this set of conflicting actions out of the meeting. Usually the hardest ones to meet are the ones that are from the people that were not originally invited to the meeting. These unforeseen actions cause a few month setback, and then you can do another design review. Because it has been so long since the last one, people forgot why things were changed. They will then argue against the very change that they advocated for in the previous review. This sends you off to do another redesign. Finally a smart person will schedule the design review for a Friday afternoon of a three day weekend. Only the people that need to be there are there. The meeting takes 1/4th the time and it is approved as is. That is the problem today, it is not the tools, not the talent, it is the management of risk and the ability to understand the project as a whole.

I couldn't agree more. This also sets of a vicious cycle: because the object is incredibly complex and important, people want more upfront analysis and risk mitigation...which drives up cost/schedule/complexity...which leads to even more risk aversion....


It certainly doesn't help that there are dozens out there (usually those who have never done anything similar in their lives) just waiting to bounce on any stumble and blow it out of all proportion. Often too, they bring their armies of lawyers to the party...leeches all waiting to suck the money out of anyone/anything!


I wish there was more of the attitude shown at one of the Mars Direct Meetings, whereby one attendee was heard to yell out "It's a frontier...people are supposed to die!" People also need to accept that risk is directly proportional to reward: You want a bigger prize you've got to be willing to accept more risk...and conversely, if you want zero risk, you get zero reward!

 

[Stargazer]

You want a bigger prize you've got to be willing to accept more risk...and conversely, if you want zero risk, you get zero reward!

Or as the old adage goes: "No pain, no gain." :

 

[CJGibson]

Lost this lot as well

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/aviation/10123406/Futuristic-transport-ideas-of-the-1960s-revealed.html

Mind you the Prodigal was a ropey concept.

Chris

 

[JeffTracy]

Many very good points already discussed. A couple more to add to the mix.

The rise in safety engineering (related to the risk aversity mentioned earlier). How safe is too safe for operating cutting edge weapons of war? Should it be as safe as riding a motorbike? Driving a car? Commercial air travel? The problem is that it is very difficult to have a rational discussion on the subject and ever increasing safety demands are having an exponential effect on costs. Also, the safest peacetime solution may not turn out to be very safe at all when the bullets start flying. The increased costs and reduced numbers alone may serve to increase risk. The lack of helicopters in 'stan meaning troops having to make greater use of ground transport is a example that springs to mind. Litigation muddies the waters still further.

Project management. What was once done by engineers as part of the engineering job has become a discipline in its own right in many organisations. Many doing the PM role have no direct engineering experience (it's become a shortcut to the top) and yet are increasingly making important programme calls. Part of a worrying trend divorcing decision making from engineering fundamentals. That's how you get things like starting production before you're anywhere near finished testing.

Software. Although it doesn't weigh anything it has a massive effect on cost. Addition of software functionality should be treated with the same rigor as adding weight or drag. Anyone saying "it's easy, we' ll just do it in software" should taken to a small room and made to listen to Aqua's greatest hits on continous loop. For a week.

 

[TaiidanTomcat]

I would say that we have not lost a lot of talent, but we have lost the desire to take risks.

There it is. Homerun right out of the gate. B) I was talking to an engineer the other day that postulated that we couldn't build the Hoover Dam today thanks to risk aversion, and on top of that (this is a civil design case of course rather than aerospace or military aerospace) the risk aversion to making people angry by building a dam.

Risk is an extremely relative term, and people generally are very poor assessors of risk. I have been told by people who are obese that "exercise is dangerous-- you could hurt yourself" This is true of course, but weighed against losing limbs to diabetes or heart disease? its a "risk" worth taking.

Risk aversion has permeated the US Military to an incredibly disturbing degree. Safety has become the ultimate animal, which is understandably tricky for an organization that does inherently dangerous things, and where people come second to victory. We continue to strive for a day when we win a war and no one gets hurt. :

 

[Stargazer]

Risk aversion has permeated the US Military to an incredibly disturbing degree. Safety has become the ultimate animal, which is understandably tricky for an organization that does inherently dangerous things, and where people come second to victory. We continue to strive for a day when we win a war and no one gets hurt. :

Risk aversion has permeated all aspects of our society, be it the banks, the governments, the political parties. And these do not even have the excuse of doing "dangerous things"... :-\

 

[GTX]

Project management. What was once done by engineers as part of the engineering job has become a discipline in its own right in many organisations. Many doing the PM role have no direct engineering experience (it's become a shortcut to the top) and yet are increasingly making important programme calls. Part of a worrying trend divorcing decision making from engineering fundamentals. That's how you get things like starting production before you're anywhere near finished testing.

I am a firm believer that Project Management is a separate discipline from Engineering. After all one can easily find examples of projects that have absolutely no engineering involvement what-so-ever and where they are being managed superbly by someone without a shred of Engineering knowledge. Whilst I agree that the seemingly exponential growth in people who call themselves Project Managers or who list the capability on their CVs is wrong, I have also seen numerous cases of projects being damaged because of Engineers who think that they can easily do the Project Management bit or that their aspect should be dominant to all others. I have also noted a growing trend whereby Engineers think they are somehow superior to all others...and I say this as someone who was originally an Engineer. This is a misconception that needs to be stamped out! The important thing with any project involving multiple people, especially complex ones is that everyone pulls together to do their part. No one part/person is more important than another. The guy/girl ordering screws is just as critical as the one specifying what screw to use...as is the guy/girl who cleans up afterwards or the person who manages the whole endeavour.

 

[Triton]

I think that the whole Shareholder's Rights movement to maximize value for investors has really taken its toll on companies. Now companies are forced to look at quarterly results rather than invest and develop products that may return on investment years in the future. We mostly see incremental product upgrades rather than revolutionary new products. Management seems to be quickly replaced if quarterly results don't meet expectations. There is little incentive to take risks because of the uncertainty of financial returns. Companies used to also be concerned about their customers, employees, and other stakeholders.

 

[GTX]

I think that the whole Shareholder's Rights movement to maximize value for investors has really taken its toll on companies. Now companies are forced to look at quarterly results rather than invest and develop products that may return on investment years in the future. We mostly see incremental product upgrades rather than revolutionary new products. Management seems to be quickly replaced if quarterly results don't meet expectations. There is little incentive to take risks because of the uncertainty of financial returns. Companies used to also be concerned about their customers, employees, and other stakeholders.

There is nothing wrong with companies focusing on shareholder's (read OWNER's) rights. In fact they should. I think what you are focussing upon is short term thinking...along yet again with risk adverse ness

 

[Radical]

One thing that I noticed is just how many mergers there have been in the aviation industry. Back then, there was Vought, Douglas, Boeing, McDonnell, Grumman, Northrop, Lockheed, Convair, North American, etc. Nowadays, it's pretty much just Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and Boeing. Granted, these companies have quite a few divisions, but it's still quite a loss in diversity.

 

[Hanse]

One thing that I noticed is just how many mergers there have been in the aviation industry. Back then, there was Vought, Douglas, Boeing, McDonnell, Grumman, Northrop, Lockheed, Convair, North American, etc. Nowadays, it's pretty much just Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and Boeing. Granted, these companies have quite a few divisions, but it's still quite a loss in diversity.

And LM almost merged with NG but the government stepped in.

 

[jsport]

http://www.kurzweilai.net/radical-abundance-how-a-revolution-in-nanotechnology-will-change-civilization

"dude, where's my manufacturing revolution?"

 

[Stargazer]

One thing that I noticed is just how many mergers there have been in the aviation industry. Back then, there was Vought, Douglas, Boeing, McDonnell, Grumman, Northrop, Lockheed, Convair, North American, etc. Nowadays, it's pretty much just Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and Boeing. Granted, these companies have quite a few divisions, but it's still quite a loss in diversity.

No wonder I'll always find more interest in vintage aviation. More companies, more prototypes, more programs, more competing designs, more experiments, more originality and diversity in designs...

Companies participated in a tender, built a prototype on their own funds at their own risks sometimes, won or lost, but if they lost they had several other projects cooking and moved on to the next program.

Today, one single aircraft type can keep an employee busy for a lifetime. How boring can that be? To me, aviation became frankly boring after the 1960s, and I have for the most part lost my interest in contemporary programs. All the aircraft for a given mission look pretty much the same, and the fact that there is now only a handful of players on the scene certainly doesn't help.