bobbymike said:
The economy is irrelevant to the 'war economy' really? You stand by that? Thank God the US's economy had the heavy industry to convert into a 'war economy' we might be speaking German right?
And it seems you have a very limited view (hey maybe cause you looked to the east and thought that was all the Cold War was about?) of what the Cold War entailed it was a global conflict where yes Marines might have been needed for amphibious ops in about a thousand places. Your self defense only West German background is showing the US had far greater responsibilities if you didn't notice.
I see, the matter is much too complicated for you. I will dumb the explanation down accordingly.
military = military
economy = economy
war economy = still economy
The strategic military importance of motorway networks is a myth.
This is even true today, as alternative overland roads are nowadays paved and allow an average speed almost as high as on motorways - especially if you have MP in cars speeding ahead and securing crossroads.
Back in the 30's and 40's the Autobahn was almost entirely useless for Germany.
-----------------
The Marines weren't needed in any amphibious op during the Cold War. Even Inchon was no necessity, and many Marines were employed as simple army infantry substitutes in that conflict and in Vietnam. There was no USMC unit in Normandy, or at Anzio, or in Southern France '44.
Marines are not needed for amphibious ops or alliance defence, nor is forward positioning of MEUs.
The USMC's raison d'être was always first and foremost to coerce small powers. They were cost-inefficient for Cold War interventions even compared to the 82nd.
And the other responsibilities of the U.S. were much smaller than the assets available. Austral/NZ were far out of reach of any reds. South Korea protected itself since the 70's, with only token U.S. forces left in the peninsula. Americans did not secure Turkey, Greece or Italy to significant extents. There was no American force on Iceland which could have repelled Soviet airborne forces. The main effort of the US for NATO were two CVBGs, the two corps in Germany and a couple wings in Germany.
The DoD during the Cold War was a story of poorly devised small wars, a middle power level contribution to Central European defence, plenty troops held back in the U.S. where they were guaranteed to be useless for the usual two-week European WW3 scenarios and lots of inefficient spending.
The American contribution to Europe's defence was always dwarfed by the DoD budget's overall size.