War between France and Italy in the 1930s

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papacavy

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I have read that during the early 1930's, Mussolini was very concerned about the increase of French naval (and I will assume air) power in the Mediterranean. I wonder how a Mediterranean war between those two powers would unfold? How would the Italian air force perform against the French air force. I would like to see the readers of this forum do some speculations on this subject (I'm doing some idea mining for a proposed alternate history novel or anthology) set between 1930 and 1938.

Have at it, boys!
 
Jonathan Meades referred to this in his recent TV programme 'Ben Building'


Seems Il Duce pondered war with France and Austria before opting for Ethiopia.

Chris
 
I like this idea. :)
Would suggest a casus belli based on aeronaval skirmishes between Capraia Island and Cape Corse with planes from Solenzara and Grosseto air bases.
I'd love to read that...
 
French military intelligence followed with care the erratic course of Italian
foreign policy under Mussolini. In late 1933 and early 1934 the 2e Bureau
considered Italy a likely enemy and, accordingly, was concerned about
assessing her offensive possibilities against French territory in Europe and
North Africa.' By the autumn of 1934 there were signs of a rapprochement.
Italian military intelligence had made unmistakable overtures to Parisot who,
in turn, advised his superiors in Paris that the Italians were genuinely interested
in a military as well as a political accord.10 Within months, in January 1935
the political agreement had been concluded in Rome between Laval and
Mussolini. That accord, towards which the Italians had been the prime movers,
was followed by renewed Italian pressure for military discussions. By the
summer of 1935 a series of co-operative arrangements had been worked out
by the respective staffs, ranging from an exchange of technical information
and intelligence,11 to the agreement for holding periodic staff talks, to the
generation of some detailed military plans for joint operations against
Germany.
The elaboration of such plans carried on for another year, at least until the
summer of 1936. However, long before then there was trouble in the wind. Even
before General Denain and Gamelin had undertaken their respective visits to
Rome in May-June 1935, the 2e Bureau was expressing unease about Italian
policy. The Italian government seemed to have rallied to the defence of the
territorial status quo in Europe, yet Italians had been conditioned to take pride
in their 'esprit guerrier et l'esprit offensive'. Hence, 'il n'est pas interdit de
penser que cette contradiction se presenta a l'esprit du Duce... et qu'il se
resolut des lors a chercher hors d'Europe une diversion qui satisfait l'esprit
guerrier qu'il s'efforc,ait de developper'.12 Ethiopia, the Bureau predicted, was
the logical place for such an adventure. The prediction proved faultless.
Mussolini began military operations against Ethiopia in October 1935, by so
doing embroiling the League of Nations and with it both Britain and France.
Relations between these two soon soured, almost as quickly as their respective
relations with the government in Rome. The difficulty for France, as General
Gamelin remarked, was to uncover some' terrain d'entente' which would keep
both the Italians and the British on side.13
Click to expand...

French Military Intelligence and the Franco-Italian Alliance, 1933–1939
Robert J. Young
 
Severe complaints about the French administration in
Lebanon were formally expressed by the Maronite Patriarch in his Green
Book printed in 1936, extracts from which were widely quoted in Oriente
Moderno. The Patriarch, remembering the first talks with the French delegation
in 1919, emphasised that the French Mandate had originally been
welcomed by the Lebanese people. It was believed that the French government
would ‘prepare the ground for future Lebanese independence, by
developing national feeling and leaving in the hands of the Lebanese
people the organisation, administration and justice of their country’.8
History, however, had taken a different course and after seventeen years
the French had failed to fulfil their promises of political independence and
economic prosperity. Instead of creating an administrative system that
could be regarded as a model for the Middle East, the French government
was still exerting direct control over Lebanon. The calls of the Lebanese
leaders, including the Patriarch, remained unheard: ‘As a loyal friend of
France, we have expressed our complaints to the French authorities in
good faith and with clear intentions; as a consequence we have been suddenly
regarded with hostility by the High Commissioner and the Foreign
Ministry’.9
The Levant was not the only area under French administration targeted
by the Italian government. Mussolini had decided to move into French
North Africa from the Italian colony in Libya, attempting to win the
favour of the Algerian ulama. In the early 1930s, however, Mussolini was
not regarded with favour by the Algerian people and religious caste. The
‘great enemy of Islam’, as he was described, was resented for his aggressive
colonial policy and his ambition to extend Italy’s rule over what remained
after the dismemberment of the Ottoman empire.10
Click to expand...

Franco-Italian rivalry in the Mediterranean generally affected the dialogue
between European great powers. The dispute between Rome and Paris over the
North African colonies (and in particular Tunis, Tangier and Libya) cast a
shadow over negotiations in Europe concerning a settlement of the Rhineland
question. In 1925 Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Belgium became
involved in attempting to reach a permanent diplomatic solution over the
legacy of the peace accords that had followed the First World War. With the
Locarno Treaty the signatory states reached agreement over the status of the
Rhineland region and Alsace-Lorraine; the treaty also provided mutual security
guarantees for both Germany and France, with Italy and Britain as the guaranteeing
powers. For a more thorough examination of the impact of Franco-
Italian tensions over the Locarno negotiations, see H. J. Burgwyn, Italian
Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period, 1918–1940 (Westport, Conn.: Praeger,
1997), pp. 27–32. On the development of Franco-Italian diplomatic and military
relations during the second half of 1930s, see also R. J. Young, ‘French
Military Intelligence and the Franco-Italian Alliance, 1933–1939’, Historical
Journal, Vol. XXVIII, No. 1, 1985; R. J. Young, ‘Soldiers and Diplomats: The
French Embassy and Franco-Italian Relations, 1935–6’, Journal of Strategic
Studies, Vol. VII, No. 1, March 1989.
Click to expand...

A. M. Williams Mussolini's Propaganda Abroad: Subversion in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, 1935-1940
 
Perhaps a different path of events in Spain might have relevance?

Primo de Rivera's Spain and Mussolini's Italy were feared to be on a path to a "Mediterranean alliance" the the late 1920s. If he wasn't overthrown, a
Fascist Spain under Rivera (earlier than Franco) supporting Italy in attacking French colonies in North Africa might be a trigger for war.
 
Interesting stuff, guys. Keep 'em coming. The creative juices are starting to flow. Eeeewwwww!
 
CJGibson said:
Jonathan Meades referred to this in his recent TV programme 'Ben Building'

Seems Il Duce pondered war with France and Austria before opting for Ethiopia.

Chris
Click to expand...

Damn, how did I miss that? I'll have to catch that on iPlayer. I love Jonathan Meades and his no-nosense blunt approach, I always remember the programme he did on Nazi architecture years ago.

Mussolini always strikes me as an erratic character. By 1938 he was looking at ways of bringing Britain and France together with Italy to oppose any attempts by Germany to annex Austria, which they eventually did. Of course Abyssinia had by then scuppered any chances of a meaningful reapproachment with Britain and France, especially while he was still aiding Franco. Then he decided to throw in his lot with Hitler and looked for Albania and Greece as easier pickings. While he may of wanted to tackle France at some point, and perhaps had the events of 1939 been different, both Italy and France as the major Med powers would eventually have been forced into friction and war eventually. But I think for the period 1920-1940 Italy was too weak to seriously embark on any expansionist wars against France.
 
It's on Iplayer (assuming you live somewhere civilised) or on Youtube. Youtube also has a Meades Shrine channel. Thinking person's telly.

Chris
 
What parts of continental France did Italy have historical claims on?
Avignon?
 
Italy build the Pola-class cruisers, France build the Algérie and the Dunkerque class. Italy answered with the Vittorio venetto, France then build the Richelieu-class battleships. Surely naval war would be interesting.
 
From an airpower standpoint, I think France out numbered Italian aircraft and air service personnel 2 to 1. Their aircraft were on par with Italy, but not Germany. During the Spanish Civil War, France recognizing the threat of European powers, nationalized the small aircraft companies (mostly building crafted commercial aircraft) and began to focus on military production aircraft. Their designs were relatively outdated Dewoitine D.500's and D.501's. The Morane Saulnier M.S.406, which arrived on the scene in the late 1930's was still no match for the German Me-109's, which were fighting in Spain and opened WWII air campaigns.

The Italians in the Mediterranean were busy building bases in order to extend their air force into North Africa. They lacked long range bombers needed to take down Alexandria and the Suez Canal. They were able to fly their missions against Ethiopia unmolested. The Ethiopians only had a few aircraft used for transport operations. Also, Italian pilots were pretty good as having fought in Spain along side the German Condor Legion and they had developed considerable experience. However, they were beginning their decline in men and machines due to their over extension in wars in Spain, Libya, and Ethiopia. They also weren't above committing atrocities against civilians as Frenchmen had reported that during WWII 1940, the Italians strafed civilians on a number of occasions.

If the Italians were countered by the French and British in the Med I would imagine that it would have curtailed Italy's expansion into North Africa and that may have signaled to Hitler that unchecked expansion would not be tolerated (Hitler looked up to Mussolini during his rise to power. Seeing him countered by Western European powers may have made him think twice, focusing on areas around Germany populated by Sudeten Germans).
 
Britain was not keen in getting into a confrontation with Mussolini
because it needed to focus on Germany and Japan, but I recall
that the Navy was deployed during the Abyssinian Crisis (as the Brits
called his invasion of Ethiopia).
A more robust approach to dealing with Mussolini, force instead of
League of Nations Collective Security, was advocated by some (Eden?)
and might have served (if successful) to set a good precedent for
dealing with Franco and Hitler as well.
Very much the stuff of Alternate History.
 
Early Me-109s - B, -C and -D - were certainly not as formidable as the -E and beyond because they lacked the more powerful engine and heavy armement. MS-406 could have kick their asses, just like Hurricanes. At least Fiat CR-32s and -42s were highly manoeuverable if not lagging in performance.
 

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