The U.S. does not need to equal Chinese production. It just has to produce sufficient capability to destroy < 100 ro/ro and car carriers and about a dozen cruisers, three dozen destroyers, and a similar number of frigates. The CSIS wargame, the most recent open source exercise I am aware of, generally had this entire force devastated in three weeks in most of its couple dozen scenarios (generally with very high U.S. casualties as well, of course). The U.S. is adopting an asymmetrical strategy of sea denial as opposed to its traditional position of sea control. The question is not how many U.S. ships and planes will survive the effort or how many sausages the U.S. can crank out; the question is whether the PLA can force a change to the status quo or not. The default setting is the region being aligned with the US and the PRC having to make a major military commitment to alter it.
I don't believe in Taiwan war scenario personally.
No one begins a big war just for a scenario from your last paragraph, in a huge maritime region completely unsuitable for it. It's assumption of opponent being completely clueless. As such, it's close to impossibility, because it can happen only if war is (1)forced by Taiwan, (2)catches China completely without pants, scrambling for solution, and (3)sure that bluefor won't dare.
This is a mighty set of assumptions. US made it quite clear to anyone not completely stupid, that dare at will.
And there was a good example in the exact same place, how to operate in this specific region under assumption that US will dare.
It reminds me is how allies, seing japanese invasion convoys sailing away in november 1941, tried to guess a single point where they'll eventually go; US even looked how to set up provocation options. Allies of our time, apparently, already decided that single point, despite knowing that they'll be outproduced to.... outproduced.
Japan, as it turned out, knew the region, and there was no such point. Invasion was bound to happen everywhere.
Japan could be rather easily outproduced, in fact, it was a course that was set before the war, to which Japan failed to react even before the war(which strictly speaking it could). But the point is not that it could, the point is that it had to be, which is a planning failure.
And the problem is exactly that China can not be outproduced, and it is also a course visible even before. Making such plans is not much more than giving oneself false direction.