Xi made a statement about being ready to fight.
Plus it's the 100th anniversary of the PLA.
In addition, their fighting mass of military age men is falling pretty rapidly, I suspect there is an even stronger drop coming around 2027.
If your military ability to take and hold ground is weakening, you get stuck in a mentality of "use it or lose it".
Also, there's Xi's age to consider.
Were the mainland willing to let the economic ties drag the island back under mainland control in the ~2050s, it wouldn't be much of an issue to anyone.
But the political apparatus at the mainland is not making noises like they are happy with that plan any more. Probably because it's gotten even less likely to work since the mid 2010s.
There's no particular element of China's current Taiwan strategy which anticipates the PRC to initiate a conflict over Taiwan in 2027, however the goal of continued military modernization and growth in military capability (and whole of nation economic/tech/industry advancement) is basically still the priority.
If they were serious about wanting to initiate a conflict in 2027 their procurement wouldn't be looking like what it was for the last few years -- it instead would be much more expansive and much more near term and Taiwan oriented, rather than the relatively moderate pace of purchasing new platforms (yes, the production of new ships and fighters some have called "war footing" is more like a fraction of what they're actually capable of) and R&D (medium/long term) focused approach we have observed
The way I see it, there are only a few prongs to the PRC's Taiwan strategy:
1. Have sufficient forces to wage a war over Taiwan if political circumstances force it
2. Ideally, possess forces that are able to A) deter Taiwan from moving towards de jure political independence and/or B) deter US intervention if conflict occurs
3. Continue to develop and grow the military forces as well as the non-military circumstances to enable 1. and 2. to occur more and more in the PRC's favour as time goes on
4. In the long term, achieve such an overmatch in military, economic/industrial/technology and political capability in the regional level and on the global level that Taiwan will be forced to unify on China's terms.
Of those prongs, only 4. is a situation where China might prepare to actively initiate a conflict, but the prerequisites for them to even start planning step 4. is still not fully existent yet, and certainly not going to happen in 2027.
The relevance of all of the above to USAF's caution to getting NGAD right, IMO can be summarized to a single question -- "whose side is time on?"
There seems to be some elements of the natsec community who believe that if the US can get through the mid/late 2020s without a conflict (or if conflict occurs, being able to win one), then by the early 2030s various technological/economic/political circumstances will shift back to the US's favour, including in terms of the ability to get superior military capabilities in service by then which the PLA won't be able to match.
That's also partly why the US military seems very cognizant of also wanting to try and maximize its preparedness and attain some degree of near term "deliverable" capabilities to be ready for a "2027" (or mid/late 2020s) conflict if it occurs, with the risk that this may partly be to the detriment of capabilities desired for the 2030s (in terms of opportunity cost).
I wouldn't be surprised if the USAF is trying to work out all of the permutations and possibilities for what PLA capabilities in the 2030s (and 2040s, and beyond) may look like, before fully committing into a potential big ticket air superiority/manned fighter project.
There isn't much margin for error.