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There's a lot of conflicting information on the ACEVAL and AIMEVAL programs in published accounts.
ACEVAL was focused on the relative effects of force size with a red force of F-5s versus blue force F-14 and F-15s. It was limited to visual engagements only and the AIM-54 was prohibited. Importantly, and often not mentioned, red force were given simulated all aspect missiles. The official conclusion was a kill ratio of 2:1 was the best that could be expected in visual engagements when outnumbered even with the high quality F-15 and F-14.
However, according to Navy participants, every time the Blue Force figured out tactics to give them an advantage (at one stage achieving 6:1 kill ratio) the rules were changed or Red team given an advantage to bring the kill ratio down. The conclusion appeared to have been predetermined that quality fighters alone weren't going to be a winning strategy - hence the F-16.
AIMEVAL tested 5 different simulated potential short range missile designs including actual AIM-95 Agile seekers. The recollections of some Navy pilots is that the high-off-boresight capable missiles were obviously and definitely superior in the tests, and were surprised (to say the least) that the official findings were that there was no real advantage to be had in the high-off-boresight designs.
Both these results were advantageous for Air Force interests. ACEVAL said they should stay out of visual range arena and Sparrow sucked - this helped secure funding for the AIM-120 AMRAAM - and that numbers mattered - so buy F-16s. AIMEVAL said there was no real advantage to the Navy's AIM-95 Agile type missile, which was canned. 3 strikes for the Air Force.
It'd be interesting to find some more pilot's opinions on this topic.
ACEVAL was focused on the relative effects of force size with a red force of F-5s versus blue force F-14 and F-15s. It was limited to visual engagements only and the AIM-54 was prohibited. Importantly, and often not mentioned, red force were given simulated all aspect missiles. The official conclusion was a kill ratio of 2:1 was the best that could be expected in visual engagements when outnumbered even with the high quality F-15 and F-14.
However, according to Navy participants, every time the Blue Force figured out tactics to give them an advantage (at one stage achieving 6:1 kill ratio) the rules were changed or Red team given an advantage to bring the kill ratio down. The conclusion appeared to have been predetermined that quality fighters alone weren't going to be a winning strategy - hence the F-16.
AIMEVAL tested 5 different simulated potential short range missile designs including actual AIM-95 Agile seekers. The recollections of some Navy pilots is that the high-off-boresight capable missiles were obviously and definitely superior in the tests, and were surprised (to say the least) that the official findings were that there was no real advantage to be had in the high-off-boresight designs.
Both these results were advantageous for Air Force interests. ACEVAL said they should stay out of visual range arena and Sparrow sucked - this helped secure funding for the AIM-120 AMRAAM - and that numbers mattered - so buy F-16s. AIMEVAL said there was no real advantage to the Navy's AIM-95 Agile type missile, which was canned. 3 strikes for the Air Force.
It'd be interesting to find some more pilot's opinions on this topic.
ACEVAL/AIMVAL (Air Combat Evaluation/Air Intercept Missile Evaluation) was a series of exercises (the exercises lasted from 1975 to 1978 and comprised of nearly 1500 engagements) designed to test the efficiency of the then-latest front line fighters, the F-14 Tomcat and F-15 Eagle, against inexpensive, small (F-5) opponents carrying all-aspect air to air missiles, and would serve as a means to justify the development of new systems for the air combat environment (and kill off some others). It was also a highly aggressive situation; the pilots participating (12 Tomcat crews, 6 Eagle pilots and a handful of both Navy and Air Force Aggressors) were hand-picked, being some of, if not the very best pilots either service had at ACM at the time.
The rules, most basically, were:
1. No AIM-54 for the F-14. (The AIM-54 had an active ACM mode that proved useful against maneuvering targets even at dogfight range)
2. Positive VID must be had before shooting an opponent.
3. (Not actually a rule, but a truism) The rules will change every time the blue force figures out how to get a kill ratio lopsided in their favor.
That third non-rule rule wound up being one of the most frustrating, but best rules the blue force would have to deal with, because it forced them to think up new tactics; to find new ways to kill opponents while keeping themselves alive. The blue force did have a few things going for them, however:
1. Bigger aircraft with powerful radars, better wing loading and thrust-to-weight ratio gave good advantages in target detection and dogfighting.
2. Radar guided TVSU in F-14 gave positive VID at 8 miles on average or more (the later TCS was zoomable for further range)
3. VTAS - The Visual Target Acquisition System, predecessor to the JHMCS, was used by both F-14 and F-15 crews and accounted for 90% of all off-boresight AIM-9 shots. Why didn't we develop it back in the 1970's? More on that later...
What should also be noted is that with regard to airframes, there were no G limits briefed, and every prohibited maneuver in the manuals was exploited by at least the F-14 and Navy F-5 side, from over-alpha to asymmetric thrust, to landing flaps used in "non-landing configuration."
"Hoser" provides: "At AIM/ACE, 'g' restrictions were not mentioned. "what ever it takes" was the unwritten rule. When the Turkey first hit the street, Mr. & Mrs. Grumman said it was pilot limited. The TACTS range recorded 12.2 g's symmetrical during a Guns 'D' break (mentioned way back [in the forum]). The high 'g' hurt Hill Billy's neck and he was was out of the hunt for a few days. We had the brand new Blk 90 Turkey x-rayed, inspected and gone over by a team of Grummanites...... not a lose rivet, zero skin wrinkles, perfect engine mounts, no hyd or fuel leaks; Just a broke RO. NAVAIR kept slapping new 'g' restrictions on the Turkey cause they figured them to last 100yrs. Hell, they would have lasted a hunnert and fifty years with a symmetrical 9.5 'g' guidance doctrine."
The combat was fierce. The 1000' gunshot bubble was violated countless times by both the blue and red force, in some instances, so that the pilot of the a/c being gunned had both a pipper on their head, and their name clearly visible in the gun footage. This matter of pride and competition was very unsafe, but surprisingly the only loss was a collision between a Blue Force F-15 and Red Force F-5 (no fatalities). Typically if the F-5's got into a gunfight, they were at a big disadvantage because both the F-14 and the F-15 have huge lift bodies, better wing loading and better T:W; Tomcat pilots would (if possible) get slow, drop flaps and drag the F-5's into rolling scissors to get on the Tiger's tail quickly.
But getting into such engagements would only happen if the Tomcat or Eagle wasn't killed with Sidewinder shots by the F-5's, which was one of the key points of the exercise: the ability to VID at long range, and splash the enemy aircraft without getting killed. The problem was that the AIM-7 is a semi-active homing missile, and so if the F-14 or F-15 shot at R-Op (8 miles) they'd have to keep the target painted, flying towards the F-5's. By 4 miles, the F-5 would have a positive ID on the F-14/F-15 and shoot an all-aspect infrared missile back, resulting in a 1:1 kill to loss ratio.
Early on, this spawned a bunch of ideas; the "Booker T. Washington Shuffle," the "Piston," the "Spincter" just to name a few. The BTW was designed to work with 2, 4, or 6-plane formations, where one/two/three of the F-14s would fly ahead of the other one/two/three, VID at 5-8mi, break and run, then the following F-14's would all fire at the F-5's from well beyond the AIM-9L's range, ensuring kills while staying out of the Sidewinder envelope, and then kill any survivors with their own AIM-9's or with GUNS, failing the former. The kill-to-loss from the BTW was better than 6:1. "Hawk" Smith came one weekend and found a way to ruin the BTW (after a few flights), so the "Piston" was developed, which caused a resurgence in K:L. The "Spincter" has to do with passing off a target lock to a weapon in flight. Can it be done? Can't say, but given the BTW, you can see it was of prime interest to the Blue Force.
As time went on, more and more rules were instated, and the findings processed after roughly 1500 engagements with a scant 2:1 (or about 2.5:1 depending on source)overall kill to loss ratio in favor of the "Big" fighters (both F-14 and F-15) against the small ones and average mission survivability of 3 missions. Hoser explains (also found in RADM Gilchrist's book "Tomcat! The F-14 Story")
"The basic final cold hard facts were/are:
1. In the visual arena, 'A small' supersonic, highly maneuverable fighter, packing all aspect heaters/guns 'against' a 'large', highly maneuverable fighter packing "all" aspect radar / heat missiles/dual seat VTAS and guns.. survives better, cost wise, than the 'big boys'.
2. If the 'Big Boys' can 'not accept a kill ratio of 2 to 1, they best stay out of the visual arena.
3. Wahlla! Solution for higher 'Big Boy' survivabilty/kill ratio= "AMRAAM" type weapon! Launch and leave and never subject your Big, High $$, Aerospace War Machine to the visual arena! Just can't have no fun no more! Of course there are a few alternatives, but that' a whole nother story."
"Turk" is still somewhat bitter about the way the test was run and the conclusions drawn...
"They [The Air Force blue force] undermined the validity of the tests by having moles tell them when intruders were going to be in their engagements. The intruders were intended to ensure that the both Blue Forces complied with the requirement to visually ID bandits before launching missiles. The Eagle drivers tried to justify their average 7 NM head on ID range by installing Weaver rifle scopes in the F-15 cockpits. Ahhhhhbbbulll****. Pardon me; I sneezed. That was greater than the average head on ID range of the TVSU [radar-slaved for precise tracking] equipped Tomcats. I get a little emotional about that.
Later, the Eagle ONC, Lt. Col Joe Griffith, lied in his final report about the recommendations of the Joint Services Operational Requirements (JSOR) for the Advanced Short Range Air-to-Air Missile (ASRAAM). No, he didn't slightly misrepresent the results; he outright lied. I was the Tomcat representative on the committee. After the tests, "Boomer" was successful in getting the report of the JSOR corrected to reflect the actual recommendation for a high off boresite capability, more like Hey Joe's Agile than the 30 degree off boresite, low capability Lady Finger that Griffith had been directed by the Air Force to endorse. Griffith and those who directed his activities committed fraud.
The published statistics were as Hoser described, but their validity was diminished by some dishonest individuals who were more interested in furthering their own careers than adopting effective future weapons technology."
The high-off boresight AGILE missile was axed and the VTAS was never developed further until Russia, who had high interest in ACE/AIM, developed their own high off-boresight missiles and Helmet Mounted Cuing system. The result to counter those is the AIM-9X and JHMCS, but it took another 20 years to get these capabilities into service. On the bright side, the AMRAAM was a direct development of ACE/AIM, and "Turk" seemed pretty happy with that.
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