The 'other' Sea Wolf?

[zen]

So back in December 1964 the UK sketched five options for point defence missiles for the Anglo-dutch-french tripartite requirement for a new short range missile system to defend warships...
1?
2?
3?
4?
5?
Then ruled out the first three as too large and expensive. The remainder were Designated :-
System A
System B
-----
System A the simplest intended for very small ships such as minecraft using a combined search and track system then under consideration as a new lightweight gun fire control. It would replace Sea Cat directly in larger ships and command line of sight (CLOS) for a 60 to 80kg missile.

System B a Frigate self defence missile using separate search and track sensors. It would use either command guidance of System A or SARH.

Then at the third international conference in Paris in May 1965 added in a sixth 'System C'.
This would be able to intercept any target at 7km that would be passing within 4km of the ship, such as crossing targets and weigh in around 140kg for a SARH missile or 80kg for CLOS.

Missile C seems to have the high performance demanded by the French. Who broke up the international project when this was not chosen.

One can see that System B was chosen by the RN as a compromise between cost and capability. Possibly they hoped the French and Dutch would stay onboard with this choice.
But the Dutch left for Sparrow III BPDMS (a UK file suggests they'd have only agreed if the system used a Dutch radar) and the French were not satisfied with the lower performance left and ultimately developed their own system.
Briefly the Germans considered joining this international partnership...couriously the Italians are not mentioned even though they were working on Indigo with the Swiss.

So....two alternatives are clearly visible in the form of System A and System C.
The former being closer to Rapier and the latter for the time a new class of missile compared with the alternatives that were developed.

What I do not know is the earlier three options ruled out?

However of the two later options, we can speculate on how history flows in the light of a alternative decision.
System A being like Rapier, it's possible that this will lead to unified self defence SAM system and be applied even on minehunters. It certainly lifts a degree of burden on designers of Frigates compared to the System b (sea wolf) and could be cheap enough to win far greater export success.
If it does merge with Rapier......then it's main limit is when Rapier needs replacing.

System C however comes across as having more scope to be further developed, not just to extend it's range, but also it's capacity to engage crossing targets. The downside is the increased costs and demands this would place on new Frigates.
As it was System B came in as quite demanding in terms of weight and size inside the warship, and a lot of effort was put in to offering 'lighter' options for the guidance of this.

I shall now speculate further on System C....
To engage a crossing target may require separate missile and target tracking sensors, as well as the separate search radar. This certainly would increase the the demands for arcs of view and avoidance of interference of the separate sensors. Unlike Type 811 or VM40 radars, this means sets which are fully separate and independent of each other.
It also requires more computing power, to process tracks and predict interception points to aim the SAM at. Upside here is the increasing power of computers would expand the engagement ranges and the number of targets able to be both tracked and intercepts calculated.
The missile must be heavier to handle the manoeuvres needed to hit such crossing targets, such as needing a larger motor. This could imply a potentially greater range when dealing with simpler direct defence interceptions.
This in turn implies that the sensor's abilities if increased in tracking ranges would permit the system ever longer ranged engagements, and hypothetically the 'system' could handle alternative missile's of even greater range/endurance if the sensors gain greater tracking ranges against various targets.

Conceptually, this path forward for System C allows it to be applicable when the RN looks at alternative medium ranged SAM systems to Sea Dart in the 1970s.

It also could make it, once further developed, a much stronger contender for the even later NAAWS during the 1980s.

Sensor merger is possible with the arrival of AESA sets, the functions of search, target and missile tracking being potentially now undertaken by a single AESA system.

 

[robunos]

ships such as minecraft

Sorry, couldn't resist...

cheers,
Robin.

 

[uk 75]

Zen
Fascinating info.
Does it ast any light on
1 Why did Seacat 2 not get anywhere as a basic Seacat upgrade.
2 How does Seawolf end up taking up so much space and that awful six box launcher

 

[zen]

Unlike the those lucky swines who get to spend who knows how long trawling through the archives at Kew, I'm unable to go much further (well maybe a little) without recourse to inference and speculation.

In that light however....

Sea Cat II, suffers the same problem as Sea Cat, namely it seems conceived as a visually guided weapon. Granted some degree of automatic guidance on the ship could and was provided (based on the MRS.3 I seem to reccal reading), the potential of a more sophisticated and comprehensive systems such as PT.428 and Mauler likely excluded the concept fairly quickly.

Rapier however comes closer, but is also the inheritor of efforts around the earlier PT.428.

Even in this light PT.428 and Mauler were viewed as either lacking sufficient capability to take down a small incoming missile (PT.428) or too difficult/expensive to achieve (Mauler).

Interestingly Rapier was ruled out by the RN, as lacking sufficient warhead. Remember this is considered an anti-missile-missile, and the institutional successor to the concept of Orange Nell.
So I guess Sea Cat II and a notional Sea Rapier (beefed up for the RN) would end up very similar and these come closest to System A.

This does open several other potentials and questions......

Orange Nell....making this work earlier would again alter the situation, and the utilisation of Q-band guidance apparently avoids the issues of reflections from the water. Making SARH practical at these low level engagements.
This would have been quite transformative, as it would permit true FFG designs from the early 60's and was intended to be fit-able in place of a 4.5" gun.
At such a size and weight, further development to long ranges is clearly there as rocket and guidance system improve.
Pre-dating Mauler, PT.428 and of course Sea Sparrow.
It suffers from it's size and weight compared to the later studies and ultimately Sea Wolf. But this is also where it can gain more capability and performance within the envelope of it's size and weight.
Conceptually one might envision a Leander type, with Ikara in place the Limbo and Orange Nell in place of the 4.5".

While that takes us out of the process that lead to Sea Wolf, it does offer a tantalising glimpse of another alternative.

Back to the issue..
Sea Indigo curiously weighs in about the same as System C, but differs in guidance. It does however make me wonder if the option was on of the original 5 looked at by the tripartite group. We know that Sea Sparrow was rejected for it's size and weight previously.

 

[uk 75]

Zen

Thank you for this, I am very interested in this whole area.

One subject that has always puzzled me since going on HMS Kent in 1974 as an RAF Cadet and
passing an Adams class DG visiting Portsmouth, is how the US got its launchers so right and the
UK so wrong.

Terrier launchers were updated to carry ASROC and Standard

Tartar launchers were able to carry Standard and Harpoon

Sea Sparrow started life in a converted ASROC pepperbox and then had the NATO BPDMS
which could fit on ships as small as Danish and Norwegian frigates.

If the RN could have at least made its missiles fit the US launchers. Tartar twin launchers for Seadart
and NATO BPDMS launchers for Seawolf.

 

[zen]

Well....

I'm more of the view that having developed a launcher for Sea Slug, no alternative weapon or successor missile used that launcher. Arguably a different design of launcher could and should have been produced, but only if that benefited from being usable by other and successor weapons.
Vertical stacking of complete weapons would've been a considerable improvement.
Rather an interesting whatif, since a weapon launcher system able to handle weapons the size and weight of Sea Slug would confer considerable flexibility in future weapons design.

Sea Dart's launcher could and should have been usable for a much wider range of weapons than the corresponding US launcher. But nothing seems to come out from this and almost certainly that is down to the details of the two.

Deeper.....Popsy/Mopsy ought to be applicable to US launchers, especially Mopsy.
But this all steps quite a bit away from the topic.

Save that perhaps Orange Nell had it been achieved as desired, would also confer great latitude in other compatible weapons design. Furthermore, it might just have emerged as something that could fit the US launcher systems.

Back to topic, probably System C would fit Indigo or Sparrow/ASROC launchers. But knowing the way the RN and UK defence sector works it would end up incompatible.

 

[JohnR]

The cumbersome magazine arrangement of the Counties was dictated by Britains adoption of wrap around booster for all the early medium range missiles, however I have read; but I can't remember where, of an "indexing" launcher design, which I've took to mean vertical. There were images of a launcher desigh on the Barrow Shipyard photo library but this seems to have disappeared.

There was in interesting design for a launcher produced by Hawker Siddely featured in a 1972 Janes Weapons Systems. It looks very much like a MK13 drum magazine with a single arm, however the arm can take two missiles on each side. It was designed to carry Sea Killer and Indigo missiles in two concentric rings, the larger Sea Killer in the outer ring loading onto the two upper missile stations and Indigo on the inner ring loading onto the lower missile stations.

I have often wondered why we didn't come up with a fully powered launcher for Sea Wolf.

 

[CJGibson]

Perhaps you should be looking at Sinner and why it failed to prosper.

Chris

 

[zen]

Now Sinner is an interesting issue, and I'm sure we'd all love to know more about this earlier VLS development, and it's trials.

The move to VLS this much earlier would be somewhat transformative again, and if factored in with say System C.....

I see no reason why Sea Slug cannot be stored complete in the vertical condition, after all it could be launched in near vertical. But this again takes us away from the main topic.
Though.....and this is one of the more vexing matters for those of us without easy Kew access....I still don't know the range the of the 'boosted' version of PT.428.
What I do now know, is that Beam Riding guidance is potentially good for ranges up to 30nm, as evidenced by the maximum range of Sea Slug.

Actually this also brings me back to another vexing area, SAM.72 and the expected/desired range and warhead of this study.
My instinct here is that the 'minimum' range of Sea Dart was an issue, and that the RN was looking at something able to intercept from 'closer in' to a similar distance out. Hence why XPX.430 (scaled up Sea Wolf) was offered to this.
The other instinct is the concern to knock down the incoming missile, and needing a larger warhead, necessitating a larger missile.

In this suspected light, I'm of the mind that System C offered the growth potential to meet these needs, being upto 140kg in weight and potentially SARH/Command guidence, and consequently the RN could have transitioned away from Sea Dart for all but the much longer ranged engagements that a Sea Dart mkII could offer.
Granted this could impose even more demands on the ship, possibly driving up size and guaranteed to dirve up cost.
But the longerterm benefits would be clear.

 

[zen]

So now to go with System C in '65
we have GAST.1210 circa '67/'68.
And later on we have SAM.72
And we have the re-fielding of Bloodhound in '75
And Thunderbird retired in '77

So the scope for a possible MSAM is there.

 

[Volkodav]

Probably part of the reason the UK didn't manage to deploy a compact launcher such as the Mk11 or Mk13/22 Tartar types is because Tartar was I believe developed at the suggestion/request of the UK and the RN was meant to adopt it but never did. There were multiple studies of using Tartar, such as replacing two Mk6 twin 3" on the cancelled missile cruiser, fitting it to the Tribal class sloops/frigates, a Leander air defence version with it, and DDG rebuilds of the Battle and Daring classes. Interestingly Mk-13 was adapted to fire NATO Sea Sparrow, I wonder, had the UK acquired Tartar, if the launcher could have been adapted to stow, feed and fire a long booster Seawolf as a point defence supplement for the Standard upgrade to the Tartar system.

 

[zen]

If I was being strict I'd say that is beyond the scope of this thread.
Principally because that relates more to the earlier efforts such as Popsy Mopsy, Orange Nell and possibly SIG-16.

Sea Wolf has more logic with VLS as the early trials suggest, and the MSAM proposals show.

Deeper though and the problem with the mk11/Tartar is the cost (in dollars) and the guidance.

 

[PMN1]

There were multiple studies of using Tartar, such as replacing two Mk6 twin 3" on the cancelled missile cruiser, fitting it to the Tribal class sloops/frigates, a Leander air defence version with it, and DDG rebuilds of the Battle and Daring classes.

Would that have been a 1 launcher replacing 1 twin 3" or 1 launcher replacing 2 twin 3"?

 

[Volkodav]

There were multiple studies of using Tartar, such as replacing two Mk6 twin 3" on the cancelled missile cruiser, fitting it to the Tribal class sloops/frigates, a Leander air defence version with it, and DDG rebuilds of the Battle and Daring classes.

Would that have been a 1 launcher replacing 1 twin 3" or 1 launcher replacing 2 twin 3"?

Going off my memory of Friedman's The Post War naval Revolution, or it may have been British Cruisers, I believe it was a one for one replacement of two of the four 3' twins with two Tartar systems in a midriff arrangement not dissimilar to that employed in the Albanys. Way off topic but imagine if the RN had managed to deploy Tartar in rebuilt Battle and Daring, or at least Daring destroyers, it would have resulted in a very different looking fleet in the 60s and 70s.

 

[zen]

Yeap ranging off topic.
It's not a bad alternative so start a thread.

That said perhaps one should consider
Red Dean
http://www.secretprojects.co.uk/forum/index.php/topic,28221.0.html
Popsy/Mopsy
http://www.secretprojects.co.uk/forum/index.php/topic,26709.0.html

 

[Pioneer]

Wow, how did I miss this subject/topic?

Following tentative Zen!!
Many of this British missile programs I haven't heard of before

Regards
Pioneer

 

[Pioneer]

Missile C seems to have the high performance demanded by the French. Who broke up the international project when this was not chosen.

So this became the French Crotale system??

Regards
Pioneer

 

[zen]

I think it's not that simple because if memory serves crotale was an Army project, though from my reading the NG and later versions are much closer to MN requirements.

So it's more like the MN walked away and ended up compromising anyway, but in typical French fashion.

Musings on System C, SAM.72 and MSAM.
http://www.secretprojects.co.uk/forum/index.php/topic,28604.0.html

 

[Volkodav]

Yeap ranging off topic.
It's not a bad alternative so start a thread.

That said perhaps one should consider
Red Dean
http://www.secretprojects.co.uk/forum/index.php/topic,28221.0.html
Popsy/Mopsy
http://www.secretprojects.co.uk/forum/index.php/topic,26709.0.html

Fair call so why not.

Actually not sure where the topic would belong as Tartar is a real system that was built and used in a multitude of modernised and new build warships around the world. I suppose Naval - unbuilt projects, as Tartar was a real option for a number of unbuilt projects, versions of built designs and upgrades of existing ships, it was even an option for a planned upgrade to a design that was never built. At the same time it is also ideal for speculative builds and upgrades.

Any suggestions / guidance?

 

[zen]

RN wanted Q-band SARH for their version of Tartar. I think that makes it properly Alternative history.

 

[Volkodav]

RN wanted Q-band SARH for their version of Tartar. I think that makes it properly Alternative history.

Interesting, thanks for that.

 

[zen]

So resurrecting this thread a moment.

System C ought to meet GAST.1210 and potentially deliver the Battlefield area defense variants of Sea Wolf could not achieve.
Including presumably anti-SRBM interception.

If this is VL as per early Sea Wolf, the greater weight of the missile alone is great enough to justify either a scaled Sea Dart magazine launcher and handling gear or accept the use of VLS silos. Of the two VLS is cheaper and easier to fit into ships.

With the Army opting in on this, production and funding increases ought to achieve the desired result.

Such is the potential here that notional Type 22s could include this. Making stretched variants of the Type 22 the main product of the shipyards and leaving Type 42 to either have a much shorter production run or be cancelled outright, leaving Sea Dart just on Bristol and the Invincible class carriers.

 

[uk 75]

I know its irritating but NATO and the US went down the Sea Sparrow route replacing the early heavy pepperbox launcher with an eight box launcher and I think Dutch radar. It served in the Belgian, Danish, German, Greek Netherlands, Norwegian, andTurkish units. Canada, Italy and US had their own national variants.
Seawolf never sold to any of them and I cant see any alternatives above doing so either. A solely UK system which couldnt be easily fitted to most of its frigates seems to me a bad idea. Type 21s and 12s with NATO BPDMS instead of Seacat in 1982 might have been useful

 

[zen]

The French are in, because they wanted the higher performance of System C.
The Dutch could be in, if they get the radar side of this.
The Army could be in, if it can meet GAST.1210 and succeed Thunderbird.
At which point the French Army could also be in.

The RN would prefer this to Sea Dart for the original SIGS type requirements.

Meaning that despite it's impact on Frigates, it's cheaper (through wider use) and easier to fit than GWS30. Especially so if using VLS.

The RN wanted to build more Type 22 and studied Type 22 hull and propulsion setup for Type 44 instead of the larger Type 43. But GWS30 held that back due to deep magazine and weight of launcher. Plus conflicting with Sea Wolf.

 

[zen]

Consequence of System C.....focus on Type 22 and Type 23. Either more Type 22 built, especially after the Falklands or stretched Type 23 built and Horizon ditches.

 

[Zoo Tycoon]

During my brief encounter with one of these systems in the mid eighties I remember an old salt telling me that the superiority of VL was well known to the industry in the late sixties;- so much less to go wrong in the golden seconds before getting the bird away. A technology demo of a few VL Sea Wolf’s was satisfactorily conducted in about 69 or 70 but it was still judged to be too difficult for the required entry into service date and the Admirals looked at the American trainable launchers with envy anyway;- I’m unsure if they really understood the nitygritty of the availability problem until post Falklands. Sea Dart was a bit different because of the ramjet and it’s initial version was target referenced (aka collision course). This later point means it got to go off the rail within a pretty tight angular tolerance to pick up the returns or ideally be tracking internally prior to ignition. Again the Admirals wanted the thing in service as opposed to delayed. Initially, Sea Darts trainable launcher on the foredeck couldn’t engage threats approaching from astern, which was only partly fixed by the addition of an inertial reference system within the missile in the later mod std. Don’t get me wrong, I understand the Sea Dart 2 team were keen to have a go at VL even if there had to be an interim step of TVC from a trainable launcher.

 

[zen]

During my brief encounter with one of these systems in the mid eighties I remember an old salt telling me that the superiority of VL was well known to the industry in the late sixties;- so much less to go wrong in the golden seconds before getting the bird away. A technology demo of a few VL Sea Wolf’s was satisfactorily conducted in about 69 or 70 but it was still judged to be too difficult for the required entry into service date and the Admirals looked at the American trainable launchers with envy anyway;- I’m unsure if they really understood the nitygritty of the availability problem until post Falklands. Sea Dart was a bit different because of the ramjet and it’s initial version was target referenced (aka collision course). This later point means it got to go off the rail within a pretty tight angular tolerance to pick up the returns or ideally be tracking internally prior to ignition. Again the Admirals wanted the thing in service as opposed to delayed. Initially, Sea Darts trainable launcher on the foredeck couldn’t engage threats approaching from astern, which was only partly fixed by the addition of an inertial reference system within the missile in the later mod std. Don’t get me wrong, I understand the Sea Dart 2 team were keen to have a go at VL even if there had to be an interim step of TVC from a trainable launcher.

Certainly that's consistent with other word of mouth tales I've heard.

VLS was clearly the way to go and once you get inertial or command guidance into a missile this solves a lot.
VLS Sea Dart isn't a bad idea, but it wasn't going to deal with the minimum range issues much nor the guidance system issues.

 

[Tony Williams]

Then at the third international conference in Paris in May 1965 added in a sixth 'System C'.
This would be able to intercept any target at 7km that would be passing within 4km of the ship, such as crossing targets and weigh in around 140kg for a SARH missile or 80kg for CLOS.

This bit surprised me - I had no idea that there would be such a huge difference in missile weight just down to the guidance system. I can understand that active radar would be heavy at that time, but semi-active?

Is there a book or other source of information which explains the development of SAMs and their guidance systems over time, including the consequences for launcher design?

Incidentally, I put forward some thoughts about VLS for Sea Wolf and Sea Dart in my alternative 1970s RN: http://quarryhs.co.uk/AltRN.pdf

 

[zen]

Then at the third international conference in Paris in May 1965 added in a sixth 'System C'.
This would be able to intercept any target at 7km that would be passing within 4km of the ship, such as crossing targets and weigh in around 140kg for a SARH missile or 80kg for CLOS.

This bit surprised me - I had no idea that there would be such a huge difference in missile weight just down to the guidance system. I can understand that active radar would be heavy at that time, but semi-active?

Is there a book or other source of information which explains the development of SAMs and their guidance systems over time, including the consequences for launcher design?

Incidentally, I put forward some thoughts about VLS for Sea Wolf and Sea Dart in my alternative 1970s RN: http://quarryhs.co.uk/AltRN.pdf

I do rather like your efforts there though I have my own opinions.

I have a theory which resulted in me sketching some flight paths, one for SARH guidance (constantly flying towards the moving target) and one based on predicted location (flying to where the target will be).
In a lot of these scenarios the hardest manoeuvres for SARH became harder once the target 'jinks', and harder (bleeding more energy) at the last moments of flight....the worst time to do so since the missile's motor has long since burned out and the weapon is coasting.
While predicted location and Command Guidance tended to place hard manoeuvres much earlier into the missile's flight. Potentially during the extent period of motor burn and thus allowing the missile to recoup any energy loss after manoeuvring.

Consequently the SARH missile may either have to have a larger motor or warhead (also increasingmotor size to compensate). Either to counter the manoeuvre energy loss or create a larger kill zone radius.

 

[zen]

If...of you have Command Guidance in a variant of Sea Dart.....your potential engagement ranges are much greater. As you no longer need to Illuminate the target all the time and the missile no longer needs to home onto that reflection all the time. Command Guidance can get you most of the way. You can even loft the missile on a ballistic predicted course, substantially increasing range.

In essence this gets into NIGS territory.
And......and had we developed the ASWE C-band SSSR (let's call that Type 966) or the cut down NSR (let's call that Type 985), then this sort of thing is achievable.

My contention over multiple threads is rather that the close range defence system can progressively be extended out into Medium range and consequently a notional Brakemine, Mopsy, System C, SAM.72, or Orange Nell successor or even just GWS.27 will deliver close to meduim range defense for both RN and Army, avoid entanglement in NF-90 NAAWS, and PAAMS (FUN, FUNI, FUNGI and Horizon), and as a further consequence the next generation of AAW ships can be developed from either Type 22 or Type 23 designs.
The earlier Type 22 option ensures the systems are in production from the 70's through the 80's and avoiding the bottleneck of the 90's. Which resulted in us halving the number of AAW ships and leaving us in a mess until the development of CAMM.
As is, the RN was increasingly interested in just this sort of system from the moment it knew the price of SIGS performance was a high minimum range limit.

 

[Tony Williams]

I have a theory which resulted in me sketching some flight paths, one for SARH guidance (constantly flying towards the moving target) and one based on predicted location (flying to where the target will be).
In a lot of these scenarios the hardest manoeuvres for SARH became harder once the target 'jinks', and harder (bleeding more energy) at the last moments of flight....the worst time to do so since the missile's motor has long since burned out and the weapon is coasting.
While predicted location and Command Guidance tended to place hard manoeuvres much earlier into the missile's flight. Potentially during the extent period of motor burn and thus allowing the missile to recoup any energy loss after manoeuvring.

Consequently the SARH missile may either have to have a larger motor or warhead (also increasingmotor size to compensate). Either to counter the manoeuvre energy loss or create a larger kill zone radius.

Thanks, that makes sense. I was thinking that a heavier guidance system would require more power to compensate, making the missile bigger overall. But I can see that the nature of the flypath would have a greater effect. It's a strong argument for command guidance - for most of the flight, anyway. I presume that CG becomes less accurate as the range increases.

 

[zen]

I have a theory which resulted in me sketching some flight paths, one for SARH guidance (constantly flying towards the moving target) and one based on predicted location (flying to where the target will be).
In a lot of these scenarios the hardest manoeuvres for SARH became harder once the target 'jinks', and harder (bleeding more energy) at the last moments of flight....the worst time to do so since the missile's motor has long since burned out and the weapon is coasting.
While predicted location and Command Guidance tended to place hard manoeuvres much earlier into the missile's flight. Potentially during the extent period of motor burn and thus allowing the missile to recoup any energy loss after manoeuvring.

Consequently the SARH missile may either have to have a larger motor or warhead (also increasingmotor size to compensate). Either to counter the manoeuvre energy loss or create a larger kill zone radius.

Thanks, that makes sense. I was thinking that a heavier guidance system would require more power to compensate, making the missile bigger overall. But I can see that the nature of the flypath would have a greater effect. It's a strong argument for command guidance - for most of the flight, anyway. I presume that CG becomes less accurate as the range increases.

Well that depends on the radar's capabilities, but generally yes.
That's why the long range missiles combine Command Guidance with SARH or ARH.
And this is why the Soviets did just that.
While the US took a even greater step with TVM, where the missile is data linking it's picture back to the warship.

 

[Zoo Tycoon]

If...of you have Command Guidance in a variant of Sea Dart.....your potential engagement ranges are much greater. As you no longer need to Illuminate the target all the time and the missile no longer needs to home onto that reflection all the time. Command Guidance can get you most of the way. You can even loft the missile on a ballistic predicted course, substantially increasing range.

That’s what the Sea Dart Mod 2 actually did with the embodiment of an onboard INS/command update system. When introduced into service the late eighties, it gave the capability to have up to eight missiles in various stages flight only requiring target illumination in the terminal phase. It also offered a significant range improvement with optimised ballistic trajectories. The INS itself was developed for Sea Dart mk2 cancelled in 1980, but was cherry picked out for the mid service upgrade... the TVC Chow booster was dumped, shame really as although only intended for providing greater area coverage for the trainable launcher, it was the key stepping stone to a very capable VL air defence system.

 

[zen]

If...of you have Command Guidance in a variant of Sea Dart.....your potential engagement ranges are much greater. As you no longer need to Illuminate the target all the time and the missile no longer needs to home onto that reflection all the time. Command Guidance can get you most of the way. You can even loft the missile on a ballistic predicted course, substantially increasing range.

That’s what the Sea Dart Mod 2 actually did with the embodiment of an onboard INS/command update system. When introduced into service the late eighties, it gave the capability to have up to six missiles in various stages flight only requiring target illumination in the terminal phase. It also offered a significant range improvement with optimised ballistic trajectories. The INS itself was developed for Sea Dart mk2 cancelled in 1980, but was cherry picked out for the mid service upgrade... the TVC Chow booster was dumped, shame really as although only intended for providing greater area coverage for the trainable launcher, it was the key stepping stone to a very capable VL air defence system.

This is partly where NIGS's possible last gasp being RP.21 a 20.5 inch diameter ramjet missile would allow earlier CG and potentially allow a straight move to VLS by the mid-to-late 60's. Meshing nicely with ASWE's work on a C-band PAR.

In essence SIGS is a bit too small to fit the electronics of the day until Sea Dart MkII.
But unless Sea Dart MkII had a major change in ship side systems it doesn't solve the limitations inherent to it.

 

[Volkodav]

I know its irritating but NATO and the US went down the Sea Sparrow route replacing the early heavy pepperbox launcher with an eight box launcher and I think Dutch radar. It served in the Belgian, Danish, German, Greek Netherlands, Norwegian, andTurkish units. Canada, Italy and US had their own national variants.
Seawolf never sold to any of them and I cant see any alternatives above doing so either. A solely UK system which couldnt be easily fitted to most of its frigates seems to me a bad idea. Type 21s and 12s with NATO BPDMS instead of Seacat in 1982 might have been useful

Australia was interested in an evolved Type 21 with US weapons and sensors, I have no information on the configuration but Sea Sparrow would be a pretty safe bet as being the SAM.

 

[zen]

First my thanks to CNH for the material concerning liquid motor for Martel. This being the reason for a bit of necromancy.

On the basis of that material I think a liquid motor solves a lot of issues for System C.
Both by capability to throttle the motor between 100% and 10% and the ability to stop and restart the motor, especially pulsing operation, enabling lower total thrust in sustained flight and it's utility for manoeuvres.

Such a solution would permit System C to change course and recoup energy, throttle to ensure an optimal intercept trajectory and permit future increases in range/velocity through scaling up the propellant tank.
Making GAST.1210 achievable through the simpler expedient of more propellant.
Storage is reasonable for 5 years or more.
Fragility is no worse than a solid motor.
Initial thrust being the only cost and overcome by duration.

This would piggyback liquid Martel development as an affordable scaling of proven technology.
VL is still possible, though slower. Overcome-able by booster or internal accelerator in the silo.

Opposition is questionable since liquid Sparrow motor.....liquid Bullpup etc....

 

[uk 75]

Re-reading this excellent thread, I am still puzzled (allowing for your reasonable desire to look solely at UK solutions) why are our launchers always so heavy and space hogging.
I wont mention how awful the Seadart launcher is compared with Tartar/Standard (oh well I did-sorry). But the ghastly manual Seawolf launcher which screws up the T21 fit and strips the Leanders of other weapons, I despair.

 

[zen]

Re-reading this excellent thread, I am still puzzled (allowing for your reasonable desire to look solely at UK solutions) why are our launchers always so heavy and space hogging.
I wont mention how awful the Seadart launcher is compared with Tartar/Standard (oh well I did-sorry). But the ghastly manual Seawolf launcher which screws up the T21 fit and strips the Leanders of other weapons, I despair.

Start a thread on it. I'm sure to pitch in

 

[JohnR]

I picked up a 1972 edition of Janes Weapons Systems and in that it suggested that the six cell SW launcher could elevate to 90 degree and would be loaded from below deck with the launcher trained that way. In the same book it mentioned to launcher for Sea Killer and Indigo I mentioned in post no 7. Why a similar launcher couldn't be developed for SW I don't understand. There is then the proposal for the twin armed launcher to be placed in the 'corners' of the Type 24 and proposed for the Broad Beamed Type21. Then there .was the proposal illustrated in Browns Rebuilding the Royal Navy with a design which resembles a smaller variant of the Type21 with VLS tubes mounted along the side of the helo hangar as with the Canadian Halifax's and Dutch M class.