The only feasible way to try to counter stealth?

UpForce said:
So wait, what, does other than military operators

using one or another band spectrum categorically render that band unusable or unavailable for military purposes? Wouldn't any force or unit have to contend with at least somewhat cluttered, "spoiled" or indeed actively challenged EM environment, necessitating deconfliction (at the minimum) and other (counter)measures anyway?
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I think it's more the other way round. If a radar operates on a certain frequency, that frequency becomes unusable for all other uses: radar uses very powerful transmitters, which will drown out pretty much all other traffic.
 
AeroFranz said:
Yes, but the illuminating aircraft is way farther from the LO target than the missile. The radar range equation varies with the fourth power of distance, so you have to pump WAY more power to get the same return.
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For this you should use Bi-static Radar equation or treat the missile as a "separate" passive receiver. The 4th root rules only applies for Monostatic case where the transmitter and receiver are in same place (co-located) For bi-static case we have separate equation as following.

regarding semi-active missile case or bi-static implementation. Missile or other receiver in other angle may receive better return, basically because of 2 reasons :

1.shorter path length.
2.Bi-static RCS. Or the RCS of the object "seen" by the receiver. We know all object has NO static value of RCS, frontal aspect RCS may be different to what's on the side. The side tho can be expected to always have relatively large value, thus can give higher return.
 

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Who would in turn be laughed at by the USAF and raise you the SAGE networked F-101,F-106, etc.

The question of who was first with a datalink-based interception control system seems a bit foggy. This page...

https://www.f-106deltadart.com/flightcontrols.htm

...suggests that the datalink bit of the F-106 system took some time to get developed, and it's not clear when the link was in use. (If there is someone who has covered SAGE like Friedman has covered naval air defense, I haven't found them yet.)

Most of the detailed coverage of Stril 60 is in Swedish, but it does seem that they claim that the datalink was working by 1963 on the J35B.
 
As you keep insisting:

* The "F-86L" was developed under "Project Follow-On". It was essentially an F-86D incorporating a data-link capability for the "Semi-Automatic Ground Environment (SAGE)" air-intercept control system.

The CGI system used with the F-86D had not proven entirely satisfactory. Communications between the ground controller and the pilot tended to be slow or confusing, and so something a little smarter was needed. SAGE, introduced in 1953, had been developed by the Lincoln Laboratory at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). It used a big ground-based computer to assess target information obtained by ground radar, and relayed target data to the interceptor through an AN/ARR-39 datalink, automatically guiding the interceptor to the target while the targeting information was displayed to the pilot. It was a marvel of the world at the time -- though it is an indication of the growth of computing power since the 1950s that even though the SAGE computers filled up rooms, any cheap modern smartphone would dwarf the memory, mass storage, and processing power of all the SAGE computers added together.

The F-86L was intended as stopgap for SAGE operation until better the better Convair F-102 Delta Dagger and its successor, the F-106 Delta Dart, came on line. All F-86Ls were rebuilds of low-flight-time F-86Ds, with the first such rebuild flying on 27 December 1955. The rebuilds were brought up to the equivalent of an F-86D-45, with other improvements including updated avionics and the "F-40" long slatted wing. Rebuilt F-86D-50, F-86D-55, and F-86D-60 were simply redesignated "F-86L-50", "F-86L-55", and "F-86L-60" respectively. Oddly, however, earlier F-86D subvariants were given block numbers incremented by 1 after update. For example, an F-86D-40 became an "F-86D-41".

981 F-86Ds were converted to F-86Ls in all. They began to go into USAF Air Defense Command service in late 1957, but were phased out into Air National Guard service by 1960, to be finally obsoleted in 1965.
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my 2 cents

Text extracted from here: http://www.airvectors.net/avf86_2.html
 
Stril 60 development started in the mid-fifties. The project's first <edit>largely successful</edit> demonstration of control via data-link was on 16/10 1962 with a modified J35A Draken. See page 104 of linked pdf.
J35B was the first Draken-variant built with the hardware necessary for data-link operations. 73 J35B aircraft were built from 1962 till 1963.
PDF found here:
http://www.fht.nu/Dokument/Flygvapnet/flyg_publ_dok_svenska_flygvapnets_styrdatasystem.pdf
<edit> I'm not completely sure about the modified J35A being the aircraft involved in the 16/10 1962 demonstration. Two Lansen aircraft were also used during data-link trials, with two J29 Tunnan explicitly mentioned as target aircraft </edit>
 
Ferranti, Elliotts and BAC developed an automatic interception system for the Lightning with a datalink which was fully engineered and tested on a P.1B. £1.4mil was spent on development but it never entered service, although the datalink was used until 1975 with ground controllers. I haven't got the exact dates at my fingertips but it most have been circa 1960-63.

https://www.pprune.org/military-aviation/205755-anyone-remember-lightning-datalink.html
 
Marconi was heavily involved with the Swedish effort.
 
TVIP - I hadn't known that about the F-86L.

However, Wiki says that the first operational datalink ground station was Sault Ste-Marie, in April 1961. There are lots of references attached and I'll dig into them later, but it sounds as if the F-86L was early-to-need...

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semi-Automatic_Ground_Environment#Deployment
 
Hood said:
Ferranti, Elliotts and BAC developed an automatic interception system for the Lightning with a datalink which was fully engineered and tested on a P.1B. £1.4mil was spent on development but it never entered service, although the datalink was used until 1975 with ground controllers. I haven't got the exact dates at my fingertips but it most have been circa 1960-63.

https://www.pprune.org/military-aviation/205755-anyone-remember-lightning-datalink.html
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That system was intended to be a major part of Tinsmith/SLEWC (Standby Local Early Warning & Control). Unfortunately there were problems with the software in the ground based computers. By the way £1.4 million was the cost of the datalink development, but the overall cost of the automated interception system project was reportedly £30 million. As Hood has mentioned, the datalink was used in a manual reversion mode until 1975, when it was supposed to be replaced by a new datalink as part of the Linesman System, Tinsmith having already been phased out around 1974. Alas, Linesman (also known as Linesman/Mediator) was a flop at best.

Interestingly, certain physical remnants of the datalink on the Lightnings were then used from then onwards by air & ground crew for the time honoured tradition of transporting life's little luxuries. ;)
 
quellish said:
I do not think that is accurate. If you look through the US MCTL, S-5230.28, etc, you will see long lists of effective counter low observables technologies and tactics.

For example:
"The CLO suite of subsystems includes wideband radars, infrared and electro-optical (IR/EO/laser) sensors, visual and acoustics components and systems used to detect low observable air, sea and land-based targets. The importance of accomplishing signal processing in very short time is a critical capability."

Both the Navy and Air Force have long running "third party targetting" programs (I can't recall the name of the Navy program, but can look it up later).
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Not that it matters, lol, smh, but I would tend to agree with your views, here. It really is amazing that no one has been able to "solve" stealth since its debut almost 40 years ago, now, but perhaps my expectations are/were simply too high. I mean, even today, with advanced processing power, etc., most of the "techniques" are more theories than anything else.
 
AeroFranz said:
Frankly, if you can get a missile within a few miles of an LO aircraft, an internal x-band seeker (or whatever high frequency device is used) might do the job. At such low ranges low RCS only helps you so much when you are blasting the target with energy.
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If you're within a few miles probably any modern IIR AAM would be up to the task.
 
Joint Soviet Fighter said:
Not that it matters, lol, smh, but I would tend to agree with your views, here. It really is amazing that no one has been able to "solve" stealth since its debut almost 40 years ago, now, but perhaps my expectations are/were simply too high. I mean, even today, with advanced processing power, etc., most of the "techniques" are more theories than anything else.
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If anyone “solved” it, we probably would not be informed. I expect there are a number of countermeasures with varying levels of success and costs in SWAPC/money. Nothing likely completely negates low RCS, but some measures likely greatly reduce its effectiveness under specific conditions at certain ranges. Signature reduction still will tend to make other countermeasures more effective.
 
Josh_TN said:
If anyone “solved” it, we probably would not be informed. I expect there are a number of countermeasures with varying levels of success and costs in SWAPC/money. Nothing likely completely negates low RCS, but some measures likely greatly reduce its effectiveness under specific conditions at certain ranges. Signature reduction still will tend to make other countermeasures more effective.
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That, too. Perhaps I should have said that it has yet to be demonstrated in actual combat that anyone has really "solved" the problem of downing/stopping stealth aircraft, en masse, not to mention potential secrecy orders that might be in place as happened to James Greer, so...I'll leave it to someone else, as I'd rather not wind up in court/getting in trouble with the government, lol, smh.

On the whole, however, I still think that stealth is a challenge that can be overcome with existing technology, but perhaps doing so still belongs in the category of being more possible than probable at this particular moment in time.
 
Joint Soviet Fighter said:
On the whole, however, I still think that stealth is a challenge that can be overcome with existing technology, but perhaps doing so still belongs in the category of being more possible than probable at this particular moment in time.
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My take on this is even if someone develops a means to reduce the effectiveness of stealth aircraft I'd suggest most new aircraft will still incorporate stealth features as this would still reduce the chance of detection versus a non stealth airframe.

Spitball example:

Option A is design a non stealth airframe and be detected at distance Y

Option B is incorporate stealth and new fancy anti stealth tech means you might be detected at distance X which might be a half or two thirds of Y.

In the event new fancy anti stealth tech is down for maintenance, having software issues or the generator is out of power then stealth still provides a significant advantage and worth the initial investment.
 
The barriers for RCS reduction are a lot lower than they used to be. Modern digital tools allow mid level producers to design low signature aerodynamic shapes. For smaller missiles, UAVs, and even fighters, there really is no reason not to put the effort in: minimally, you still enhance any counter measures, even if you do not delay detection.
 
Ozair said:
My take on this is even if someone develops a means to reduce the effectiveness of stealth aircraft I'd suggest most new aircraft will still incorporate stealth features as this would still reduce the chance of detection versus a non stealth airframe.

Spitball example:

Option A is design a non stealth airframe and be detected at distance Y

Option B is incorporate stealth and new fancy anti stealth tech means you might be detected at distance X which might be a half or two thirds of Y.

In the event new fancy anti stealth tech is down for maintenance, having software issues or the generator is out of power then stealth still provides a significant advantage and worth the initial investment.
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Maybe, maybe not. Reducing the detection range is obviously always preferred, but these aircraft aren't exactly cheap nor easy & quick to replace, so there might be a scenario wherein some kind of a compromise is reached, as if, for example, your expensive stealth cruise missiles are no longer effective, it would probably necessitate the development of another approach/technique.
 
Joint Soviet Fighter said:
Maybe, maybe not. Reducing the detection range is obviously always preferred, but these aircraft aren't exactly cheap nor easy & quick to replace, so there might be a scenario wherein some kind of a compromise is reached, as if, for example, your expensive stealth cruise missiles are no longer effective, it would probably necessitate the development of another approach/technique.
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It is entirely feasible to produce inexpensive aircraft that have very competitive RCS.
 
yeetmahboi said:
And you reduce that competition... How? Shaping is fairly easy to grasp and stealth isn't simply "countered".

The rule of quadruple magnitude remains...
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By "reduce the competition" are you referring to essentially "closing the gap" between the radar returns of competing aircraft, thereby potentially leveling the playing field in that regard, or are you inquiring as to how one would effectively counter stealth?
 
yeetmahboi said:
The former.
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It's like you said - mostly shaping. Not everyone has the financial resources & manufacturing experience, for example, to construct an aircraft that will have an rcs that is on the level of, say, an F-22, but if you can manage to reduce your radar return to such an extent that battling a Raptor will most likely occur within visual range, then, at least in theory, you have a chance, as the matchup is no longer "like clubbing baby seals", which is a really bizarre & disturbing way to explain the lack of difficulty, I guess.

Weird.
 
The only way to counter Stealth?

Come on, folks! Think out of the box.
I nominate deploying a bazzillion nails on the runway just as the Red Force is ready to land.
Replace the Prist added to the fuel supply with something nasty.
Chaff that gets sticky after you deploy it. And then the bad guys fly through it.
And so on...
 
aim9xray said:
The only way to counter Stealth?

Come on, folks! Think out of the box.
I nominate deploying a bazzillion nails on the runway just as the Red Force is ready to land.
Replace the Prist added to the fuel supply with something nasty.
Chaff that gets sticky after you deploy it. And then the bad guys fly through it.
And so on...
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Agreed.
 
Joint Soviet Fighter said:
Looks like these materials might be even better at absorbing radio waves than that ceramic-based RAM from a few years ago, iirc.
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Materials have both practical and theoretical physical limits. Those limits are well defined in the literature.
 
Just today there is an article called "Ultra thin absorbers record breaking bandwidth" by Younes Ra'di.
 

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