The Mysterious 1944-45 Gibbs & Cox Battleship

[Tzoli]

I've post here as well in hope we can find more info on this!

Some time ago I've stumbled upon a discussion and a historical document between Fleet Admiral Ernest Joseph King and then Secretary of the Navy James Vincent Forrestal in 1945 January for the fleet building programme and mentioning a 60.000ton battleship design from around 1944/45 offered by the Gibbs & Cox company for the navy!

My research into this matter not yet fruit me any results but maybe some of you know something?

Remember that Gibbs & Cox offered at least 4x battleship / battleship-carrier hybrid designs as well as a few destroyer designs for the Soviet Union prior to WW2.

The discussion I've first found is here:

History, Politics And Current Affairs • View topic - Post War Navies, March 16, 1945

While the official document is here:

Construction Program: King-Vinson, 1944-1945 - Finding Aids

findingaids.princeton.edu

 

[DWG]

I think the most significant thing in the meeting may be this line:
"It was passed by the General Board."

Which AIUI means it wasn't just waved about as a possibility by Gibbs and Cox, the USN seriously considered it for construction and was willing to proceed, it just didn't make it into the final building plan. That doesn't necessarily mean it had completed detailed plans, but when the Admiralty went through a similar process for UK designs they'd be looking at outline drawings and full stats.

An interesting point in the Construction Program documents is section 6 on page 7 and its discussion of 'the "so-called Insurance Program" of March 1945' for 84 additional ships, which I don't think I'd ever heard of before.

 

[World B4]

Just me spitballing, but if I had to guess at a basic description I would say based on the tonnage and the aforementioned battlecarrier designs It was probably a 4x3 406mm battleship that would have had pretty few differences with the Montana class, perhaps less armor and more speed? I can't really think of any reason for the navy to seriously consider building it, at least compared to the Montanas, perhaps it was able to fit through the Panama canal? I don't know, either way I find it really interesting and I hope the community can find some design specs or technical drawings, I'd love to see this thing.

Edit: with a draft of 39 feet it could not fit in the canal, and even the Montanas had 3 feet less.

 

[Tzoli]

It could be a modified Iowa or South Dakota with improved underwater and AA protection.

 

[ceccherini]

Just me spitballing, but if I had to guess at a basic description I would say based on the tonnage and the aforementioned battlecarrier designs It was probably a 4x3 406mm battleship that would have had pretty few differences with the Montana class, perhaps less armor and more speed? I can't really think of any reason for the navy to seriously consider building it, at least compared to the Montanas, perhaps it was able to fit through the Panama canal? I don't know, either way I find it really interesting and I hope the community can find some design specs or technical drawings, I'd love to see this thing.

Edit: with a draft of 39 feet it could not fit in the canal, and even the Montanas had 3 feet less.

by 1945 standards 60000 tons is quite small and maybe barely sufficient to replicate the Iowa's armament but 2 triple turrets seems more probable. By late war the main drive to size increase were the anti torpedo defence system and the horizontal belt. Caliber was stabilized to 16", with the only exceptions of some larger soviet studies and some smaller british studies both regarded as less practical than the standard 16" equivalent, the number of main gun was also reduced and there was no interest in increase of the vertical belt thickness. So by a 1945 USN 60000 ton design I expect a ship as large or larger than Montana in length and beam and about as fast as Iowa, armor generally comparable to Iowa's except for the horizontal belt of about 8"/10", armed with two triple 16"/50 gun turrets maybe improved with an improved, faster firing loading arrangement and the usual secondary battery of 20 5" guns of the longer 54 caliber version.

 

[Dilandu]

By 1945, the US naval designers should already be accustomed with Italian multi-layered armor belt; is it possible that it may been incorporated in new battleship design?

 

[ceccherini]

By 1945, the US naval designers should already be accustomed with Italian multi-layered armor belt; is it possible that it may been incorporated in new battleship design?

I've never heard of any USN report on Littorio class so I don't think so

 

[Tzoli]

If only USNI shared this info with Gibbs & Cox. Also we don't know since when the company started designing it. The only sure data that the major naval persons like Admiral King and likely Forrestal already knew about it by January 1945.

The only comparable design was the RN's beast, the first of the 1945 Lion series, Design A:
59.400tons std, 304,8 wl x 36,57 x 10,67m 3x3 16", 12x2 4,5", 10x6 40mm, 20x2,20x1 20mm 2x5 21" Torpedo Tubes, 13/15" belt 4/6" deck
Underwater protection should defend against Uncle Tom threat and 1.200lb TNT charge.

 

[Dilandu]

I've never heard of any USN report on Littorio class so I don't think so

Strange, actually...

 

[ceccherini]

I've never heard of any USN report on Littorio class so I don't think so

Strange, actually...

Maybe such a report actually exist but the general USN seems to have been very unimpressed by Regia Marina efforts. The Royal Navy instead was much more benevolent and the examination by them of the italian vessels after 1943 often produced very positive judgement

 

[Colonial-Marine]

Unfortunately I fear this might be one of those designs that has been lost to time.

 

[Hood]

I have a vague recollection of this project, but can't remember where, I will have a rummage.

 

[Tzoli]

I have a vague recollection of this project, but can't remember where, I will have a rummage.

Please do!

 

[airman]

I know this type of Battleship of Gibbs & Cox : the project 1058 that can be found also on book " Hybrid Warships " . I suppose that design for 60.000 ton battleship was uncompleted or a rejected proposal .

 

[Tzoli]

That is from the 1937-39 series of proposals for the Soviets not equivalent to this design.

 

[DWG]

Off the direct topic, but there's some interesting stuff in that meeting between King and Forrestal, such as King* saying he doesn't really like the 6" DP cruisers (Worcester class) and would prefer the 5"/54 ones (CL-154 class), despite this meeting happening in the same month the CL-154s were cancelled.

* And Horne, who was VCNO.

 

[ptdockyard]

Is this the same as the Gibbs & Cox Battleship Design D that was discussed in WI recently?

Dave

 

[Tzoli]

All offers for the Soviets by Gibbs & Cox are pre WW2 so I doubt it, but it could had been used as a basis.

 

[awhalen61]

Is this the same as the Gibbs & Cox Battleship Design D that was discussed in WI recently?

Dave

Was this by McLaughlin? It isn't on JSTOR yet, so would you mind PMing me images of the article?

 

[airman]

That's strange : these types of battleships reminds me Montana class .

 

[Dilandu]

All offers for the Soviets by Gibbs & Cox are pre WW2

Yep, as far as I knew USSR lost all interest to Gibbs & Cox after reviewing their proposals. Ironically, Gibbs & Cox seems to be sincerely trying to produce the most modern and advanced design they imagined - but USSR wanted a pretty standard battleship, not a hybrid, and Gibbs & Cox did not prepare THAT one proposal...

 

[Tzoli]

It did as Design D or Project 1058.3
But as war broke out in Europe or when the Soviets attacked Poland the Senate and USN told GIbbs & Cox to stop their offers

 

[Tzoli]

I have a vague recollection of this project, but can't remember where, I will have a rummage.

Hood, did you able to mine out anything from your archives?

 

[Hood]

No luck as yet, it wasn't where I thought it might have been. I have a feeling it was in an article but more digging needed sadly.

 

[that_person]

Seeing as no one can seem to find anymore info on this, what do you personally think this design looks like? The thing that catches me is that it’s 70,000 tons.

 

[Tzoli]

Knowing this is likely a private shipyard design.
I could guess 4x2 16" 10-14x2 5"/54 and strong below water defence as well as good speed to keep up with the carriers.
Or just an Updated Iowa with good anti torpedo defence and speed and AA something like the King-Nimitz Redesign but with 5"/54 turrets.

 

[that_person]

Knowing this is likely a private shipyard design.
I could guess 4x2 16" 10-14x2 5"/54 and strong below water defence as well as good speed to keep up with the carriers.
Or just an Updated Iowa with good anti torpedo defence and speed and AA something like the King-Nimitz Redesign but with 5"/54 turrets.

What about something like the Kentucky AA conversion, on something like the Montana hull? That would give you the 70,000 ton displacement , the speed to keep up with carrier groups, and enough space to incorporation new technology and design the ship around wartime lessons.

 

[Tzoli]

Only this was from late 1944 early 1945 not from 1948.
Montana was 60/71.000tons because of the armour, 4 turrets and large size.
My friend agree that giving the Iowa excellent anti torpedo protection could easily add 10.000tons to it's hull, and to maintain it's speed the hull had to be enlarged thus nearing to Montana displacement.

 

[BlackBat242]

Just me spitballing, but if I had to guess at a basic description I would say based on the tonnage and the aforementioned battlecarrier designs It was probably a 4x3 406mm battleship that would have had pretty few differences with the Montana class, perhaps less armor and more speed? I can't really think of any reason for the navy to seriously consider building it, at least compared to the Montanas, perhaps it was able to fit through the Panama canal? I don't know, either way I find it really interesting and I hope the community can find some design specs or technical drawings, I'd love to see this thing.

Edit: with a draft of 39 feet it could not fit in the canal, and even the Montanas had 3 feet less.

Remember that the US had started building a 3rd set of locks for the Panama Canal in 1939, so when the Montana & Midway classed were designed, it was expected that they would be able to use the Panama Canal via the new locks!

After the end of the war, the US spent 1945-48 conducting a new study on the Canal, focusing on security and making it attack-resistant, as well as looking at capacity requirements.

While this study eventually supported abandoning the Third Locks project in favor of a new sea-level canal, in 1944-45 it would have been expected by the USN that the project would be resumed and completed after the end of hostilities.:

THE FIRST THIRD LOCKS PROJECT

The first Third Locks Project was authorized by Congress with an appropriation of $277 million in the spring of 1939. It proposed to enlarge the canal’s locks; from 1050 to 1200 ft long, from 110 to 140 ft wide, and from 31 to 45 ft deep. Excavations for the Third Locks at either end of the canal were essentially completed between mid 1939 and early 1942, but the project was shut down shortly after the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, and never completed. The massive excavations for the Third Locks Project are usually mistaken for the old French excavations at either end of the canal (Figure 1).

Interestingly, the current, Chinese-built completed "Third Locks" did use the excavations for the abortive US work.

3rd locks after suspension in 1941, Miraflores:




And in 1953:




Here is the under-construction modern set of locks for the same location and the reverse viewpoint:




And the completed Cocoli Locks:

 

[CV12Hornet]

@Tzoli The forum post link is dead, do you of anyplace else where the conversation linked there can be found?

 

[Tzoli]

@Tzoli The forum post link is dead, do you of anyplace else where the conversation linked there can be found?

This works:

Construction Program: King-Vinson, 1944-1945 - Finding Aids

findingaids.princeton.edu

 

[Tzoli]

At page 38 after a brief discussion about the USN having 10 modern Battleships, 6 "Alabamas", 4 Iowas and 2 more Iowas under construction. Fleet Admiral King says:
"we have designs for the future"
On page 40 Fleet Admiral King mentions a new 60.000ton design which Secretary Forrestal adds:
"Admiral King is referring to this new Gibbs design -- 60.000 ton monster."

They mention if it is possible to improve the underwater defense of the two Iowas in construction but they are too well advanced for that modification. Also "repeater" ships are mentioned I presume repeat Iowas if new construction had be started soon, otherwise different and improved designs are in order.

This indicates that especially Admiral King and likely Nimitz together with Forrestal advocated new battleship construction!

 

[fishpond]

This is somewhat strange, because for major warships the USN did its own basic designs. Gibbs sometimes tried to sell his own, but he was generally rebuffed -- in connection with a 1952 carrier, the BuShips designers wrote that 'he still has amateur status' (it was an Olympic year). He would not have had the slightest idea of USN thinking about underwater or other protection, as these ideas were closely held. Saying that 'we have our own designs' for the future is also odd, because no one has found the relevant BuShips designs, at least yet. Too, battleships did not figure in the projected late-war programs, apart from continued work on the two last Iowas. All of this makes me wonder where the King-Forrestal discussion was found.

 

[fishpond]

This gets stranger. I found the January 1945 paper (the transcript of a discussion between King and Vinson, mainly) on the Princeton archives web-site, and it certainly refers to a Gibbs design. But I have gone through the General Board file on battleships (420-6), and I am pretty sure that you don't find any 1944-45 Gibbs design there. All you find for Gibbs is a 1939 discussion of some of the proposed designs for the Soviets. You can find a very detailed account of these designs in a recent Warship International article. If you know about U.S. battleship design practice, it is clear that Gibbs didn't. Now, Gibbs had strong political connections in the Democratic Party at this time, and I wonder whether the reference to that design was intended to deal with that influence. Otherwise it is weird, to put it mildly. Everything else in the file lines up with what we know of King's thinking. I think that Vinson was primed to ask about a new battleship, and that King knew that it was about Gibbs. I'd bet that Gibbs kept working on his design, and kept pushing the Navy to build it.

Again, I know that other Navy files don't mention a battleship design beyond the Iowas. King clearly was not too enthusiastic about building more battleships in 1945, and he mentions that the existing design has little margin for improvement. The Preliminary Design organization had limited manpower, and it was working on improved cruisers -- there was a sort of super-Atlanta (CL 154 class) and improved destroyers, as well as an improved submarine. Soon there would also be work on a new carrier design. All of these ships are well documented, and a new battleship would not have been more highly classified. So my guess is that nothing was being done.

 

[Tzoli]

On the other hand many WW2 and pre-WW2 related ship development documents were lost or got destroyed in the 1960's and 70's see the missing Springstyle books (1925-1939) (1944-xxxx) and the missing Montana development files. It is likely that evidence for any other battleship projects of that era too got destroyed.

 

[fishpond]

Tzoli, a lot was destroyed, but a lot remains. It would have been difficult to bury something as big as a battleship design. There is another issue, too, which is which designs you count as worth a look. My own view is that only designs which had a real chance of being built count; the others are fantasies which aren't part of navies' stories. I don't mean to exclude super variations on the Yamatos here. The major navies all had their own in-house designers. Apart from early destroyers, torpedo boats, submarines and most motor torpedo boats, I think everything they built (combatants, anyway) was an in-house design (I'm not as sure about Germany after 1918). Gibbs doesn't count. His contribution is obscured by the fact that he claimed his firm had designed several classes of U.S. destroyers. That reflected normal U.S. practice, in which the preliminary and contract designers produced plans in which the machinery spaces were blank; the U.S. machinery authority didn't produce plans. The machinery designers normally said that they had designed ships, but that referred only to machinery (Rickover operated similarly). At the end of the war Gibbs & Cox produced a classified brochure listing its wartime contributions, which included a variety of auxiliaries (I forget which), possibly iincluding the 'Wind' class icebreakers and the 250-foot Coast Guard cutters. The company claimed that it had designed the escort carriers, which may refer to the Kaiser-built ships (Gibbs & Cox was probably design agent for the Maritime Commission).

My view on the Gibbs & Cox design (or, rather, how seriously it should be taken) is based in part on having seen the boxes of U.S. preliminary design material on battleships, now probably destroyed. There was nothing beyond the Montana class. You might wonder whether the files in question had been removed, but the boxes were labelled with their contents. The only missing file, according to the list, was one describing the prewar project to modernize the 'big five' battleships. That means we don't have a drawing of what was planned, but there is plenty of paper about the project. That is, we may not know what the prewar navy planned to do, exactly, but we know that a lot was going on.

Another hint is King's comment that the Gibbs & Cox design was 'passed by the General Board.' King was on the General Board in 1939, when Gibbs was trying to get permission to sell the design to the Soviets. There are no later General Board documents referring to another Gibbs & Cox design. Again, I think what you saw in the January 1945 document is a reference to something Gibbs was trying to sell via Vinson, who was the senior Democrat on the House Naval Affairs Committee, the grand old man of Congressional bills supporting U.S. naval expansion. The main theme of the meeting was King's attempt to tell Vinson what the Navy wanted. You can read his reaction to the battleship question as a gentle brush-off. Again, remember that Gibbs had very little idea of what the U.S. Navy wanted or needed in terms of battleships. I am pretty sure that he was involved in the (roughly 1937) Battleship Board convened by the Secretary of the Navy, to bless the design of the new North Carolinas. I'm not sure how much that taught him about subtleties like underwater protection or protection in general, both of which were kept pretty quiet by the U.S. designers. I'd guess that his involvement was limited to the new high-temperature, high-pressure steam plants which his company designed for U.S. warships.

You can bet that I and many others have been hot to find U.S. battleship projects pursued after the Montanas. We have never found anything. I would guess that the Soviets had the world's last battleship design projects, and that the last Western project was the British 1945 battleship. I would guess, too, that it became more and more difficult to design a viable battleship after the Germans demonstrated (in 1943) that they could hit a battleship from high altitude with a guided armor-piercing bomb. Presumably that meant that deck armor had to be comparable to side armor. Unfortunately there is a lot of deck to cover, so that makes for something too big to build -- as witness those weird German projects.

It is certainly true that a lot has unfortunately been lost. But in some cases we seem to have a sense of what existed. For example, the General Board papers seem to have survived intact, with a list of all their studies to give a sense of completeness. There are also a lot of Bureau of Ordnance and Bureau of Ships papers -- so many that they are still not completely explored by researchers. They do, however, fit filing practices which suggest that the relevant bits of the BuShips material are known.

 

[Dilandu]

would guess, too, that it became more and more difficult to design a viable battleship after the Germans demonstrated (in 1943) that they could hit a battleship from high altitude with a guided armor-piercing bomb. Presumably that meant that deck armor had to be comparable to side armor.

Not only that, but also USAAF tests in 1945 of shaped-charge warheads for RAZON guided bomb. "Guided missiles and techniques" of NDRC, 1946, have a description of shaped charge warhead in 1000-pdr bomb body test against a full-scale model of battleship's horizontal protection. The test rig was composed of several layers of armor abd deck plates, with deck-size spaces between them. And the bomb punched through it.

 

[RyanC]

My dear Tizoli, I found that correspondence by accident looking for information on Operation DOWNFALL planning.

Here is the document regarding BB planning

Construction Program: King-Vinson, 1944-1945; James V. Forrestal Papers, Box 120, Folder 11; Public Policy Papers, Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, Princeton University Library Find it online: https://findingaids.princeton.edu/collections/MC051/c04737

MEMORANDUM​

A meeting was held, at 10:15 a.m. on Saturday, 6 January 1945, in the Office of the Secretary of the Navy, Room 2046, Navy Department, Washington, D.C., which was attended by:

Honorable James Forrestal
Honorable Ralph A. Bard
Honorable Carl Vinson
Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King
Vice Admiral F. J. Horne
Vice Admiral S. M. Robinson
Rear Admiral Earle Mills
Captain Donald J. Ramsey

and the following proceedings were had:

ooOoo​

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: We have in service now 23 battleships, of which 10 are modern: 6 Alabamas and 4 Iowas. We have two more Iowas to go. They take a long time to build —

CHAIRMAN VINSON: And. we are building one — we are building two now?

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: Yes.

CHAIRMAN VINSON: And they will finish in ’46 and '47?

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: That is right.

Except for minor improvements in topside battery and the command post and one thing and another like that, basically we can’t make any changes in those ships. In fact they have been marking time; the material is in hand and it is a question now of putting it together. I have discussed the question of whether we could modify the under-water line and increase the protection, but that seems to be impotent. So I think we can check off the battleship position.

CHAIRMAN VINSON: Then your idea would be that in 1947, as we finish the battleships, the two you are building now —

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: Well, we have designs for the future. There is another thing that comes in, that I ought to make mention of at once. We have endeavored to apply this situation, not wishing to get into the refinements, but there are some repeaters here —

CHAIRMAN VINSON: Some what?

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: Some repeaters — repeater ships. So we have set a goal for ourselves of what can be built by the end of 1947.

CHAIRMAN VINSON: That is right.

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: Because we have three years in which to develop new designs, for instance, in the battleship situation. So it seems clear to me that we are not warranted in going any further into the battleship business.

CHAIRMAN VINSON: For the time being —

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: For the time being, yes.

CHAIRMAN VINSON: Then from your viewpoint, when we have the two battleships finished in 1947 you have nothing more in mind now in reference to laying down any new battleships?

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: No. And I understand the crucial thing about this is to get a decision, because the ways are becoming vacant, the material is becoming scarce, manpower is becoming scarce, and if we are to have continuity in shipbuilding program and continuity in employment of the forces building ships, why then we ought not say what we are going to build up to 1950. If we go through ’47 — which is three years — we can at that time pass on it. So I repeat, in my view, we are not warranted in building any more battleships of the type we are now building.

CHAIRMAN VINSON: In connection with that, then, Admiral, our battleship program will just stay what it is?

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: Well, until — unless and until we have the opportunity to get out new and improved designs.

CHAIRMAN VINSON: Well, hasn’t the war developed sufficient facts to justify some modifications or new designs? It takes three years to build a battleship. If we finish the two in ’47, then it would be ’51 before you would get another battleship.

UNDER SECRETARY BARD: Well, in the meantime you would be working on new designs.

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: Well, the 60,000 ton design is pretty well developed.

CHAIRMAN VINSON: It doesn’t take three years to work out the designs.

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: No.

SECRETARY FORRESTAL: Admiral King is referring to this new Gibbs design — 60,000 ton monster.

VICE ADMIRAL HORNE: It was passed by the General Board.

SECRETARY FORRESTAL: But there are some misgivings as to whether that is —

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: Well, the great trouble about that is how you are going to service the thing. It can get into only very limited ports and limited anchorages. It is fine while on the high seas, but it has —

SECRETARY FORRESTAL: How much will it draw? Forty feet?

REAR ADMIRAL MILLS: Thirty-nine feet.

CHAIRMAN VINSON: Well, go to the next category.

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: I think we can answer it, Mr. Secretary, by saying that we are not proposing to build, more than the two battleships now under way

VICE ADMIRAL HORNE: May we put that this way, too, Admiral: particularly in this authorized, tonnage.

REAR ADMIRAL MILLS: Yes, of the 700,000 tons.

CHAIRMAN VINSON: Yes, of course.

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: Well, you wouldn’t get it in '47.

Now, there is this 12" — the next is CB, 12" type, of which two are in commission, and one is building. That will be finished this calendar year, will it not?

REAR ADMIRAL MILLS: Yes, sir.

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: Well, we don’t know enough about that to warrant going out — it is a new type, and I was the proponent of it when I was a member of the General Board, but I don’t think any of us know enough about its usefulness — and a factor in the usefulness of the 12" type is that the Bureau of Ordnance at long last has developed a rapid-fire type of 8" gun which makes the 8" cruisers loom very large again. I don’t think we are warranted in building any more CB's.

CHAIRMAN VINSON: All right. Then we have 18 airplane carriers that will be finished this year —

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: Yes; I will take them — these are cruisers.

CHAIRMAN: I thought you said. CV's — CB’s.

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: Yes, that is CB, the big cruisers.

CHAIRMAN VINSON: Oh, yes, CB. I thought you said. CV. Oh, yes.

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: Now, one of the things that has developed, in talking to the Bureau of Ships, is that on the basis of what can be completed. — not necessarily in service, but completed — we are only talking building figures now, am I right?

REAR ADMIRAL MILLS: Yes.

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: There can only be built 8 new ships of the combatant type, other than the CVE’s, by the end of 1947. We have got that figure to keep in mind. As soon as the ways become vacant —

REAR ADMIRAL MILLS: That is, 7,000 tons or larger.

CHAIRMAN VINSON: You say only 18 combatant ships can be built?

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: By the end of 1947 —

SECRETARY FORRESTAL: Additional —

CHAIRMAN VINSON: In addition to what you are now building?

REAR ADMIRAL MILLS: Yes, sir.

VICE ADMIRAL HORNE: Of 7,000 tons or over.

CHAIRMAN VINSON: That is not what Admiral Cochrane and Admiral Mills told, me the other day. They told me the other day they had ample facilities to lay down a program to take care of practically all of this tonnage.

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: That is true enough, but we are talking of 18 ships of 7,000 tons or over.

CHAIRMAN VINSON: Oh, yes. Yes. Yes.

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: Now, we have building, 3 CVB’s.

Those are the armored deck carriers. They are a new type, and I have a memorandum here from the Bureau of Ships. It says:

“This is a new and advanced design — three keels are down, the first two vessels scheduled for reporting in the fourth quarter of 1945, the third in the third quarter of 1946. No modification of the design is contemplated as all known modifications to meet service experience, such as arrangement of CIC, flag plot and radar equipment and latest gun director control are being incorporated in the three vessels under construction. Two additional vessels of this type, if authorized, would be delivered in the fourth quarter of 1947.”

Well, Mr. Secretary, if we are going to keep in mind keeping the Navy fitted out with modern vessels, there is a new and advanced type of which they can build two more; and if you make a decision I would recommend that we build two more of those carriers, the CVB’s. And I surmise it would be a tight squeeze to get them through —

CHAIRMAN VINSON: CVB —

SECRETARY FORRESTAL: Big carriers, 45,000 tons —

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: Incidentally, they will not pass the locks of the Panama Canal; either have to go around Cape Horn or the Northwest Passage.

CHAIRMAN VINSON: Well, now in connection with that, do you think it is the thing to do, to build any ship that won’t go through the Canal Locks, of any type?

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: Well, I mention that as a factor. I propose keeping my eye fixed now on modern types, the most advanced type we are capable of laying down at the present time, and since the air power is what it is, I think we could lay down two more of the armored deck carrier type, two CVB.

VICE ADMIRAL HORNE: I don’t think there is any doubt but what we have to enlarge the Panama Canal.

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: That is true of the 60,000 ton battleships, they would have to go around.

CHAIRMAN VINSON: That may be a good argument and justification for the Nicaraguan Canal.

VICE ADMIRAL HORNE: Right now the Saratoga can’t go through. In other words, we actually have in commission now ships that can’t go through.

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: Now, we will stick to carriers —

CHAIRMAN VINSON: Yes —

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: We have CV’s — those are 27,000 ton combatant carriers — 17 in commission, 12 building, for a total of 29. Now that type of ship has been very successful, but to build any more of those would be in effect a repeat ship. The Memorandum from the Bureau of Ships says:

“The 27,100 ton Essex type is the latest advanced type under construction and are advanced over the original Essex design in the following features:

“Sectionalized ventilation to permit total splitting of power plant.

“Maximum increased length of flight deck, restoring deck to original length and contour of Essex deck before it was shortened and AA battery increased.

“Flight deck strengthened to handle heavier planes of 25,000 lbs. instead of the original 14,000 lbs.

“Improvement in protection of gasoline storage and inboard gasoline piping systems.

“Improvement of watertight integrity between the third and second decks.

“Incorporation of most recent instructions regarding CIC, flag plot and radar and fire control equipment.

“At present there are 13 of this type — no, 12 — scheduled for completion during 1945 and 1946.”

That is, with all these improvements in them. Twelve already building already have them. We know of nothing more we can do beyond that on that model. It states that “8 CV's of this type can be laid down and delivered between August 1, 1947 and December 31, 1947.” It must be between August ’45 —

VICE ADMIRAL HORNE: No, sir; the first of them wouldn’t be ready until August of ’47.

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: Yes. Well, we have got — at the moment we have, as far as I know, 29 top flight carriers. And I — I don’t know what is going to happen, but I am reluctant to, personally, see as many as 8 additional. I would like to put down here, for the purpose of keeping within this 18 consideration, a tentative figure of 6, which would bring the grand total to 35. But it would be more important to build the others, the CVB's, if we could get them in time. But, allowing for attrition, possibly 6 —

SECRETARY FORRESTAL: Admiral King —

CHAIRMAN VINSON: That is 6 CV’s.

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: That is the Essex type.

CHAIRMAN VINSON: Now, Admiral, on the program of CV’s, the Essex type will go out in 1946?

SECRETARY FORRESTAL: That is right.

VICE ADMIRAL HORNE: In the year ’46 they will be completed.

CHAIRMAN VINSON: All right; then your suggestion would be to continue along that same type in the number of 6?

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: Yes, sir.

CHAIRMAN VINSON: To be laid down when?

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: As soon as we get the general picture and fit it into the availability of ways.

CHAIRMAN VINSON: So that the manpower and so that the ways will not become vacant.

VICE ADMIRAL HORNE: They could be laid down this year.

SECRETARY FORRESTAL: Isn’t it fair to say, Admiral, that some of the operations impending may indicate — may clarify your mind a little bit as to the degree of loss?

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: After all, we have got 29 of them, and the attrition is figured into that. I am holding my breath as to when we lose them. We lost a CVL at Christmas.

CHAIRMAN VINSON: Well, shouldn’t you also take into consideration the damage that puts a large number into dry dock?

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: Well, the general rule is that you have a certain number of ships of a certain type in service, that you should, not count on more than two-thirds of them being available at any one time.

UNDER SECRETARY BARD: That is all figured in.

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: Yes. We have 30 now, and a third of them is 20, and that is a lot to handle. And 6, I think, is an outside figure on using up this.

CHAIRMAN VINSON: When would those 6 be finished?

VICE ADMIRAL HORNE: ’47.

REAR ADMIRAL MILLS: They would come in the last two quarters of 1947.

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: I don’t propose to go to more than 6. They are just repeater ships. And they are good ships of their type of the unarmored flight deck type you can’t beat them. Especially with this list of modern improvements.

Now, next we come to the CVL’s. There are 8 in commission, 2 building.

SECRETARY FORRESTAL: That is the converted cruiser type.

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: Yes, converted cruiser type.

“The CVL contemplated is a new design, of which two units (CVL48 and 49) are now under construction for delivery in December 1945 and February 1946 respectively. The vessels under construction incorporate all the carrier features which service experience with previous types has considered essential. Four additional units can he produced for delivery, — one in the first quarter of 1947 and three in the fourth quarter, 1947.”

Our experience is beginning to show now that they are a very difficult type to deal with. We were trying to convert them to night carriers and we have turned them down now. The decks are too short. Now the principal advantage they have over the CVE type is their speed, and they carry a little larger complement of planes. But from the limitations that they are finding in service, combat experience, etc., I don’t think it is worth laying down any more of them.

VICE ADMIRAL HORNE: I would like to support that, Mr. Secretary. I don’t think we ought to build any more of them.

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: And another thing is we are getting a multiplicity of types. Now, if you consider that the CVB is a new type coming in, you have three types of combatant carriers. I don’t think any more CVL ought to be laid down.

REAR ADMIRAL MILLS: These we are building now are really in the category of replacements.

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: Yes. So I don’t think we ought to build any more CVL’s.

When it comes to CVE’s, of all types and descriptions there are 65 in commission, 21 building, for a grand total of 86. That does not include 8 CVE’s that are now in process of clearance with the White House, and that tonnage, therefore, has not been allocated. That is 8 CVE’s up for consideration in this 700,000 tons.

REAR ADMIRAL MILLS: And that would obligate 96,000 tons if they are approved.

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: Well, I had it roughly 100,000.

SECRETARY FORRESTAL: Those are the merchant-ship carriers.

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: Now, they are the best type we have today; they are called the Sangamon Class. You remember, Mr. Chairman, the old Cimmaron Class, they were 19-knot fast tankers, and we had 12 of them and converted 4 of them about four years ago.

CHAIRMAN VINSON: For that 90,000 tons, how many would you turn out?

REAR ADMIRAL MILLS: Eight.

CHAIRMAN VINSON: That is CVE’s.

REAR ADMIRAL MILLS: That is right.

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: Those ships are really useful.

Now, suppose I take a. little time to point out that we have three different types of CVE’s. We have the Maritime Commission type, which is about 16½ possibly 17 knots. We have these Kaiser types, which are a conglomeration of odds and ends that could be manufactured; and —

SECRETARY FORRESTAL: Those have the Skinner engines.

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: Yes; compound, and all that sort of thing. And those ships are being relegated to ferry duty and possibly training ships; not used for combat where we can avoid it. And then we have this so-called Sangamon class that is just by all odds the best. These 8 are to be in the Sangamon class. I don’t know what speed they are; it was originally 19 knots.

REAR ADMIRAL MILLS: They can make 19 knots.

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: They probably don’t load them down too much.

REAR ADMIRAL MILLS: We figure that under service conditions they are 19-knot ships.

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: That is the way they were supposed to be built.

CHAIRMAN VINSON: Admiral Mills, to go back to the CV’s, the 6, what would be the estimate of the total tonnage?

SECRETARY FORRESTAL: 180,000 tons.

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: CVE, 145,000 —

CHAIRMAN VINSON: And 196 on the CVE —

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: Those are the 27,000 ton —

SECRETARY FORRESTAL: About 160,000 —

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: No, 160-odd now —

SECRETARY FORRESTAL: 170,000 tons.

REAR ADMIRAL MILLS: 165,000.

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: Now, the next type we come to is the heavy cruiser: 17 in commission and 27 building, for a grand total of 44; and of those 44, 8 are the rapid-fire type. Well, what is the tonnage of those, Mills?

REAR ADMIRAL MILLS: They run 17,000.

SECRETARY FORRESTAL: 16,500, aren’t they?

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: Well, I have got 8, to bring it up to 12 — 4 of those. I am still figuring on this 18.

VICE ADMIRAL HORNE: Which are you talking about?

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: CA’s; four more.

CHAIRMAN VINSON: Building 27 of them now, and you propose 4 additional?

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: Four additional. That would give us 12 of these rapid-fire 8-inch. What is that tonnage?

REAR ADMIRAL MILLS: 68,000 total.

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: Now, the next type that we have in hand is this new 6" cruiser, that has 6" double-purpose guns.

CHAIRMAN VINSON: Is that the CL?

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: That is the CL, 6"; 38 in service, 21 building, for a total of 59. And 4 of those building are of the 6" double-purpose type.

SECRETARY FORRESTAL: Is that an extension of the Juneau?

REAR ADMIRAL MILLS: No, sir; this is a modified Cleveland.

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: A modified Cleveland; they have 6" guns and then go to 40mm; they haven’t any 5"/38’s; and that is so highly experimental that I am reluctant to see more than these go along. We will pass that by for Just a moment.

Now we come to the CL 5", of which there are 5 in service, 4 building, for a total of 9.

REAR ADMIRAL MILLS: Sometimes referred to as the antiaircraft cruiser.

SECRETARY FORRESTAL: That is the one I was thinking of.

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: We have 5 in service, 4 building, for a total of 9. These 4 that are building are practically duplicates; they are all alike.

VICE ADMIRAL HORNE: They will be completed in the first half of ‘46.

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: Now they have a 5" CL:

“This is a new and improved design, the basic characteristics of which have been submitted to the General Board for consideration. The design contemplates the installation of twelve 5"/54 cal. guns in six twin mounts, steeple arrangement and increased speed over CL95 class. This design requires complete hull and machinery plans and provision of a new machinery plant and new main battery mounts.

Four of this type can be undertaken for completion, — two in the second quarter and two in the third quarter of 1947. Due to the increase in size and weight of the 5" battery, over the present 5" cruiser construction, it will require an increase in displacement to about 7200 tons. An interim program, CL119 to 121, with lowered silhouette and improved arrangement of heavy machine gun battery is now under construction.”

SECRETARY FORRESTAL: Will that 54 caliber give greater range?

REAR ADMIRAL MILLS: Oh, yes. Greater slant range too.

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: I would prefer going to that instead of this 6-inch. The gun has been developed. Now, the way I feel, in trying to balance this thing up, I would rather have 6 of these 7,000 tonners in this picture than I would double these 6-inch with the double-purpose guns.

VICE ADMIRAL HORNE: I would, too.

CHAIRMAN VINSON: Now, what would be the tonnage?

REAR ADMIRAL MILLS: I think you better allow for that, 7,500 tons — that would be 45,000 tons.

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: That is what I have got.

Now, Let’s go back on the 18. You are proposing here 2 CVB, 6 CV's, is 8; 4 CA’s, is 12. That is the rapid-fire. And 6 of these 7,000-ton anti-aircraft. There is your 18; which is what can he built, laid down and built by the end of 1947. The 8 CVE's are not in that limitation picture. Is that correct, Mills?

REAR ADMIRAL MILLS: That is right.

FLEET ADMIRAL KING-: Now, when you total that up and include the 8 CVE’s, you get —

REAR ADMIRAL MILLS: 464,000 tons.

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: I got it roughly 470,000.

Now, the next combatant type is Destroyers. And on that the Bureau of Ships says:

“The present destroyer program of a lengthened 2200-ton destroyer of greater radius extends through the first two quarters of 1946, with 128 units scheduled for delivery during 1945 and the first half of 1946. Due to the heavier loading on these ships and the desire to obtain a destroyer with better flank speed to screen the Iowa class and the Essex class of carrier, the Bureau has submitted to the General Board for consideration an improved design destroyer of approximately 3,000 tons standard displacement which, while having no greater armament, would have speed of 37 knots in full-load condition, with cruising radius equivalent to that of the present destroyer.”

SECRETARY FORRESTAL: That is about a 7,000 mile destroyer.

REAR ADMIRAL MILLS: 6,400.

FLEET ADMIRAL KING:

“This is an entirely new design, requiring complete hull and machinery plans and the creation of a new machinery plant of 80,000 H.P. in place of the existing 60,000 H.P. plant. It is considered to be impracticable to complete this design and produce improved units before the 1st of January 1947, and if an extended destroyer program is authorized, the Bureau proposes to recommend that two-thirds of the program be of the existing lengthened 2200-ton type for delivery in 1946, the remaining third to be of the improved design for delivery starting the first quarter of 1947. This maintenance of some units of the existing design is essential to keep the destroyer building yards in production pending availability of such improved design as may be authorized.”

So that, hanging in the balance, now, I have put down here tentatively 36 more destroyers, and I averaged them out at 2500 tons —

SECRETARY FORRESTAL: That is 90,000 tons.

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: Now, let’s get that clear. Even if the General Board approves this, you see you are getting nothing except 37-knot speed. When I was on the General Board the 2100-ton destroyer was supposed to be a 38-knotter. But they started decorating it up like a Christmas tree and. the speed went down. I haven’t any argument on this at all, because the Iowa and Hornet classes are 33 knots, and. you have to have — one time they wanted. 10 knots in excess of the speed of those ships. Well, from my own personal experience you can’t get those ships up to 33 knots all of a sudden, and you can’t run long at it. It is only a burst if you got on more than 30 knots.

Now, here is another example that ought to be borne in mind. The Alabama or North Carolina Class, the 35,000 tonners, they give them something over 27 knots. The Iowa has nothing more except the speed is pushed to 33 knots and the displacement run up to 45,000.

Now you are pushing this displacement to gain nothing but speed, and not much of that.

REAR ADMIRAL MILLS: You are really holding your own.

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: They really make about 35.

REAR ADMIRAL MILLS: Yes, sir.

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: Now these 2250-ton destroyers, the Frank Knox type, are pretty fine ships. And it is staggering now what they displace when they are loaded. They can hardly be called, destroyers any more. They are young cruisers.

REAR ADMIRAL MILLS: 3250 tons loaded.

SECRETARY FORRESTAL: What is the beam?

REAR ADMIRAL MILLS: About 38 feet, Sir.

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: Now, let’s look at these 2300-ton ships —

SECRETARY FORRESTAL: What is the over-all length?

REAR ADMIRAL MILLS: 336.

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: There are 128 of these 2300 tonners scheduled for delivery in ’45 and the first of *46.

SECRETARY FORRESTAL: 128.

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: Yes. And I don’t think it is wise to put down more than 36 in addition, which would be on the order of 90,000 tons.

CHAIRMAN VINSON: May I ask one question, Admiral, if this one type you have in mind, classified as the Frank Knox type — is that the same type that went down in the typhoon?

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: No, sir.

CHAIRMAN VINSON: I want to make this observation in reference to destroyers —

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: Well, excuse me, just a minute. We have in commission 372, building 132, for a total of 504. And that does not include those that have been converted to special types, such as DM, APD, AG, or AVD. Those are straight out destroyers — 504 in sight.

CHAIRMAN VINSON: Now, my observation in reference to destroyers — and I have been over it for a great many years.

The destroyer program has always been out of line with the other program. I have always been of the opinion that destroyers are far in excess of what you actually needed for a well balanced team. So that my views about the destroyer program that has been in vogue for a long time, and the reason why we have always built more destroyers than anything else, is you can build them quicker.

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: And cheaper.

CHAIRMAN VINSON: Yes.

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: Well, this is a very modest increase, and it leaves us some leeway.

CHAIRMAN VINSON: All right.

REAR ADMIRAL MILLS: I would like to — Admiral King, with your permission, I would like to correct the Chairman in one respect. He is overlooking one fact entirely, and that is we couldn’t have carried on our anti-submarine campaign without destroyers.

VICE ADMIRAL ROBINSON: The Deputy Commander in Chief told me the other day, Mr. Vinson, that destroyers was one type of ship we never got enough of.

CHAIRMAN VINSON: On the theory that you can get them quick and they don’t cost much.

VICE ADMIRAL ROBINSON: No, no.

CHAIRMAN VINSON: All right, then, Admiral King, you propose 36 of that type of DD’s.

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: Yes. We certainly don’t want to build any more DE's.

CHAIRMAN VINSON: No. That is out of the program.

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: Well, I am just calling the roll as we go along.

CHAIRMAN VINSON: Yes.

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: Now, submarines. We have 240 in service, 62 building, for a total of 302. Now, the Bureau of Ships says:

“The present submarine program covering vessels of approximately 1570 tons displacement extends into the early part of the third quarter of 1946, with deliveries, starting in May of 1945, reduced to approximately one-half of the present monthly rate. The Bureau is now preparing characteristic studies of an improved design of submarine to incorporate the characteristics recommended by the Chief of Naval Operations, involving primarily increased surface speed, increase in number and diameter of torpedo tubes and a slight increase in safe operating submerged depth. To incorporate these improved features would require an increase in displacement and length of the submarine to a vessel of about 1800 tons displacement, with an increased length of about 20 feet. These studies are not sufficiently complete for submission to the General Board for discussion. If such a design is authorized, it will require approximately two years to develop the plans and to obtain the increased horsepower main engines; and delivery of the first of the improved designs cannot be expected before the first quarter of 1947. In case an extended submarine program is authorized, the Bureau would recommend construction of three-fourths of the present type for delivery in 1946, the remaining fourth to be of the improved type for delivery in the first two quarters of 1947.”

Mr. Secretary, I can’t go along with building any more of the present type. I am very much interested in this improved type myself, but we hove gone over that forwards and backwards. I am very much interested in the thing. I have been exploring it. I recently sent out word to Nimitz that I was wondering what we were going to do with all the submarines we had in service if the Japanese shipping went down and the Japanese fleet went out of business, and I made three proposals. One was that we place all the older type submarines in training — and that is being done gradually — and that they be used more extensively for reconnaissance, although they are in use incident to that a good deal. And, thirdly, that submarines by squadrons be placed at the disposal of the technical command, such as Halsey or Spruance or McCain or what-not. Well, he demurred, because submariners are a peculiar kind of people. They wanted me to approve it, but I didn’t.

The reason I bring this up really is to show that I am concerned lest we have a surplus of submarines of this type. Now I am agreeable to exploring the new type which is not yet developed for presentation to the General Board. If that can be expedited, on that ground, I think we could perfectly well start with a group of 12 of the new type, because inevitably what they call, in aviation at least, bugs will develop, and I wouldn’t want to lay down any more of them than that at the present time.

CHAIRMAN VINSON: But you would advocate the new type?

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: Yes, but they can’t begin those before 1947.

REAR ADMIRAL MILLS: That is our No. 1 design problem right now.

CHAIRMAN VINSON: All right.

VICE ADMIRAL HORNE: I would like to call attention to the fact that there will be at the end of 1945 only 16 submarines to be built on the present program. I am thinking about the submarine yards.

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: Well, if we have only got 12 coming up they will just have to back up, that is all.

REAR ADMIRAL MILLS: It would be pretty hard, Admiral King, to retain a suitable nucleus of personnel at the submarine yards under those conditions.

CHAIRMAN VINSON: Now, let me clear that up. In 1945 —

REAR ADMIRAL MILLS: There will be 47 completed in '45.

CHAIRMAN VINSON: Forty-seven completed in ’45, and then the program runs out in the third quarter of '46.

REAR ADMIRAL MILLS: That is right, but at the end of '45 there will only be 16 left to be completed.

VICE ADMIRAL HORNE: That is the reason I brought it up, because I wanted to get the effect there would be on the shipbuilding yards.

REAR ADMIRAL MILLS: We are not trying to maintain Manitowoc at all. They will just fold up. It will have to go out. Also, it is in a good commercial location and they will shift over rapidly to commercial business. We ought to keep two yards.

SECRETARY FORRESTAL: There is this about Manitowoc — I think you are right economically, but psychologically it would be a good thing if you could have submarines building in the heart of the country.

REAR ADMIRAL MILLS: I won’t argue that point.

CHAIRMAN VINSON: Well, the question arises as to what you will do with the other two yards after the first quarter of 1946.

REAR ADMIRAL MILLS: That question answers itself though, Mr. Secretary. Manitowoc can’t build the improved, type of submarine; you can’t get them out of the Lake.

CHAIRMAN VINSON: Now from Admiral King’s point of view we will not be justified in carrying beyond the third quarter of ’46 the building of the present type. He offers that new type being developed that will probably be able to lay down in the first quarter of 1947. Now the question arises as to what is going to become of those establishments building submarines.

SECRETARY FORRESTAL: That is the question all right.

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: If it will be of any help to that situation, my own inclination is to stretch out what you are now building.

CHAIRMAN VINSON: Well, that increases the cost.

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: No, it means they gradually let down their force.

SECRETARY FORRESTAL: You have to be mindful a little bit, Mr. Vinson, of the general manpower situation. As we get the impact of these new drafts for the Army we are going to have a very tight position on manpower in this country all year.

VICE ADMIRAL HORNE: You say it would take two years before we have the designs ready.

REAR ADMIRAL MILLS: We will be starting construction of those —

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: The first of ‘47.

REAR ADMIRAL MILLS: Well, I should say in the last quarter of 1946 we would get construction started. We can get components, of course, on order much before that. But there is a lot of developmental work with that engine; that is one of the unknown factors.

SECRETARY FORRESTAL: What is the power of those subs?

REAR ADMIRAL MILLS: 8600 as against 8400.

SECRETARY FORRESTAL: Is that going to take a HOR engine?

REAR ADMIRAL MILLS: No; Fairbanks-Morse “suped” up with a General Motors development.

VICE ADMIRAL ROBINSON: As a matter of fact, four submarines would fill that gap, two at each yard would fill that gap.

VICE ADMIRAL HORNE: In the last quarter of 1946.

REAR ADMIRAL MILLS: Yes; so that you wouldn’t have any hiatus there at all. You see, they have already tapered off those deliveries to such a small number, that a couple more boats —

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: Well, I would go along with that.

REAR ADMIRAL MILLS: Six is the figure I had in mind.

CHAIRMAN VINSON: In other words, make your program end up at the end of 1946 instead of the third quarter of '46, with two at each — four additional.

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: Two at each, place.

CHAIRMAN VINSON: And then 12 of the new type to be laid down just as soon as you. get your design.

SECRETARY FORRESTAL: Now, let’s recap that, Admiral King.

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: Now, here is what this ends up building:

2 CVB’s; those are the most advanced type of carriers we have.

CHAIRMAN VINSON: That is 2 —

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: That is 90,000 tons. And 6 CV's of the latest type, and of the unarmored deck type we have got —

CHAIRMAN VINSON: How many tons? That would be the Essex type?

SECRETARY FORRESTAL: That is 165,000 tons.

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: 165,000.

CHAIRMAN VINSON: All right.

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: Eight CVE's, we still have to get clearance on that.

SECRETARY FORRESTAL: That is 100,000 tons —

REAR ADMIRAL MILLS: That is CVE's —

SECRETARY FORRESTAL: CVE's, Escort Carriers.

REAR ADMIRAL MILLS: 100,000 tons.

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: Four rapid-fire 8" cruisers.

SECRETARY FORRESTAL: CA's.

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: CA's. That brings the total up to 12 of them.

CHAIRMAN VINSON: Now, you classify that as a heavy cruiser?

REAR ADMIRAL MILLS: Yes, heavy, 8" cruisers.

CHAIRMAN VINSON: That is four — 75,000 tons.

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: And 6 of the 7,200-ton 5" CL's.

REAR ADMIRAL MILLS: Call that 45,000 tons, Sir.

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: Yes. Thirty-six destroyers at an average of 2,500 tons — is 90,000 tons of destroyers. And about 30,000 tons of submarines; that is 6 more repeats and 12 new.

CHAIRMAN VINSON: What does that make the total come to?

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: I have about 590,000.

REAR ADMIRAL MILLS: That is about right.

CHAIRMAN VINSON: That is about right. Now this program could all easily be gotten under way, except the 12 submarines.

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: Well, the new type of 5" CL, there would be a little delay on that, but that is a question — that comes in that 18 of 7,000 tons or over which calls for the Bureau of Ships to space their laying down, and they will have to work that out.

CHAIRMAN VINSON: Then that would be — that would leave a leeway of 127,000 tons, still.

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: Yes, sir. And this same kind of process could be gone through from time to time as appropriate, and I am bound to say I think it is in keeping with keeping the Navy modernized.

Now except for the Essex type, we lay great stress here on the very latest thing that is in sight. There is very great doubt in my mind about the 3,000-ton destroyers, but we have got to angle to the windward there, because we have averaged it out, so that we would have — we would bring ourselves to these totals:

25 battleships, of which 12 will be modern battleships with 6 North Carolinas and 6 Iowas;

3 12" cruisers;

5 of the armored-deck carriers;

35 of the Essex type carriers;

10 CVL's;

94 CVE's;

48 8" cruisers;

59 6" cruisers;

15 of the 5" cruisers;

540 destroyers;

386 destroyer escort vessels; and

318 submarines.

Now —

SECRETARY FORRESTAL: Forty-eight CA's, isn’t it?

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: Forty-eight CA's, yes, sir.

SECRETARY FORRESTAL: And how many CL's?

REAR ADMIRAL MILLS: Fifty-nine.

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: Fifty-nine of the 6".

SECRETARY FORRESTAL: And. how many 5"?

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: Fifteen of the 5".

CHAIRMAN VINSON: Now, outside —

SECRETARY FORRESTAL: About 550 destroyers —

REAR ADMIRAL MILLS: 540.

CHAIRMAN VINSON: Outside of the submarines, then, all except 12 of the submarines can be laid down in a very short time.

REAR ADMIRAL MILLS: Yes, sir, to work in with the present program.

CHAIRMAN VINSON: To work in with the present program,

REAR ADMIRAL MILLS: Yes, sir.

CHAIRMAN VINSON: And there will be no slack-up in the yards.

REAR ADMIRAL MILLS: Not below what we have already planned to carry along. I would like to round that figure of submarines off, if you have no objection, Admiral King: you have this checked down as 318. Make that 320, in order to place them if we find it necessary.

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: Then you are going on repeaters from 4 up to 6.

REAR ADMIRAL MILLS: Yes, sir.

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: Well, I would say that is the limit then.

REAR ADMIRAL MILLS: Yes, sir.

SECRETARY FORRESTAL: What is the average cost of a submarine?

REAR ADMIRAL MILLS: It runs now about $5 million.

SECRETARY FORRESTAL: Does it really?

REAR ADMIRAL MILLS: Yes, sir.

CHAIRMAN VINSON: Well, Mr. Secretary, that looks like a good, forward program to keep the Navy abreast of the most modern improvements and at the same time to keep the yards and the unlimited resources of the country being utilized in the prosecution of the war. Admiral King and Staff here, that is a good, healthy program, because it gives you a leeway of 127,000 tons, and you always have to have a leeway. The only question that runs in my mind is when should Congress authorize tonnage again, because we don’t want to wait until the end of the war to continue a shipbuilding program. We have got to have a shipbuilding program.

SECRETARY FORRESTAL: We want tonnage available to build new stuff.

CHAIRMAN VINSON: I would say we shouldn’t do that until sometime in 1946.

VICE ADMIRAL HORNE: I think that would be much better.

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: I have one more observation to make. As long as we are going into this thing, I would like to read the Bureau of Ships' notation about CVE’s:

“The eight CVE's show are the eight CVE's for which a directive to build has already been approved. These vessels were scheduled to be a follow-on program to the existing program of 23 vessels now under construction, — 18 of which are due for delivery in 1945 and four in the first quarter of 1946. The 23 vessels now under construction are an improved design, based upon the features obtained in the conversion of four tankers of the Cimmaron type into CVE’s. The major improvements incorporated in the 105 to 127 class are a subdivision of the machinery spaces to obtain split-plant operation, improvement in the gasoline system, and a redesign of the hangar deck to permit better utilization of the space between the hangar and original main deck. The first of the 105 class has just reported to the Fleet and it is not contemplated that any modifications of the design will be needed. These additional CVE’s are scheduled for delivery during the third and fourth quarters of 1946.”

Well, I am willing to go the whole hog and propose we put the number of CVE’s from 8 to 12. That is another 50,000 tons.

CHAIRMAN VINSON: That will leave about 80,000 tons then.

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: Yes.

CHAIRMAN VINSON: That is CVE's now.

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: Yes. That will depend on Mr. Kaiser. And I am going to have all this stuff on my desk when he comes to see me. Now, that is a repeater type, but there isn’t much we can do with this. I think we would do well to increase that from 8 to 12.

SECRETARY FORRESTAL: What will this do to the authorized strength of personnel of the Navy?

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: Well, I have a memorandum on that, but my answer on that — I suppose I better read it —

VICE ADMIRAL HORNE: Well, It won’t do anything for some time.

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: No. The personnel required to man the number of vessels will be 3,312 officers and 52,000 enlisted men.

Mr. Secretary, I would just put the older types out of commission, give them to the South Americans, or something like that.

CHAIRMAN VINSON: What do you call old types?

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: The older types — Omaha class of cruisers, for instance —

CHAIRMAN VINSON: You wouldn’t put them out of commission during the war, though?

REAR ADMIRAL MILLS: You will have to; they are going to run themselves out. They are having difficulty keeping them running now.

CHAIRMAN VINSON: Well, you don’t want to give them away, you may want to tie them up.

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: Well, I am going to get into another subject now, if I may, Mr. Secretary. In looking to the future here, stating it in the broadest terms, it seems to me that we have got to have a Navy in commission comprising the most modern types. We will have a certain number in reserve, and I am in favor of taking the oldest types and junking them. They cost money to maintain, and you are just fooling yourself that you have got something. That will apply to the Omaha class, for instance, and particularly the older battleships and the old 1200 ton destroyers — Just a lot of junk.

REAR ADMIRAL MILLS: Aren’t some of our earlier cruisers getting to the doubtful stage?

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: Oh, yes, the Salt Lake City and some of those. But I Just want to say, Mr. Vinson, it gave me an opportunity to say that when the time comes to settle on a post-war Navy, I hope and trust we do not keep a lot of this junk on hand. Break it up for scrap.

CHAIRMAN VINSON: That is one of the reasons that prompted me —

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: We will be in a better position then,

Mr. Vinson, which you know better than I do, to ask to keep the Navy up-to-date.

SECRETARY FORRESTAL: Keep new types.

CHAIRMAN VINSON: And that very reason prompted me in coming down here asking for a constant building program. Of course we want a Navy of the most modern ships man can develop, but at the same time, while the war is on, an old ship may sometimes be able to run a very effective mission, as I have read, with much interest what the Navy has to say about the Texas, Arkansas, and other old ships. Why, of course, later on we want to get rid of them in some capacity. Now I don’t know whether we want to get rid of them to the extent that they will be scrapped, but we don’t want them ever to be charged against a modern Navy.

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: That is right. The point I was trying to make, Mr. Vinson, is that if there comes a question of manpower on account of this increase in building program, I don’t think I would hesitate at all to recommend, that we put those older types out of commission. We wouldn’t scrap them at that time. But if it is a manpower squeeze, that is the only answer.

CHAIRMAN VINSON: Of course, that is true, if you have got something more effective it is the proper place to put the men, but it would be a terrible situation if the manpower situation reaches the point where we can’t arm what we have got building.

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: Well, the area out there is contracting, and we hope to decrease it more and more. That means the attrition will go up. Thanks to your initiative, Mr. Chairman, with this increase in the building program — to which I don’t think anyone could take exception —

THE SECRETARY: We can defend that —

CHAIRMAN VINSON: Well, this program will get under way immediately, so that —

VICE ADMIRAL HORNE: Well, excuse me — this program will have to be put up to the President —

CHAIRMAN VINSON: Oh, I understand that.

VICE ADMIRAL HORNE: We will get those papers up right away.

CHAIRMAN VINSON: Yes. Yes. Now, will you give me a statement of that tonnage and all, Admiral, so that I can file it?

VICE ADMIRAL HORNE: Yes. Will it be all right if I send him a copy of the letter?

SECRETARY FORRESTAL: Yes, sure.

CHAIRMAN VINSON: Then you will have something like about 80,000 or 90,000 tons remaining.

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: Yes.

REAR ADMIRAL MILLS: That is right.

FLEET ADMIRAL KING: We have got some leeway.

CHAIRMAN VINSON: Thank you very much.

00O00​

​

 

[RyanC]

This is somewhat strange, because for major warships the USN did its own basic designs. Gibbs sometimes tried to sell his own, but he was generally rebuffed -- in connection with a 1952 carrier, the BuShips designers wrote that 'he still has amateur status' (it was an Olympic year). He would not have had the slightest idea of USN thinking about underwater or other protection, as these ideas were closely held. Saying that 'we have our own designs' for the future is also odd, because no one has found the relevant BuShips designs, at least yet. Too, battleships did not figure in the projected late-war programs, apart from continued work on the two last Iowas. All of this makes me wonder where the King-Forrestal discussion was found.

I think they weren't quite fully developed designs -- they were more of what we would call "Springsharp" (i.e that computer program) level -- lots of dirty paper, some rough sketches and estimates.

Remember that Norman Friedman did the majority of his research nearly 35 years ago, and has been coasting off the copies and notes he made back then.

They were starting to conceptualize the "future fleet" by 1944-1945, as a lot of technological advances were now clear; and it was clear that the 1939-1940 designed fleet (with some refreshes in 1942-1943) was hopelessly outdated by 1945.

For example, a SHIPALT memo I found at NARA dated 25 July 1945 authorized for the early CL-55 Cleveland class the following mods:

Replacing armored doors in conning tower with light plate doors
Replacing the armored doors in radio I with joiner doors.

To save 0.7 tons of weight and 40 foot-tons of momentum.

That's how tight things were in 1945 for the 1940 designs.

An all new design dated 1945-1946 would enable a lot of margin that was destroyed to be restored -- especially important in light of "Halsey's Typhoon" revealing how dangerous some of our topweight was.

 

[RyanC]

Too, battleships did not figure in the projected late-war programs, apart from continued work on the two last Iowas. All of this makes me wonder where the King-Forrestal discussion was found.

I believe some context is needed. This discussion was in SECNAV's office on 6 January 1945.

At this time, it's around December 1944 - January 1945. In Europe, the German War is raging on. The German collapse that looked inevitable suddenly reversed itself on 16 December 1945 with Unternehmen Wacht am Rhein; making it look like the War in Europe might drag on to possibly Summer 1945.

If Germany doesn't fall until late Summer 1945, it hopelessly dislocates US planning for the PTO (see attachment). I made a typo in that graph (labelled "V-J Day" as "V-E Day") but you can see how the longer Germany survives, the higher the probability of WW2 lasting into 1947 is).

The US has taken the Philippines in the Fall of 1944 and encountered the Kamikaze in it's first form. Wiki claims for the Leyte Gulf area: In total, seven carriers were hit, as well as 40 other ships (five sunk, 23 heavily damaged, and 12 moderately damaged) and about 2000 attempts during that phase.

Hence why we saw the FY1945 Fleet Program (2 x CVB, 6 x CV, 12 x CVE, 4 x CA, 6 x CL, 36 x DD, 18 x SS, 84 x total combatants) approved by FDR in one of his last major policy decisions -- as "fleet insurance"; i.e. pay for these ships now when they're at their cheapest, thanks to wartime wage restrictions in the shipyards and mass production of spare parts for all the components of the ships; and use them to replace hypothetical 1945-1946 (or 1947) war damaged ships in the post-war fleet; instead of spending $$$ to repair them.

However, by March 1945, the 1945 Combatant program was all but killed.

What changed by March 1945?

1.) Germany was pretty much done

Atlas of the World Battle Fronts in Semimonthly Phases to August 15 1945 - Wikisource, the free online library

en.wikisource.org

March 1, 1945 Front Lines

Atlas of the World Battle Fronts in Semimonthly Phases to August 15 1945 - Wikisource, the free online library

en.wikisource.org

March 15, 1945 front lines

This meant that an enormous amount of ASW resources in the Atlantic could be freed up and either decommissioned, or sent to the Pacific as replacements for damaged ships.

In the Pacific, Iwo Jima was ten days away from being secured (26 March 1945), while Okinawa was about to launch in about 15 days (1 April 1945.

Scheduled vs actual losses in warships were probably running lower than estimates.

This led to the decision to kill everything but the CVE section of the FY1945 program.