At the end of World War Two the RN had the elegant Town and Colony Class cruisers in service and was to add the Minotaur and Tiger classes to them.
The cruisers were useful ships but could not be converted easily to missile ships like their US counterparts.
They lingered longer than was probably wise. The Superb/Swiftsure conversions were botched. The three Tiger class arrived too late for their original role and their helicopter conversions were expensive and dubious.
What could have been done better with these ships which the RN valued so much.
Frankly, nothing. Royal Navy desperatedly needed something at least remotely capable of protecting the carriers against Soviet jet bombers. The Tiger's were the only units that could be put into service in late 1950s.
The only realistic alternate possibility that I could imagine is the RN decision to buy American RIM-2 Terrier missiles in 1950s as stopgap measure, and fitting them on still-in-construction Tiger's in place of rear turret. Or RN deciding that "screw safety, we need it now!" and put an original - liquid-fuel - Seaslug into service by late 50s.
Are we talking about the Minotaurs that were Colony class-derived, or the projected ones with the Tiger turrets which were never actually built? I assume the former.
IIRC the Clevelands were always a "tight" conversion and only the Baltimores were really roomy and easy to turn into missile boats - but the Baltimores had the advantage of not needing to conform to Treaty restrictions. I remember reading that converting a Fiji into a Seaslug ship would cost it everything but A turret, and while this was also what happened to some of the Clevelands, the RN thought it not worth the trouble - not to mention that the surviving hulls had all seen better days.
The helicopter conversions were the worst waste of money. I suppose they could have been given Exocet to supplement their gun armament, but an area-defence missile system that isn't Standard SM-1 doesn't seem to be an option for timeline reasons. You might theoretically fit Sea Dart in place of the aft twin 6-inch, but that system didn't go to sea until 1973, by which time the ships are too old.
The climate is nice in South America and they love a big gun cruiser, one each to India and Pakistan, maybe the Shah needs a new Royal Yacht? Turkey or Greece maybe to bolster Med defences.
The climate is nice in South America and they love a big gun cruiser, one each to India and Pakistan, maybe the Shah needs a new Royal Yacht? Turkey or Greece maybe to bolster Med defences.
I think the rest of the world had swallowed enough ex-RN cruisers by 1960.
1948 - Achilles to India as Delhi. Not decommissioned until 1978 then scrapped.
1948 - Aurora to China as Chungking. Taken over by Communists in 1949 and sunk later that year.
1948 - Bellona to RNZN until 1956
1948 - Black Prince to RNZN. Scrapped 1962.
1956 - Royalist modernised modified Dido to RNZN. Scrapped 1967.
1956 - Diadem to Pakistan.
1957 - Nigeria to India. Paid off in 1985 after spending last 10 years as a training ship.
1960 - Ceylon to Peru. Paid off for disposal in 1982
1960 - Newfoundlaand to Peru. Scrapped 1979.
In 1973 & 1976 Peru picked up the two Dutch De Zeven Provincien class cruisers. DZP had been refitted with Terrier aft but that was stripped out before transfer. Technology transfer issues perhaps? Looks like pre-helicopter carrier conversion Tigers would have been too early for them as replacements for Ceylon & Newfoundland.
Chile, Argentina and Brazil were all firmly in the US pocket each receiving a pair of Brooklyn class in 1951 under MDAP.
Chile picked up the Swedish Tre Kroner class, Gota Lejon, in 1971 scrapped 1984. Any interest Chile might have had in the Tigers was in the late 1970s / early 1980s. Instead they picked up the 4 Batch 2 County class destroyers between 1982 & 1987. Newer and a lot less demanding of manpower.
By the mid-1960s these old WW2 British cruisers were not wanted as they were just sitting targets for SSMs like Styx. India and Egypt were sinking WW2 era destroyers with them by then. Add to that the financial woes of many of these prospective customer nations at different times between the 1960s and 1980s.
Until the threat of the Soviet Sverdlov class class emerged in the early 1950s, the cruiser in the postwar period was largely without a role. Many of its traditional functions had been taken over by aircraft. Defence of the fleet was having to take place at longer ranges than 6" guns were capable of tackling. Really all that was left for them was showing the flag around the Commonwealth. And they were costly to man for that role. Even as a Sverdlov killer, cruisers were simply seen as a stopgap. The solution was seen to be an aircraft to Naval Staff Requirement NA-39 issued in 1952, arond the time the first Svedlov completed. And that was flying before the decade was out.
From what I know about the limited funds the RN had to work with post-war I don't know if they'd be able to do much better.
Maybe if you go back to WWII and build fewer of the Crown Colony and Swiftsure class cruisers and instead put that money towards a few larger cruisers like the unbuilt Neptune (1944) class. Yet would require such a decision to be made in the time period of the war when the UK was at the greatest risk. During that time the RN understandably wanted more ships sooner even if they were smaller and built to "war emergency" standards.
Seems like that. Peru was quite... pro-Soviet at roughly this time, and I think, the idea of selling Terrier to pro-Soviet nation wasn't well-received in USA.
Until the threat of the Soviet Sverdlov class class emerged in the early 1950s, the cruiser in the postwar period was largely without a role. Many of its traditional functions had been taken over by aircraft. Defence of the fleet was having to take place at longer ranges than 6" guns were capable of tackling. Really all that was left for them was showing the flag around the Commonwealth. And they were costly to man for that role. Even as a Sverdlov killer, cruisers were simply seen as a stopgap. The solution was seen to be an aircraft to Naval Staff Requirement NA-39 issued in 1952, arond the time the first Svedlov completed. And that was flying before the decade was out.
To be frank, the "Sverdlov killer" role was basically invented by Royal Navy to justify the maintaining of cruiser fleet. One thing USSR truly never ever planned to do is to launch any kind of surface commerce raiders against British communications. Soviet admirals were highly critical about German surface raiding campaing during WW2, arguing that submarines and long-range bombers represent order of magnitude more efficient way to attack enemy shipping. So essentially, all efforts RN put in "Sverdlov problem" were efforts wasted against exactly one threat that RN was not going to face anyway...
I use to think the Toulon 1942 scuttling (while certainly a complete heartbreak in the short term) was a boon in 1945 and beyond.
Algerie Dunkerque Foch Dupleix BC and CA plus a whole bunch of CL were wiped clean.
The one and only useful big hull to survive was the De Grasse, and it could never get an helicopter nor a MASURCA. So the brand new Colbert and Jeanne d'Arc were loosely derived from that hull shape... and France was done for cruisers and for good.
Still France managed to waste the two Richelieus battlewagons - although they did not sailed a lot nor fired their guns - except a few rounds at Suez in 1956. And then they went into storage and scrapping.
Shame the Jean Bart couldn't be finished as a carrier, but the odds against it were too strong.
I use to think the Toulon 1942 scuttling (while certainly a complete heartbreak in the short term) was a boon in 1945 and beyond.
Algerie Dunkerque Foch Dupleix BC and CA plus a whole bunch of CL were wiped clean.
I use to think the Toulon 1942 scuttling (while certainly a complete heartbreak in the short term) was a boon in 1945 and beyond.
Algerie Dunkerque Foch Dupleix BC and CA plus a whole bunch of CL were wiped clean.
I thank Archibald for the comparison with the other major Western European Navy . We have done this together in a number of threads. I also thank Dilandu for his insights on the Swerdlow threat.
I think the words you want here are 'the best is the enemy of good enough.' The Cleveland conversions are relevant, because they involved cutting away the after superstructure and building what amounted to a hangar to house the missile system. I'd bet that the same thing could have been done to a 'Colony' class cruiser. It would have given the RN more Seaslug platforms earlier, assuming Seaslug could have been made to work (I suspect it could have). I wonder whether the RN was worried about boilers going bad and even wartime hull material deteriorating. I have never seen official documents discussing the state of the fleet in terms of maintainability. There may also be a connection to the state of the Royal Dockyards, another subject not much discussed.
On the Sverdlovs, they were leftovers from Stalin's fleet program. I don't know what influence anyone had on that, but remember that Stalin also wanted battleships and super-heavy cruisers. They died with him. Very soon after Stalin died, Khrushchev, and presumably others from the top, watched an air-launched missile blow up an old cruiser in the Black Sea. Khrushchev wrote later that he wanted to get rid of the Sverdlovs; his admirals managed to keep some of them (barely) alive, I suspect for presence. I'd have to look, but I think that Sverdlovs not nearly complete in 1954-55 died. The Soviets were interested in missile conversions, but apart from one ship they went nowhere. The RN (and, I think, Stalin) remembered the effect of German surface ships on the Arctic convoys. I also suspect that the early postwar RN was insufficiently air-minded, partly because it was never allowed (by the RAF) to consider attacking shore targets. So it could not play the way the USN did, and the main justification for the postwar fleet was ASW. The cruiser retention of the 1960s came out of analysis that the future would be 'warm' warfare on the Eurasian periphery. I think the cruisers were liked because they could carry landing parties and could provide them with fire support.
And, yes, the RN would have been better off operationally if it had bought Terrier -- but also if it had stuck with Seaslug and fixed it (and kept Seaslug ships going a lot longer). The 1950 Terrier deal was killed because it would have killed the nascent British missile industry. That raises other questions about British industrial policy -- should the country have tried to maintain a full-spectrum defense industry, or whether it should have chosen to emphasize particular areas. The full-spectrum idea presumably helped force the 1957 Defence Review, which was intended to cut back to something affordable. That raises all sorts of questions about how British industry would have worked best, and whether the best way would have been some sort of collaboration (Canadians and, to a lesser extent, Australians, may have some strong feelings about this).
Remember also that there was not only a money cruch but a serious manpower crunch, particularly after National Service died. From about 1958 on, British fleet plans were couched in terms of available or expected manpower, as in the '80 Plan,' which assumed 80,000 naval personnel.
Do we have to do this again?
Where we go over the facts.
That UK had developed a functional SAM during WWII. Brakemine.
That the team was broken up afterwards.
That Seaslug worked.
That Seaslug was subject to a protracted developed and rigorous test program and fact substantial live fire in exercises. Some records of which were saved and show some impressive feats of accuracy.
That the standards of a successful kill differed between the UK and US.
What can be raised is the hoped for early smaller Seaslug. Likely based on liquid fuel and a throttle-able motor.
Well, Stalin concluded that surface raiders were totally ineffective. Soviet naval doctrine considered strikes against convoys, yes, but as organized combined force operation (using subs, long-range bombers, and surface ships), and only relatively close to Soviet coastlines. Free-running ocean raiders, attacking targets of opportunity, weren't even considered by Soviet admirals.
I also suspect that the early postwar RN was insufficiently air-minded, partly because it was never allowed (by the RAF) to consider attacking shore targets.
Frankly, the RN post-war thinking was some kind of weird attempt to "hide in the past". They essentially refused to acknowledge that nuclear bombs changed the fundamental doctrines of warfare, instead pretending that "it's not our concerns" and pushing the doctrine of "indecisive nuclear war" (known as "broken-backed warfare"). Which essentially boiled down to "mutual nuclear exchange would have the same indecisive character as WW2 bombing campaign, and after it a prolonged phase of conventional warfare would ensure, during which navies would play key role".
Frankly, the RN post-war thinking was some kind of weird attempt to "hide in the past". They essentially refused to acknowledge that nuclear bombs changed the fundamental doctrines of warfare, instead pretending that "it's not our concerns" and pushing the doctrine of "indecisive nuclear war" (known as "broken-backed warfare"). Which essentially boiled down to "mutual nuclear exchange would have the same indecisive character as WW2 bombing campaign, and after it a prolonged phase of conventional warfare would ensure, during which navies would play key role".
Is that not just a reflection of part of development of thinking around nuclear weapons as their numbers and capabilities grew as their physical sizes shrank over the first few decades of the postwar era?
Is that not just a reflection of part of development of thinking around nuclear weapons as their numbers and capabilities grew as their physical sizes shrank over the first few decades of the postwar era?
Not exactly. It was more a Royal Navy refusal to admit the new reality. The whole concept was so dubious, that even its supporters viewed it mostly as political weapon in fighting for funds against Army and RAF, rather than viable warfighting doctrine.
Well, Stalin concluded that surface raiders were totally ineffective. Soviet naval doctrine considered strikes against convoys, yes, but as organized combined force operation (using subs, long-range bombers, and surface ships), and only relatively close to Soviet coastlines. Free-running ocean raiders, attacking targets of opportunity, weren't even considered by Soviet admirals.
Sadly their Lordships didn't have a hotline to Stalin's desk to ask him, and even more sadly weren't on the mailing list to receive the Soviet Navy's planning documents to know what they were thinking.
The danger of commerce raiding was built into the RN's DNA, they had more experience of it than anyone else. And Stalin's boasts of an oceanic big-gun fleet seemed very likely to be for the purposes of cutting NATO's supply routes.
Not exactly. It was more a Royal Navy refusal to admit the new reality. The whole concept was so dubious, that even its supporters viewed it mostly as political weapon in fighting for funds against Army and RAF, rather than viable warfighting doctrine.
Depends, in the 1950s nuclear stockpiles were quite low on both sides and with mainly fission weapons being the norm until the early 1960s MAD was not quite achievable and broken backed seemed a likely outcome if neither side could inflict enough damage to inflict a critical blow. Besides the Strath Report of 1955 largely killed off any talk of 'broken backed'.
There is no denying a fight for resources, but until the main role was always Atlantic convoy focused and remained ASW oriented from 1945 to 1991. Carrier-based strike was a sideline and would have relied on USN backup in any case and the existence of specifications like NA.39 show that nuclear and anti-shipping strike was high on the agenda in the 1950s.
Yes probably so, I guess the Tigers would have the benefit of being brand-new (ish) but fitting the to modern standards (e.g. with MRS3 and upgraded fire-control etc., 3in L/70s) would be very expensive to just give away at second-hand prices and would waste vitally needed new kit for the RN's own building programme.
Maybe the best answer is just to scrap them in the early 50s. A major missile cruiser rebuild might be an option if stripping right down to the main deck but will probably mean new boilers with ABC protection and basically building a new ship anyway. That would clash with the new GW-series of cruiser studies, and they grew quite a bit larger and somehow I have doubts that the Admiralty would go for a rebuilt Tiger over GW96 (in my view GW96 was impressive but wasteful and certainly the wrong ship to have been wasting effort on).
Sadly their Lordships didn't have a hotline to Stalin's desk to ask him, and even more sadly weren't on the mailing list to receive the Soviet Navy's planning documents to know what they were thinking.
The danger of commerce raiding was built into the RN's DNA, they had more experience of it than anyone else. And Stalin's boasts of an oceanic big-gun fleet seemed very likely to be for the purposes of cutting NATO's supply routes.
And this clearly demonstrared, how dangerous is to build naval strategy on the basic of biased analysis (the Soviet naval buildup was interpreted as desire to launch raiding campaign, despite the fact that USSR literally never demonstrated any interest toward such), and "traditional" doctrine. Which became the Royal Navy undoing in late 1950s, when it essentially stayed a World War 2 navy in nuclear & missile age.
Well, in 1955 US stockpile was numbered in thousands, including several hundreds of multi-megaton fusion weapons.
USSR, while having far less munitions, still have several hundreds warheads by 1955, and tested the first fusion weapon.
So the probability of "indecisive" nuclear warfare was, frankly, already gone. By mid 1950s, it was far more likely that either one side win decisively, or neither side would won at all.
Very what if but the RAN was left in a bit of a panic when the USSR started supplying modern equipment to Indonesia. Immediate effects where the retaining Melbourne as a conventional carrier, searching for new aircraft for her, acquiring submarines, and dropping investigations into replacing the aft 5" on the ordered CFA class DDGs with helicopter facilities, as the extra gun power was seen as critical to provide something to use against the Irian.
There were a number of complete backflips in defence policy at the time, even consideration of buying Hermes, building a CVA-01 or the preferred option of buying an upgraded (or to be upgraded Essex). It is not beyond the realms of possibility that had a Tiger or three been offered Australia may have accepted.
The F-111 acquisition was pushed through when the then opposition made the obsolescence of the Canberra fleet an election issue, had their target been the run down of the RANs carriers and cruisers its not completely unbelievable that the CoA could have requested the Tigers, Hermes, and or Victorious. This leads to the interesting possibility of a mid 1960s Tiger guided missile conversion using primarily US systems, imagine Tartar installed in B position for example.
Maybe the best answer is just to scrap them in the early 50s. A major missile cruiser rebuild might be an option if stripping right down to the main deck but will probably mean new boilers with ABC protection and basically building a new ship anyway. That would clash with the new GW-series of cruiser studies, and they grew quite a bit larger and somehow I have doubts that the Admiralty would go for a rebuilt Tiger over GW96 (in my view GW96 was impressive but wasteful and certainly the wrong ship to have been wasting effort on).
I think a lot of the problems with the cruisers are due to the vast changes to the UK’s finances and global posture, especially after Suez. With the economic damage imposed by Eisenhower, and adverse political developments in the Middle and Far East, there was, as exemplified by 1957 and Sandys, a need to economize. However, this was not matched by a limiting of areas of operation, and so the RN had to operate worldwide - with a significant force. So, unless the UK is willing to drawback from areas before 1967, or find a way to replace the command, deterrence, and intervention abilities of the traditional cruiser then they’re needed until the 70s.
Or, we could have a touch of realism, and complete (or convert early) the Tigers with a significant helicopter complement - to suit the evolving needs of operation. Tiger, if I recall correctly, was involved in deploying a significant amount of troops in the Brunei Revolt - by requisition lighters. How much more useful if they could use helicopters to rapidly deploy on board troops to nascent hot spots - of which there were many in the 50s and 60s. HMS Belfast was proposed to be modified to this role, but it wasn’t thought worthwhile by the mid-60s.
If there was a less adversarial relationship between the Treasury and the Armed Forces, less need for everyone to viciously ‘fight their own corner’, then perhaps sensible decisions could have been made earlier - Tigers recast, and talk of them being in the cusp of launching as traditional cruisers could be countered by pointing out changed circumstances.
All-in-all, and considering that one party ruled the UK continuously from 1951 to 1964, the confusion over the integration of geopolitical and military policy does not reflect well on them, or on the ultimate utility of the Oxford Philosophy, Politics, and Economics degree to running a nation.
Very what if but the RAN was left in a bit of a panic when the USSR started supplying modern equipment to Indonesia. Immediate effects where the retaining Melbourne as a conventional carrier, searching for new aircraft for her, acquiring submarines, and dropping investigations into replacing the aft 5" on the ordered CFA class DDGs with helicopter facilities, as the extra gun power was seen as critical to provide something to use against the Irian
Well, yes, if Indonesia stayed in Soviet orbit, the urge to build up military for Australia, Philippines and other pro-Western nations on Far East would be significant. Australia would certainly spent much more on defense, having hundreds of millions of pro-Communists just over the Arafura Sea...
With the benefit of hindsight, the conversion exercises were overdone and an error. We should have done with the cruisers, the same as with the carriers. the few with life/potential upgrade modestly, the rest scrapped asap considering the glut of warships being disposed of post WW2. NEW build and designs to fit the GM role which would retain the ability to build ships a few decades longer but more importantly, better ships for the role and an easier route to build more newer ships in a rolling modernisation plan. This means the first post war tranche ships getting a better price used with healthy demand for better quality while maintaining higher quality ships in the RN. Plenty of options if you have leadership unafraid of investment and improvement rather than throwing good money after bad in the expectation that, "They volunteered, they should be happy if we give them a rowing boat". Investment, investment and more investment.
I have a.copy of the 1962-3 Jane's Fighting Ships and is interesting to see how few missile ships had made it into service by the esrly 60s.
Even the US Navy still had some gun cruisers left.
The Tiger class on paper at least compared favourably with other navies. The RN was phasing out its other cruisers with Belfast the last to go.
Until the County class were available in sufficient numbers the Tigers were the main escort ship in a task group otherwise only shipping 4.5" guns and ASW mortars.
As has been pointed out above Seaslug was comparable with Terrier and Masurca. The Italian Navy took until the mid 60s to get four Terrier equipped cruisers to sea (Garibaldi, Doria, Duilio, Veneto). Only the Dutch joined them with one cruiser.
The remaining European cruisers in NL, FR, Sp, and Sweden were all gun armed.
West Germany had the big destroyer, training ship Deutschland with French guns.
The Italians led the way in adding helicopter decks on cruisers along with France's cruiser size training ship Jean d"Arc. The RN wanted similar new build ships in the form of the 1962 Escort Cruiser.
Italy makes the best use of limited resources and the RN should perhaps have followed their ecample.
Tangential to re-purposing of hulls and 'up-grading' ships...
Which was the hapless RN missile-equipped ship series that had, effectively, a car-factory assembly line fed by multiple lifts and magazines, running from stern to bow-launcher ?
Beyond Murphy-wept failure modes, IIRC, it made compartmentalisation a nightmare, damage-control difficult, repair nigh impossible...
FWIW, sounds like prototype rail-gun designs that sorta re-built their eroded 'rails' after each salvo...
Which was the hapless RN missile-equipped ship series that had, effectively, a car-factory assembly line fed by multiple lifts and magazines, running from stern to bow-launcher ?
You meant County-class? Their "assembly line" magazine weren't anything unusual in 1950s. Early model of "Terrier" and "Talos" have the same magazine system, because those early missiles required a lot of manual preparation before sending them to the launcher. County-class just went further than usual, because RN wanted to ensure durability - that the whole missile system could not be knocked out by just one (un)lucky hit.
I have been remiss in not mentioning the Russian Navy's missile ships which were evolving at the same time.
It would be interesting to have Dilandu's take on that. The four ships tagged as Kynda class by NATO were new builds but there was also at least one comverted Swerdlow.
The Moskwa class helicopter cruisers were futuristic looking ships like the Italians.
I have been remiss in not mentioning the Russian Navy's missile ships which were evolving at the same time.
It would be interesting to have Dilandu's take on that.
Dilandu sorry I wrote that instead of them auto correct on my phone.
it would be useful to have a view of what the Soviet Navy was doing with its cruisers and the arrival of missiles compared with the West.
Well, USSR have a lot of plans about refiiting the "Sverdlov"-class, that's for sure. But most of them didn't get much traction. The reasons were different; one is that Khrushev considered large surface ships too vulnerable to nuclear strikes, and wanted a fleet composed mostly of submarines and small missile-armed units. Second, the mid-1950s missile tech was, in Soviet admirals opinion, not good enough to validate major reconstruction, and by late 1950s it was more promising to build a new ships with far more advanced technology. Also, the third reason - Soviet military did not have last word about what weapon systems they would be using. It was decided by Politbureau, chosing among the project suggested by different factories and research centers. That's why, for example, Soviet Navy was forced to use navalized versions of land-based SAM's; Politbureau decided that it would be cheaper, completely ignorant about the headache of using bulky land missiles on warships.
The more or less well-known "Sverdlov"-refit projects:
* Project 67-EP (1955) - installation of "Strela" anti-ship missile ("Strela" was land-based version of air-launched anti-ship missile KS-1 "Kometa"). One cruiser, "Admiral Nakhimov", was refitted for experimental purposes:
The "A" turret was disarmed and turned backward, the launcher was installed in front of it, and two hangars for reload missiles were set on sides of "B" turret.
The results were considered not satisfactory, the ship was forced to sacrifice too much firepower for the very limited missile capability.
* Project 67-SI (1956) - installation of turret-like SM-58-II launcher for "Shyuka" shipborne anti-ship missiles instead of frontal turrets:
Not implemented, because destroyers with "Shyuka" were much cheaper.
* Project 67-bis (1957) - replacement of all turrets with turnable multi-tube launchers for P-6 supersonic anti-ship missile. Not implemented.
* Project 71 (1957) - replacement of rear turrets with two M-2 "Volkhov-M" SAM (naval version of S-75 "Volkhov"). Not implemented.
* Project 70 (1957) - replacement of all turrets with four M-2 "Volkhov-M" SAM (naval version of S-75 "Volkhov"). Not implemented.
* Project 70-E (1958) - a testbed for M-2 "Volkhov". A single SAM was installed in place of "Y" turret on cruiser "Dzerjinsky". While it worked, the massive land-based missiles with toxic corrosive fuel were utter pain to use on cruiser, so she remained a single example.
* Project 64 (1958) - a complete rebuild, with the installation of two M-2 "Volkhov" SAM, two M-1 "Volna" short-range SAM, and three four-tube launchers for supersonic P-6 anti-ship missiles. Not implemented.
* Project 68-U1/68-U2(1966-1972) - two cruisers, "Zjdanov" and "Admiral Senyavin" were in late 60s converted into command ships. The refit included removal of "X" turret, and installation of self-defense "Osa-M" SAM in its place.
On "Zjdanov", refitted as 68-U1 everything went fine, but on "Senyavin" a Really Stupid Mistake was made, and turret "Y" was removed instead of "X". To cover the blunder, the shipyard & navy retroactively developed a 68-U2 project, which included removal of both rear turret, and installation of "Osa-M" and helicopter hangar in place.
Dilandu thank you for this excellent account. I had not seen much of the material before and the drawings are very helpful.
So apart from one ship the Soviet Navy decided like the RN to move from cruisers to destroyer leaders.
Was the Kynda class developed alone or were there other proposals? Am I right in comparing them with 4 Countys? Their appearance always seemed very futuristic with their big SSM launchers.
Essentially yes, albeit justification was different. Soviet admirals wanted "functional" navy, in which ships were optimized for narrow set of fuctions. Like "large anti-submarine ship, small anti-submarine ship, missile armed ship", ect.
Was the Kynda class developed alone or were there other proposals? Am I right in comparing them with 4 Countys? Their appearance always seemed very futuristic with their big SSM launchers.
Well, Kynda-class weren't even supposed to be a cruisers, to be exact) Initially, it was a project of next-generation missile-armed destroyer, a follow-up to Project 57bis (NATO Krupny-class). They were reclassified as "cruisers" mainly because they were supposed to serve as fleet flagships, and it was deemed that merely destroyer would not be suitable.
Must admit, that among Soviet ships of early 1960s, Project 58 cruisers are my favorites)))
They have the same "intermediate" aestetic as, say, USS Long Beach or Albany-class cruisers; they combine futuristic elements with traditional ones, like superfiring gun turrets and massive, trainable missile launchers.
Initially a series of 20 such ships was planned - to fight American carrier attack groups, which were viewed in late 50s as main naval threat to Soviet territory. But after USSR learned about "Polaris" program, the Soviet Navy priorities shifted toward hunting and destroying missile-armed submarines. Therefore only four of Project 58 destroyers/cruisers were laid up, and a massive fleet of Project 61 large sub-hunters was ordered instead.
When the RN was asked to look at a navy without aircraft carriers I am pretty sure that the Kynda class was what they had in mind when they talked about a ship armed with SAGW and big anti ship missiles.
When the RN was asked to look at a navy without aircraft carriers I am pretty sure that the Kynda class was what they had in mind when they talked about a ship armed with SAGW and big anti ship missiles.
Well, this would require Britain investing in big anti-ship missiles starting with 50s) Which would most likely require far earlier doctrine change.
My IMHO, the most probable situation would be that Royal Navy would make a move against V-bomber program - arguing that strategic bombers would be inadequate detterence for Britain, since they are too vulnerable to enemy pre-emptive strikes - and promoting instead the idea of nuclear-tipped cruise missiles, launched from patrolling warships. This would be a good start to switch from carrier-centered to missile-centered fleet.
Well, USSR have a lot of plans about refiiting the "Sverdlov"-class, that's for sure. But most of them didn't get much traction. The reasons were different; one is that Khrushev considered large surface ships too vulnerable to nuclear strikes, and wanted a fleet composed mostly of submarines and small missile-armed units. Second, the mid-1950s missile tech was, in Soviet admirals opinion, not good enough to validate major reconstruction, and by late 1950s it was more promising to build a new ships with far more advanced technology. Also, the third reason - Soviet military did not have last word about what weapon systems they would be using. It was decided by Politbureau, chosing among the project suggested by different factories and research centers. That's why, for example, Soviet Navy was forced to use navalized versions of land-based SAM's; Politbureau decided that it would be cheaper, completely ignorant about the headache of using bulky land missiles on warships.
The more or less well-known "Sverdlov"-refit projects:
* Project 67-EP (1955) - installation of "Strela" anti-ship missile ("Strela" was land-based version of air-launched anti-ship missile KS-1 "Kometa"). One cruiser, "Admiral Nakhimov", was refitted for experimental purposes:
View attachment 676327
The "A" turret was disarmed and turned backward, the launcher was installed in front of it, and two hangars for reload missiles were set on sides of "B" turret.
The results were considered not satisfactory, the ship was forced to sacrifice too much firepower for the very limited missile capability.
Most likely by dismounting one or both rear turrets & installing missile hangar and turnable launcher instead. On the other hand, Sweden managed to install the rather massive Robot 08 missiles on their destroyers just by putting launch rail over torpedo tubes:
Two Robot 08 missiles on launch rails. Launch rails placed on the top of centerline torpedo mount of Halland-class destroyer.
I suppose, it is possible to actually put missile rails on the top of main gun turret of 6-inch cruiser also. The reload, of course, would be problematic...
I suppose, if we remove the rear DP gun and rear Pom-Pom, and redesign the superstructure to accomodate missile hangar with blast protection (so the blaze of rocket boosters would not damage it), we could simply put the SSM's launch rails on the roof of "X" turret. The missile itself, after all, isn't very heavy.
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