The Biggest Blunders in WW2 Aviation History

[Steve Pace]

For a book I'm gathering info on the biggest blunders in WW2 aviation history.

For example: The Luftwaffe never acquiring a dedicated strategic bomber...

Please give me your feedback. Thank you. -SP

 

[Grey Havoc]

Not proceeding with the Martin-Baker MB 5?

 

[CliffyB]

For the US and RAF; thinking that the Heavy Bombers could protect themselves and realizing far too late that a long rang escort was needed.

For the Germans; not proceeding with the jet at an earlier time.

 

[SpudmanWP]

1. Germany not wiping out the retreating forces at Dunkirk
2. Germany switching from attacking British airfields to attacking British cities during the London Blitz
3. Japan missing the US carriers at Pearl and Midway

btw, the MB-5 would not have made a difference so it was not a blunder, IMHO.

 

[Michel Van]

Making Herman Göring, head of the Reichsluftfahrtministerieum ?

 

[chuck4]

Having crippled B-29s divert to Soviet airfields? Pretty severe consequences for the next 15 years.

 

[lastdingo]

Poor proposals in my opinion.


The German army not wiping out forces at Dunkirk was based on a stop order by Hitler, which was probably partially motivated by exaggerated claims of effectiveness by Göring. I doubt this was a "biggest" blunder, though.

The switch from airfield attacks to night attacks in the BoB was non-decisive. At most the Fighter Command would have been pushed north for a while, so what?

The IJN not killing more than one CV at Coral Sea, not more than one at Midway and none at PH weren't blunders. This was rather bad luck.

The MB.5 was totally unessential.

Germany needed no strategic bomber. Its bombers were able to reach all of Britain during 1940 and a super-long range bombing campaign against Ural targets in 1942 would have been vastly less efficient than more CAS aircraft.



Some candidates for the biggest WW2 aviation tech blunders:

(1) The Japanese failure to appreciate the importance of self-sealing fuel tanks and bulletproof armour prior to ~1944.

(2) The late invention of the German R4/m rocket.

(3) The too late adoption of magnetron-based radars by the Luftwaffe.



Candidate for the biggest WW2 aviation personnel blunders:

(1) Japanese military pilot training.

(2) German Luftwaffe technical ground troops training program (aircraft mechanics mostly)



Candidates for the biggest WW2 aviation operational blunders:

(1) French disposition of the Armée de l'Air in May 1940 (betting on a long war, not concentrating air power in range to influence the ground war much).

(2) Soviet disposition of the Red Air Force in June 1941 (too far forward and without permission to defend itself for much of the first day of Barbarossa, although the loss of obsolete aircraft without much loss of trained aviators was in hindsight probably even a blessing).


Candidate for the biggest WW2 aviation production blunder:

(1) Heinkel He 177

 

[chuck4]

The IJN not killing more than one CV at Coral Sea, not more than one at Midway and none at PH weren't blunders. This was rather bad luck.

Pearl harbor was bad luck. At Midway and Coral Sea Japanese reconnaissance doctrine was a blunder. At Midway the entire Japanese disposition was a colosal blunder.

 

[GTX]

Maybe not so much a blunder, but rather a case of poor timing: Italian aircraft design was out of step during WWII. If the war had started in the mid 30's though, they would have been nicely positioned.


Maybe also, the over expenditure of resources on the Zerstörer concept/class of fighters by Germany. Although good for nightfighter work and during the initial battles, the concept did stand up to a dedicated, first class enemy when confronted. It was also not useful in defending against daylight bombers.

One might also say that there was a blunder in having the German Aero Industry working on so many concepts/paper planes - they needed to concentrate on far fewer good ones and get them into service.

 

[Sea Skimmer]

Japan forming Kido Butai. If they hadn't done that they wouldn't have been able to delude themselves into thinking they could beat the US with one swift air blitz attack. That would mean no Pacific War and Japan's warlords might have still found a coal powered way to beat China into submission.

 

[chuck4]

Japan forming Kido Butai. If they hadn't done that they wouldn't have been able to delude themselves into thinking they could beat the US with one swift air blitz attack. That would mean no Pacific War and Japan's warlords might have still found a coal powered way to beat China into submission.

Coal powered tanks, If I was Chinese I would submit before those.

BTW, What about the Russians in Siberia, would the Russians submit before coal powered tanks too?

How about Japan's internal transportation? Coal powered buses, trucks and airplanes? What about petrochemicals? No asphalt paved streets?

 

[alertken]

UK has two candidates: Priority on Heavy Bombers, and under-resourcing maritime Air...odd, for an island, trading Nation.

Heavies: the consensus of the politico-military mind as fascists became a Threat, not a surrogate to be pointed East, was that the unwashed lumpen mass would become ungovernable under hard rain. Zeppelins and Gothas had caused chaos out of any proportion to the actual damage inflicted. Bloody Paralysers would substitute for armaggedons. 2/3/44 SecState. for War “RAF programme is already employing more than the Army(’s) I dare say that there are as many engaged in making heavy bombers as on the whole Army programme”: 7% of UK war effort {12% ’44/5 “measured (as) production and combat man-hours” R.Overy,Why the Allies Won,P128 - truly more, as the King’s Forces took even moreUS-built B-24 than Stirling}. This policy consumed fine young men as ground and aircrew, and fit men and women in the Munitions industries, that were thus unavailable to...for example, more corvettes, more landing craft...take your pick.

Low Priority on Maritime Air: - Coastal Command is: “Highly inefficient...must not trench so heavily (on) reserves. In spite of (losses to) U-boat(s) the Bomber offensive should have first place in our effort” July,42: C.Ponting, C’hill,94,S-Stevenson, P581. “Why (RAF resisted) releasing bombers for work over the ocean defies explanation (A) mere 37 (xB-24 with ASV III(UK)/US DMS-1000, 5/43 closed) the Atlantic Gap (which) had almost brought plans to stalemate.” Overy,P60.

And as for Carrier-borne Aviation:
(FAA’s history) “is a succession of failures...hopelessly outclassed by everything that flies (We) have made a false god of the business of (carrier) flying” RN memo,May,40,Morgan/Spitfire,P.515. 1942’s hopes for FAA Types: “were soon belied...shortcomings (the) story of the fleet fighter (turret 2-seat Roc) is even more melancholy” MM.Postan,Design & Development of Weapons,HMSO,P135.

 

[CJGibson]

Not during WW2 but could have had some effect on it, how about Whittle's 1929 meeting with Griffith?

Chris

 

[JFC Fuller]

I would agree entirely and expand on what ken said and go with the entire structure of the RAF pre-war expansion programme- especially the last one.

Scheme M (1939- approved by the cabinet): 85 squadrons of only heavy bombers versus 50 squadrons of fighters and just 28 Army cooperation and recce squadrons with a further 49 squadrons for "overseas". The result was that at the outbreak of war the UK had the following heavy bomber development programmes: Lancaster, Halifax, Stirling, Supermarine Type 316/7, Bristol Type 158, Handley Page HP.60 and Vickers ongoing high-altitude work with pressurised Wellingtons as well as the legacy production of medium bombers such as the Wellington and the Whitley. In the mean time, and as a result, potentially useful types like the Henley were left on the shelf and the Albemarle was ruined by the decision to make it out of wood and steel meaning the RAF became reliant on the US for tactical bombers bigger than the Mosquito for almost the entire war.

The Armstrong Whitworth Albemarle is a perfect fit for this. not only did the RAF's world view result in it being made from wood and steel, thus ruining any chance it had of operating effectively in its originally planned role, but it also suffered from another British blunder. The British failure to develop an effective ventral gun turret meant that even if it had entered service as a bomber it would have done so with a third less defensive armament than was planned due to the abandoning of the Boulton Paul Type K Mk2 periscope aimed turret.

The only thing that makes me curious is whether it would have been possible to redesign the tail to mount the Boulton Paul four-gun Type E used on some RAF Liberators and Halifaxs?

 

[Sea Skimmer]

Coal powered tanks, If I was Chinese I would submit before those.

BTW, What about the Russians in Siberia, would the Russians submit before coal powered tanks too?

How about Japan's internal transportation? Coal powered buses, trucks and airplanes? What about petrochemicals? No asphalt paved streets?

Yes, because obviously coal to oil conversion is proven physically impossible and launching a global war is a far more economical solution. :

 

[Avimimus]

In many cases - failure to step up production of single-seat fighters early enough in the war. Production numbers climbed throughout the war - but too slowly to save countries like France and Germany. In some cases, overly ambitious designs and failure to implement interim solutions was also to blame.

Gaining air-superiority is critical to maintaining it. A few thousand fighters a year earlier than they were historically built could have been very significant for things like discouraging strategic bombing.

Bombing England was probably a mistake for Germany - as it help prevent any possibility of truce. If Germany had engaged Russia immediately after the invasion of Poland (and then depicted their actions as defense against the Russian incursion) they could have gained support from the anti-communist elements in England and the United States. This would have prevented a two-fronted war.

One other, more minor, consideration - medium bombers are much harder to intercept if they are within 70-80% of the speed of interceptors. This also allows deleting of forward firing and lateral guns (which saves weight and crew). So - three engined bombers might have made sense.

Coal powered transportation also seems like a very good idea for Germany.

 

[Pioneer]

Some very interesting and valid point posted gent!! For me: Germany

• The failure of the RLM and Luftwaffe to both appreciate and field the Heinkel He 280 jet fighter - I like and support the analogy "The He 280 could have gone into production by late 1941 and maintained the air superiority which the Fw 190 had established, and filled the gap between the Fw 190 and Me 262. Initial problems with the HeS 8 engine would have likely been ironed out as production of the fighter began". The He 280 was technically less complicated (and hence cheaper) to build than the Me 262. The experience gained by the servicing and operating of the He 280 would have been a very important and productive measure for the Luftwaffe on the introduction of the Me 262.
• The premature death of General Walther Wever
• Appointing the likes and calibre of Ernst Udet to a such important and critical role as that of Director of Research and Development for the burgeoning Luftwaffe and later Director-General of Equipment for the Luftwaffe.!!!! Not to mention his obsessiveness of every aircraft having to be able to dive-bomb
• The failure of the Luftwaffe and RLM to appreciate strategic warfare and the critically importance for the need and operational fielding of a long-range, heavy bomber(s) aka either Dornier Do 19 or Junkers Ju 89. This failing to appreciate the importance of long-range, heavy bombers cost the Germans dearly!
• The RLM & Ernst Udet biased obsession with dive-bombing (along with that of the Blitzkrieg doctrine) denied and plagued the German war effort of the likes of the Heinkel He 177 Greif of what it could and should have been all along - the He 277 (after all Hitler had approved the He 177B four-individual engines variant - aka the He 277 for production. Only to have this order shortly afterwards countered by Goering who forbid production and further development of the He 177B! After all the British/RAF both saw and fully appreciated the failings of their initial design specifications and parameters with the two-engine Avro Manchester heavy bomber program (like that predominantly due to engine issues), in which, like the Luftwaffe, they had staked so much on. But the RAF, unlike that of the Luftwaffe, had the foresight to re-designed in to the successful Lancaster bomber. One should remember that as early as Nov 1938 Ernest Heinkel himself had personally requested permission from the RLM that the He 177 V3 and He 177 V4 airframes be set aside for a trial installation of four 'separate' Junkers Jumo 211 powerplants!!
• The Luftwaffe's failure to operationally field a purpose designed and built high-altitude interceptor! Even though they (and the RLM) had spent so much time and resources designing and studying such aircraft projects as the Messerschmitt Bf 109H, Focke-Wulf Ta 152H, This negligence to firstly appreciate, let alone put the deserved time, effort and resources into such an important air defence asset meant that the Allies were more easily afforded critical high-altitude aerospace over German held territory by Allied reconnaissance aircraft and bombers.
• The German's put to much emphasis on air defence artillery (Flak) - as opposed to fighter/interceptors to protect its strategically important cities and war industry. This initial doctrine proved over optimistic and required a major and very disruptive restructure of the Luftwaffe, come the major Allied bomber offensive
• The Luftwaffe had neglected the importance of night fighter / interceptors, and had to greatly improvise its air defence to compensate. This was done by utilising and adopting existing fighter (Messerschmitt Bf-110 and Messerschmitt Me 210 Zerstörer's)and bomber (Dornier Do 17, Do 215 and Do 217 and Junkers Ju 88) designs, to make up this oversight and strategic shortfall.
• The failure of the Luftwaffe to appreciate the early obsolesce of many of its aircraft type through the Second World War! Examples of this being the failure to replace the Junkers Ju 87, Messerschmitt Bf 109, Messerschmitt Bf 110, Dornier Do 17, Focke-Wulf Fw 200 Condor
• To little emphasis of the realities of a global strategic war, which Germany as a whole failed to grasp - hence her failure to implement the 'Total War' principle, which she needed to implement in the form of her military manufacturing and its economy! Germany's arrogance and overconfidence of knowing the resolve and capability of its enemies, meant that many promising (and needed) aircraft projects/programs were sadly and detrimentally overlooked or simply ignored! Because of this realisation, when it was to late, the Luftwaffe, RLM and German aircraft industry in their desperation to right their wrong, put to much time, effort and resources into wonder weapons, so as to make up for their blindness and arrogance. Examples of this often waisted resources, which should have been concentrated on known and effective aircraft/weapons platforms are - the ridiculous political decision to fit bombs to the Messerschmitt Me 262 to become a Schnellbomber, when what was desperately needed by the Third Reich was fighters/interceptors; Bachem Ba 349 Natter expendable interceptor, Arado Ar 234 Blitz jet bomber, when fighters / interceptors were needed; Junkers Ju 287 jet bomber; Messerschmitt Me 163 Komet

More to follow.................... Regards Pioneer

 

[Steve Pace]

Very impressive! -SP

 

[Pioneer]

Britain

• The failure of the British Air Ministry to both acknowledge and remedy the short-comings of the Short Stirling heavy bomber! The pre-war economic consideration to utilise existing aircraft hangers, resulted in the Stirling ridicules short-wing span = a very poor, and to the detriment of its crews service ceiling, which made it much to vulnerable to enemy fighter and Flak interception. Ironically, like that of the Avro Manchester and Heinkel He 177 Greif, its designer and builder both fully appreciated this operational shortcoming and had and was willing to remedy this problem!
• Not unlike that of the Luftwaffe and its obsession with not replacing its Messerschmitt Bf 109. The RAF and the Air Ministry for far to long procrastinated over and failed to develop and field an effective (war experienced) replacement for the Supermarine Spitfire. Although the British were able to squeeze every ounce out of the basic design thanks to bigger and more powerful engines, the Spitfire's design inherent a terrible (and operationally restrictive) short-range, due to its original design requirements as an interceptor, which dictated its overall size - and hence very short range.
• The ridiculous political thought and directive to not allow the bombing of German military industry - due to it being deemed 'privately owned property', at the start of the war. (It's ironic that some 25-years latter the United States politician's would come up with a similar absurd notion when it came to taking the war to North Vietnam!)
• The Air Ministry and the RAF neglect of the adequate and effective maritime patrol/anti-shipping/ASW aircraft needed to support the Royal Navy's operations, allowed the Kreigsmarine's to run ramped and chose its operational area's until the advent of the purchase and adoption of American Consolidate B-24 Liberators and the Short Sunderland's.

More to follow ................... Regards Pioneer

 

[Steve Pace]

I'm listening... -SP

 

[Abraham Gubler]

In my opinion the biggest mistake made by the Allies in the air was to not replace the heavy bomber (Lancaster, Halifax, B-17 and B-24) with the fast bomber (Mosquito) for the offensive against Germany. A fast bomber force could deliver the same bomb tonnage with much less risk and less resources. Otherwise the basics were all correct as seen by the clear superiority in the air even when operating over the skies of the enemies.

I can’t see how the Germans could change anything to compensate for Hitler’s bumbling tactical interference. They could have won the war (at least on the continent) with what they had – in no short measure thanks to the tactically minded Luftwaffe – without Hitler’s operational risk adversity. The Japanese made a whole raft of mistakes but then again they were punching well above their weight industrially so those mistakes were probably all inevitable if they were to be as competitive as they were.

Narrowing down to Australia and the biggest mistake was the pro-British aviation policy that replacement PM Menzies brought in before the war over the top of the professional advice and previous work for an American sourced aviation industry. Firing the Chief of Air Force (Air Marshall Williams the first air force commander to destroy an army), duplicating the efforts of CAC to build aircraft with a Government owned factory to build a medium bomber and cancelling the single engine fighter program. But someone has already written a book about that: the excellent “Wounded Eagle” by Peter Ewer.

 

[Pioneer]

Germany (cont)

• As an inherent issue with most dictatorships, the regimes leadership had a tendency to fraternise, favoured and reward given industrial supporters. The Nazi regime would have to have been one of the worst in history to the detriment of its armed services. Because of this fraternisation and political affiliation, many German armaments industries were rewarded in the form of production contracts, as opposed to that of the actual best weapons platform/aircraft needed by the Luftwaffe!
• The RLM and Luftwaffe's failure to see and appreciate the performance and potential of the Focke-Wulf Fw 187 Falke (Falcon) twin-engine fighter. This design could and should have been the fighter that the Luftwaffe should have employed as a long-range and escort fighter in place of the heavier, slower and far less agile Messerschmitt Bf 110! I can't help but wonder what difference the Fw 187 would have had in the Battle of Britain. The employment of the Fw 187 would have given the Luftwaffe a fighter some 80 km/h (50 mph) faster than the contemporary Jumo-powered Bf 109B, despite having twice the operational range (a unquestionable want and need during the Battle of Britain). Kurt Tank, the designer of the Fw 187 even conducted studies that sported a variety of engines, including theDB 601, DB 605 and even the BMW 801 radial. One has to remember that in October 1939, the Fw 187 V6 prototype clocked 634 km/h (395 mph) in level flight, making it the fastest fighter in Germany at the time. Sadly for the Luftwaffe, the RLM would reject the Fw 187 design on the grounds that the single-engine Bf 109 had comparable performance but would cost roughly half as much.
• The Messerschmitt Me 210, although a much cleaner and refined Zerstörer than that of the aircraft it was intended to improve on and replace. It in fact (due more to RLM specifications than that of its designer) was in fact not much of an improvement over that of the Bf 110. This fact, along with the inability of the Luftwaffe & RLM to recognise the short comings of the Zerstörer concept in general, along with the troubled and protracted time it took to operationally field the Me 210, meant that the likes of even a two-seat Focke-Wulf Fw 187 Falke (Falcon) could have and should have been fielded!
• The RLM's failure to recognise and pursue the proposal by Kurt Tank in 1941 (in a conversation with Udet and Jeschonnek) about the desirability of a high-altitude engine for the Fw 190; to which tank received the answer "What for? We don't fight aerial combat at such altitudes" (source: The German Fighter since 1915, by Rudiger Kosin). I have read that had Kurt tank been given support for such a marriage between the Fw 190 and such an engine, the Luftwaffe may have had a Fw 190D-9 like fighter by 1943, as opposed to the precarious 1944 (I'll try and find this source!).

More to follow.................. Regards Pioneer

 

[Pioneer]

Perhaps the Whirlwind MkII could have been made long-ranged?

I completely agree with you JFC Fuller!In fact you have just reminded me of the British single-seat, two-engine fighter I was trying to recall, so as to compare to the Focke-Wulf Fw 187 Falke (Falcon)!!

In my opinion the biggest mistake made by the Allies in the air was to not replace the heavy bomber (Lancaster, Halifax, B-17 and B-24) with the fast bomber (Mosquito) for the offensive against Germany. A fast bomber force could deliver the same bomb tonnage with much less risk and less resources. Otherwise the basics were all correct as seen by the clear superiority in the air even when operating over the skies of the enemies.

Excellent point Abraham Gubler!!I guess the same could have been said for the acceleration of the Douglas XB-42 Mixmaster! "the USAAF seeing an intriguing possibility of finding a bomber capable of the Boeing B-29 Superfortress range without its size or cost." But then again, I guess the U.S. Government, USAAF and Boeing had put so much time, effort and recourses into the B-29 (the second most costly weapons system of the U.S. war effort during WWII), that they might not have had the stomach to make such a radical backflip!

Regards Pioneer

 

[Pioneer]

The failure of the British Air Ministry to both acknowledge and remedy the short-comings of the Short Stirling heavy bomber! The pre-war economic consideration to utilise existing aircraft hangers, resulted in the Stirling ridicules short-wing span = a very poor, and to the detriment of its crews service ceiling, which made it much to vulnerable to enemy fighter and Flak interception. Ironically, like that of the Avro Manchester and Heinkel He 177 Greif, its designer and builder both fully appreciated this operational shortcoming and had and was willing to remedy this problem!

Aha I found it!

Even before the Stirling went into production, Short had improved on
the initial design with the S.34 in an effort to meet
specification B.1/39. It would have been powered by four Bristol Hercules 17 SM
engines, optimised for high-altitude flight. The new design featured longer span
wings and a revised fuselage able to carry dorsal and ventral power-operated
turrets each fitted with four 20 mm Hispano cannon; despite the obvious gains in
performance and capability, the Air Ministry was not interested.
In 1941,
Short proposed an improved version of the Stirling, optimistically called "The
Super Stirling" in the company's annals. This Stirling would feature a wing span
of 135 ft 9 in (41.38 m) and four Bristol Centaurus radials and a maximum
takeoff weight of 104,000 lb (47,174 kg). The performance estimates included 300
mph (483 km/h) speed and a 4,000 mile (6,437 km) range with a weapons load of
10,000 lb (4,536 kg) over 2,300 miles or 23,500 lb over 1,000 miles. Defensive
armament was 10 0.5 inch machine guns in three turrets. It was initially
accepted for under Specification B.8/41 (written to cover it) and two prototypes
were ordered but the C-in-C of Bomber Command Arthur Harris felt that, while it
would be a better aircraft, actual production would be slower and that effort
would be better spent on giving the Stirling improved Hercules engines for a
higher ceiling. Shorts were told in May 1942 that the Air Ministry would not be
continuing the project and in August Shorts decided to terminate work.

Now what a difference this could and would have made to Bomber Command!

Regards
Pioneer

 

[Abraham Gubler]

Now what a difference this could and would have made to Bomber Command!

Powered by Centaurus motors it wouldn't enter service until well after the Lancaster and make little difference at all.

 

[JFC Fuller]

The B.1/39 requirement may not have actually been possible with the technology at the time and even if it was the S.34 was rejected over the Bristol Type 158 and the Handley Page HP.60. The Super Stirling was the S.36 to B.8/41 and it was rejected on the basis that it would interrupt the existing Stirling lines and it would only be possible to manufacture 2 S.36s for 3 Stirlings whilst the use of Centaurus would not solve the problem of poor altitude performance.

Where the British really failed in bomber design was not developing turbo-blown engines and the supporting industry sufficiently to allow large-scale production and simultaneously not building on the pressurisation research they had undertaken with the Wellington B.Mk.V/VI. It is an interesting thought exercise to imagine a British 4-engined heavy with a pressurised crew capsule, turbo-blown Hercules and the remote-control twin 20mm Hispano barbettes designed for rear defence on the Lancaster by Boulton & Paul. In short, abandoning the original B.5/41 requirements was a blunder and one that arguably lead to the RAF procuring what was essentially the Manchester B.VI as the Lincoln B.I at the same time as the USAAF was procuring one generation ahead with the B-29. As yet a further consequence of failing to produce an adequate B.5/41 type the RAF ended up using the B-29 as the Washington from 1950-54 before being forced to use the Canberra as the main part of its bomber force until the Valiant arrived in numbers.

 

[Pioneer]

Italy & Imperial Japan

• Both Italy and Japan failed to keep pace with aero-engine technology and development! Both countries had to rely on imported German aero-engine technology. This detrimentally meant that many of their innovations and the attempt to introduce lessons learnt in air combat could not and did not keep pace with the engines required. Imperial Japanese failure to keep pace with aero-engines became explicitly clear with the early introduction of the high-altitude Boeing B-29 Superfortress combing campaigns!
• Both Italian and Japanese fighter pilots (which strongly influenced their fighter designs) were infatuated with close in combat - i.e. manoeuvrability over all else! Hence when the Allies eventually through combat experience come to fully appreciated these enemy attributes ('never get into a turning fight with a Zero'), they employed their often superior speed and durability to carrying out hit and run / slashing attacks against the more agile enemy fighters! Come these important combat lesson 'which had to be learnt' by the Allies, their next generation of fighters would be vastly superior in speed and climb rates. Something both Italy and Japan never caught up or matched!
• Japan, like that of Germany initially appreciated, but never fully implemented the introduction on a mass scale of specialised long-range, heavy bombers. For like Germany, Japan favoured lighter/tactical bombers over that of heavy's! I am at odds with this strategic decision when it comes to Japan! For it both appreciated and knew that its operational exploits would require vast over-water distances to targets. And yet I fully appreciate Japan's inherent lack of strategic materials and resources! One should not forget that Japan was not ignorant, nor incapable of designing and building long-range aircraft. One only needs to consider the exploits of the Tokyo Gas and Electric Industry (also known as Gasuden) Koken, Tachikawa Ki-77 long-range experimental plane, Then there was Project Z - a 1942 Imperial Japanese Army specification for a intercontinental bomber project which was to be capable of bombing North America (aka Nakajima G10NFugaku). And of course there was the Japan appreciation of the capabilities and potential of the purchased Focke-Wulf FW-200 Condor and the Douglas DC-4E DC-4E in late 1939, so as to evaluation the American technology. This DC-4E was reverse-engineered and became the basis for the unsuccessful Nakajima G5N bomber. Yes I know and appreciate that the Japanese were able to deploy and operated some of their combat to extraordinary ranges/radius, but as already mentioned and fully appreciated, this was at the cost of armour, design strength, self-selling fuel tanks and an inherent loss rate!

Regards Pioneer

 

[Avimimus]

I'd temper the enthusiasm for twin-engined fighters. They make excellent light bombers (hard to intercept), but they have a surface area which is about 2.5 times that of a typical single-engined fighter. This makes them easy targets (especially if they lack defensive armament).

Conversely, there was a lot of difficulty getting remote controlled or ventral guns working on night bombers. Without extensive redesign - the best protections are speed and maneuverability. The high rate of fire also made the 0.303 fairly effective at close range - while a 0.50 or 20mm would have been an improvement, the extra ballistic performance would have been less important at night.

 

[Rickshaw]

Some very interesting and valid point posted gent!! For me: Germany

• The failure of the RLM and Luftwaffe to both appreciate and field the Heinkel He 280 jet fighter - I like and support the analogy "The He 280 could have gone into production by late 1941 and maintained the air superiority which the Fw 190 had established, and filled the gap between the Fw 190 and Me 262. Initial problems with the HeS 8 engine would have likely been ironed out as production of the fighter began". The He 280 was technically less complicated (and hence cheaper) to build than the Me 262. The experience gained by the servicing and operating of the He 280 would have been a very important and productive measure for the Luftwaffe on the introduction of the Me 262.

Except the engines were grossly immature in 1941, with a life measured in only a few hours. They could produce the airframes easily but without the metallurgy to make the fan blades last more than one or two flights, they were going to be very expensive and not very useful. Even when the 262 was developed, when they did put it into production, production was held up, not for the excuse usually given - "to redesign it as a fighter-bomber" but because the engines still had too short a life.

• Appointing the likes and calibre of Ernst Udet to a such important and critical role as that of Director of Research and Development for the burgeoning Luftwaffe and later Director-General of Equipment for the Luftwaffe.!!!! Not to mention his obsessiveness of every aircraft having to be able to dive-bomb

Not sure that was Udet's fault. My understanding was that the dive-bombing requirement came more from Milch and the rest of the RLM, rather than expressly from Udet.

• The failure of the Luftwaffe and RLM to appreciate strategic warfare and the critically importance for the need and operational fielding of a long-range, heavy bomber(s) aka either Dornier Do 19 or Junkers Ju 89. This failing to appreciate the importance of long-range, heavy bombers cost the Germans dearly!

That stemmed from the Nazi belief their own moral superiority and that the rest of the world would be defeated easily because of it's moral decadence (in their view). The entire German military suffered as a consequence and was short-sighted, as was the German government as a whole. Something I actually believe we should be very thankful for.

• The German's put to much emphasis on air defence artillery (Flak) - as opposed to fighter/interceptors to protect its strategically important cities and war industry. This initial doctrine proved over optimistic and required a major and very disruptive restructure of the Luftwaffe, come the major Allied bomber offensive

"The bomber will always get through" was a common misconception. The emphasis upon AA artillery stemmed from this and was common between all combatants, even the British. The failure to appreciate the usefulness of Radar to detect and vector defending aircraft lasted long after the Battle of Britain in Germany though, even as the Kammhuber Line was being created, in the higher echelons in the Luftwaffe. As a consequence, only FlaK could down an attacking bomber with any sense of surety.

 

[Pioneer]

Germany (cont)

Without doubt one of the biggest neglects of the Luftwaffe was its failure to implement an effective replacement for the venerable, but by WWII, obsolete Junkers Ju 52/3m transport/cargo aircraft. Sadly for the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe, the need of a modern and more capable transport/cargo aircraft was continuously neglected. Of course there was also the slow and vulnerable Messerschmitt Me 323 Gigant, and a handful of Junkers Ju 290's. And yet it is ironic that the aircraft supposed winner selected by the Luftwaffe/RLM to replace the Ju 52/3m – the Arado Ar 232 (an excellent and purpose designed and built STOL transport/cargo aircraft. It lacked the range required to completely fill the role.) . This is both strange and ironic when one considers that the 'Auntie Ju' was without doubt the Wehrmacht primery workhouse, to which there was never enough of them to support the German war effort!
Even more ironic is the fact that Junkers had seen the obsolescent of the faithful 'Auntie Ju' (especially when compared to that of the Douglas DC-3/C-47, let alone the Curtiss C-46 Commando, in the form of aerodynamics, speed, range and payload capacity) by 1938 and had discussion with Lufthansa (which would have involved the Luftwaffe by this stage of Germany's preparations for war) pertaining to a much more powerful, bigger, cleaner, faster and longer range replacement. This design would become the EF.77 design - the Junkers Ju 252. So great was the potential of the Ju 252, compared to that of the Ju 52/3m, that the new Ju 252 was twice as heavy (13,100 kg compared to 5,600kg), over 100 km/h faster (440 km/h compared to 305 km/h) and very importantly it had a dramatically improved range of 3980 km km verses 1300 km when fully loaded. In October 1941, the Luftwaffe took over the Ju 252's development. The Luftwaffe was fortunate that Junkers had already developed the Trapoklappe concept (the Trapoklappe, a hydraulically powered ventral rear loading ramp that possessed powerful enough operating mechanisms to lift the plane off its tailwheel, levelling the floor and allowing oversized cargo to be loaded directly forward into the fuselage.), which it had incorporated into the 5th & 6th Ju 90 prototypes in 1939, and so had proposed its incorporation it into the Ju 252 design. But as fate would have it in Nazi Germany, in the middle of a war, the RLM would not permit any disruption of the existing production lines, and was of the opinion that any replacement for the Junkers Ju 52/3m must make minimum demands on supplies of strategic materials and use powerplants not required by combat aircraft (the Ju 252 designed to use the Junkers Jumo 211F engine).
So it was detrimentally to both the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe, that Junkers was instructed to investigate the possibility of redesigning the Ju 252 in order that a considerable portion of wood could be included in its structure, replacing the Junkers Jumo 211F engine with the BMW Bramo 323R engine of which surplus stocks existed. The result was the inferior and less capable Junkers Ju 352, whose wings were made of wood and the fuselage of steel tube and fabric.
Production of the Ju 252 was restricted to already completed prototypes plus those for which major assemblies had already been semi-completed, thus only 15 transports of this type were completed before production was switched to the Junkers Ju 352.
In fact I found this , which I thought was very interesting on the net some years ago and saved it to a ‘what if’ folder (sorry I don’t know the publisher!)

“One of the reasons the
Stalingrad Airlift failed is because the departure runway, within 170 miles of
Stalingrad was too small to handle all of the arriving and departing aircraft
that were supply all of the cargo and fuel. The Ju 252 could fly all the 1200 miles
all the way from Berlin, deliver 7 tons or so of cargo, take-off with a small
payload.
Eventually the departure runway was lost due to a Soviet armoured raid Tatsinskaya Raid) (which destroyed 76
aircraft) and forced the Germans to move their operations to an airfield 220
miles away. This then lead to reduced cargo and meant that aircraft with burned
out engines could no longer be used at reduced take-off
power.
The Ju 252 could bypass all this by delivering supplies the 1200
miles from Berlin to Stalingrad directly, landing and taking off with a small
return cargo and all without refuelling.
If operating from bases in Eastern Poland the Cargo only goes up.
The Ju 52 would require two stops on the way and a second cumbersome logistics
trail to supply fuel.
Without the Ju 252 the Germans realistically stood no chance of
supplying their forces in either Africa or Russia.

Some of the other possibilities include supply
Rommel.
For instance a Ju 252 could carry its maximum cargo of 7 tons or
so the 1200 miles or so from Berlin to Morroco and return with a small cargo all
without refuelling. It could carry
11 tons of cargo from Airfields in the South of France to Tunisia over about 680
miles. By dedicating a ton of
cargo 3 44 gallon drums and a 66 gallon drop tank Me 109 could be used to
shuttle escort the Ju 252.
Some 100 aircraft with an operation rate of 50% (75% is realistic
AFIKT) some 500 tons or cargo can be delivered in a day.
A 100 tons will keep over 100-150 tanks a full load of fuel and
ammunition everyday.
A further 100 tons will keep 200 trucks and support vehicles going.
A further 100 tons will supply food and blood for 100,000
soldiers.”

I thought it was very interesting!

More to follow over…………
Regards
Pioneer

 

[Spark]

Hi,
The Rolls Royce Merlin.

Germany (cont)

Without doubt one of the biggest neglects of the Luftwaffe was its failure to implement an effective replacement for the venerable, but by WWII, obsolete Junkers Ju 52/3m transport/cargo aircraft. Sadly for the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe, the need of a modern and more capable transport/cargo aircraft was continuously neglected. Of course there was also the slow and vulnerable Messerschmitt Me 323 Gigant, and a handful of Junkers Ju 290's. And yet it is ironic that the aircraft supposed winner selected by the Luftwaffe/RLM to replace the Ju 52/3m – the Arado Ar 232 (an excellent and purpose designed and built STOL transport/cargo aircraft This is both strange and ironic when one considers that the 'Auntie Ju' was without doubt the Wehrmacht workhouse, to which there was never enough of them to support the German war effort!
Even more ironic is the fact that Junkers had seen the obsolescent of the faithful 'Auntie Ju' (especially when compared to that of the Douglas DC-3/C-47, let alone the Curtiss C-46 Commando, in the form of aerodynamics, speed, range and payload capacity) by 1938 and had discussion with Lufthansa (which would have involved the Luftwaffe by this stage of Germany's preparations for war) pertaining to a much more powerful, bigger, cleaner, faster and longer range replacement. This design would become the EF.77 design - the Junkers Ju 252. So great was the potential of the Ju 252, compared to that of the Ju 52/3m, that the new Ju 252 was twice as heavy (13,100 kg compared to 5,600kg), over 100 km/h faster (440 km/h compared to 305 km/h) and very importantly it had a dramatically improved range of 3980 km km verses 1300 km when fully loaded. In October 1941, the Luftwaffe took over the Ju 252's development. The Luftwaffe was fortunate that Junkers had already developed the Trapoklappe concept (the Trapoklappe, a hydraulically powered ventral rear loading ramp that possessed powerful enough operating mechanisms to lift the plane off its tailwheel, levelling the floor and allowing oversized cargo to be loaded directly forward into the fuselage.), which it had incorporated into the 5th & 6th Ju 90 prototypes in 1939, and so had proposed its incorporation it into the Ju 252 design. But as fate would have it in Nazi Germany, in the middle of a war, the RLM would not permit any disruption of the existing production lines, and was of the opinion that any replacement for the Junkers Ju 52/3m must make minimum demands on supplies of strategic materials and use powerplants not required by combat aircraft (the Ju 252 designed to use the Junkers Jumo 211F engine).
So it was detrimentally to both the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe, that Junkers was instructed to investigate the possibility of redesigning the Ju 252 in order that a considerable portion of wood could be included in its structure, replacing the Junkers Jumo 211F engine with the BMW Bramo 323R engine of which surplus stocks existed. The result was the inferior and less capable Junkers Ju 352, whose wings were made of wood and the fuselage of steel tube and fabric.
Production of the Ju 252 was restricted to already completed prototypes plus those for which major assemblies had already been semi-completed, thus only 15 transports of this type were completed before production was switched to the Junkers Ju 352.
In fact I found this , which I thought was very interesting on the net some years ago and saved it to a ‘what if’ folder (sorry I don’t know the publisher!)

“One of the reasons the
Stalingrad Airlift failed is because the departure runway, within 170 miles of
Stalingrad was too small to handle all of the arriving and departing aircraft
that were supply all of the cargo and fuel. The Ju 252 could fly all the 1200 miles
all the way from Berlin, deliver 7 tons or so of cargo, take-off with a small
payload.
Eventually the departure runway was lost due to a Soviet armoured raid Tatsinskaya Raid) (which destroyed 76
aircraft) and forced the Germans to move their operations to an airfield 220
miles away. This then lead to reduced cargo and meant that aircraft with burned
out engines could no longer be used at reduced take-off
power.
The Ju 252 could bypass all this by delivering supplies the 1200
miles from Berlin to Stalingrad directly, landing and taking off with a small
return cargo and all without refuelling.
If operating from bases in Eastern Poland the Cargo only goes up.
The Ju 52 would require two stops on the way and a second cumbersome logistics
trail to supply fuel.
Without the Ju 252 the Germans realistically stood no chance of
supplying their forces in either Africa or Russia.

Some of the other possibilities include supply
Rommel.
For instance a Ju 252 could carry its maximum cargo of 7 tons or
so the 1200 miles or so from Berlin to Morroco and return with a small cargo all
without refuelling. It could carry
11 tons of cargo from Airfields in the South of France to Tunisia over about 680
miles. By dedicating a ton of
cargo 3 44 gallon drums and a 66 gallon drop tank Me 109 could be used to
shuttle escort the Ju 252.
Some 100 aircraft with an operation rate of 50% (75% is realistic
AFIKT) some 500 tons or cargo can be delivered in a day.
A 100 tons will keep over 100-150 tanks a full load of fuel and
ammunition everyday.
A further 100 tons will keep 200 trucks and support vehicles going.
A further 100 tons will supply food and blood for 100,000
soldiers.”

I thought it was very interesting!

More to follow over…………
Regards
Pioneer

 

[riggerrob]

German paratroopers failed to learn from thier early successes invading the Low Countries. They failed to learn that gliders were the quickest way to capture major choke-points (Fortress Ebam Emal).

Meanwhile only German and Italian paratroopers clung to the (obsolete) Salvatore harness, long after everyone else converted to modern vertical (e.g. Irvin) harnesses. Salvatore harnesses limited Fallschirmjager weapons to pistols and grenades?
Even Luftwaffe aircrew wore vertical harnesses.

LW also failed to learn from early successes with Junkers 52 tri-motored transports. Granted 20 years of development had resulted in great dispatch reliability .... but Junkers had already flown a prototype of the revolutionary tail ramp during 1939.

WI Junkers converted production lines to Ju252, 352 and finally the Ju452 with a nosewheel?
WI German soldiers glided into Crete with mortars and MG-34s in hand?
WI they were soon supported by glider-delivered Kubelwagens and light artillery?
WI Ju252 simply dropped rations (sans parachute) to German soldiers defending Stalingrad?
WI Theo Knacke invented low altitude parachute extraction systems in 1940?
WI LAPES delivered significant AT guns and ammo to sustain paratroopers for several days until they could be relieved by tanks?
WI LAPES reduced aircrew casualties during Crete, Market Garden, etc.?
WI greater successes with assault gliders and LAPES postponed the need to develop helicopters?

A decade later: "Goering's Revenge" (Junkers Tri-Motor) helped defeat "DeGaulle's SS" (Frech Foreign Legion) defending Dien Ben Phu because they could not deliver a sufficient tonnage of supplies. Even the handful of CIA-supplied C-119s were too late to salvage the French garrison.

Another decade later, US Marines successfully defended Khe Sanh primarily because US Army Cariboos, USAF C-123s and C-130s were able to deliver enough tons of artillery ammo to prevent the North Vietnamese Army from closing in. Sure most of those American airplanes were bigger, faster, longer-ranged, more powerful, etc. but the key difference was tail ramps that allowed them to quickly unload under fire.

Tail ramps were invented in Germany during 1939, the Luftwaffe failed to utilize thier potential for delivering cargo to troops under fire.

 

[CJGibson]

Ah, but they did develop the Arado Ar 232 - more flexible, easier to load, blueprint for the future. So perhaps not pursuing the Ju 252 was not a mistake but sensible as it was expensive and even the cheaper Ju 352 was less practical than the Arado design.

Chris

 

[Arjen]

German paratroopers failed to learn from thier early successes invading the Low Countries. They failed to learn that gliders were the quickest way to capture major choke-points (Fortress Ebam Emal Eben-Emael).

The Luftwaffe lost hundreds of the transport aircraft used to deliver the paratroopers when invading the Netherlands. I've read somewhere - can't remember where - this seriously hurt Germany's ability to deploy paratroopers.

 

[riggerrob]

Yes, both Arado and Gotha made pod-and-boom airplanes that set the pattern for 1950s military transports (C-119 Flying Boxcar, Nordatlas and Bristol Beverly).

Arado only made 20 Millipedes.

Meanwhile Gotha made about 1500 Go242 gliders of which more than a hundred (174?) were up-engined to become Go 244 transports. Gothas were big enough to carry Kubelwagens or 20 men.

Arado and Gotha tail-hatches speeded loading and un-loading - on the ground - but were not useful for dropping cargo. IOW early German designs were only the first step to perfecting modern military cargo airplanes. A disadvantage of pod-and-boom designs is that they had to leave thier tail-cones on the ground if they wanted to drop heavy cargo. Deleting the tail-cone increased drag, reducing combat radius.

I was speculating about how much Junkers engineers could learn from each successive generation of Ju52, 90, 252, 352 and a speculative 452. I was was wondering if a speculative Ju452 would develop the ability to open its tail ramp in-flight and drop cargo straight out the back (aka. Budd Conestoga). Dropping cargo in-flight vastly reduces casualties from AAA and during time on the round unloading. The next step is developing LAPES which further reduces exposure to AAA.
Size of cargo is less important than tonnage per hour, especially when all your artillery is working over-time to push attackers back from your perimeter.

As for casualties ... the Luftwaffe lost so many Ju52s at Crete (1941) that it crippled their air transport fleet for the rest of the war.

In conclusion: my speculation is about Germans learning the correct lessons from early assault glider successes and applying those lessons-learned to better generations of assault gliders and eventually to cargo planes with tail-ramps.

 

[Avimimus]

That is similar to the overall trend for other parts of the Luftwaffe.

If one looks at 1939 and 1940 the exchange ratio the Luftwaffe is getting when on the offence is often close 1-to-1. This was despite being up against smaller and sometimes woefully equipped opponents. It should have set off alarm bells. However, production rates weren't stepped up.

In 1940 the Luftwaffe increasingly found that daylight operations required fighter escorts, and that larger twin-engined escort fighters were too vulnerable for this task.

So, basically, by 1940 the Luftwaffe had the data to know that they needed to rapidly step up aircraft production and that they needed to focus on gaining air-superiority.

If this message had been internalised, then German bombers would've been in a much better position to provide ground support in 1942 and the Luftwaffe would've done much better at combating strategic bombing. Speer's people calculated that they could indefinitely counter American industrial capacity if they could trade a single-engined fighter for shooting down a four-engined bomber. Of course, that is assuming that the bombers don't due enough damage to crush German manufacturing. However, a larger fighter force would've lessened the effectiveness of strategic bombing and given more time to disperse production. Furthermore, if the casualty rate was high enough bomber command might have taken a pause to re-assess their strategies. So, it could've perhaps prolonged the war for a year or two... thankfully the mistake was made.

 

[Avimimus]

Conversely, there was a lot of difficulty getting remote controlled or ventral guns working on night bombers. Without extensive redesign - the best protections are speed and maneuverability. The high rate of fire also made the 0.303 fairly effective at close range - while a 0.50 or 20mm would have been an improvement, the extra ballistic performance would have been less important at night.

For the British at least, the argument that 4 x .303 would be as effective as a pair of .50 at likely night ranges was one of the arguments used to postpone the development of such turrets in 1940 though the lack of easy access to large numbers of .50 guns was also another reason. However, as the war went on Lancasters were progressively fitted with .50 weapons culminating in the Lincoln with no .303s at all. The British failed completely to develop an effective ventral defence mechanism.

That is very interesting to hear. I'd read most of the argument - but the engagement range was based on my own assessment - so it is pretty neat to hear that people were thinking along similar lines!

 

[riggerrob]

Sounds like an ex post facto explanation.

Rifle-calibre (.303 Enfield) medium machine guns had proven "good enough" against pre-war, fabric-covered biplanes, so the RAF just stuck with tradition, bolting more and more .30 calibre MGs to airplanes.


Before the war, Vickers had developed a .50 HMG, (12.7 x 81 mm) but only sold it to the Royal Navy, where it proved ineffective against modern, all-metal aircraft. The RN then ordered 20 mm AA rapid-firing cannons. That ineffectiveness may have been the start of the RAF's bias against Browning .50.

After .30 proved its limited killing power during the Battle of Britain, the RAF started installing 20 mm cannons in Hurricanes and Spitfires and all subsequent fighters.

The primary reason for retaining .30 MGs in turrets is that they were lighter, shorter and quicker to turn.
Consider that an entire Browning Model 1919 firing .30 cal. is in the 35 pound range, while a Browning .50 cal.(barrel and receiver) weighs more like 92 pounds.

 

[JFC Fuller]

The RAF knew before WW2 started that the .303 was inadequate, that was the point of F.37/35 and B.1/39, to provide fighters and bombers respectively equipped with cannon. It had also been planned to fit the Mk.II versions of the Manchester, Stirling and Halifax with two twin 20mm cannon turrets.

Unfortunately war intervened; weight growth in the existing bombers made fitting Hispano turrets impractical and B.1/39 was cancelled. A new scheme to fit .50 gun turrets was scuppered by a shortage of guns (the archive evidences talks of plans to buy the FN .50 factory in Belgium) whilst other up-arming schemes, such as installing a quad .303 mid-upper on the Stirling and Lancaster, on the heavy bombers were prevented by complaints about weight growth (in particular CoG) and the problems with rejigging factories for what were substantial structural changes just as emphasis was on increasing production.

There were some who claimed that the concentrated high RoF fire of the quad .303 tail turret would be as effective as a twin .50 cal at night engagement ranges in 1940; however many myths still existed in RAF senior officer circles in 1940.

 

[Rickshaw]

Sounds like an ex post facto explanation.

Rifle-calibre (.303 Enfield) medium machine guns had proven "good enough" against pre-war, fabric-covered biplanes, so the RAF just stuck with tradition, bolting more and more .30 calibre MGs to airplanes.


Before the war, Vickers had developed a .50 HMG, (12.7 x 81 mm) but only sold it to the Royal Navy, where it proved ineffective against modern, all-metal aircraft. The RN then ordered 20 mm AA rapid-firing cannons. That ineffectiveness may have been the start of the RAF's bias against Browning .50.

After .30 proved its limited killing power during the Battle of Britain, the RAF started installing 20 mm cannons in Hurricanes and Spitfires and all subsequent fighters.

The primary reason for retaining .30 MGs in turrets is that they were lighter, shorter and quicker to turn.
Consider that an entire Browning Model 1919 firing .30 cal. is in the 35 pound range, while a Browning .50 cal.(barrel and receiver) weighs more like 92 pounds.

The RAF didn't use .30cal machine guns...