especially when you factored in the induced drag of external conventional bombs the RAAF deemed as its principle weapons load.
An issue shared with the Vigilante, considering the unusefulness of its linear bomb bay.
 
Looks... overcomplicated a bit. Not impossible, but required a lot of cooperation. And what about Indonesian fighters? The CAP would operate at least in range of Mig-25, likely Mig-23 too. Combat air patrol that could NOT be reinforced quickly could be easily neutralized if the opponent have fighters in range.

Strikes on Indonesia wouldn't be the Melbourne's main role. That would be sea control in the NE Indian Ocean, keeping the TNI-N from venturing out too far, providing a covering force for shipping being routed south to Perth and the East coast and supporting the RAAF and RAN assets operating in the NW and Cocos and Christmas Island.

However, given the limited ability of the early-mid 70s RAAF to attack Indonesia they will accept a bit of complicated planning and coordinated action to get an extra airstrike in that wouldn't happen otherwise. I think it wouldn't tackle the toughest targets that would be well defended by Migs, and in any case the TNI wouldn't have AEW or much other wide area surveillance so a surprise attack would likely be successful and suffer acceptable losses.

The hardest part about the Melbourne in this scenario is her basic limitations, such as having a combat endurance of about 10 days and a nominal range of 14,000 miles at 14 knots. Add this to the dearth of bases for the carrier and this becomes a problem. By the early-mid 70s in this scenario I'd guess the RAN could operate from Perth in a crisis well enough, but Perth is about 1500 miles to the NE IO, so the Melbourne would take maybe 4 days to transit there and use 10+% off her fuel just getting to her station. Once there, assuming she was topped up by a tanker and conducted minimal flying during the transit she could fly for 10 days before needing to head back to port. What happens then? Darwin is likely 2 days closer; 2 days there, 2 days turnaround, 2 days to get back on station, but Darwin is even less developed than Perth and is well within range of a decent number of TNI assets so would require heavy RAAF effort to keep her safe. Or she could head back tp Perth, 4 days there, 2 day turnaround, 4 days back to station, but she would be virtually immune to attack while on most of her transit and in port. Then there's her escort, which in comparison has extremely short legs, but more options, such as Darwin or even some of the small ports in NW Australia in a pinch.
 
Strikes on Indonesia wouldn't be the Melbourne's main role. That would be sea control in the NE Indian Ocean, keeping the TNI-N from venturing out too far, providing a covering force for shipping being routed south to Perth and the East coast and supporting the RAAF and RAN assets operating in the NW and Cocos and Christmas Island.
Hm. This looks logical.
 
The Mirage IV didn't have the range, especially when you factored in the induced drag of external conventional bombs the RAAF deemed as its principle weapons load.
I'm sure the orginal - hence the proposed Mirage IV offered to Australia, lacked terrain avoidance radar.

Dassault did propose a version of the Mirage IVA with Rolls-Royce Avon engines, which I would encourage (given that I would have stipulated Avon-powered Mirage IIIO's, from the getgo!).

[Pictures of Mirage IV armed with 1,000-pound GP bombs from https://combatace.com/forums/topic/35771-mirage-iva-wip-update/?page=3]

Regards
Pioneer

In any case the Government chose the 1969 IOC option and the F111 way back in 1964, long before this scenario veers from actual events. By 1969 a whole new array of aircraft begin to appear on the menu for the future of the RAAF.
 
An issue shared with the Vigilante, considering the unusefulness of its linear bomb bay.
Although, one would think that the linear bomb bay would have incorporated fuel, even if they were to utilise a more permanent (non jettisoned) arrangement of the 'stores train' - perhaps replacing the Mk28 module with a third fuel module. After all the NAA aerial refuelling module developed for the proposed aerial refuelling stores train, which was made up of a three tank arrangement [see attachments].
Or replacing the three-part 'stores train' with a single complete fuel tank (no independent modules) - perhaps even a large bladder tank.

Regards
Pioneer
 

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You're right, but you could do mostly the same with the Mirage IVA "bomb belly recess" (per lack of a better name). The AN-11 / 21 / 22 nuclear bombs there were 2200 kg, then 1500 kg: and the recess was actually modular: besides an atomic bomb or a conformal fuel tank (and later, ASMP attachement points) there was also a reconnaissance pack. That after 1996 became the Mirage IVP core mission, until retirement in 2005. They even flew U.N missions over Iraq before a certain stupid war in 2003...

It would be relatively easy to turn a AN-22-shaped conformal fuel tank into a buddy-buddy refueling pod.

I swear I red somewhere this was considered as an alternative tanker (besides Vautour, Caravelle and finally: those 12 x C-135FR) but I can't put my finger on it. Could be a case of Mandela effect.

This webpage is a little gem. https://ervc135--amicale-fr.transla..._sch=http&_x_tr_sl=fr&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=fr (d'oh, the buddy-buddy Mirage IV is mentionned there)



So is that one. https://spotaero.blogspot.com/2013/07/dassault-mirage-iv-le-temps-de-la.html
 
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In any case the Government chose the 1969 IOC option and the F111 way back in 1964, long before this scenario veers from actual events. By 1969 a whole new array of aircraft begin to appear on the menu for the future of the RAAF.
Sukano remaining would make the delays to the F-111 more critical than they were in real life, hence they likely would have been cancelled and the F-4E/RF-4C (or E), KC-135 option would most likely have happened. Mirage would have been replaced earlier, and all the cancelled projects would have been more likely to proceed. So AH-1, Hawk SAMs, supersonic Lead In Fighter Trainer, DDL as a supplement to the DDGs, DDs and DEs, An earlier replacement for Melbourne, possibly an Essex, if Hermes or Victorious were unavailable, flying Skyhawks and Trackers.
 
G’day guys, hope I’m not repeating something other people have said here but the biggest Indonesian worry was a first strike on Darwin by long range bombers that would essentially be impossible to intercept. The role of the carrier was partially to provide a forward air defence line out of range of Indonesian fighters and before the bombers threatened Darwin. Regarding a carrier replacement, the French option (likely very similar to PA-58) is the most reasonable for this role as it allows the RAN to have proper air dominance fighters close to Indonesia at a reasonable cost. Another option is an Oriskany style refit to an Essex (I believe this option is only marginally less costly) or a home built design (which was considered but would take 10-12 years and required substantial parts imports). Navy considered the carrier a principle weapon against Indonesia, I don’t believe this would have changed. Regarding nuclear submarines, it’s known we had an option to procure American subs but I’m wondering if they would have real utility? In the environments surrounding Indonesia diesel boats would be perfectly adequate in my opinion. Poke holes in this, interesting conversation thus far
 
The role of the carrier was partially to provide a forward air defence line out of range of Indonesian fighters and before the bombers threatened Darwin
Well, the problem with single carrier (a strike one, not merely anti-submarine one) is that it became a single point of failure. If anything happens to it, the whole strategy is crashing. So if Australia wanted a strike carrier group, they would need at least two. And escort force for them, since Indonesian Tu-6K are rather formidable force already, and Tu-22K would be even more dangerous. The cost of having two carrier groups would be sinificant. Would it be the most practical investment of limited resources?
 
Well, the problem with single carrier (a strike one, not merely anti-submarine one) is that it became a single point of failure. If anything happens to it, the whole strategy is crashing. So if Australia wanted a strike carrier group, they would need at least two. And escort force for them, since Indonesian Tu-6K are rather formidable force already, and Tu-22K would be even more dangerous. The cost of having two carrier groups would be sinificant. Would it be the most practical investment of limited resources?
Yes. Even having one hull puts air power where no one else can. The thing is you can’t think of an Aussie carrier like a US carrier or even a British carrier. In a low intensity conflict it would serve as a strategic platform like a US carrier but in this context it’s a tactical platform relying on positioning and smart usage of its air wing to strike and get out before the Indonesians can hit back.
 
In the 1970s, the RAN might be able to convince the government that YARD's Protean design would be quite useful to have, not least because it can be built locally relatively easy (preserving existing & providing new shipbuilding jobs in the process).
Or they might’ve gone with the merchant ship conversion for CVE type ships as proposed slightly later to supplement
 
In late 1960s, the Royal Australian Navy became rather worried about Indonesian continuing naval development. The intelligence reported, that Indonesians (with the help of Soviet specialists) started a major refit of their Project-30bis destroyers, replacing their old torpedo tubes with P-15 Termit missile launchers.

1741625743123.png

This caused great concern to RAN command. While Indonesian already have anti-ship missiles on their Soviet-delivered missile boats, those were coastal units, not suited for open sea, and thus viewed as defensive only. Missile-armed destroyers - big, fast, sea-capable - represented a completely different level of threat. No Australian ship have any kind of over-the-horizon missiles that could counter Indonesian long-range weaponry.

Trying to find some solution, RAN officers approached Sweden, which just recently adopted the Robot 08 ship-launched anti-ship missiles. The proposal of ordering a bunch of Rb.08 was seriously considered by RAN, but after a series of demonstration Australian liason officers came to unexpected conclusion that it probably would be perfectly possible for Australia to develope the comparable missile by itself.

The Government Aircraft Factory (GAF) already have experience with developing - in cooperation with Britain - an "Ikara" anti-submarine missile, a solid-fuel radio-control missile, carrying a homing torpedo. Several RAN frigates were already equipped with "Ikara" system, and newly ordered missile destroyers were also supposed to carry such weaponry. So the idea of building an anti-ship missile as follow-up to "Ikara" development was born.

The initial idea was rather straightforward; merely to hang the American-delivered AGM-62 Walleye guided bomb under the "Ikara" missile body (in place of torpedo) and install the two-way datalink from bomb to the ship through missile. The missile was supposed to carry the guided bomb to the vicinity of the target, after which operator would use image, transmitted from bomb TV camera, to lock the Walleye contrast seeker on enemy ship and command the release.

The concept was tested in two flights, and proven "sorta workable", but not exactly in the way Australian Navy wanted. The main problem was, that "Ikara" was not exactly designed as bomber drone; unless the missile was going right over the target, the chance to drop the Walleye correctly was abysmal. The second problem was, that rather crumblesome wings of Walleye caused additional drag, reducing "Ikara"'s range (already insufficient) even further.

Two conclusions were made out of this experiment:

* The anti-ship missile must have integrated seeker and homing system to have good chances to hit the target
* The anti-ship missile must have range of no less than 25 nautical miles, to be a viable counter against "Termit"

Since the required range was outside of solid-fuel rocket capabilities, GAF engineers briefly considered replacing it with liquid-fuel rocket, but facing rather cathegorical resistance from sailors, settled on air-breathing turbojet instead.

The new missile was initially supposed to have Aborigenal Australian name (as usual for GAF), but during the development someone half-jokingly suggested to name it "dropbear", since "it was porty, funny-looking and kinda cute, like a killer koala". The name stuck; the whole project was called "project Dropbear", and then the name was approved for the missile as well.

1741625506224.png

The resulting missile generally resembled the "Ikara", but with longer, slender hull and more streamlined body. The solid-fuel rocket motor was replaced by a compact Microturbo Cougar 022 french-designed turbojet, with air intake on the top of the body. The launch was achieved by solid-fuel JATO bottle, bolted to the lower fin. The warhead blister was made non-detacheable, with warhead inside bolted to the missile body. A new, streamlined nose section - housing a optical contrast seeking camera on gimball mount behind transparent dome - was added.

The "Dropbear" missile was have two-stage guidance. Immediately after launch, the radio command system - the same as for "Ikara", just switched to getting targeting information from ship fire control radars - tracked the missile, and guided it toward the target. When missile was in the proximity of the enemy ship, the autopilot locked on straight course and the two-way AN/AAW-9 datalink with the launcher ship activated.

The image from missile TV camera was transmitted on the scope of operator control station; using joystick, operator turned the camera from side to side until he found the target. Then he got the crosshair in the senter of the image over any contrasting point on the target (just like standard Walleye) and "locked" it for contrast seeker. The autopilot switched to the automatic seeker control; the camera tracked the target, and the missile followed camera movement, power-gliding toward the target. The combined shaped charge/HE warhead was activated by impact fuze; an auxilary hydrostatic fuze was installed to explode the warhead underwater in case of near miss.

The "Dropbear" wasn't exactly an elegant solution. It was rather big, subsonic missile, which was requred to fly at sufficient altitude so the missile-to-ship datalink have a clear line-of-sight - thus making missile rather vulnerable to anti-aircraft fire. It also required direct human input to find & lock on target. The initial model, equipped with simple vidicon camera, were daylight-only (on the later models, the problem was remedied by using thermal imaging camera). On the other hand, the "Dropbear" was rather immune to chaffs and usual countermeasures, albeit datalink could be jammed. Also, it could be launched from standard "Ikara" launcher without any significant alterations.

Dropbear-A (1973) - a basic version of missile, equipped with a simple vidicon camera (daylight only) and a 500-pdr shaped charge/HE warhead. Have a 30 nautical miles range, limited mainly by the requirement to stay above horizon for the launching ship, so the guidance datalink with operator could have a clear line of sight with missile.

Dropbear-A-A (double A, Anti-Airfield) (1974) - a land-attack version, with a cluster warhead, filled with "Kagrina" bomblets and altimeter with pre-programmed release. Was intended for strikes against coastal airfields and similar area targets. In British service was equipped with SG-357 anti-runaway bomblets.

Dropbear-A-N (nuclear) - proposed version, armed with kiloton-scale nuclear warhead. Not produced.

Dropbear-B (1976) - was an improved, all-weather version, equipped with an thermal imagining camera, capable of tracking the infrared signature of the target. Otheriwise identical to A model.

Dropbear-C (1977) - a folding-wing version of Dropbear-B, designed for the box launcher. It was installed on small missile boats (that could not carry proper Ikara system) and frigates. A coastal defense version, transported on trailers, was also produced.

Dropbear-D (1978) - first version with fully automatic target seeking & tracking alghoritm, capable of "fire and forget" attack mode (as well as usual "man-in-the-loop"). The thermal camera was used as infrared seeker, locking on the brightest thermal spot in the pre-programmed search arc. This capability allowed Dropbear-D to perform a low-altitude attack below the horizon for launching ship, using radar altimeter to fly as low as 15 meters.

Dropbear-E (1982) - final version, with increased range (up to 55 nautical miles), heavier interchangeable warhead (800-pdr shaped charge/HE or cluster) and improved seeker. Two guidance mode: low-altitude "fire and forget" and high altitude "man-in-the-loop"/ Could use the shipboard helicopter, equipped with AN/AAW-12 guidance pod for over-the-horizon manual-controlled strikes; in that case operator was placed onboard the helicopter, performing terminal targeting. Have a rudimentary air defense penetration capability, being equipped with chaff disperser for terminal dive.
 
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The role of the carrier was partially to provide a forward air defence line out of range of Indonesian fighters and before the bombers threatened Darwin.

The Melbourne was not equipped to undertake this role during the Confrontation era, even in 1965 during the height of the Confrontation the RAN ordered 8 + 2 A4s so Melbourne could embark 4.

Regarding a carrier replacement, the French option (likely very similar to PA-58) is the most reasonable for this role as it allows the RAN to have proper air dominance fighters close to Indonesia at a reasonable cost. Another option is an Oriskany style refit to an Essex (I believe this option is only marginally less costly) or a home built design (which was considered but would take 10-12 years and required substantial parts imports).

The left and right of arc in 1964 were a CVA01, a major refit of an Essex (with F4Bs, cool!) and updating Melbourne. PA-58 likely fits in with the CVA01 end of the arc, but it was long gone as a programme by 1964.
Regarding nuclear submarines, it’s known we had an option to procure American subs but I’m wondering if they would have real utility? In the environments surrounding Indonesia diesel boats would be perfectly adequate in my opinion.

The problems with subs in Australia is the oceanography and its impact on transit/patrol time, and the indiscretion rate.

The Timor and Arafura Seas are really shallow, (as is the Java Sea) so a sub cannot dive deep enough to avoid being seen visually from the air, although much of the waters in and around Indonesia itself are deep enough to hide a submarine. The closest deep water from Darwin is south of Timor, some 500km away and at ~25km/h on the surface a sub cannot transit that in a single night, so is vulnerable to simple visual search and attack. This is why subs are based in Perth, especially the USN subs in WW2, however this requires a ~2,700km a weeklong transit there and back which eats into a subs ~60 day patrol endurance. Nuclear subs can be based in Perth, get to deep water quickly and transit within a few days to Indonesia without eating into their ~80 day patrol endurance. Indeed, they can even be based in Sydney without much detriment. This is why the RAN wanted 8 Oberons in the 60s and why the Govt wanted 12 diesel subs in 2009 but 8 SSNs is enough.

The second issue is indiscretion rate, the amount of time a diesel subs has the breathe air to charge its batteries in normal and strenuous combat operations. The Collins is really great in this regard, it only needs to snort something like 20 minutes a day in normal ops and in wartime doing strenuous stuff can get a good charge from low battery level in an hour or two. However, an Oberon was much worse, it maybe needed a couple of hours every night in normal ops to keep the battery charged and in wartime doing strenuous stuff needed several hours to charge a low battery. As you can imagine, in Indonesia a sub isn't ever far away from land and every time it sticks up its snort it risks detection from everything from the TNI-AF & N to commercial ships and planes to local fishermen. An SSN has no indiscretion time, no matter how fast it goes.

Make no mistake, SSNs are awesome as well as cool.
 
Sukano remaining would make the delays to the F-111 more critical than they were in real life, hence they likely would have been cancelled and the F-4E/RF-4C (or E), KC-135 option would most likely have happened.

They were delivered (into storage) in 1968, by the time the Sukarno threat and Australia's isolation becomes clear cancelling the F111 is very problematic.
 
The Melbourne was not equipped to undertake this role during the Confrontation era, even in 1965 during the height of the Confrontation the RAN ordered 8 + 2 A4s so Melbourne could embark 4.
You’re right, I should’ve clarified. This is what the navy wanted to be able to do from what I understand according to gov documents. The A-4s where purely counter snooper aircraft anyway
The left and right of arc in 1964 were a CVA01, a major refit of an Essex (with F4Bs, cool!) and updating Melbourne. PA-58 likely fits in with the CVA01 end of the arc, but it was long gone as a programme by 1964
The French option wasn’t exactly PA-58 if I understand correctly. It was to be less expensive and have a lesser crewing requirement than CVA-01. Of course, they talked about replacing Melbourne so many times it’s hard to find real concrete detail but that’s what I remember. With regards to the Essex, I wonder how economical it actually would’ve been
 
You’re right, I should’ve clarified. This is what the navy wanted to be able to do from what I understand according to gov documents. The A-4s where purely counter snooper aircraft anyway

That said, the Melbourne's Task Group operating in the NE IO would have a reasonable impact on the threat you have laid out, even if the RAN can't really act on it too much. The ships would create a big surveillance bubble. Their ELINT gear would hear all sorts of military comms and their radars would watch a volume of airspace hundreds of km in diameter that bombers attacking the mainland would have to avoid in order to maintain surprise. The A4s and S2s would chase MPAs and ships away creating an intel black hole that the TNI would have to avoid unless operating into it deliberately and the DDG escorts might be able to set up a SAM trap or at the very least create an air defence zone the TNI-AF would have to avoid. Even without the combat power of a CVA01 the Melbourne would be problematic for the TNI.

The French option wasn’t exactly PA-58 if I understand correctly. It was to be less expensive and have a lesser crewing requirement than CVA-01. Of course, they talked about replacing Melbourne so many times it’s hard to find real concrete detail but that’s what I remember. With regards to the Essex, I wonder how economical it actually would’ve been

There is a big package of documents on the internet around the mid 60s Melbourne replacement debate that goes in depth into the Essex class option. It's an information gold mine, talking about the extended nose oleo on the F4B, the difficulties of F4s and C11 catapults etc.

COSC CAM Scherger asks a few pointed questions in pen in the margins about the cost and short service life of a refitted Essex.
 
There is a big package of documents on the internet around the mid 60s Melbourne replacement debate that goes in depth into the Essex class option. It's an information gold mine, talking about the extended nose oleo on the F4B, the difficulties of F4s and C11 catapults etc.
It's a stretch, of course, but would the Invincible version with gas-air catapult & aerofinishers work?
 
It's a stretch, of course, but would the Invincible version with gas-air catapult & aerofinishers work?

I've never heard of that. Who would pay for the development of that?

I suspect that when Melbourne finally retires in about 1985 the RAN would either have to rely on the RAAF, or get some sort if Harrier carrier.
 
I've never heard of that. Who would pay for the development of that?
The C14 internal combustion catapult (working on compressed air & JP5 gasoline) was developed by USN in late 1950s as alternative to steam catapults. Originally the USS Enterprise was supposed to be fitted with them. Apparently it have some reliability issues, and was replaced with C13 steam catapult. But the design exists, its was tested and proven to be workable.
 
The C14 internal combustion catapult (working on compressed air & JP5 gasoline) was developed by USN in late 1950s as alternative to steam catapults. Originally the USS Enterprise was supposed to be fitted with them. Apparently it have some reliability issues, and was replaced with C13 steam catapult. But the design exists, its was tested and proven to be workable.

When looking at the Essex class in 1964 it was suggested that the Essex might be fitted with the C7 catapult given how marginal the C11 was for operating Phantoms. CCSOC ACM Scherger commented that while it was easy to say was it even physically possible, let alone at a reasonable cost.

Imagine the response from the CDF in the late 70s if it was suggested that Australia should install a catapult from the 50s that was never adopted for service due to reliability issues into a small (for a carrier) British ship originally designed to carry helicopters but currently being fitted with a less than idea ski jump for Harriers but no angled deck of arrestor gear.
 
Imagine the response from the CDF in the late 70s if it was suggested that Australia should install a catapult from the 50s that was never adopted for service due to reliability issues into a small (for a carrier) British ship originally designed to carry helicopters but currently being fitted with a less than idea ski jump for Harriers but no angled deck of arrestor gear.
Hm, you are right.
 
They were delivered (into storage) in 1968, by the time the Sukarno threat and Australia's isolation becomes clear cancelling the F111 is very problematic.
However, that was the plan, Frazer even travelled to the US to negotiate the cancellation. This was, if memory serves for an article in flight magazine I read while at uni in 1992/3, after the Indonesian Coup. Actually, just used my Google Fu, Frazer was Defmin from 69 to 71, so the Phantom replacing the F-111 plan coincided with the interim lease plan.

Further thought, and I think this was from the Lincoln, Canberra and F-111 In RAAF service book by Stewart Wilson, there was a financial penalty associated with the F-111 cancellation as the US were operating on the basis that Australia was a development partner, not a customer. Thus they were prepared to take the F-111Cs off out hands and rebuild them as FB-111As (or possibly F-111Fs) if Australia agreed to switch their order to F-111D at greater cost. Frazer apparently was quite keen on three Sqns of F-4Es, supported by RF-4s and Stratotankers.
 
I am really curious what the Modified LHA was. It was mentioned as an option to replace Melbourne in the 70s ad was meant to have had an air group of 50 helicopters and Harriers, versus a maximum of 30 on the standard LHA.
 
I am really curious what the Modified LHA was. It was mentioned as an option to replace Melbourne in the 70s ad was meant to have had an air group of 50 helicopters and Harriers, versus a maximum of 30 on the standard LHA.
I believe they cut the amphibious capability to be more of a sea control ship. Although, frankly, this design would not fit the requirements we needed anyway, particularly in this scenario.
 
I am really curious what the Modified LHA was. It was mentioned as an option to replace Melbourne in the 70s ad was meant to have had an air group of 50 helicopters and Harriers, versus a maximum of 30 on the standard LHA.
It would appear to have been a direct ancestor of the 'Modified LHA' program of the late 1980s, what would become the Wasp-class LHD.
 
However, that was the plan, Frazer even travelled to the US to negotiate the cancellation. This was, if memory serves for an article in flight magazine I read while at uni in 1992/3, after the Indonesian Coup. Actually, just used my Google Fu, Frazer was Defmin from 69 to 71, so the Phantom replacing the F-111 plan coincided with the interim lease plan.

Further thought, and I think this was from the Lincoln, Canberra and F-111 In RAAF service book by Stewart Wilson, there was a financial penalty associated with the F-111 cancellation as the US were operating on the basis that Australia was a development partner, not a customer. Thus they were prepared to take the F-111Cs off out hands and rebuild them as FB-111As (or possibly F-111Fs) if Australia agreed to switch their order to F-111D at greater cost. Frazer apparently was quite keen on three Sqns of F-4Es, supported by RF-4s and Stratotankers.

It's been years (decades) since I read the particulars, but Fraser went over to solve Australia's Canberra replacement and F111 cancellation was one option. I think in case of cancellation the alternative was like 40 F4s and 8 KC135s, which certainly wasn't going to be a cheap to buy or operate. The basic problem was when Australia ordered the F111 they failed to specify in detail what constituted an airworthy aircraft for delivery.

SecDef Laird's offer of 24 F4Es was unexpected and that it was accepted so readily I think shows a basic belief in the F111, especially in its awesome capabilities.

I think it's also important to keep in mind the timing of this in relation to the scenario. While Sukarno had been in power for another 2-3 years at this point the British have not long announced their accelerated withdrawal EoS and the US haven't announced Vietnamisation and the formal adoption of the Guam doctrine. I doubt it has become apparent that Australia needs to act firmly and decisively in its own defence at this point, although I suspect some things will be changing.
 
Interesting idea...

And that is one hell of a big "if." With a Soviet aligned Indonesia in their backyard, Australia is likely to be a lot more proactive in upgrading their strike capabilites. This would mean at least that the 4th Perth class gets built, Harpoon missiles would be bought for them, Walleye bombs and Maverick missiles would also likely be purchased for their A-4 fleet. It's possible that they buy Vigilantes early instead of waiting years for Aardvarks. An F-4 or F-8 buy is also possible with a more urgent need to counter Indonesia. More MPA assets are also a given here
F-111C was already decided by this time.



A possibility, actually. While expensive, F-14 is much better suited for area cover & long-range operations over sea.
While really expensive.



Аnother thing is that the Australians have been operating the f-111 which is similar to the f-14
Not really. The F-111B were not super similar to F-111C. Completely different avionics.

The F-111Bs were cancelled in 1968, and in trouble in 1966.



* Some kind of missile-armed fast attack craft likely would be obtained. A squadron or two of Pegasus hydrofoils might make perfect sence; they are fast, they have relatively long range, and Australia have a big coastline to cover
Agreed.



Regarding nuclear submarines, it’s known we had an option to procure American subs but I’m wondering if they would have real utility? In the environments surrounding Indonesia diesel boats would be perfectly adequate in my opinion. Poke holes in this, interesting conversation thus far
Nuclear subs are vastly better than diesels. Diesels must snort every so often to recharge. Nuke boats do not. Nuke boats can do a quick transit through shallows (it's amazing how much ground you can cover at 14 knots over time, faster if the sub can stay submerged), and be back out in water deep enough to not be visible from the air. (Unless you're driving a sea monster. Ohios can be seen 160ft down!)
 
Nuke boats can do a quick transit through shallows (it's amazing how much ground you can cover at 14 knots over time, faster if the sub can stay submerged), and be back out in water deep enough to not be visible from the air. (Unless you're driving a sea monster. Ohios can be seen 160ft down!)

There's a picture on the internet of a submerged Collins class, but every time I want it I can't find it. :confused:
 
Does anybody know if it's possible to upgrade Bloodhound Mk I to Mk II?

The reason I ask is I'd think it would impact the Army SAM buy. If a good chunk of Mk I gear and facilities can be reused, modified and/or upgraded then I think the Bloodhound upgrade and possible expansion would be a profitable path to go down. That leaves the Army with a discrete task for its SAMs which would impact the chouce of system. Perhaps it would prefer a more mobile system, trading off outright performance. However, if the Mk I can't be adapted for the Mk II Bloodhound then the Army will have to take up the mantle of area air defence of specific targets such as Darwin. This would drive the Army toward a high-performance but semi-mobile SAM like the Hawk.
 
Does anybody know if it's possible to upgrade Bloodhound Mk I to Mk II?

The reason I ask is I'd think it would impact the Army SAM buy. If a good chunk of Mk I gear and facilities can be reused, modified and/or upgraded then I think the Bloodhound upgrade and possible expansion would be a profitable path to go down. That leaves the Army with a discrete task for its SAMs which would impact the chouce of system. Perhaps it would prefer a more mobile system, trading off outright performance. However, if the Mk I can't be adapted for the Mk II Bloodhound then the Army will have to take up the mantle of area air defence of specific targets such as Darwin. This would drive the Army toward a high-performance but semi-mobile SAM like the Hawk.
I mean, in general, Oz is too big to effectively do much anything else. I mean, I get it, northern Oz is too damned hot even in winter to make it worthwhile to stay there, if not for large mines and the small cities that support them.
 
I mean, in general, Oz is too big to effectively do much anything else. I mean, I get it, northern Oz is too damned hot even in winter to make it worthwhile to stay there, if not for large mines and the small cities that support them.

Darwin and Townsville were worthwhile civil/military targets, clusters of military bases and significant other assets that make it worth having an area defence SAM and Mirage sqn. Given Darwin had an area defence SAM in 1969 as did Williamtown NSW it might be worthwhile to keep and upgrade these and get something like the Chaparral or Rapier for the Army, something that can be rapidly deployed in an amphibious or/and air mobile op to protect purely military targets. Without Bloodhound the Army would have to buy something that could do both, which means it would be ideal for neither.
 
Darwin and Townsville were worthwhile civil/military targets, clusters of military bases and significant other assets that make it worth having an area defence SAM and Mirage sqn. Given Darwin had an area defence SAM in 1969 as did Williamtown NSW it might be worthwhile to keep and upgrade these and get something like the Chaparral or Rapier for the Army, something that can be rapidly deployed in an amphibious or/and air mobile op to protect purely military targets. Without Bloodhound the Army would have to buy something that could do both, which means it would be ideal for neither.
In which case, make it Rapier, as it's purposely designed, built and effective, unlike the Chaparral, which was a compromise, as to it's capability.

Regards
Pioneer
 
In which case, make it Rapier, as it's purposely designed, built and effective, unlike the Chaparral, which was a compromise, as to it's capability.

Regards
Pioneer

I'm a fan, the Army ordered it in 1975 and IOC was about 1978, so they liked it too. I'd think that timeline would be accelerated a few years in this scenario.
 

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