Stalin's Missed Chance - What if USSR invaded Germany in 1941?

[Hammer Birchgrove]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stalin%27s_Missed_Chance

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_offensive_plans_controversy

I imagine that there wouldn't be much countries left that could form NATO after the (much earlier) end of WWII... USSR would have much more resources at its disposal after the war, all of Germany's uranium, steel, aircrafts, ship yards, etc, all the German scientists and engineers... Soviet atom bomb, (short and medium range) missiles, jets etc might very well arrive sooner, as well as a much larger Red Navy, with battle ships and perhaps Graf Zeppelin type aircraft carriers.

On the other hand, it would of course be nice to have the Final Solution ended before it started, even if that wouldn't be Stalin's (main) concern.

 

[mz]

In 1807, Napoleon and Alexander met as dear friends on a barge at the Niemen border river, and divided the Europe between them, though everybody knew what would inevitably happen later...

 

[Triton]

If the Soviet Union had attacked the Third Reich in 1941, the Eastern Front may have been very different. The only member of the anti-German coalition at the start of the war to remain standing in mid-1941 was the British Empire, the United States had not entered the war as of June 1941. Although there was fear that the Axis powers might control the world, there was little love for Joseph Stalin and the Soviet Union. The British Empire and the United States of America needed the help of the Soviet Union to defeat the Third Reich. To paraphrase Winston Churchill "the enemy of my enemy, is also my friend."

But I wonder what might have happened if the Soviet Union had made a preemptive strike against the Third Reich and wasn't a victim of aggression. Would the British Empire and the United States fear that the Soviet Union would conquer the entire continent of Europe? Would the British Empire and the United States of America create an alliance against the Soviet Union? Perhaps even allying with the Third Reich to defeat what was seen as communist aggression in Europe? Remember too that the Wannsee Conference that proposed the "Final Solution" occurred on January 20, 1942. It may not have been as morally reprehensible a proposition to ally with the Third Reich.

Would the Soviet Union have endured so many casualties if the battle against the Wehrmacht hadn't been a Great Patriotic War?

 

[bobbymike]

Was the Soviet Union - post Stalin's "General's Purge" even capable of such far flung offensive operations in 1941?

 

[Triton]

Was the Soviet Union - post Stalin's "General's Purge" even capable of such far flung offensive operations in 1941?

That's a very good question. The Soviet Union also had large numbers of obsolete aircraft most without radios and a shortage of modern fighter aircraft in 1941. The Luftwaffe had superior modern aircraft in large numbers. The Red Army also suffered from poor training, lack of transportation, and ammunition. Perhaps an attack on the Third Reich by the Soviet Union in the spring of 1941 would not have been a victory for the Soviets, but a defeat. The war may still have lasted for years on the Eastern Front.

Some historians believe that Stalin was convinced that Hitler would not attack so soon after the signing of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, that the Third Reich would concentrate on conquering the United Kingdom, and that he had more time to make preparations for war with the Third Reich.

Would the armed forces of the Third Reich have been taken unprepared by a Soviet attack?

Poor judgment and the harsh Russian winters also played their part in the defeat of the Third Reich on the Eastern Front.

 

[igor-mich]

And also bears on the streets and dolls Matpeshki.

 

[Colonial-Marine]

I imagine such an offensive would be more likely to backfire than succeed. Yes the Soviets would have the advantage in numbers, but consider how badly the Wehrmacht mauled the Red Army initially during Operation Barbarossa. The end result may be worse for the Soviets as any units encircled and cut off by the Germans are going to have a much harder time breaking out.

 

[Johnbr]

I heard on the radio that USSR was preparing to go to war with Germany and they found this out.This is why they attacked first.This was found in the Ussr archive this year.

 

[Hammer Birchgrove]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PTuh-hRoCNU

 

[Hammer Birchgrove]

Hurm. The credibility of that clip got a bit tainted by the allegations that it was all UK's and France's fault Stalin sided with Hitler in 1939. :

 

[alertken]

We Brits are Brit-centric on these issues, assuming the centre of the known universe is Piccadilly Circus.

In 1938/39 Germans, not solely Nazis, believed the stab-in-the-back cause of 11/1918 Armistice, and/or that naval blockade/starvation had stifled Central Powers undefeated in the field. So a Teuton Surge to the East would:
- rid Europe of the threat of Bolshevism;
- provise land for a burgeoning, pioneer-spirit folk;
- provide food and oil to surmount any encirclement/blockade.
We should forget any Bond-villain rule-the-world notion: soldiers do not go over the top for that motivation.

In 1938/39 the Motherland was trying hard to feed itself after a pitiful series of setbacks dating to the profligacy of the Czar's attrition methods of fighting the Prussians, 1914-17. We know of Party purges, but famine and pestilence were also visited upon the Slav. The Party needed import of material that Germany offered on barter, where Westerners sought real money, or declined to trade at all. The Spanish Civil War was seen then, just as Korea would be seen 1950/53, as dress rehearsal, Communist-collective team v. team that was not thus. Stalin needed time/imports to build Socialism in one country; Nazis had no time or money, but needed grain/oil to restore an historic people to their rightful place in the world.

UK/France in 1938/39 could have:
- ignored faraway people of whom we knew little (isolationism);
- found ways of bartering with USSR, to keep them out of a fascist bloc;
- found ways of pointing fascists East.
What we actually did was vaguely all of these. So the Pact of Steel was done in August, 1939, Stalin gobbled up half of Poland in September,1939, ta ever so; until April,1941 he had a good thing going, of barter with ascendent, friendly Germany/Italy. Prognosis was of stalemate, UK to settle for primacy at sea, Axis primacy upto the Pripet Marshes, everybody building homes fit for heroes.

That might well have happened, at least for awhile, except for FDR's success in causing a largely isolationist Congress to fund US as the arsenal of democracy, Lend/Lease to forget the silly $ sign, and thus kit the King to keep b...ering on inhope things would get better. US thus did not trade with USSR or (much with) the Axis. Stalin lacked the kit to move into German-held areas of Poland, and why would he: he would not/could not believe Hitler would move East while USSR was supplying everything he sought.

 

[Wingknut]

Before this thread makes any further headway towards the fanciful republic of Patbuchananland, might I at least query the tone and substance of one or two utterances immediately above?
Far from seeking to "restore an historic people to their rightful place in the world" or seeking "land for a burgeoning, pioneer-spirit folk" (sic), from its very outset the Nazi regime's purposes were predicated on the wholesale extermination of supposedly 'subject' or 'inferior' peoples to the East (and elsewhere). Since when did Germany's (or anybody's) "rightful place" (whatever that phrase is supposed to mean) require or excuse theft, expropriation and mass murder?
As for the Polish people being "faraway people of whom we knew little" (sic), Poland was a nation with whom Britain had extensive treaties and to whom we had extensive historical obligations.
(Oh dear - I may have waxed political. "It's a long, long way to Piccadilly. But my heart's right there ...")

 

[Abraham Gubler]

Before this thread makes any further headway towards the fanciful republic of Patbuchananland, might I at least query the tone and substance of one or two utterances immediately above?
Far from seeking to "restore an historic people to their rightful place in the world" or seeking "land for a burgeoning, pioneer-spirit folk" (sic), from its very outset the Nazi regime's purposes were predicated on the wholesale extermination of supposedly 'subject' or 'inferior' peoples to the East (and elsewhere). Since when did Germany's (or anybody's) "rightful place" (whatever that phrase is supposed to mean) require or excuse theft, expropriation and mass murder?
As for the Polish people being "faraway people of whom we knew little" (sic), Poland was a nation with whom Britain had extensive treaties and to whom we had extensive historical obligations.

Hear, hear. The Nazi "Hunger Plan" is the greatest crime inflicted upon humanity since Genghis Khan decided to see just how many people you could kill in Eurasia.

Apart from the gross lack of morality to the Nazi’s plans it was all based on very bad economic strategy. The Germans didn’t need a "new frontier" to secure economic growth but rather peace and good relations with other states. The very things the Nazis were hell bent on not having.

 

[Triton]

As for the Polish people being "faraway people of whom we knew little" (sic), Poland was a nation with whom Britain had extensive treaties and to whom we had extensive historical obligations.

Neville Chamberlain was actually speaking about the Sudetenland/Czechoslovakia crisis, not Poland, when he said on September 27, 1938:

How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is that we should be digging trenches and trying on gas-masks here because of a quarrel in a far-away country between people of whom we know nothing. It seems still more impossible that a quarrel that has already been settled in principle should be the subject of war.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neville_Chamberlain

The Munich Agreement was later signed by Chamberlain, Daladier, Mussolini, and Hitler. The agreement is also called the Munich Betrayal because the military alliances between Czechoslovakia and France were not honored.

It seems that the popular opinion in England and France at the time was that appeasement to avoid another war with Germany was the best policy. From September 1938 to March 1939, Czechoslovakia was dismembered.

Chamberlain later realized the mistake of the Munich Agreement and prepared the country for war. In August 1939. Britain's assurances to Poland became a formal treaty even though Lord Halifax urged the Poles to negotiate with Hitler and give up Danzig.

At the time of the proposed three party alliance of Britain, France, and the Soviet Union against Germany, Poland and Romania objected to the stationing of Soviet troops in their territory because they did not trust Stalin. Chamberlain had also been consistently told by his advisers that the Red Army was of dubious fighting value and the United States was firmly isolationist. Chamberlain also distrusted Stalin's motives.

The Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact was signed on August 23, 1939.

 

[alertken]

(wingnut: I'm no Nazi: I presented the viewpoint of (most) Germans ("respect!"), not just of rabid loonies, and offer the point that 1938-41 geo-politics were not Brit-centric. RN was insignificant to land Powers, who noted only the small, garrison, Indian-centric nature of the British Army. The "guarantee" to Poland had no meaning in terms of boots or bombs).

In April,1941 Musso's adventurism caused Hitler to divert into the Balkans. If Stalin had pre-empted Barbarossa by moving then into German-Poland, his horses would have been Stuka'd within hours, leaving a clear run onto Moscow in the summer. Endof the Soviet experiment.

 

[Wingknut]

Two points for your consideration, gentlemen:
Triton: where did I mention Chamberlain, or indeed Munich? I said that Britain had treaty and historical obligations to Poland, and so it did. Poland was after all the casus belli in 1939 and a key object in what is delightfully termed above Hitler's "surge to the East".
Alertken: I don't remember calling you a Nazi but I do note a certain 'Tomorrow belongs to me' flavour in some of the terminology you adopt, seemingly not for satirical effect. There are specialist web-sites for those sorts of interests and I fear this isn't one of them.
Oh, and by the way, Britain's guarantees to Poland were at least sufficiently meaningful that they sparked a declaration of war.
Top of the morning to you,
'Wingknut'.

 

[Antonio]

wingknut and alertken, gentlemen, please avoid going personal.

Thanks

 

[Wingknut]

Point taken, Pometablava - thanks.
At the risk of veering back towards Munich in '38, I grant this next impression might have arisen through hindsight but, based on conversations I've had with British people who actually remember the Munich crisis, I suspect most British people dreaded another war but did not welcome the appeasement of Hitler or think Chamberlain's efforts to that end were commendable. Indeed, as far as I can tell, most British people (then and now) regard Chamberlain as having been transparently conned by Hitler. Granted, our Neville did finally declare war on Hitler but arguably he did so at least a year late. (See some of the sources cited in the thread I started on 'Operation Pike'.)
I do agree though that Britain's policies in the 1930's towards Hitler or Stalin were inconsistent and did not send the sort of message that might (possibly) have contained or even prevented the spread of Nazism. With that said, even Churchill had to admit that there was no political will in Britain for going to war over (e.g.) the re-militarisation of the Rhineland or the Sudeten question.
Cheers,
'Wingknut'