Ah, the Bell RSRA. I was in charge of that proposal while waiting for NASA and Bell to agree on the XV-15 contract. My unwritten orders were to provide a credible stalking horse for NASA Langley to use with Sikorsky so that they got a good price. The proposal had to be technically competent even though it was done on a shoestring budget so we didn't besmirch our reputation. The only good part of the deal was that I was expected, nay required, to lose. Bell management didn't want any part of that particular program. Losing wasn't hard, except for the engineers who poured their hearts into the effort - if I remember correctly, Sikorsky bid $24 million and Bell, $42 million. The latter was a little hard to explain since we had bid only $28 million to beat Boeing for the TRRA (Tilt Rotor Research Aircraft) program. Our glib explanation was that we had already developed the transmission and rotor for the Bell tiltrotor.
Personally, I thought the RSRA was a huge waste of time and money. One of my fantasies was that NASA would put the X-wing variant in the NASA 40x80 tunnel and it would come apart and destroy three dumb ideas, the RSRA, the X-Wing, and the 40x80. Actually the 40x80 was not really as dumb as the first two, but NASA forced the XV-15 to undergo an expensive and dangerous (and again, in my opinion not only unnecessary but useless) test program in the 40x80 before flight test. We managed to convince them to allow us to make a first flight and fly out to 40 knots (whoopee) in helicopter mode before the 40x80 entry. In addition to the risk (there's no inertia relief in a wind tunnel test, so it's relatively easy to overload the aircraft, particularly a helicopter, inadvertently), by the time we were done in the 40x80, we were out of money (the $28 million was really, really optimistic as it turned out; we knew it was optimistic but not really, really optimistic). What's worse, the tunnel could only put 200 knots or so on the aircraft and the real worry was at much faster speeds. Fortunately, the Navy came to the rescue with more funding (I was and always will be grateful to the late Hal Andrews) so we were able to get aircraft number 2 into the air, get to 300 knots (rounded up a tinsy bit, another story), and take it to the Paris Air Show, thereby demonstrating that the tiltrotor concept was worthy of even more money, some of which Bell management provided. However, the 40x80 effort delayed the program by at least a year, maybe two, and could well have resulted in its cancellation.
Bell Design vs. Model numbers can be confusing. The former were issued by engineering and fairly easy to get. The latter were recommended by marketing and authorized by executive management; getting one was a significant milestone for a program internally. Design numbers, if I remember correctly, were sequential. Thought was put into a model number, e.g. 209 Cobra (well, maybe not that one), 309 King Cobra, and 409 for the AH-63 program. As a result, a design and model number could be the same but refer to two completely different projects. In this case it was in fact the Model 646, since model numbers were almost assigned to formal proposals.