(Excerpts)
Page 53
The proposed selection of Convair as the prime development
contractor was predicated on several interrelated factors. Aside
from the fact that it submitted what was considered to be the best
system design, Convair, as a division of General Dynamics, had at
its disposal a wide selection of experienced engineering talent and
its management staff had gained a wealth of experience and knowledge
through Navy and Air Force missile system contracts. No additional
facilities would be required for the MAULER development phase, as
Convair planned to use the Navy-owned plant at Pomona, California,
where it had begun development of the Army's REDEYE guided missile
system earlier in 1959. The Navy's Bureau of Ordnance had assured
OCO staff that the Pomona facility was adequate and available for
both the MAULER and REDEYE programs. Moreover, this arrangement
would be of mutual benefit to both services, since the Navy was
interested in a shipboard MAULER program. Production facilities
for the MAULER would present no problem, as several alternate
choices were available at minimum cost to the Government.
Pages 90-92
Negotiations with the Navy and Marine Corps
Both the Navy and Marine Corps expressed an official
interest in and closely followed the MAULER program from its inception.
The Department of the Army began negotiations to secure
funding assistance for the development program as early as 1960;70
however, neither of the services could make a firm commitment until
specific operational requirements had been established. Meanwhile,
their participation in the program was limited to observing the
progress of development through attendance at conferences, briefings ,
presentations, design reviews, and steering committee meetings.
The Marine Corps maintained a somewhat aloof, wait-and-see
attitude toward the program throughout the 1960-62 period. The
Commandant, in March 1961, reaffirmed that the Corps still had a
requirement for a low-altitude air defense system "which possibly
may be fulfilled by the MAULER." He noted, however, that a
specific Marine Corps requirement 'for the MAULER was yet to be
approved, and pending such action the Corps wished to furnish only
an observer to the steering committee meetings.71 Some 29 months
later , in August 1963, the Marine Corps Landing Force Development
Center issued for field coordination a "Proposed Specific Operational
Requirement for a Mobile Surface-to-Air Missile System,''
which substantially paralleled the MAULER materiel requirement.72
_______________
70Ltr, Coford to CG, AOMC, 7 Sep 60, subj: Presn on MAULER
Dev Program.
71(1) Ltr, 004C-6061, Comdt, USMC, to CG, AOMC, 9 Mar 61,
subj: MAULER Steering Com. (I left out an internal file reference here.)
(2) Also see Ltr, 004A-11060, Comdt, USMC, to CofS, DA, 31 May 60, subj: MAULER
AD Wpn Sys. File same.
72DF, Marine Corps Ln Off , MICOM, to CG, MICOM, 16 Aug 63,
subj: Ppsd Marine Corps SOR, MSAMS.
By that time, the MAULER program was in serious technical trouble
and it appeared highly doubtful that the weapon system could be
developed within reasonable time and cost-with or without Marine
Corps support.
The extent of the Navy's involvement in the MAULER program
was much greater than that of the Marine Corps, chiefly because of
the difference in operational concept and the modifications required
to adapt Army equipment to shipboard use. In early June
1961, the Chief of Naval Operations issued a proposed Navy supplement
to the MAULER MC's for consideration by the MAULER Steering
Committee.73 Shortly thereafter , the Bureau of Naval Weapons gave
the Applied Physics Laboratory, Johns Hopkins University, an
engineering study contract to investigate the feasibility of the
shipboard installation and to define the special ancillary equipment
needed for that mode of operation. Tentative plans called
for the procurement of hardware for shipboard tests in FY 1963,
followed by the initial buy of production equipment in FY 1964.74
Based on the results of the engineering study and data obtained
during a visit to Convair's plant,75 the Chief of Naval Operations,
on 21 March 1962, established a specific operational requirement
for the SEAMAULER weapon system.76
In late March 1962, representatives of AOMC, OCO, and the
Bureau of Naval Weapons met in Washington, D. C ., to discuss the
tasks and hardware requirements for the SEAMAULER. The Navy indicated
that it was prepared to spend about $6 million for FY 1963
________________
73Ltr, CNO to HQ CONARC, 9 Jun 61, subj: MAULER MC ' s , Fwdg of;
& incl thereto, Navy MC ' s Suppl to Army MC ' s for MAULER Wpn Sys.
(Left out an internal file reference here.)
74MAULER Program Plan, 21 Nov 61. (Left out internal file reference.)
75MAULER Program Report , Jan 1962, p. 1.
76Ltr, CNO to Chf, Bu of Nav Wpns, 21 Mar 62, subj: SOR W17-10
(Surface-to-Air Wpn Sys SEAMAULER). (Left out internal file reference.)
development, but overall control of the program would be retained
by the Army. AOMC recommended that the Navy establish a single
manager for the program with authorities similar to those of the
Army project manager, and further, that the Navy place all of its
requirements on the Command for inclusion in a single contract.77
The MAULER Project Manager advised the Bureau of Naval Weapons
that funding support in the estimated amount of $17.796 million
would be required for hardware procurement, testing, and support
services during the 1963-65 period.78 Navy officials later indi-
cated that the design problems being encountered in development of
the mobile Army system would not adversely affect the shipboard
installation.79 Nevertheless, plans for procurement of the
SEAMAULER were subsequently cancelled along with the rest of the
program.
_________________
77(1) Hist of HQ AOMC, 1 Jan - 30 Jun 62, pp. 60-61. (2)
Trip Rept, Fred B. Stevenson, Dep Chf, Low Alt AD Wpn Sys Div,
Indus Dir, 19 Apr 62, re: Conf on Navy Part in MAULER Program
OCO, 27-29 Mar 62. (Left out internal file reference.)
Page 212 (with part of first sentence from 210)
(U) Meanwhile, members of the GD/P crew completed a series of
captive flight tests to validate the missile in-flight reacquisition
circuitry design, preparatory to the first RTV firing . In the
initial phase of the captive flights, conducted during the period
25 February to 3 April 1964, they used the Navy EA3A aircraft sta -
tioned at Point Mugu, California, to gather clutter data on video
tape to verify the missile flight reacquisition circuitry and
determine the clutter environment in which the weapon was expected
to operate. In the second phase, completed in early June, they
used a Navy A3A and F-100 target aircraft. These tests indicated
that the MAULER target analyzer would reacquire a target under
simulated after-launch conditions.
Page 246
(U) Having taken over the operation of the General Dynamics/
Pomona plant effective 1 July 1965,13 the Department of the Navy
had become the administering contracting officer for the MAULER
project and therefore administered the close-out of GD/P'S MAULER
contract. MICOM's Procurement & Production Directorate served as
the Army focal point for matters dealing with the transfer of
residual MAULER property to the Navy to support the further
evaluation of the system for shipboard use.14
___________
13Up to that time, General Dynamics had operated the Pomona
plant under cognizance of the Department of the Navy.
14(1) Min, Staff Meeting No. 24, HQ MICOM, 10 Aug 65. (2) DF,
Cmt 1, Chf, Facs & Resources Div, P&PD, to Dir, P&PD, 22 Oct 65,
subj: Recent Devs on Dspo of MAULER Equip, & Cmt 2, Dir , P&PD, to
MAULER PM, 25 Oct 65, same subj.
