Royal Navy:composition choices

[uk 75]

The gift of HMS Ocean to the Brazilian Navy prompts me to ask again what the composition of the Royal Navy should be
set at.
Since the end of the clear NATO fleet structure of the Cold War era in 1991, the Royal Navy has found it hard to hold on to a meaningful force.
Top of the failure list has been the absence of a Type 23 successor. Other European navies have all developed ships
in this category.
The amphibious warfare force was restored to a level associated with East of Suez. However, the kinds of conflict
in which the UK has been embroiled since 1991 have, with the exception of Blair's Sierra Leone rescue, not required opposed RM Commando landings.
With the reemergence of the Russians, the enemy fleet in being and NATO's flanks reappear as issues. But reinforcement of the Baltic States for example requires Army mechanised forces rather than RMs storming ashore.

 

[Foo Fighter]

Does a sale at £84M constitute being 'a gift'?

 

[uk 75]

As it would cost at least a billion to build a replacement I would say yes

 

[Hood]

Ocean is 20 years old, she's not young and was probably never likely to have served much over 25 years anyway.

The cost of construction was £154 million (roughly £288 million in 2016), so selling her for £84 million probably isn't a bad price.
The genesis of her design and construction was mired in controversy and delay, the government did everything to strip the price down to the minimum possible. Yet it was the biggest boost to the amphibious capability that was possible at the time and was an invaluable addition. I agree today a replacement wouldn't be anywhere near as cheap unless built in a foreign yard. Anyway, Ocean will never be replaced, that duty will fall to the new carriers who will try to be strike platforms, fighter bases and Royal Marine camps all in one. I still think its madness to attempt it but in these shoe-string times we have to muddle on through. They are better than nothing.

 

[uk 75]

Thanks Hood for the accurate answer

The RN seems to me to suffer from trying to be a Mini-USN, with a finger in every pie.
Other European navies seem to be better at making do with their resources and prioritising
what they really need.
It seems odd that 40 years after the 1966 Working Group the RN is still thrashing around with the same
issues.
Queen Elizabeth (same name) is eerily like what CVA01 might have looked like in the late 1970s.
With only obsolete (as opposed to badly designed) escorts and an uncertain air group (USN already replacing Phantoms
with F14s, which we could n't afford)
Then there is the ghost of Nott, who also found that the Navy just wanted a bit of everything with no real justification.
The Navy does not seem to learn from history