Royal Air Force strike aircraft squadrons in the late 60s: plans versus reality

[uk 75]

I know that this is a well trodden subject but I thought that it would be interesting to compare the plans with what happened in reality.

Ground Attack/Recce Squadrons

It was planned to replace the Hunter with the 1154 Harrier in 8 squadrons: 2 in the UK, 2 in Germany, 2 in the Gulf and 2 in the Far East. None of these squadrons would be in service before 1970. By 1965 the likely in service date was slipping towards 1972 or worse.

Following cancellation of 1154 this is what actually happened in the likely 1154 squadrons.

UK: 38 Group

1 Wittering 1127 Harrier 1968
41 Conningsby Phantom 1968

RAF Germany

2 Bruggen Phantom 1971
4 Wildenrath 1127 Harrier 1970

Gulf (in the UK in real life)

43 Phantom 1969
54 Phantom 1969
208 Buccaneer 1971

Far East

20 1127 Harrier 1972

This suggests that the RAF did well to cancel the risky 1154 and replace it with a combination of Phantoms and the more flexible 1127.

Light Bomber/ Interdictor/Recce

The allocation of TSR2 aircraft to replace Canberra squadrons on a basis of 1 for 2 and Valiant squadrons on a one for one basis is a much more fraught subject. By cancellation plans to base TSR2 overseas had been scrapped in favour of a UK based force which could be deployed like the V bombers as necessary.

UK Bomber Command

Events led to the three Valiant squadrons at Marham (49,148 and 207) being scrapped in 1965. They were replaced by the re-roleing of the Vulcan force from 1968. There is no evidence that the squadrons would have been resurrected as TSR2 units at Marham. Plans suggest that TSR2s were also intended to replace the Vulcan from 1972. However, this is only an assumption.

40 Squadron at Honington was to be resurrected from a disbanded Canberra squadron. Other disbanded Canberra squadrons that could have been revived were: 59 61 69 82 104 109 149 151 192 199 245 527 540 and 542. No evidence suggests that any of these were proposed but modelmakers have plenty of nice badges to choose from!

NEAF and FEAF

6 squadron at Akrotiri received Phantoms and returned to the UK.
9 and 35 squadrons with Vulcans assumed the role that TSR2 had been intended to fill.
45 squadron at Singapore might have received TSR2s or the later F-111. It was disbanded with the withdrawal from East of Suez.

RAF Germany Interdictor Force

In a sensible world this would have been the main purpose of the TSR2 force to replace the aged Canberra by the end of the 1960s. Instead the role was left unclear.
Only 2 1154 squadrons were planned for RAFG and they have been accounted for above. UK based TSR2s or later F111 squadrons would have been the logical choice but the numbers become problematic.

Reality gives clues as to why TSR2 was a dead end.

14 Bruggen Phantoms from 1970
16 Laarbruch Buccaneers from 1971
17 Bruggen Phantoms from 1970
31 Bruggen Phantoms from 1971

To which can be added the following re-roled UK squadrons

12 Honington Vulcans up to 1968. Then TSR2s/F111s? Buccaneer instead.
15 Marham then Bruggen Vulcans Then TSR2s/F111s. Buccaneers from 1970 moving to Germany.

Replacing the TSR2 with Phantoms and Buccaneers allowed the RAF to have disposed of its SACEUR assigned Canberras by 1971. Only an optimist would suggest that operational TSR2 squadrons could have been available in this period.
Moreover, TSR2 was a nuclear delivery platform and less capable in the conventional role than the Phantom, Buccaneer, Jaguar or Tornado.

Some of the above detail may not be quite right but it does show that by 1971 the RAF had a credible strike force which it might not have had if the riskier 1154 and TSR2 options had been followed.

 

[alertken]

Now put onto that, money and industrial politics, all as addressed, 1964-70, by traitor Wilson and ex-communist Healey.

For a decade F-4M was free (dwell before the hire purchase instalments began) and carried free US weapons in RAFG, easing AWRE/ROF overload while kitting the SSBNs. From 1975 Anglo-French Jaguar + UK WE177C in RAFG, phasing into UK/FRG/It Tornado - all building Euro-Jointery (conforming with the then-spirit of the times, common across all UK political Parties {irrelevant if today you disagree}).

When India, Singapore, Gulf States comprehended we were really vacating East of Suez they got on with paying for their own defence.

On the Central Front we replaced our 1947-technology Hunter/Canberra with kit that could at the least force a pause for thought.

RN on one Strike carrier till 1978 had a credible Air Group, then from 1981 an ASW/amphibious assault Force, both for the first time ever. Strategic Deterrence from 7/68 became highly credible.

What people forget, whingeing about deleted solo-complex TSR.2/P.1154, is total Force capability. Outgoing Ministers, 10/64, were down to 50 TSR.2 (10 OCU, 40 to be strike/recce), maybe 150 P.1154, 5 SSBNs, all somehow to be funded from barren coffers.

 

[uk 75]

While on the subject of the Navy, I would add that the most important decision taken by the Labour Government was to develop the Hunter Killer SSN as the RN capital ship. Cancellation of the 5th Polaris submarine allowed the SSN programme to resume sooner than otherwise.

Had resources been out into the CVA 01 we would have had fewer SSNs and escort ships in 1982. Despite problems with the torpedos, the SSN was a decisive weapon in a way that a carrier could not have been.

In the 70s deployments of SSNs were sufficient to warn off the Argentines. Had the MOD and FCO had their eyes on the ball in 1982 a similar deployment might have done so again and saved much blood and treasure.

By contrast CVA 01 (which by this time would have been our only flat top) might not have been available. Assuming she had entered service in the early 70s (very optimistic), 1982 might have well found her going into refit, or worse still mothballed by John Nott to pay for our NATO commitments. I doubt Eagle would have been still in service by 1982 (Ark only staggered into the late 70s because she was a national institution). Hermes might have been the only available carrier, with a hodge podge air group of Buccaneers and Harriers borrowed from the RAF.

The unlovable Dr Owen is to be thanked for pushing through the Invincibles at a time when our economy was through the floor. Roy Mason as Defence Secretary kept the Sea Harrier going through the twilight years of the 70s.

Despite all this a part of me would like to have seen TSR2s and 1154s in service and CVA 01 with its battlegroup. However, that part is nine years old and not having to fight in them!

 

[phrenzy]

I'm not particularly well versed in these things but wasn't buying the F-111 a big (if not biggest) factor in TSR2 cancelation?
The fact that it was over promised, over budget and over time left them in the wind. It too was supposed to be useful in the tactical nuclear role (which apparently was part of the reason Australia kept on board with it though they never followed through with nukes).

That in mind a slightly related question:
Do you think they would have gone ahead with tornado if they ended up with aardvarks?

 

[Abraham Gubler]

Had resources been out into the CVA 01 we would have had fewer SSNs and escort ships in 1982.

If by fewer you mean none? It’s just not feasible or logical to surmise that the RN could maintain a high end strike carrier capability (in the form of the CVA-01) through the 60s with the same budget it received in real history. The budget would have to be much more to afford the new ships and wider fleet recapitalisation. Which is an obvious problem for the HM Treasury.

the SSN was a decisive weapon in a way that a carrier could not have been.

I don't agree

Had the MOD and FCO had their eyes on the ball in 1982 a similar deployment might have done so again and saved much blood and treasure.

No it wouldn’t. This argument ignores of the Argentine plans for invading the Falklands which were very serious and tied up with the 150 year anniversary of their eviction that was going to clock over on New Years day 1983.

 

[zen]

1. Phantom II was an 'interim' system, until the cheaper to run Jaguar entered service.


2. Capability....in both cases (P1154 and TSR.2) the capabilities of these aircraft IF they had reached RAF service could not have been as planned.


First off P1154 (to be called Harrier) had much a similar fit of avionics as that which ended up in both Harrier and Jaguar. Yet they did not recieve the digital INS but rather a analogue system.


Then we come to the vexed issue of the TSR.2 computer and the fact it couldn't have been the system they were working with at the time of cancellation. The 'most likely' is that produced for the USN A7 Corsair, which proved quite flexible.
A 'barebones' system would ditch the sophistcated computer for using something similar to the Jaguar, again leaving great scope for flexibility.


3. Yes CVA-01 and the SSN fleet are probably mutually exclusive without other compromises across all Services. However range of weapons systems means it's not an easy comparison between the offensive capabilities of a CVA-01 and its aircraft with that of a SSN.

 

[pathology_doc]

I'm not particularly well versed in these things but wasn't buying the F-111 a big (if not biggest) factor in TSR2 cancelation?
The fact that it was over promised, over budget and over time left them in the wind. It too was supposed to be useful in the tactical nuclear role (which apparently was part of the reason Australia kept on board with it though they never followed through with nukes).

Both were over promised, over budget, etc. etc. The difference is that the US kept paying and paying until the F-111A matured as a successful attack bomber (and knew when to stop paying when the -111B flopped as a naval interceptor). If the Aussies had known how long they'd have to wait for their F-111s, they might have put money down on the TSR.2. Whether that would have saved it (possibly by encouraging other buyers, e.g. Canada), who knows?

That in mind a slightly related question: Do you think they would have gone ahead with tornado if they ended up with aardvarks?

Given how long the Aussies kept the F-111 in service, arguably not. (ETA: to clarify, whatever your opinion regarding the relative merits of the Tornado and the F-111, unless you are absolutely rolling in money that you're desperate to spend, you're not going to buy both - which means that any nation already operating the F-111 isn't going to spend money developing another airplane to do the exact same job within the same time scale. The strike/attack version of the Tornado may have outlasted the F-111 in service, but the overlap between the two is sufficient that the purchase of one is redundant to anyone who already has the other, unless for various reasons they are deeply, desperately unhappy with it.)


(What rankles about the TSR.2 cancellation IMO is not just the culling of the programme on the basis of unaffordability but the fact that both the proposed replacements (F-111K and AFVG) subsequentlyfell by the wayside after substantial outlays of money with no hardware to show for it. One could write reams on the incompetence of the Services/MOD with respect to procurement, but at the end of the day it seems to me that the closest the West has ever come to one airplane that truly does it all for everyone is either the F-4 Phantom II or the F-15, depending on your tastes. Given that the F-15 has never operated from carriers and probably never will, I'd have to give the gong to the F-4.)

 

[J.A.W.]

Wasn't the point of 'Groundhog Day' (the movie) to learn from/correct previous errors?

The Australians had learned to be a bit wary of 'promising' British aero-space development programs,
- since having to put the old Meatbox up against MiG 15s in Korea - when they ought to have had the Hunter..

 

[J.A.W.]

The point remains applicable..

 

[JFC Fuller]

The point remains applicable..

http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/Groundhog-Day

 

[J.A.W.]

The point remains applicable..

http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/Groundhog-Day

The ox-dic editor who chose that entry - has obviously not seen the movie.. or has missed the point..

Which is... redemption.. by getting it right.. finally..

 

[pathology_doc]

I love this forum but sometimes its like groundhog day.

True, but any thread that goes into the title topic is going to revisit this argument by default. Who cares? Some of us don't mind thrashing it out for the billionth time, and nobody's forcing you to read it.

The only genuinely viable potential customer for TSR-2 beyond the RAF was Australia. The type was a large theatre bomber- not many of those were acquired by western export customers after the Canberra.

Air defence variant for Canada? After the Arrow's demise, doesn't that become at least a theoretical possibility?



TSR.2 should have been a fast battlefield tactical bomber, with some application to logistic targets beyond the immediate front line (bridges, railheads, canals, etc.), but it ended up being asked to hit strategic targets in the nuclear strike role too, and that was just pushing things too far (as well as substantially narrowing down the list of potential customers). Higher cost and narrower market were only ever going to end in tears.

 

[JFC Fuller]

The Arrow was cancelled in early 1959. TSR-2 didn't fly until late 1964, by which time the Arrow programme and the requirement was long dead and buried.

TSR-2 was never going to be a "battlefield tactical bomber", that was the role undertaken by Venoms, then Hunters and was to have been undertaken by the P.1154 before being swapped for the F-4M (itself later swapped for the Jaguar). TSR-2 was a replacement for the Canberra in the theatre bomber role, that was how it was originally specified and that was what it was designed to do. The type never had a formal strategic bomber role.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

The Australians had learned to be a bit wary of 'promising' British aero-space development programs,
- since having to put the old Meatbox up against MiG 15s in Korea - when they ought to have had the Hunter..

Dude WTF? The RAAF brought the Meteor specifically for Korea because nothing else was available for rapid acquisition to replace the Mustang. No. 77 Squadron started flying the Meteor in operations over Korea at the same time as the Hawker Hunter had its first every flight!

 

[Flying Sorcerer]

Air defence variant for Canada? After the Arrow's demise, doesn't that become at least a theoretical possibility?

Politically impossible. The Conservatives, who were in power until '63, would have to explain why they cancelled the Arrow and replaced it with a British bomber and the liberals would have blanched at the expense of TSR.2

 

[J.A.W.]

The Australians had learned to be a bit wary of 'promising' British aero-space development programs,
- since having to put the old Meatbox up against MiG 15s in Korea - when they ought to have had the Hunter..

Dude WTF? The RAAF brought the Meteor specifically for Korea because nothing else was available for rapid acquisition to replace the Mustang. No. 77 Squadron started flying the Meteor in operations over Korea at the same time as the Hawker Hunter had its first every flight!

Dude WTF?
The Meteor had been scheduled for replacement since the end of WW2, & the Australians
had been a bit keen on the Hawker swept wing prototype equivalents of the F-86/MiG 15,
but none were in production, or forthcoming, so the poor ol' Meatbox was all that was available for Korea.

& the Hunter took so long that they stretched the Sabre-jet over an Avon/Aden package instead..

 

[Abraham Gubler]

Dude WTF?
The Meteor had been scheduled for replacement since the end of WW2, & the Australians
had been a bit keen on the Hawker swept wing prototype equivalents of the F-86/MiG 15,
but none were in production, or forthcoming, so the poor ol' Meatbox was all that was available for Korea.

& the Hunter took so long that they stretched the Sabre-jet over an Avon/Aden package instead..

This is an extremely mangled version of history.

The Meteor that the RAAF brought was not of the 1945 variety. It was a new build F.8 that had first flown in late 1948. It lacked the swept wing to be comparative to the Sabre and MiG-15 but it was arguably better than the F-80 and F-84. It was all that could be brought in a time of need and could hold its own at anything but the highest altitude. It’s still an item of controversy in the RAAF that it was flown on a few high altitude fighter sweeps.

The RAAF was interested in the swept wing Hawker P.1081 but it was never going to be timely to replace the Mustang for Korean service. The P.1081 had its first flight in June 1950 and even if it wasn’t lost in a crash and continued on in production by CAC could not conceivably be in service significantly earlier than the Avon Sabre (1954).

The RAAF had been interested in the P.1081 because it aligned with its original late 1940s jet engine plan. Which was to build an air force based on the R-R Nene/Tay engines being built in Australia by CAC. Both the Vampire interim fighter, Canberra bomber, the new swept wing day fighter (P.1081) and the new all-weather fighter (CAC designs) were to have these engines. But the availability of the axial flow R-R Avon engine changed these plans as first the Canberra then the new all-weather fighter (CA-23) were to ditch the Nene/Tay engine. With the cancellation of the P.1081 in 1951 the RAAF decided to build the new fighter with the Avon. When it came to selecting a new Avon powered fighter in 1951 the Sabre was a clear choice over the Hunter because it was in service rather than still in prototype stage.

None of this had any impact of course in the 1960s strike aircraft selection. Doubt in the TSR.2 was instilled in the RAAF by the British senior levels during the assessment tour. But the RAAF in the ten years previous had been more than interested in acquiring other British aircraft when they suited their needs. Like the Vampire trainer brought in large numbers and the Vulcan bomber the order for which was cancelled by a government defence cutback in the late 50s.

 

[J.A.W.]

The Australians had held an interest in swept wing Hawkers - from the P.1052 - which belatedly flew in `48..

From D.N. James - 'Hawker An Aircraft Album'; ..during 1949..

"...at A & AEE Boscombe Down, VX279 was being assessed as a potential fighter for the RAAF."

The Meteor F8 was an over-powered ( good acceleration/climb performance) 1st gen jet & had been developed for too long, given its fundamental Mach limits, it was never going to be an A2A match for the MiG 15..

The RAAF was right to be suspicious about the ability of the British to come through with a timely, effective
& on budget TSR 2, but were destined to be frustrated at the F-111 delays/troubles too..

 

[J.A.W.]

It was the British, including H-S of course -who were planning the replacement of the Meatbox from `45..
issuing " Specification F.43/46..." which ..eventually.. produced the Hunter for service well into the next decade..

& it was the long delay in producing an up-to-date swept wing fighter that kept the old Meteor in production..
So long in fact - did the Hunter take.. ..that even the RAF took up flying the F-86..

The RAAF did accept F4s (Phantoms) in lieu of delayed F-111s though, I recall seeing them as a kid..

 

[J.A.W.]

Correct..
& from D.N. James again..

"Following the end of WW2, the A.M. began planning a replacement for the Meteor & in January 1947 issued...
Spec... F.43/46...Requirements of F.43/46 included rapid starting, climb to 45,000ft in 6 min, a top speed of 547kt at this height & a service ceiling of 50,000ft."

The Hunter was the belated Hawker response to this spec set..

 

[JFC Fuller]

The RAAF did not operate (with the exception of a single F.4 sent for trials by the RAF in 1946/7) operate the Meteor until 1951 when No.77 squadron converted to the type in Japan, having originally been deployed with Mustangs. It would thus have been rather difficult for the RAAF to have been planning for the types replacement "since the end of WW2". The Meteor F.8 in Australian service was primarily used as an A2G type in Korea though it did tussle with Mig-15s.

The RAAF did however operate the Vampire (produced in Australia) and were planning to produce the Hawker P.1081 but dropped it when it was apparent it was not going to be available anytime soon (the RAF had little interest in the type and were holding out for Avon/Sapphire powered types) so the RAAF went with the Avon Sabre. P.1052 VX279 was rebuilt as the prototype P.1081.

F.43/46 wasn't issued until January 1947. The Hunter was built to F.3/48 which was issued in March 1948. F.43/46 was abandoned although the work undertaken for it fed F.3/48.

 

[J.A.W.]

Yeah, & how many obsolescent Meatboxes were built - prior to a definitive Hunter seeing squadron service?

Since the RAF didn't want R-R Nene powered fighters ( although they powered the MiG 15 well enough)..

No wonder the Aussies were duly doubtful about the prospects of the TSR 2..

 

[alertken]

Oz TSR.2? They had more sense.

1962. Pols tell RAAF that a Canberra replacement might be affordable, maybe. Indonesia, China brewing away Near North. RAAF tech evaluation team sets about looking at the market..Vigilante, Crusader...comes fairly promptly to TFX or TSR.2. (Only our Oz mates can comment on the issue of a nuke option, analogous to NATO's Project E - RAFG Canberras hauled US nukes until 1971. If anysuch was in the least likely, US Bombs would be cheaper/easier carried on a US platform).

Now: much Oz experience of operating (self or alongside) Brit and US kit. Plus points and minus points for both: Brewster Buffalo! try maintaining anySabre in the jungle. So, brochures are fiction, whether in Pom or Yank English. By 1963 Ansett, TAA and Qantas were well wed to US products (even though for every Viscount which shed its wings...so did an Electra). Product Support. But US military spares arrived at exactly the same snails' pace as British bits. So...it's all down to credibility of price and delivery date. If I had been doing the advising I would have said: the Brit type might be in FEAF, a Squadron or so. 8, 16 machines. McNamara was basing US Defence Policy around 3,000 F-111A/B, available for logistics support on USN carriers and USAF/PACAF bases here, there and everywhere. No brainer. Rattle the Brit type just to rattle McNamara's deal for F-111.

 

[JFC Fuller]

The idea that the Australian decision not to procure the Hawker P.1081 (but to procure an American aircraft with a British engine) in 1950 had any effect on the decision not to buy TSR-2 thirteen years later is silly. The Australians didn't buy TSR-2 for a whole range of reasons, including the F-111 package being cheaper, the UK marketing effort being almost non-existent and the Australians (Air Marshall Sir Frederick Scherger) rightly realising that the UK establishment was not fully committed to the type. Neither the Meteor or the P.1081 had anything to do with it.

 

[J.A.W.]

The idea that the Australian decision not to procure the Hawker P.1081 (but to procure an American aircraft with a British engine) in 1950 had any effect on the decision not to buy TSR-2 thirteen years later is silly. The Australians didn't buy TSR-2 for a whole range of reasons, including the F-111 package being cheaper, the UK marketing effort being almost non-existent and the Australians (Air Marshall Sir Frederick Scherger) rightly realising that the UK establishment was not fully committed to the type. Neither the Meteor or the P.1081 had anything to do with it.

Simply another emotively expressed opinion..& light on facts.

P.1052 was the initial swept wing Hawker tested for RAAF suitability,
- but longitudinally - a long list of stymied projects, delays & cancellations soured the procurement potential.

This was in spite of a long running pro-British Commonwealth conservative government in Australia,
who supported the primary purchase of British military products - where feasible - for local use..

The Avon/Aden Sabre-jet built in Australia was a bit of a 'Frankenstein' effort - but showed what lengths were
resorted to - in the absence of a viable off the shelf alternative..

 

[JFC Fuller]

No, facts, and plenty of them. The Australians were planning on procuring the P.1081- they abandoned this plan in December 1950. Then 13 years later they chose not to procure the TSR-2 for the reasons I outlined (see Damien Burke's book).

It is your turn to provide facts to support your thus far unsupported assertion.

 

[J.A.W.]

No, facts, and plenty of them. The Australians were planning on procuring the P.1081- they abandoned this plan in December 1950. Then 13 years later they chose not to procure the TSR-2 for the reasons I outlined (see Damien Burke's book).

It is your turn to provide facts to support your thus far unsupported assertion.

Refer to post #21, per D.N. James - P.1052 predates P.1081..

What reference/s do you use? Do post them..

 

[JFC Fuller]

Nobody is questioning that the P.1052 predates the P.1081- in fact I myself pointed that out earlier, the second P.1052 prototype was even rebuilt as the P.1081.

You are being asked to provide evidence to support your claim that the decision to not to procure the P.1081 in 1950 impacted the decision not to procure the TSR-2 in 1963.

I gave you a source above for TSR-2. Australian interest in the P.1081 is available in multiple publications if one chooses to look.

 

[J.A.W.]

Providing a quote from your source may be helpful, more so than just a name..

The history of British-Australian aerospace/defence/trade relationships is too big a topic for this thread..
..never-the-less, as an Aussie might say.. even 'Blind Freddy' - could see the ongoing issue..

 

[GTX]

The Avon/Aden Sabre-jet built in Australia was a bit of a 'Frankenstein' effort - but showed what lengths were
resorted to - in the absence of a viable off the shelf alternative..

That is somewhat of a distortion of the facts. CAC had a long term relationship with North American which strongly contributed to the Sabre selection. The RR Avon was also already being set up for licence production in Australia for the EE Canberra. Combined with the already proven performance if the Sabre, this made the selection/development of the Avon Sabre more than simply a choice driven by there being no viable off the shelf alternative.

 

[J.A.W.]

You are correct about CAC/NAA cooperation going well back, even past the Mustang & Boomerang..

But 'Frankenstein' is a fair (IMO) call, given the 'surgery' & dimensional changes required..

Very probably the most potent Sabre-jet iteration.. but perhaps.. also too late?

 

[JFC Fuller]

Damien's book is readily available so with a minor investment you can look it up yourself: http://www.secretprojects.co.uk/forum/index.php/topic,10221.0.html

I strongly recommend it.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

The Avon Sabre was also far from a Frakenstein. It was a very good airplane that many thought was the best Sabre. The Sabre was also put into production with four different engine types: J47, Orenda, Avon and J65 (Sapphire).

 

[J.A.W.]

Damien's book is readily available so you should be able to look it up yourself: http://www.secretprojects.co.uk/forum/index.php/topic,10221.0.html

I strongly recommend it.

Well JFCF, if you have it, you could post a a cogent quote from it.. ..that contributes something.. ..useful..

 

[J.A.W.]

Quotes serve a purpose..

 

[overscan (PaulMM)]

Get a room, you two. : Better yet, have your argument via Facebook or something.


Must every topic end up in a running battle between you and get locked?


I will be considering next actions.

 

[J.A.W.]

Fair enough comment Paul, I will do my bit to not repeat the 'Brer Rabbit - Tar baby' routine..

 

[uk 75]

Abraham

Sorry not to thank you for your points on the RN budget and capabilities point way back.

I was assuming that the CVA 01 would have been like the DeGaulle in France or the current CVF-shoehorned into the existing budget as planned until 1966. I stand by my point that in that case the RN would have emerged like the French Navy or the current RN.

I agree I overstated the case for SSNs somewhat. But I recall speaking to some senior ex RN Hunter Killer captains in the late 80s at a drinks do and they were in no doubt about what their vessels could do to a carrier given the chance. As I understand it in the South Atlantic CVA 01 would have found it quite difficult to fly off and land Phantoms and Bucs. She would also have been a large target.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

But I recall speaking to some senior ex RN Hunter Killer captains in the late 80s at a drinks do and they were in no doubt about what their vessels could do to a carrier given the chance.

Remember OUR submarines don’t go after OUR carriers. Well at least in theory.

Also the idea that submarines can wipe out carriers based on the frequent publishing of periscope photos and lots of boasts from the submariners does not necessarily make it so. There are two key factors that are usually not in play during peacetime exercises. Live warshots and freedom of manoeuvre.

That is in war time the ASW force will drop lots of live torpedoes into the water on any possible hint of a target. This can’t be replicated in peacetime training: all those live torpedoes zinging around underwater. From memory the RN dropped over a hundred LWTs during the Falklands Campaign. Killed a lot of whales and kelp blooms but would have made it very, very hard for any Argentine submarine if one had tried to make an approach on the task force.

The second element is the freedom of manoeuvre. A carrier task force can easily disarm the threat of conventional submarine attack by deciding where it can sail and staying out in deep water. Requiring a conventional submarine to make a long and difficult approach to try and get in an attack position.

As I understand it in the South Atlantic CVA 01 would have found it quite difficult to fly off and land Phantoms and Bucs.

I very much doubt it. The Argentineans had trouble launching their carrier strike because they had a large WOD requirement. The RN did not put aircraft to sea on carriers that could not be launched with more than the WOD the ship could generate itself. The CVA-01’s slightly angled flight deck was also excellent for recovery in pitching deck situations because the arrestor gear was very close to the CG of the ship meaning there was little vertical movement when pitching. Which is what leads to large numbers of bolters during pitching deck recovery.

She would also have been a large target.

Mike Tyson is a large target but it’s pretty hard to get close enough to hit him and still stay conscious.

 

[pathology_doc]

However, IF you believe a fixed-wing capability at sea is necessary (and for the Royal Navy's Cold War mission in the Atlantic I believe it was), then unless you have Sea Harrier or its functional equivalent, an Invincible-class carrier simply won't cut it. You certainly cannot operate Phantoms off an Invincible. You might operate the Skyhawk or some sort of navalised and upgraded Folland Gnat from something the size of Hermes, but would that have done the job against the USSR?


A sea-capable Harrier (and let's face it; the RAF's Harriers adapted well) and the Invincibles were a natural match to each other, especially when the fighter finally got radar-guided BVR missiles. Without it, flat-tops of that size would've been just what the cover story said they were - guided-missile air-defence cruisers with a very large capacity for operating ASW helicopters, much like the Terrier ships the Italians built except with a straight through deck and not bristling with gun armament alongside the missiles. Hence the need - THEN - to build CVA-01.

If you accept an absolute dependence on US carrier assets, having nothing more than ASW air assets is fine... but I suspect that in a shooting war against the USSR, the US carriers would have been such high-value targets that their entire capability might very quickly have been diverted to their own protection. And that might have left the British in a very bad position, with the one saving grace that the Invincibles at least had an area air defence capability of their own and could supplement the Sheffields and the Bristol.