RN Escorts 1965 to 1975: Options?

[uk 75]

Sorry if some of you are irritated by this sort of thread, but they do seem to provoke some fantastic contributions from the various interested parties.

We have had some excellent discussions on the RN capital ships in the 1960s, but the escort question has only been dealt with in connection with specific projects.

I pose a question based on a line in one of the usual source books (I think it is "Rebuilding the Royal Navy"). Should the RN have carried on building Leander class frigates as long as they did? Delays in designing the replacement Type 22 meant that the Type 21 had to be brought in as an interim type (or were they just replacements for other elderly frigates).

There is quite a long gap between the commissioning of the last Leanders in the early 1970s and the arrival of the first Type 22 at the end of the decade. In comparison, the US Navy were able to move rather more quickly with its Perry and Spruance programmes.

Air defence escorts also offer a picture of delay and waiting for new kit. The last two County class (Antrim and Norfolk) would not have been ordered if the Type 82s had not been delayed. As it was, HMS Bristol never really entered service, because of various mishaps. The first Type 42, HMS Sheffield, did not arrive until the mid-70s, some 5 years after the last County.

By the end of the 70s the County class and the Leanders were obsolete ships, lacking effective new systems, except where expensive conversions (Exocet and Ikara, and in the 80s, Seawolf) improved their abilities somewhat. The USN was able to fit Harpoon and new helicopters, as well as point defence missiles, to its Knox class escorts and DLG/DLGN ships were also upgraded relatively easily.

Even in 1982 the RN had only a handful of air defence ships (3 Type 42 and 2 Type 22s initially) out of a much larger number of escorts, mainly armed with 4.5 inch guns and out of date SAMs. Even without its big carriers, a USN force of the same size would have had a much broader set of capabilities.

At a time when the RN is once again asking the taxpayer for big ticket ship construction programmes, following on from the dismal Type 45 experience ( 2 ships in service(just) when Japan, Germany, Spain, Norway and others have all introduced similar ships with much less fuss and cost. Is a task force equipped with a selection of Type 42 and 23/22 ships shepherded by one or two Type 45s able to do anything worthwhile in the absence of the huge US Navy? Liam Fox must be asking similar questions to John Nott in 1981. Next time the RN may not face an opponent armed with non-fuzing bombs and a handful of missiles supplied by a friendly country.

UK 75

 

[JFC Fuller]

I pose a question based on a line in one of the usual source books (I think it is "Rebuilding the Royal Navy"). Should the RN have carried on building Leander class frigates as long as they did? Delays in designing the replacement Type 22 meant that the Type 21 had to be brought in as an interim type (or were they just replacements for other elderly frigates).

The Leander was not a bad design, in fact it was pretty good by the standards of the day, ideally they would have been replaced in production earlier but circumstance intervened. The Type 21 was an interim solution and an unfortunate one at that.

There is quite a long gap between the commissioning of the last Leanders in the early 1970s and the arrival of the first Type 22 at the end of the decade. In comparison, the US Navy were able to move rather more quickly with its Perry and Spruance programmes.

The gap is simple. The collapse of the CVA-01 programme meant that the entire fleet had to be redesigned from the waterline up, it took time. In the mean time money was spent on SSN's and SSBN's.

Air defence escorts also offer a picture of delay and waiting for new kit. The last two County class (Antrim and Norfolk) would not have been ordered if the Type 82s had not been delayed. As it was, HMS Bristol never really entered service, because of various mishaps. The first Type 42, HMS Sheffield, did not arrive until the mid-70s, some 5 years after the last County.

The original plan was for 10 Counties but the last two were cancelled as it was thought that Sea Slug escort cruisers would be built instead, of course they were not. It was also planned to upgrade the first 4 units to Sea Slug II standard replacing CDS with ADAWS as well as the newer missile but this never came to pass either. Seemingly due to concerns about hull availability. As with the ASW escorts the fleet redesign resulting from the CVA-01 cancellation forces the gap wider. I have never been able to uncover the early plans for County class procurement and I would welcome any insights?

By the end of the 70s the County class and the Leanders were obsolete ships, lacking effective new systems, except where expensive conversions (Exocet and Ikara, and in the 80s, Seawolf) improved their abilities somewhat. The USN was able to fit Harpoon and new helicopters, as well as point defence missiles, to its Knox class escorts and DLG/DLGN ships were also upgraded relatively easily.

The Leander class were never quite the ships that they could have been, at various points in the design process it was hoped they could be fitted with the Type 2001 sonar used by UK SSN's, a true ADA/ADAWS system (from the outset) a full sized helicopter with genuine hunter killer capability and ASW torpedos (eventually triple light weight launchers were installed). Of course none of this happened. However they were still effective ships and with their later modernisations they remained very effective assets. The internet has generated a lot of Leander hate but in reality they good vessels that were well equipped.

Even in 1982 the RN had only a handful of air defence ships (3 Type 42 and 2 Type 22s initially) out of a much larger number of escorts, mainly armed with 4.5 inch guns and out of date SAMs. Even without its big carriers, a USN force of the same size would have had a much broader set of capabilities.

The USN was supported by an economy, and thus defence budget, orders of magnitude larger than the RN. Hardly a fair comparison.

At a time when the RN is once again asking the taxpayer for big ticket ship construction programmes, following on from the dismal Type 45 experience ( 2 ships in service(just) when Japan, Germany, Spain, Norway and others have all introduced similar ships with much less fuss and cost. Is a task force equipped with a selection of Type 42 and 23/22 ships shepherded by one or two Type 45s able to do anything worthwhile in the absence of the huge US Navy? Liam Fox must be asking similar questions to John Nott in 1981. Next time the RN may not face an opponent armed with non-fuzing bombs and a handful of missiles supplied by a friendly country.

None of those ships compares to a Type 45. Type 45 is the most modern warship afloat today in pretty much every metric. The inclusion of the Norwegian ships is just strange, they are closer to a T23 in role and capability than they are a T45.

Perhaps you could explain which vast armada of ships and planes it is that the Royal Navy will be engaging in the coming years?

 

[RP1]

The internet has generated a lot of Leander hate but in reality they good vessels that were well equipped

Not entirely. They were designed to much older standards and had inadequate subdivision and survivability - this is briefly mentioned in DKBs RBtRN. Also they had reached the limit of their adaptability. I'm surprised at there being "Leander hate", however - they were, as you note, very good for their day.

RP1

 

[JFC Fuller]

The internet has generated a lot of Leander hate but in reality they good vessels that were well equipped

Not entirely. They were designed to much older standards and had inadequate subdivision and survivability - this is briefly mentioned in DKBs RBtRN. Also they had reached the limit of their adaptability. I'm surprised at there being "Leander hate", however - they were, as you note, very good for their day.

RP1

Older standards is a bit unfair, certainly they were not as impressive as later designs but I think that owes more to their design lineage having come through convoy rather than fleet escorts. Later RN ships, especially the Type 22 were fantastic all round.

An interesting note is that one Leander was cancelled in order to allow for the Ikara conversions.

 

[Hood]

An interesting question.

For the lower end a better Type 21 would have filled the gap for simple patrol and overseas work leaving the Type 22 to be a much better equipped escort. Had the Navy continued the Type 19 line of thought into a simpler and slower ship it might have been worthwhile. Some of the trouble was Leander was so good that everything else designed in the 1960s was compared against it in terms of cost and capability and weights etc. Somewhat unfair but the penny-pinchers might have had a point.

Also had the private-venture Sea Cat 2 been followed through from 1967 using the same Sea Cat launchers but with better radar guidance then the Leanders would have had a supersonic point-defence system that was lieghtweight and it might have secured some good exports too. Maybe a Leander with ASROC rather than the twin 4.5in turret might have met the ASW need cheaper too.

Here is my take on a Type 19 of the 1970s with the Sea Cat 2 and used in one of my AUs elsewhere.

 

[JFC Fuller]

The problem here is that the Type 19 and the Type 22 are from two different fleet structures. The Type 19 is an unfortunate necessity (that never reaches a final design) for the CVA-01 fleet that was designed with EoS in mind. The RN never wanted it but was being forced in that direction by financial and manpower issues.

The Type 22 on the other hand is from the post CVA-01 structure as the RN moved towards a balanced fleet of large and well equipped frigates which had only a very limited out of SACLANT role. And it has to be said that they were very well equipped ships. Just a shame that the RN never got enough Lynxes to equip each with a pair and never fitted them with dipping sonar. Not really a requirement for a Type 19 here.

 

[zen]

Leander or improved Type 12 Frigates is a effort initiated in 1959.

But in terms of the limited Frigate of the pre-66 decision. The best option would've been some form of limited Type 82 without the high end AAW suite, work a helicopter on and just run the things off as many as possible.

However we have some perspective of the specific options mused over in studies.
First two are First Rate vessels, likely attendant with the CV or other high value assets.

Study 381 Type 17 First Rate AS Frigate. Used diesels, included Match, Ikara, AS mortars and a 4.5" gun. This with a full sonar suite and VDS. Cost 12 million

Study 382 First Rate AA Frigate was the same machinary as the AS Frigate, but toted SeaDart, two 909 trackers, two 40mm guns, and Match. Cost 12.5 million.

The second set, 392 and 391, are Medium Rate vessels. The AA version being a sort of precursor to the Type 42.

Then there where the simplified studies, 390 and 389.

One might note here, that there was scope for a 105mm gun between the 114mm (4.5") and 40mm.

 

[JFC Fuller]

The pre 66 Sea Dart frigate studies do not appear to have been taken especially seriously, both because they had the potential to undermine the far more capable Type 82 and, I assume, because their sensor fit was so pathetic that they would not have come close being able to use Sea Dart to anything near its potential. The later Type 42 is a far more capable ship.

You are of course right that the Type 17 studies represent the pre 66 equivalent of the Type 22 with both being high end ASW ships, though the Type 17 would have been some way behind the Type 22 in terms of capability. these however fit into the three tier destroyer (Type 82)/frigate (Type 17)/sloop (Type 19) force that the RN was being pushed towards to make the money and manpower situation work.

The 105mm is intriguing as there were actually at least 2 105mm suggestions around this time, there was the modified Centurion gun proposed for the Castle class OPV's (which I believe to have been the Vickers Autonomous Patrol Gun) as well as the Abbot gun suggested around the time of the 4.5 inch Mk8 studies. The APG seems to have been a very simple hand loaded weapon installed in a two man turret that required little integration on the ship. Had the Type 19 had come to be I dont think its unreasonable to suggest that it would have taken that gun along with the Castle class (which got 40mm in reality) despite the fact that the studies all used the 4.5 inch Mk8.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

The Mk 8 113mm gun is the Abbot ordnance and ammunition scaled up to the fixed 113mm calibre and fitted into an automatic loading turret. So no doubt at some stage before the RN demanded their own calibre (despite requiring a new family of ammunition) it was considered as a straight Abbot 105mm in naval mounting.

I always wondered why the RN didn't build their own type of Spurance class in the 1970s with a big common hull in both ASW (T22) and AAW (T42) versions from a common production yard.

 

[JFC Fuller]

I always wondered why the RN didn't build their own type of Spurance class in the 1970s with a big common hull in both ASW (T22) and AAW (T42) versions from a common production yard

.

It was examined but RN Hulls were just not big enough to support such a simplistic conversion (as it turned out the Spruance class were barely big enough, the Ticos had their share of issues) although they did develop a standard propulsion plant in the form of the Olympus / Tyne arrangement which was then developed into the Spey arrangement.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

It was examined but RN Hulls were just not big enough to support such a simplistic conversion (as it turned out the Spruance class were barely big enough, the Ticos had their share of issues) although they did develop a standard propulsion plant in the form of the Olympus / Tyne arrangement which was then developed into the Spey arrangement.

The CG47 is not the AAW version of the Spurance the Kidd is which was planned as the DDG version just the USN never ordered any. Certainly the Sea Dart equipment comes nothing near AEGIS in terms of volume, top hamper, weight and power demands on a ship. Plus of course the whole idea of a common hull is it is BIG enough for the largest systems requirement. The concept being steel is cheap and air is free. Anyway its clear that the penny pinching in HM Govt. would mean such a concept would be dead in the water.

 

[JFC Fuller]

Tico is the one the USN ended up building, which means it is the relevant platform, either that or the common hull approach failed.

The concept being steel is cheap and air is free

Actually not a very useful concept, high quality steel is actually not that cheap (ask Fincantieri and India about that one) then it needs to be turned into a ship, all of which requires man hours and machine tools and then it needs to be propelled through the water which requires propulsion plants and they certainly are not cheap. Then there is the issue of changes required to take different equipment, these can soon negate most commonality. The Royal Navy certainly took the best approach sticking with a common propulsion train but using seperate hull designs.

Finally I would bare this in mind, whilst in the 70s the UK standardised on a single AAW frigate design (T22) and a single ASW frigate design the USN still ended up with both the Spruance and the OHP.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

Tico is the one the USN ended up building, which means it is the relevant platform, either that or the common hull approach failed.

Where is the icon for banging ones hand against your forehead and going “ugghhh”?

The CG-47 was not part of the plan for the Spruance when it was designed and programmed. It came along later. So when one is assessing a project from the perspective of why it was built in the first place it has no relevancy. Unless you demand that defence planners need to have clairvoyance. The DDG with NTDS was certainly an effective fit in the Spruance hull.

Actually not a very useful concept, high quality steel is actually not that cheap (ask Fincantieri and India about that one) then it needs to be turned into a ship, all of which requires man hours and machine tools and then it needs to be propelled through the water which requires propulsion plants and they certainly are not cheap.

I need that icon again.

I’m not asking you to go out and buy some steel. Or to do so today in a tight market as opposed to 40 years ago when there was a general glut. In the overall cost breakdown of a modern warship the cost of the hull is one of the smallest items. Australia is currently spending some $8 billion to build three AEGIS destroyers. The cost of the 9,000 tonnes of steel for this program is $20 million or ¼ of a %. However since the phrase of term is widely accepted within the naval shipbuilding industry I hardly have to defend it to you.

 

[zen]

Hmm...

Type 82/Destroyer, Type 17/Frigate, Type 19/Sloop, is the nomenclature of the thing.

I do wonder if the PT428 SAM system was marinisable for the Type 19, as it seems quite a compact system and more potent than SeaCat.

In terms of the gun, I do wonder why they did'nt just revive the CFS mkII 3.3" weapon prototyped in the 1950's anti-MTB vessels.

I also wonder why there so much effort on the Olympus but not on the Spey or Medway, when they represent a more natural move from the Avon and other earlier marine GTs.

Might also pose the question would the RB.106 have followed such a marinised path as well, had it been brought to service.

On size, No.11 had a rather old fashioned view that tonnage = cost. Whereas by the late 50's it was already clear that complexity = cost instead.

 

[JFC Fuller]

Tico is the one the USN ended up building, which means it is the relevant platform, either that or the common hull approach failed.

Where is the icon for banging ones hand against your forehead and going “ugghhh”?

The CG-47 was not part of the plan for the Spruance when it was designed and programmed. It came along later. So when one is assessing a project from the perspective of why it was built in the first place it has no relevancy. Unless you demand that defence planners need to have clairvoyance. The DDG with NTDS was certainly an effective fit in the Spruance hull.

Actually not a very useful concept, high quality steel is actually not that cheap (ask Fincantieri and India about that one) then it needs to be turned into a ship, all of which requires man hours and machine tools and then it needs to be propelled through the water which requires propulsion plants and they certainly are not cheap.

I need that icon again.

I’m not asking you to go out and buy some steel. Or to do so today in a tight market as opposed to 40 years ago when there was a general glut. In the overall cost breakdown of a modern warship the cost of the hull is one of the smallest items. Australia is currently spending some $8 billion to build three AEGIS destroyers. The cost of the 9,000 tonnes of steel for this program is $20 million or ¼ of a %. However since the phrase of term is widely accepted within the naval shipbuilding industry I hardly have to defend it to you.

You do get very angry very quickly. You wonder why the RN did not procure a common single hull then pronounce that the designers need clairvoyance to make it work? Not a great concept then is it.

Steel costs money, good quality steel costs alot of money, it also has to be turned into a ship and then propelled all of which costs money. And it is not common within the shipbuilding industry.

You also need to get your basic facts right, the AWD is 7000 and not 9000 tonnes. Furthermore the $8 billion covers far more than the material cost of the 3 ships, unless you think a development of the relatively simplistic F100 class is going to have a unit cost (excluding R&D) of £1.57billion compared to £649 million for the more advanced Type 45??? :

 

[JFC Fuller]

In terms of the gun, I do wonder why they did'nt just revive the CFS mkII 3.3" weapon prototyped in the 1950's anti-MTB vessels.

Often wondered that myself, it seems to have been a decent weapon.

I also wonder why there so much effort on the Olympus but not on the Spey or Medway, when they represent a more natural move from the Avon and other earlier marine GTs.

Might also pose the question would the RB.106 have followed such a marinised path as well, had it been brought to service.

All good points, I suspect it revolves around the old notion of sprint and cruise configurations / what was available at the time. The standard Tyne / Olympus fit started out as Proteus / Olympus.

On size, No.11 had a rather old fashioned view that tonnage = cost. Whereas by the late 50's it was already clear that complexity = cost instead

Not quite, both add to cost, bigger ships take more man hours to build, take more raw materials, require larger and more powerful propulsion plants that burn more fuel and often larger crews. In fact it is very difficult to seperate tonnage and complexity as they are very often linked. The Treasury's view point was rarely as skewed as many people like to believe that it is / was. The very fact that the RN began to include what was essentially a sloop in the pre 66 plan is evidence of this.

 

[Thorvic]

Theres not much point comparing the early 60's designs with the 70's built ships as at the time the first post war designs were in production and the next generation ships were basically evolutions of the previous design taking into account the next generation of weapons and senors that were being planned at the time. By the time these systems were ready the designs had evolved into something akin to the ships we eventually got and the area we were expected to operate in.

Thinking about it most of the NATO frigates and destroyers were pretty much about the same size up to the mid 70's basically slightly enlarged from the wartime destroyers, and taking into account the lessons learned on stability and sea keeping. Something the size of a Spruance would be seen as being a Cruiser by their standards of the day and seen as too big and expensive to buy & run (there was an Oil crisis in this period afterall).

Interesting that we then started to stretch the hulls after this period first with the Type 42 and then the Type 22, although both have suffered fatigue issues as a result and have had to be re-einforced. Possibly due to stretching an existing hull rather than creating a fresh hull design.

Geoff

 

[Abraham Gubler]

You do get very angry very quickly. You wonder why the RN did not procure a common single hull then pronounce that the designers need clairvoyance to make it work? Not a great concept then is it.

Steel costs money, good quality steel costs alot of money, it also has to be turned into a ship and then propelled all of which costs money. And it is not common within the shipbuilding industry.

Anger? No just frustration... Since you’ve just repeated yourself with no understanding or even acknowledgement of what I wrote any reasonable person would be rightly expected to be a bit frustrated.

At no stage did I suggest what you have inferred about "clairvoyance". On the contrary that is what you are demanding when you type that problems with fitting AEGIS into the Spruance proves that common hulls don't work. AEGIS was not the AAW system conceived for the Spruance hull when the US Navy specified it for a common use DD/DDG and Ingalls designed it. The DDG fit out was NTDS as applied to the Kidd class. And they worked just fine.

As to your continued unwillingness to accept that no matter how much steel costs it is a minor element in the overall cost of a warship and this corresponds to the entire vehicle system side of a warship compared to the mission system side what can I say? For someone who asks many, many questions on this forum you are very unwilling to hear answers that don’t fit you preconception of the day.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

In terms of the gun, I do wonder why they did'nt just revive the CFS mkII 3.3" weapon prototyped in the 1950's anti-MTB vessels.

Probably cost and capability. Taking a mass production weapon like the L7 105mm (20,000-30,000 units) and sticking it in a simple mounting on a ship is very cheap. Likewise for indirect fire requirements the Army 105mm gun-howizter or Mk 8 113mm provides a lot more capability than a 3.3" weapon.

 

[JFC Fuller]

You do get very angry very quickly. You wonder why the RN did not procure a common single hull then pronounce that the designers need clairvoyance to make it work? Not a great concept then is it.

Steel costs money, good quality steel costs alot of money, it also has to be turned into a ship and then propelled all of which costs money. And it is not common within the shipbuilding industry.

Anger? No just frustration... Since you’ve just repeated yourself with no understanding or even acknowledgement of what I wrote any reasonable person would be rightly expected to be a bit frustrated.

At no stage did I suggest what you have inferred about "clairvoyance". On the contrary that is what you are demanding when you type that problems with fitting AEGIS into the Spruance proves that common hulls don't work. AEGIS was not the AAW system conceived for the Spruance hull when the US Navy specified it for a common use DD/DDG and Ingalls designed it. The DDG fit out was NTDS as applied to the Kidd class. And they worked just fine.

As to your continued unwillingness to accept that no matter how much steel costs it is a minor element in the overall cost of a warship and this corresponds to the entire vehicle system side of a warship compared to the mission system side what can I say? For someone who asks many, many questions on this forum you are very unwilling to hear answers that don’t fit you preconception of the day.

1) You need to get your basic facts right, the AWD is 7000 and not 9000 tonnes. Furthermore the $8 billion covers far more than the material cost of the 3 ships, unless you think a development of the relatively simplistic F100 class is going to have a unit cost (excluding R&D) of £1.57billion compared to £649 million for the more advanced Type 45??? I will help you out, it was expected that a second Flight II F100 (6th in total) on which the AWD is based would have cost Spain under £420 million.

2) The basic common Spruance hull did not meet the needs of the primary customer, it had to be considerably redesigned for the customers needs, ergo it was a failure. NTDS Spruances instead of Ticos would have made it a success but it was not.

3) Steel costs money, so does fitting the larger more powerful machinery plant to propel it, so do the manpower costs to fabricate the ship etc etc, just because you read a phrase on a forum once it does not make it true. Larger ships cost more money, they are more expensive in raw materials, more expensive in propulsion plant, more expensive in subsystems (everything from basic wiring to air conditioning systems), more expensive in man hours to build, more expensive to run. If you could just buy a pile of steel and have a ship that would be great but it does not work that way.

 

[Thorvic]

The very fact that the RN began to include what was essentially a sloop in the pre 66 plan is evidence of this.

Wasn't that design basically to replace the war built frigates/corvettes used for patrols east of suez. Not really needed once we decided to withdraw from theatre and focus on NATO area ?.

Don't forget with Royal Naval construction during this period, the designs were developed centrally at Bath but built by the competing and independant ship yards, as the Royal Dockyard stopped building ships about the same time. Things may have been a bit different if the Yards were able to design & develop their own designs such as Vosper did, although the Type 21 may or may not be a good example for the RN ?!!

 

[JFC Fuller]

Wasn't that design basically to replace the war built frigates/corvettes used for patrols east of suez. Not really needed once we decided to withdraw from theatre and focus on NATO area ?.

Yes and No, they were a product of the fact that the CVA-01 fleet was unaffordable, however they would have been EoS assets, if better ships could have been afforded they would have been procured. The withdrawal from EoS reduces the strain on numbers and such low end vessels are no longer required to maintain them.

Don't forget with Royal Naval construction during this period, the designs were developed centrally at Bath but built by the competing and independant ship yards, as the Royal Dockyard stopped building ships about the same time. Things may have been a bit different if the Yards were able to design & develop their own designs such as Vosper did, although the Type 21 may or may not be a good example for the RN ?!!

Different how? Personally I am quite fond of the idea of the people use the ships getting to design them, I have always regarded the DNC as a fantastic entity. There are allot of subtleties with naval shipbuilding that often dont get picked up on. Everything from the number beams and spars, the thickness of the hull plating, the quality of the steel etc that all work to effect costs.

 

[zen]

CFS guns was based on the use of existing tank guns if my memory is working, the mount had minimal penetration of the hull and was aimed for ships down to the likes of the Dark class et al.

Not quite, both add to cost, bigger ships take more man hours to build, take more raw materials, require larger and more powerful propulsion plants that burn more fuel and often larger crews. In fact it is very difficult to seperate tonnage and complexity as they are very often linked. The Treasury's view point was rarely as skewed as many people like to believe that it is / was. The very fact that the RN began to include what was essentially a sloop in the pre 66 plan is evidence of this

No can't agree with that, the most telling example is CVA-01 itself. Forcing the tonnage to stay below 54,000tons actualy pushed up the costs and risks to the design.

The key reduction in manning was the move to GTs from Steam, not a reduction in size of the vessel.
Type42 was artificialy reduced in size to fit the Treasurey dictat, later batches increased in size, but at a cost to the hull because of having to stretch the short ship. Savings would have emerged had they started with the longer hull from day1.

Curious thought, would we see the Peacock class still? Or would a number of Type19 be based at Hong Kong instead?

 

[JFC Fuller]

CFS guns was based on the use of existing tank guns if my memory is working, the mount had minimal penetration of the hull and was aimed for ships down to the likes of the Dark class et al.

Yup, absolutely correct, it died because of the death of the coastal forces in 1957. One reason it may not have reappeared is that it was based on a fairly old Army gun (17 pounder IIRC)

No can't agree with that, the most telling example is CVA-01 itself. Forcing the tonnage to stay below 54,000tons actualy pushed up the costs and risks to the design.

Your source for this? Capping tonnage does not increase material costs.

The key reduction in manning was the move to GTs from Steam, not a reduction in size of the vessel.
Type42 was artificialy reduced in size to fit the Treasurey dictat, later batches increased in size, but at a cost to the hull because of having to stretch the short ship. Savings would have emerged had they started with the longer hull from day1.

No, T42 was kept small to keep the cost down, it is the role of the treasury to decide how much money departments get and it can not be blamed for doing its job, it does not cap the size of warships. Savings would not have been made as the material cost of the earlier ships would have been higher.

Warship design is circular, the more things you want the ship to do the more people and equipment it has to be and so the larger it gets and the larger its running costs get and its production costs. Obviously size is only one factor but it is linked to the others.

Curious thought, would we see the Peacock class still? Or would a number of Type19 be based at Hong Kong instead?

A very interesting question, I have often wondered how the RN may have developed had the coastal forces been more widely deployed so that is another way of looking at it.

 

[zen]

On the gun, surely there was hundreds of old ex-tank weapons and ammunition, perhaps the mount could'nt handle the new 105mm? Or is it just a case of "we must reinvent the wheel", which something that did happen in other areas.

Surely you know No.11 did cap the CVA-01 design, and the RN played all sorts of games to suggest they where doing as requested?

Size-cost of Type42 was minor, quite why they felt the savings worth the candle is another matter, but then they did look at a coal powered version at one point. Perhaps they really were that desparate?

 

[JFC Fuller]

It must be remembered that the RN had a habit of drawing up designs for even the most unlikely requirements. I doubt anyone ever took coal seriously.

The CVA-01 restrictions hace as much to do with concerns about infrastructure than anything else, they dont mind paying for a carrier, as long as it is not silly money, but new docks is quite a different matter. And, contrary to the strange myth spread around here, big ships are more expensive.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

1) You need to get your basic facts right, the AWD is 7000 and not 9000 tonnes.

LOL, so you think that everything in that ship that has weight is made out of steel? There is 3,000 tonnes of steel for each ship. 3,000 times three equals 9,000. The rest of your points are equally vacuous, knowledge poor and lacking in “basic facts”.

 

[zen]

Lawrence, new docks or lengthend docks where available or allowed when CVA-01 was fixed as a design, it was no longer limited to Davenport No10.

 

[JFC Fuller]

Lawrence, new docks or lengthend docks where available or allowed when CVA-01 was fixed as a design, it was no longer limited to Davenport No10.

Really? Which docks? The RN certainly did not build any new ones and the only extension that I am aware of is the as yet unexplained (to me) extension of Rosyth No.1. Some consideration was given to commercial docks but this was less than ideal and seems to have only been an interim to a new dock at Portsmouth. Brown and Moore mention the requirement for the new dock to be built at Portsmouth, which was costed at £5 million (just under 10% on top of the £58 million cost of the ship), to take the ship and that it was never approved. They also specifically reference the lack of fitting out births that could meet the requirements without widening or dredging.

 

[JFC Fuller]

1) You need to get your basic facts right, the AWD is 7000 and not 9000 tonnes.

LOL, so you think that everything in that ship that has weight is made out of steel? There is 3,000 tonnes of steel for each ship. 3,000 times three equals 9,000. The rest of your points are equally vacuous, knowledge poor and lacking in “basic facts”.

At no point did I say anything like that, and you are being deliberately dishonest to suggest that I did. Furthermore my points were not vacuous which is why you have not responded to them. You wrote your post in a manner which suggested that you believed the ships to be 9,000 tonnes. At no point did you suggest your figure was cumulative, to be frank it looks like you are now trying to cover up your mistake.

And as I have already mentioned, and you have chosen to ignore, about 3 times already the cost of a larger vessel is not just in the steel but in everything else that comes with that, the cost of fabrication and assembly, the additional wiring, the larger powerplant, the more extensive air conditioning, the extra pipe work and the greater cost associated with operating the ship.

As a side note, an interesting recent story about steel in warships: http://www.cag.gov.in/html/reports/defence/2010-11_16CA_AFN/chap2.pdf

 

[zen]

No enough of that. You got more for CVA-01 put it in the right thread.

Maintenence requires access, and access for a human being, not an octopus with eight arms, no bones and enormous power to apply torque where needed. The easier the access, the more room around systems, the easier to maintain them and to replace them.

Consider how much space was increased on Type19 studies. This was precisely born out by the need to actualy keep these things operational.

Space also has its psychological effect, not every sailor in 1960s is cut out for cramped Elizibethan gun decks and Submarines designed for midgets who don't suffer clostrophobia.

The greater the space the less easy it is to bring multiple systems down with a successful strike. Explosive shrapnel disperses according the volume it must encompass, the greater the volume the more dispersed it is. Cramming it all in together like sardines is calling out for the lucky strike that takes the lot out in a single blow. 'Fighting the ship' is a key RN doctorin, to keep that vessel able to move, to float and to fight even under circumstances of damage.

Stability is easier to achieve on a larger hull too.

So by every metric bar the one of overly obsessing over the cost of steel in the hull, size makes life so much easier and makes the vessel more able to take the alternations required in future.

Type 42 was let down by the innapropriate reduction in size. Type 21 had too little margin for growth or even the full equipment fit of the time.

 

[JFC Fuller]

No enough of that. You got more for CVA-01 put it in the right thread.

OK, so you were wrong on the docks.

Maintenence requires access, and access for a human being, not an octopus with eight arms, no bones and enormous power to apply torque where needed. The easier the access, the more room around systems, the easier to maintain them and to replace them.

Consider how much space was increased on Type19 studies. This was precisely born out by the need to actualy keep these things operational.

Space also has its psychological effect, not every sailor in 1960s is cut out for cramped Elizibethan gun decks and Submarines designed for midgets who don't suffer clostrophobia.

The greater the space the less easy it is to bring multiple systems down with a successful strike. Explosive shrapnel disperses according the volume it must encompass, the greater the volume the more dispersed it is. Cramming it all in together like sardines is calling out for the lucky strike that takes the lot out in a single blow. 'Fighting the ship' is a key RN doctorin, to keep that vessel able to move, to float and to fight even under circumstances of damage.

At no point did I suggest building ships for hobbits. You can have smaller ships, with les capability and less crew, that is the lesson of the Type 19 episode. You do however get what you pay for and that is the key factor, one can not have what one can not afford.

Stability is easier to achieve on a larger hull too.

But is most certainly not unachievable on a smaller hull, especially in a world of stabilisers

So by every metric bar the one of overly obsessing over the cost of steel in the hull, size makes life so much easier and makes the vessel more able to take the alternations required in future.

As I have explained multiple times, it is not just the cost of the steel, larger ships are more expensive for a multitude of reasons, powerplant, fabrication, assembly, running costs, fitting out, internal fittings etc etc. If you are planning for your ship to have a relatively short life (as the RN was doing) the required future modifications are likely to be limited, of course the other problem is you have no idea what form they might eventually take making space saving difficult as well as costly.

Type 42 was let down by the innapropriate reduction in size. Type 21 had too little margin for growth or even the full equipment fit of the time.

Both were let down by a multitude of issues but in the end they served their purpose. Building ships has to be done within a budget, every navy in history has had to balance its procurement with its cash supply, and this requires sacrifice and usually comes, at least partially, in the form of less than perfect ships.

I am not disputing that bigger ships are better, I am merely pointing out that bigger ships are more expensive.

 

[zen]

OK, so you were wrong on the docks.

And that was what besides a deliberately provokative remark? You have something post it on the relevent thread and stop with the pointless posturing. If I chose not to argue CVA-01 here on this thread its because it gets way OT for the matter in hand.

As I have explained multiple times, it is not just the cost of the steel, larger ships are more expensive for a multitude of reasons, powerplant, fabrication, assembly, running costs, fitting out, internal fittings etc etc. If you are planning for your ship to have a relatively short life (as the RN was doing) the required future modifications are likely to be limited, of course the other problem is you have no idea what form they might eventually take making space saving difficult as well as costly

.

Now if you had actualy come out with that, perhaps we'd not be arguing this, but your approach has to been to justify the idea steel itself and its fabrication to hold that lot is somehow more dominant in cost terms than those systems. Which is not the case. The bare hull is nothing, the systems inside it are everything.
AS for lifespan, reality and pessimism intrude. What is supposed to be 'interim' tends to be permanent.

All this said a bigger hull is more desireable.
You do indeed get what you pay for, and if you don't pay enough, you get to pay for the funerals in absense of the dead personnel, those 'savings' have produced.

 

[PMN1]

Some may have seen this, others will not have.

http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk/Alternative%20RN.htm

 

[JFC Fuller]

And that was what besides a deliberately provokative remark? You have something post it on the relevent thread and stop with the pointless posturing. If I chose not to argue CVA-01 here on this thread its because it gets way OT for the matter in hand.

No provocation at all, I was merely looking for clarification and you overreacted.

Now if you had actualy come out with that, perhaps we'd not be arguing this, but your approach has to been to justify the idea steel itself and its fabrication to hold that lot is somehow more dominant in cost terms than those systems. Which is not the case. The bare hull is nothing, the systems inside it are everything.
AS for lifespan, reality and pessimism intrude. What is supposed to be 'interim' tends to be permanent.

All this said a bigger hull is more desireable.
You do indeed get what you pay for, and if you don't pay enough, you get to pay for the funerals in absense of the dead personnel, those 'savings' have produced.

Wrong, it is all interlinked, larger hull = more steel, more man hours, more propulsive power, more fuel, more internal fittings, etc, etc, etc. And actually I said it multiple times as can be seen if you read back through this thread in replies: 11, 14, 15, 19, 23, 29 and 31. It is all there.

Caviar for all is desirable, reality is what we have to satisfy ourselves with.

The dead personnel comment is silly, war is an act which sees human beings try and kill each, the end result is that some die. However, a country can only pay for what it can afford irrelevant of the emotional/logical disposition of its inhabitants. This is where democracy works a treat as the majority get to decide how much is spent on defence and today they choose approximately 2.5% of GDP.

 

[PMN1]

I've got to go with SLL on this, whilst I like the idea of bigger ships and have seen the 'air is free and steel is cheap' argument used time and time again, I've never seen any comparisons of running costs for larger ships.

Now, depending on hull shape and form you can get different power requirements but there must be a point at which the extra versatility from having a larger hull is outweighed by the increased running costs.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

You wrote your post in a manner which suggested that you believed the ships to be 9,000 tonnes. At no point did you suggest your figure was cumulative, to be frank it looks like you are now trying to cover up your mistake.

Ohh really?

Australia is currently spending some $8 billion to build three AEGIS destroyers. The cost of the 9,000 tonnes of steel for this program is $20 million or ¼ of a %.

Pretty straight forward.

At no point did I say anything like that, and you are being deliberately dishonest to suggest that I did.

Ha. What a joke. You clearly believed I was saying that the AWD displaced 9,000 tonnes and tried to correct me to its maximum displacement of 7,000 tonnes. Which of course has little to do with the amount of steel needed to build the ship. Which one would assume is the centrepiece of an argument about the naval shipbuilding axiom “steel is cheap and air is free”.

Furthermore my points were not vacuous which is why you have not responded to them.

And as I have already mentioned, and you have chosen to ignore, about 3 times already the cost of a larger vessel is not just in the steel but in everything else that comes with that, the cost of fabrication and assembly, the additional wiring, the larger powerplant, the more extensive air conditioning, the extra pipe work and the greater cost associated with operating the ship.

You seem to assume that every point needs to be responded to sentence by sentence. There is nothing in your debating about steel vs overall vehicle system cost that is different and defeats the argument. The whole point of the axiom is that proportionally the cost of steel (and everything needed to turn it into a ship: ie the vehicle system) is very much a minority of the overall ship cost compared to the mission system (sensor, weapons, etc).

That you continue to deny this clearly indicates your ego is running the show not your brain. That you have responded in such a way as above to try and muddy the waters about reasonable criticisms of the logical inconsistencies and flawed facts you are writing suggests even worse.

 

[JFC Fuller]

You wrote your post in a manner which suggested that you believed the ships to be 9,000 tonnes. At no point did you suggest your figure was cumulative, to be frank it looks like you are now trying to cover up your mistake.

Ohh really?

Australia is currently spending some $8 billion to build three AEGIS destroyers. The cost of the 9,000 tonnes of steel for this program is $20 million or ¼ of a %.

Pretty straight forward.

At no point did I say anything like that, and you are being deliberately dishonest to suggest that I did.

Ha. What a joke. You clearly believed I was saying that the AWD displaced 9,000 tonnes and tried to correct me to its maximum displacement of 7,000 tonnes. Which of course has little to do with the amount of steel needed to build the ship. Which one would assume is the centrepiece of an argument about the naval shipbuilding axiom “steel is cheap and air is free”.

Furthermore my points were not vacuous which is why you have not responded to them.

And as I have already mentioned, and you have chosen to ignore, about 3 times already the cost of a larger vessel is not just in the steel but in everything else that comes with that, the cost of fabrication and assembly, the additional wiring, the larger powerplant, the more extensive air conditioning, the extra pipe work and the greater cost associated with operating the ship.

You seem to assume that every point needs to be responded to sentence by sentence. There is nothing in your debating about steel vs overall vehicle system cost that is different and defeats the argument. The whole point of the axiom is that proportionally the cost of steel (and everything needed to turn it into a ship: ie the vehicle system) is very much a minority of the overall ship cost compared to the mission system (sensor, weapons, etc).

That you continue to deny this clearly indicates your ego is running the show not your brain. That you have responded in such a way as above to try and muddy the waters about reasonable criticisms of the logical inconsistencies and flawed facts you are writing suggests even worse.

I appreciate that you are rather emotional but the simple fact is that you are wrong. Larger vessels are more expensive for the full list of reasons that I have explained in some 7 posts. Your strange desire to believe otherwise is perplexing. If you build a bigger ship it will cost you more money.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

I appreciate that you are rather emotional but the simple fact is that you are wrong. Larger vessels are more expensive for the full list of reasons that I have explained in some 7 posts. Your strange desire to believe otherwise is perplexing. If you build a bigger ship it will cost you more money.

LOL. So I'm both emotional and claiming that larger vessels are not more expensive? Ahh where have I possibly indicated such? OK calling you out for being an idiot rates as emotion? Not quite, just simple observation.

As to the later claim I have repeatedly stated that the cost of size in a ship is minor compared to its mission systems. A 4,000 tonne ship with the mission system X will cost only a small amount less than a 8,000 tonne ship with an identical mission fit out. This is very different to claiming the bigger ship would cost the same or less.

I don’t know what’s worse? Your repeated posting of lies in an attempt to disambiguate my posts and Zen’s on CVA-01 or your idiocy in sustaining this argument against all the established learning of shipbuilding. 7,000 tonnes of steel… I’m still laughing over that one…

 

[Abraham Gubler]

None of those ships compares to a Type 45. Type 45 is the most modern warship afloat today in pretty much every metric. The inclusion of the Norwegian ships is just strange, they are closer to a T23 in role and capability than they are a T45.

LOL! Obviously not an expert in AEGIS systems... The Norwegian Nansen class is far and away above the capability of a Type 23. While the smaller array (SPY-1F) and missiles (ESSM) means the Nansen lacks the capability for a long range AAW shot very few frigate/destroyer COs would use their SM2s or Aster 30s at a range above the ESSM anyway. In terms of its ability to contribute to the air defence of a task group the Nansen would be allocated a foot print not much smaller than a Type 45 and would be capable of handling it in the worst of air threats probably better (thanks to the greater capability of AEGIS and deeper missile magazine). Once again the 'I've never been in a CIC of a contemporary major warship at sea in the middle of an air battle exercise' opinion fails to understand true capability. As to the modernity of the Type 45 it is already falling behind the latest AEGIS ships which have far more advanced computer processors running their systems.