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In reading "Diary of A Wartime Naval Constructor", DNC Sir Stanley Goodall's wartime diary, I can identify most of the ships referred to, but there are repeated references to a 20Kt Fast Oiler, probably for the 1945 Programme, where I'm coming up blank.
1942
P136. 11 November: … Bateson [Captain S L, Naval Assistant to Controller], came over re 20 knot oilers, told him the difficulty, wrote Rebbeck [H&W], Swan [Swan Hunters], Johnson [Cammel Laird?] & Rowell [Hawthorn Leslie].
P140. 7 December (Sunday): … At Future Building C’tee, ... got 20 knot oilers back to DMB [Amos Ayre, Director of Merchant Shipbuilding]
P143. 14 December: At Contr’s Liaison C’tee re 20 knot oilers, DMB & I agreed that best proposition was to ask USA offering to supply machy. ... Lunch with CMSR [Lithgow], Ayre & L[awrie] Edwards [Director of Merchant Ship Repairs DMR, previously of shiprepairers Middle Docks], talked 20 knot oilers & corvettes. With DWP saw Contr suggested McCarthy [S A, Director of Warship Production] should be the one man responsible, he agreed,
1944 (Goodall is now Assistant Controller (Warship Production) and relinquished the DNC role to Lillicrap in mid-January).
P218 14 March: … Got Fardell [Commander G E of Plans dept] up re fast oilers, he said they were not to be mentioned in the Cabinet paper. 1st L was writing a screed on the Fleet Train & was going to put the oilers in (Contr thinks this unwise as it will be another excuse for holding up the Train). …
P227. 15 May: … Touched Ayre on Fast Oilers, he says ‘they’re not merchant ships’.
P230. 17 June: … Phoned DNC re fast [20-knot] oilers, he will give me approx. dimensions when Crawford [J B, constructor] calls on 19th. Then went into situation with DWP: looks as tho’ HL [Hawthorn Leslie] is out (slip too small); it will take too long at V-A Walker & Clydebank. At H & W and SH it could only be done at expense of merchant ships.
P230. 22 June: … At Contr’s Policy meeting, another cut in shipyard labour forecast, I said ‘Ridiculous’. Contr annoyed & ticked me off: but here from one side the Govt is reducing the possibility of carrying on with our present prog[ramme], while on the other the Navy is filling up the plate (e.g. fast oilers). …
P231. 27 June: … Rowell called, said he does not want a fast oiler, fears we are going to earmark his best slip for a cruiser & prevent him building a liner. …
P235. 28 July: … Contr gave me paper re fast oilers, phoned DMB to see if he could give me facts about USS Cimarron but he hadn’t anything reliable.
P239. 23 August: DNC called, told him my advice to look into loading of fast oilers. He deprecates D of S [Director of Supply] bossing this job but agrees D of S has staff and DNC doesn’t. …
P248. 11 October: … Young Swan [Sheriton C; chairman C S died in December] with Turnbull & McPherson [Thomas, director of Wallsend Slipway & Engineering, a Swan Hunter subsidiary] called re ECF [Europe Cease Fire]. In general they agreed to my scheme but don’t want a fast oiler [they were already building Hyalina/Olna for Shell]
P252. 6 November: … Wrote Jubb [E C, Director of Contracts and Purchases] re fast oiler.
P255. 2 December: ... DNC called ... Discussed with him ... also fast oiler under ASCBS [i.e. White Ensign].
P257. 18 December: ... Fardell (Plans) came up to discuss ’45 programme further: oilers will not be in
Buxton, Ian. Diary of a Wartime Naval Constructor: Sir Stanley Goodall. Pen & Sword Books.
So it looks like a slightly faster British equivalent to the US Cimarron class (24,800t Full Load, 18kts) for the Fleet Train for the British Pacific Fleet (the Admiralty was planning for end of hostilities vs Japan being end 1947, so 1945 ships were potentially relevant), that ran into issues with being too warship-like for the merchant building side and that none of the warship yards wanted to build because they wanted to get back to more lucrative merchant contracts post VE Day.
It's interesting because the BPF was notoriously short of fast oilers and this makes it clear there was actually an attempt to address that. It's clear from other stuff in the diary that there was a huge amount of internal politics between No 10 and the various production ministries that limited progress on the Fleet Train to much less than Goodall would have liked. The gap in entries between '42 and '44 is interesting, did the focus shift off the design when Wake-Walker replaced Fraser as Controller?
Anyone have any further details?
1942
P136. 11 November: … Bateson [Captain S L, Naval Assistant to Controller], came over re 20 knot oilers, told him the difficulty, wrote Rebbeck [H&W], Swan [Swan Hunters], Johnson [Cammel Laird?] & Rowell [Hawthorn Leslie].
P140. 7 December (Sunday): … At Future Building C’tee, ... got 20 knot oilers back to DMB [Amos Ayre, Director of Merchant Shipbuilding]
P143. 14 December: At Contr’s Liaison C’tee re 20 knot oilers, DMB & I agreed that best proposition was to ask USA offering to supply machy. ... Lunch with CMSR [Lithgow], Ayre & L[awrie] Edwards [Director of Merchant Ship Repairs DMR, previously of shiprepairers Middle Docks], talked 20 knot oilers & corvettes. With DWP saw Contr suggested McCarthy [S A, Director of Warship Production] should be the one man responsible, he agreed,
1944 (Goodall is now Assistant Controller (Warship Production) and relinquished the DNC role to Lillicrap in mid-January).
P218 14 March: … Got Fardell [Commander G E of Plans dept] up re fast oilers, he said they were not to be mentioned in the Cabinet paper. 1st L was writing a screed on the Fleet Train & was going to put the oilers in (Contr thinks this unwise as it will be another excuse for holding up the Train). …
P227. 15 May: … Touched Ayre on Fast Oilers, he says ‘they’re not merchant ships’.
P230. 17 June: … Phoned DNC re fast [20-knot] oilers, he will give me approx. dimensions when Crawford [J B, constructor] calls on 19th. Then went into situation with DWP: looks as tho’ HL [Hawthorn Leslie] is out (slip too small); it will take too long at V-A Walker & Clydebank. At H & W and SH it could only be done at expense of merchant ships.
P230. 22 June: … At Contr’s Policy meeting, another cut in shipyard labour forecast, I said ‘Ridiculous’. Contr annoyed & ticked me off: but here from one side the Govt is reducing the possibility of carrying on with our present prog[ramme], while on the other the Navy is filling up the plate (e.g. fast oilers). …
P231. 27 June: … Rowell called, said he does not want a fast oiler, fears we are going to earmark his best slip for a cruiser & prevent him building a liner. …
P235. 28 July: … Contr gave me paper re fast oilers, phoned DMB to see if he could give me facts about USS Cimarron but he hadn’t anything reliable.
P239. 23 August: DNC called, told him my advice to look into loading of fast oilers. He deprecates D of S [Director of Supply] bossing this job but agrees D of S has staff and DNC doesn’t. …
P248. 11 October: … Young Swan [Sheriton C; chairman C S died in December] with Turnbull & McPherson [Thomas, director of Wallsend Slipway & Engineering, a Swan Hunter subsidiary] called re ECF [Europe Cease Fire]. In general they agreed to my scheme but don’t want a fast oiler [they were already building Hyalina/Olna for Shell]
P252. 6 November: … Wrote Jubb [E C, Director of Contracts and Purchases] re fast oiler.
P255. 2 December: ... DNC called ... Discussed with him ... also fast oiler under ASCBS [i.e. White Ensign].
P257. 18 December: ... Fardell (Plans) came up to discuss ’45 programme further: oilers will not be in
Buxton, Ian. Diary of a Wartime Naval Constructor: Sir Stanley Goodall. Pen & Sword Books.
So it looks like a slightly faster British equivalent to the US Cimarron class (24,800t Full Load, 18kts) for the Fleet Train for the British Pacific Fleet (the Admiralty was planning for end of hostilities vs Japan being end 1947, so 1945 ships were potentially relevant), that ran into issues with being too warship-like for the merchant building side and that none of the warship yards wanted to build because they wanted to get back to more lucrative merchant contracts post VE Day.
It's interesting because the BPF was notoriously short of fast oilers and this makes it clear there was actually an attempt to address that. It's clear from other stuff in the diary that there was a huge amount of internal politics between No 10 and the various production ministries that limited progress on the Fleet Train to much less than Goodall would have liked. The gap in entries between '42 and '44 is interesting, did the focus shift off the design when Wake-Walker replaced Fraser as Controller?
Anyone have any further details?