Camm long banged on about P.1121 as missed opportunity for a UK Phantom.
Sandys did not cancel it because it was never up and running to be cancelled. RAF 1957/58 Reqt was Close Air Support/Ground Attack/Recce vice RAFG Swift FR.5, NEAF/FEAF Venom FB.5. (It is a calumny that Sandys rejected the manned combat a/c: he accepted this Reqt). Flyoff in Aden was armed Hunter F.6/armed JP/armed Gnat. NATO concurrently was trying hard to launch NBMR.1, which FIAT G.91 "won" v. Breguet Taon, but few bought. UK interest in anything lapsed because Fighter Command and RAuxAF were dramatically to be slimmed, liberating shoals of part-US-funded Hunter F.6. Many of the kits to make them FGA.9 were installed in RAF MUs. Why pay HSAL for a-bit-better, when the Good Enough was near capital-free?
Camm had extracted £1.9Mn. of HSAL's own money to scheme P.1121/P.1129; he extracted little from DH Engine Co, none to persevere with Gyron after Sandys ceased its funding, 4/57; RR was ill-disposed to scheme Medway for it, PV...because the logic of "free" Hunter FGA.9/FR.10 was decisive. If Camm perceived vast exports it was for him to go to his owner, specifically HS Grp. Tech.Dir Sir A.Hall (ex-D/RAE running the Comet crash fatigue test) and mentor him on Say's Law of Economics: Supply Creates Demand: Build it and they Will Come to our Field of Dreams!
A divergent What If is if Sir A.Hall had felt he had sufficient clout to attempt what Sir T.O.M.Sopwith had not: to make one team, from the ego-clashes of HS Units. They made 3 bids to TSR.2, not plumping for one, Camm-led, until 10/58, by when the V-A+EE die had been cast.
