Quote about the post-war UK science capability

[Maury Markowitz]

Some years ago I recall reading a quote about the state of the post-war UK science/engineering capability. I seem to recall it being by someone fairly high-up in the UK political establishment. It was to the effect of:

"There is more knowledge in the little finger of a graduate at MIT than the entire country put together".

Reading over Solly Zuckerman's input to the TSR-2 debate, I cannot help get the feeling he said it. I looked up Zuckerman quotes, but found nothing useful.

Does anyone else recall this quote, and who might have said it?

 

[Hood]

If my memory is correct it was attributed to Zuckerman but I don't know the exact source of where he said it or if its one of those apocryphal quotes that get attributed to people from time to time.

 

[robunos]

Found it! 'Project Cancelled', 2nd Edition, page 158 :-
"One senior Ministry official recalls Zuckerman looking at TSR2 and remarking: 'There is more technology in the little finger of one Professor from MIT than in the whole of British Industry'. Such then was the pro-British spirit of the top scientist who guided defence thinking."

cheers,
Robin.

 

[CNH]

Project Cancelled may not be an entirely unbiased source.

 

[robunos]

Point taken... but I'm sure I've read of the same incident somewhere in Beamont's writings.
Working from memory, his version goes something like this. On completion of a test flight, a car comes out to meet the returning aircraft. Zuckerman gets out, briefly and dismissively looks at the aircraft, chats briefly with the aircrew, then climbs back into the car, uttering the infamous quote in the process. Trouble is, I can't find where I've read it, but it's not in 'Testing Years', I've checked.

cheers,
Robin.

 

[starviking]

Actually, after reading of Solly Zuckerman's reasoned contributions to the RN's carrier replacement programme in the 60s, and reading of all the problems with the TSR2 programme in Damien Burke's excellent book, I can only fault Zuckerman on the target of his quote: it should have been directed at those who micromanaged the programme from above, and those who kept shifting the goalposts.

 

[Maury Markowitz]

Wow, thanks guys. And I'm pretty sure that's where I read it as well, in retrospect.

 

[JohnR]

What source did you read for Zuckerman's contribution to the carrier debate I would be very interested in reading that?

I do recall reading somewhere that he was in favour of the cancellation of the Blue Water missile (a system that would hopefully never be used) and transferring the funding to PT428 a weapon that could have had a use.

Regards.

 

[Maury Markowitz]

What source did you read for Zuckerman's contribution to the carrier debate I would be very interested in reading that?

Me too please!

and transferring the funding to PT428 a weapon that could have had a use.

Based on the descriptions I have seen, I think it unlikely it would have succeeded any more than Mauler. Low-level air defence missiles are a very difficult problem, given 1960's era electronics. Rapier, for all its faults, was a reasonable solution to those problems. Blowpipe, on the other hand, proved to be otherwise.

Looking over the 1960s/70s in general, it seems one of the best indications of Pk has nothing to do with the tracking system and everything to do with the range of the missile. Blowpipe simply ran out of smash too early, as did the earlier versions of the Sidewinder compared to the D models for instance. This makes me think Taildog would not be a success in combat, in spite of its rather impressive performance.

 

[Hood]

This thread has reminded me of something I came across a couple of years ago concerning Zuckerman and the TSR.2.

I came across a copy of Zuckerman's book Six Men Out of the Ordinary, London, 1992.
In the chapter on Mountbatten he claimed Mountbatten was, "a friend of the retired naval officer who was the project manager," at Blackburn and that therefore Zuckerman avoided Mountbatten when he was asked by the Minister of Defence, Harold Watkinson, to make a review of the Operational Requirement and whether it should be relaxed.

Two weeks later by chance, at Kew I cam across a letter in Zuckerman's MoD files from that time. The letter was from Duncan Lewin at Blackburn Aircraft Ltd., dated 1st September 1960. The letter was a thank you note for Zuckerman's recent visit to Brough on 24 August. Lewin offered him the services of the Technical Staff to answer any questions and went on to say, "We are going to try to persuade the Minister to visit Brough so that we can introduce him to our ideas," and hoping Zuckerman could accompany him. Sadly the aide-memoire Lewin enclosed on the subject of their conversations was missing from the file.

Intrigued if this was the retired Naval friend of Mountbatten's I searched his obituary in The Times and his entry in Who's Who which soon confirmed the fact. Capt. (Ret.) Duncan Lewin began his career as an FAA pilot and rose to command HMS Glory during the Korean War and later HMS Eagle. He had been Director of Plans when Mountbatten was First Sea Lord. In 1971 he became Managing Director of Blackburn and in 1977 became Sales Director for Hawker Siddeley, being responsible for the Beechcraft 125 deal in the 1970s. He even has his own Wikipedia page: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Duncan_Lewin. Damian Burke's book notes Mountbatten's 'chance' meeting with Lewin at Farnborough but does not investigate the background. I find less than coincidental that Mountbatten, Zuckerman and Lewin were mutual acquaintances and there is evidence that Zuckerman and Lewin had met, most likely to discuss the Buccaneer's suitability to fulfil the OR. In Six Men Out of the Ordinary Zuckerman claims there was no collusion though the RAF suspected it, but in reality there is no smoke without fire and we've heard many tales of Mountbatten's interference against the TSR.2.
Presumably Lewin would have had some knowledgeable input from Zuckerman on the carrier debate too.

 

[starviking]

What source did you read for Zuckerman's contribution to the carrier debate I would be very interested in reading that?

Grove's Vanguard to Trident has a bit on his support for the carrier replacement. Hobbs' British Strike Fleet may have a bit more, but I'd have to check.

One of those two mentions Zuckerman writing a paper strongly supporting the carrier.

 

[starviking]

his basic observation that the UK had far too many, too small aerospace companies that were consequently under-resourced compared to their US counterparts.

Companies which were not allowed to "fail" in a traditional market way, and who, if they were going to merge/associate, had to do so in a government-approved way. DeHavilland's "Airco" being one victim of this command economy way of thinking.

 

[alertken]

MM: if MoD's Chief Scientific Adviser on seeing TSR.2 did say what is here presented, that would not have been a novel view. Sir R. Fedden was assisted by Cripps, his ex-boss when MAP Technical Adviser, in 1946 to found the College of Aeronautics/Cranfield (for some: Fedden's Folly, an “unwanted monstrosity”). HP designed Victor with 150 "engineers" in a payroll of 6,000: B-47 consumed 5,500 Boeing "engineers". Do we create machinery by inspiration or by sweat: one man, back of envelope, or acres of folk at drawing boards? 1944 English Electric “Preston (Works) ‘boss’ (had) little time for designers and didn’t care who knew it” C.Gardner, BAC, Batsford, 81, P30. The class divide, such a cancer on UK industry.

TSR.2 was to have been the 3rd., but most complex, UK weapons system air platform (after Lightning and Buccaneer): SZ had judged by first flight that Preston+Weybridge would be unable to integrate its systems, on time, on spec, on budget...or at all. New CAS Elworthy, 9/63, had already reached that conclusion. By mid-1964 (still the same Conservative Govt. that had funded TSR.2 in 1959), TSR.2 was for the chop: the only points at issue were: will Bucc Mk.2 do an adequate job; do we just tag on to McNamara's 3,000 TFXs (Oh, Yes, Please!); or do we not do a deep low nuke delivery at all? Neither CDS Mountbatten nor SZ caused TSR.2's deletion: go to RAFM/Cosford, look at the open avionics bay...and weep at MTBF likely measured in minutes.

It was not some notion of dirigism in a Command Economy that caused "a measure of coalescence" in aero-industry structure: Hercules piston emerged from a small Fedden team, but by 1964 8,000 bodies booked to build 50xOlympus 320 for TSR.2. Size does matter.