Post Battle of Britain: Luftwaffe/Axis options

[tomo pauk]

Similar to the post-BoB RAF: what might've Luftwafe/RLM do after Autumn of 1940 in order to improve their standing, both in short-term (next 12 months) and long-term (a few next years). I've also included 'Axis' term here - mostly European Axis countries' air forces/services - since they can be either drain on German resources, or a benefit.
Changes in strategy, tactics, logistics, hardware etc. Attack on Soviet Union, DoW on USA - all happen as per historically.

(killing Goering, Hitler etc. is an old joke)

 

[zen]

Training and tactical organisation in flight
An obsession with handing kills to Aces would ultimately hamper the Germans

 

[tomo pauk]

Training and tactical organisation in flight
An obsession with handing kills to Aces would ultimately hamper the Germans

Yes, training needs to be kept on good level, and on realistic hours of flying; the experienced pilots are necessary to bring the lessons learned to the novices. I'd also suggest making of 2-seat versions of Bf 109 and Fw 190 ASAP (no waiting until 1943-44), so the shock from new pilot trying to learn the tricks of the novice-unfriendly A/C can be avoided.

Fuel situation improvement. Find a way to increase production of Romanian oil fields and improve transportation to Germany. Try to get as much oil from Soviet union before the Op Barbarossa. See whether extra fuel can be gotten via Spain, Portugal, Turkey, Vichy France. Similar for nickel and chrome.

Some hatchet job: axe the He 177, Me 210/410. Ju 288 can probably work with BMW 801, just keep the size & weight modest like on the 1st prototypes.
Use the resources not spent on He 177 and Me 210/410 to bolster production of Fw 190s and Do 217 - yes, have the DB 601/605 installed on the Fw 190 ASAP.
An actually fast bomber will be needed.

 

[muttly]

A bomber with a heavier payload, the 262 as a fighter only, and no 110's
or their variants .

 

[tomo pauk]

Engine situation:
- much better co-operation between RLM, the manufacturers and test labs is needed; prioritization of nickel for engine production; no wholesale conscription of engineers and important technicians to the infantry units; earlier adoption of water/alcohol injection is a workable way to circumvent the lack of high octane fuel
- DB: no DB 606/610 will much improve the supply of DB 601/605 series of engines, since each of the former meant two of the later is produced. The 606/610 monthly production run was in dozens by late 1941, and in few hundreds by 1942 and 43. I'd also suggest the DB 601E with the big supercharger stolen from DB 603A, and later a 2-stage S/C for the 601/605 (by winter of 1942/43).
- BMW: press on with de-bugging the 801. No 802, no 803, use the design talent and facilities to improve the 801 and jet engine. Better S/C for the 801, don't wait for late 1944 for that, but actually make the 801E ASAP.
- Jumo: no 222. The 213 might be too late, Jumo should be producing jet engines by mid-1943 instead. Upgrade the 211 series, a bigger S/C is probably the 1st step?

 

[robunos]

Need to sort out the 'Heinkel Problem' . . .
As I previously posted HERE :-

'I've also read of another problem, in that Himmler didn't trust Ernst Heinkel, as he believed Heinkel had 'Jewish Blood in him'. Also, since Junkers was effectively owned and controlled by the Nazi Party, contracts and resources tended to be funnelled towards Junkers, the best example of this would be the cancellation of the He 219 in favour of the various Ju 188 and 388 based night fighters.'

However, if the above is true, how did Heinkel end up winning the 'Volksjager' competition, when apparently the Blohm und Voss design was the better one ?

cheers,
Robin.

 

[tomo pauk]

'I've also read of another problem, in that Himmler didn't trust Ernst Heinkel, as he believed Heinkel had 'Jewish Blood in him'. Also, since Junkers was effectively owned and controlled by the Nazi Party, contracts and resources tended to be funnelled towards Junkers, the best example of this would be the cancellation of the He 219 in favour of the various Ju 188 and 388 based night fighters.'

Heinkel received a lot, a lot of resources for the He 111 and He 177, for example, as well as a host of other aircraft (biplanes, He 116, He 115 etc). He 219 was not cancelled.

Now that we're at He 219 - I'd go with a less ambitious design, 1st as a fast bomber. Keep the wing the same, fuselage is obviously with the bomb bay, the fuselage being much shorter than historically. A tail dragger. At 1st with BMW 801s. No He 117 in the picture = more time and resources to do it in a timely manner.
Next version - night fighter.

 

[newsdeskdan]

Need to sort out the 'Heinkel Problem' . . .
As I previously posted HERE :-

'I've also read of another problem, in that Himmler didn't trust Ernst Heinkel, as he believed Heinkel had 'Jewish Blood in him'. Also, since Junkers was effectively owned and controlled by the Nazi Party, contracts and resources tended to be funnelled towards Junkers, the best example of this would be the cancellation of the He 219 in favour of the various Ju 188 and 388 based night fighters.'

However, if the above is true, how did Heinkel end up winning the 'Volksjager' competition, when apparently the Blohm und Voss design was the better one ?

cheers,
Robin.

Heinkel made a royal mess of the He 177. Its development dragged on years beyond its original in-service date and as a result Ernst Heinkel AG (EHAG) spent much of the war in disgrace - passed over for contracts etc. Nothing to do with 'Jewish blood'. However, towards the end of the war, Ernst Heinkel himself no longer had much control over his own company. The man making most of the decisions was Karl Frydag - Heinkel's director general. Frydag was also, at the same time, Henschel's technical director and head of the Hauptausschusses Flugzeuge - the main development committee at Albert Speer's ministry - the RuK. He was thereby a deputy of Speer himself and attended most of the high-level aircraft development and production meetings.
Frydag was basically a very powerful, very well-respected and very capable organiser. And he was in control of Heinkel. So it wasn't too much of a surprise when, with all variants and derivatives of the He 177 finally cancelled, he seized upon the freed-up production capacity at Heinkel to get the Volksjaeger competition going. Blohm & Voss may have had the better design (MAY have had) but they had no staff. Most of Vogt's men and Blohm & Voss's facilities generally had long since been given to Messerschmitt for Me 262 work.

 

[tomo pauk]

Heinkel made a royal mess of the He 177. Its development dragged on years beyond its original in-service date and as a result Ernst Heinkel AG (EHAG) spent much of the war in disgrace - passed over for contracts etc.

I don't think that we can point the finger just at Ernest for the He 177 debacle. RLM wanted a big bomber that can dive, to what Gunther brothers responded with a big aircraft that resembled at twin-engined, just that it was, well, very big. Then we have the DB 606s eagerly trying to self-ignite, and with that the whole aircraft will burn.

RLM should've pointed the finger to themselves 1st (not that they ever wanted to do such a move).

 

[Nik]

With 'BoB' segueing into 'The Blitz', the lack of big, strong aircraft became horribly apparent. The Condors seems to have been few and fragile, as adapted from civilian design, and and attrition whittled their numbers. IIRC, there were a few MilSpec designs, but in tiny numbers. Herr_H's old 'stop' order on big, non-tactical aircraft would come back to bite the Luftwaffe on its butt. IMHO, those lost years were never recovered: No more Maritime recon, no 'Lancaster-ish' bomb-trucks, no routine air-supply to Eastern Front and Africa Corps...

Yes, I remember those cargo mega-gliders and their lethal tow-planes, then their motorised versions that proved 'sitting turkeys' when intercepted...

 

[T. A. Gardner]

Wow, this is such a broad question it's really hard to answer it. In short the Luftwaffe had numerous problems going into and coming out of the BoB.

First there was a serious pilot shortage and this wasn't something that could be fixed in the short-term.

Next, the Luftwaffe has no coherent strategy for moving forward. They are engaged in the Med, still over Britain and into the Atlantic, and Russia is coming up. They have about a dozen, give or take, FW 200 operating in France to Norway in anti-shipping ops but no coordination with the Kriegsmarine. There is no clear offensive strategy using bombers and targets are poorly defined.

Then, at home the RAF is ramping up their bomber campaign and there is no effective--well, all but none--nightfighter force or even a conceptual way to really deal with this issue.

Add to that a completely delusional aircraft development program like the Bomber B. They have no real next-generation replacement for anything in service and the RLM is allowing manufacturers to dabble in development. The He 177 (Bomber A program) was a mess because the RLM imposed insane and idiotic requirements on the plane like a capacity to dive bomb, or the use of the DB 610 engine. A four-engine variant, the He 277 was not only rejected early on, but Henkel threatened over continued development of it.

Throw in that some manufacturers, like Henschel are horribly under-utilized, and that production planning is a total mess.

On top of that, the Luftwaffe's leadership prefers things like flak and creating a completely unnecessary ground army because Göring sees this as a necessary political power play to gain favor, and you have a perfect storm of inability to meet mission requirements.

So, where to start?

 

[tomo pauk]

Yes, I remember those cargo mega-gliders and their lethal tow-planes, then their motorised versions that proved 'sitting turkeys' when intercepted...

I guess every transport aircraft is doomed if caught unescorted.
That brings us to the question of escort aircraft. The Fw 190 carried 25-30% more internal fuel than the Bf 109, so it might be a better offering for that job. The BMW 801 was, however, a fuel hog, it was unreliable in 1941 and just a bit better in 1942, so let's re-engine the Fw 190 with DB 601N or 601E instead. Add two drop tanks and it is a pretty rangy aircraft for tasks in Med and Russia.

So, where to start?

In this thread

 

[HoHun]

Hi Tomo,

Then we have the DB 606s eagerly trying to self-ignite, and with that the whole aircraft will burn.

My impression is that the engines themselves were actually fine, and that it was the integration in the He 177 that, driven by the desire for highest performance and introducing overly tight packaging, created a number of Achilles heels that could cause the bomber to burn.

However, after a troublesome initial period, these problems were resolved. Coincedentially, I have just finished reading "Bloody Biscay" by Chris Goss, and he quotes a late-1943 report from Fliegerführer Atlantik as follows:

"Bombers

He 177

With a radius of action of 1,500 km, this aircraft cannot, by any means, be used in all the sea areas coverd by Fliegerführer Atlanktik's reconnnassance. Its use is thus limited to the Western Atlantic and north-west Biscay. The performance of the He 177 makes it suitable for use with Kehl and as a torpedo bomber. The He 177 is well armed and has no cause, particularly in formation flights, to fear any type of enemy aircraft operating over the Atlantic.

Recommendations for further development

a. Radius of action to be increased to that of reconnnaissance aircraft while retaining the same bomb capacity.

b. To be adapted for a quick change-over from Kehl to torpedo bomber (according to weather conditions).

c. Increase in speed to cope with the expected appearance of faster enemy twin-engined fighters and as a countermeasure to anti-aircraft defence."

The absence of any compaints or requirements regarding engine reliability is noteworthy, especially when one takes into account that the chances of rescuing a crew that had ditched out in the Atlantic were next to nil.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

 

[tomo pauk]

My impression is that the engines themselves were actually fine, and that it was the integration in the He 177 that, driven by the desire for highest performance and introducing overly tight packaging, created a number of Achilles heels that could cause the bomber to burn.

You are indeed right. From what I've read, the installation of the 606s was such that allowed drip oil to be collected at the lower cowling, right next to the hot exhausts - a recipe for onboard fire.
All in all, had RLM not insisted on dive bombing requirement, and if Heinkel (as company, not Ernest himself) went with a 'classic' 4-engine layout, the 'alt He 177' would've been a bomber with less problems and better availability & usability. A good long-range escort fighter will still be needed to go with it.

Re. Heinkel, jets etc. - I've long favored the 'simple' way of doing things, meaning here that companies start designing 1-engined fighters 1st, with 2-engined bombers following closely.

 

[T. A. Gardner]

My impression is that the engines themselves were actually fine, and that it was the integration in the He 177 that, driven by the desire for highest performance and introducing overly tight packaging, created a number of Achilles heels that could cause the bomber to burn.

You are indeed right. From what I've read, the installation of the 606s was such that allowed drip oil to be collected at the lower cowling, right next to the hot exhausts - a recipe for onboard fire.
All in all, had RLM not insisted on dive bombing requirement, and if Heinkel (as company, not Ernest himself) went with a 'classic' 4-engine layout, the 'alt He 177' would've been a bomber with less problems and better availability & usability. A good long-range escort fighter will still be needed to go with it.

Re. Heinkel, jets etc. - I've long favored the 'simple' way of doing things, meaning here that companies start designing 1-engined fighters 1st, with 2-engined bombers following closely.

It wouldn't have mattered. As it was, Henkel turned out a bit more than 1,000 He 177 over a period of about 30 months or something like a plane a day at best. This means if the Germans send a 100 plane bombing mission out using about 800 tons of fuel and they have say 6% losses from the raid it will take a minimum of a week to recover those losses and probably longer to restock the fuel for a second raid.

It's almost a self-defeating problem for the Germans. They lack the fuel, manufacturing capacity, pilot replacement system, and well, virtually everything else to put on a large bomber offensive like the Allies did.

 

[newsdeskdan]

Heinkel made a royal mess of the He 177. Its development dragged on years beyond its original in-service date and as a result Ernst Heinkel AG (EHAG) spent much of the war in disgrace - passed over for contracts etc.

I don't think that we can point the finger just at Ernest for the He 177 debacle. RLM wanted a big bomber that can dive, to what Gunther brothers responded with a big aircraft that resembled at twin-engined, just that it was, well, very big. Then we have the DB 606s eagerly trying to self-ignite, and with that the whole aircraft will burn.

RLM should've pointed the finger to themselves 1st (not that they ever wanted to do such a move).

I think we can to a degree - though not necessarily Ernst himself, since, again, he wasn't that hands-on with his company.
If the Guenther brothers had never conceived the He 119, the DB 606 would never have been invented. That engine was designed by Daimler-Benz based on a Heinkel concept and at Heinkel's behest. Furthermore, if the Guenther brothers hadn't convinced Walther Wever of the potential speed increases possible through advanced aerodynamics (steam cooling, flush rivets, four engines in two nacelles driving two props, all the hydraulics and fuel lines crammed into narrow spaces, flush-fitting remote controlled turrets), he might never have devised the requirements which led to the He 177 in the first place and development of the Ju 89 and Do 19 might have continued.
Indeed, to go one step further, if Wever hadn't been such an enthusiast for Heinkel's advanced aerodynamics products, he might never had got on board the He 70 he crashed in June 1936, leading to his own death.
To reiterate - the DB 606 was invented by Heinkel - not Daimler-Benz - and everyone at the RLM was aware of that. Daimler-Benz's Nallinger reports this fact himself on several occasions.

 

[tomo pauk]

I think we can to a degree - though not necessarily Ernst himself, since, again, he wasn't that hands-on with his company.

This is what I'm trying to point out: stating the he made the 'royal mess' with He 177 does not hold water.

If the Guenther brothers had never conceived the He 119, the DB 606 would never have been invented. That engine was designed by Daimler-Benz based on a Heinkel concept and at Heinkel's behest. Furthermore, if the Guenther brothers hadn't convinced Walther Wever of the potential speed increases possible through advanced aerodynamics (steam cooling, flush rivets, four engines in two nacelles driving two props, all the hydraulics and fuel lines crammed into narrow spaces, flush-fitting remote controlled turrets), he might never have devised the requirements which led to the He 177 in the first place and development of the Ju 89 and Do 19 might have continued.

Walther Wever might've had the 'plan B' laying in wait - if the spanking new He 177 does not materialize, we still have a 'legacy technology' 4-engined bomber ready to take the role. Ie. his job was not to believe every sales pitch. Alas, that was not the case.

To reiterate - the DB 606 was invented by Heinkel - not Daimler-Benz - and everyone at the RLM was aware of that. Daimler-Benz's Nallinger reports this fact himself on several occasions.

As a concept - maybe. It still took DB to realize it and make a working product.
Nallinger was not shy of poinitng fingers in other people when his products were criticized, eg. acussing the MTT for making the engine section too narrow for the DB 605A on Bf 109G so the engine was run on restricted settings for more than a year, even though the DB 605A was also de-rated in other aircraft that used it, like the Bf 110 or the Italian series 5 fighters.

 

[T. A. Gardner]

Heinkel made a royal mess of the He 177. Its development dragged on years beyond its original in-service date and as a result Ernst Heinkel AG (EHAG) spent much of the war in disgrace - passed over for contracts etc.

I don't think that we can point the finger just at Ernest for the He 177 debacle. RLM wanted a big bomber that can dive, to what Gunther brothers responded with a big aircraft that resembled at twin-engined, just that it was, well, very big. Then we have the DB 606s eagerly trying to self-ignite, and with that the whole aircraft will burn.

RLM should've pointed the finger to themselves 1st (not that they ever wanted to do such a move).

I think we can to a degree - though not necessarily Ernst himself, since, again, he wasn't that hands-on with his company.
If the Guenther brothers had never conceived the He 119, the DB 606 would never have been invented. That engine was designed by Daimler-Benz based on a Heinkel concept and at Heinkel's behest. Furthermore, if the Guenther brothers hadn't convinced Walther Wever of the potential speed increases possible through advanced aerodynamics (steam cooling, flush rivets, four engines in two nacelles driving two props, all the hydraulics and fuel lines crammed into narrow spaces, flush-fitting remote controlled turrets), he might never have devised the requirements which led to the He 177 in the first place and development of the Ju 89 and Do 19 might have continued.
Indeed, to go one step further, if Wever hadn't been such an enthusiast for Heinkel's advanced aerodynamics products, he might never had got on board the He 70 he crashed in June 1936, leading to his own death.
To reiterate - the DB 606 was invented by Heinkel - not Daimler-Benz - and everyone at the RLM was aware of that. Daimler-Benz's Nallinger reports this fact himself on several occasions.

Well, you have to admit nobody got those coupled engines to work except the US. Britain tried them too and failed just as miserably as the Germans did. The 606 wasn't the only coupled engine the Germans attempted. BMW tried it with their 803 unsuccessfully as was the follow-on DB 610. The US managed to get the P&W 4360 Wasp Major, Allison V 3420, and Curtiss-Wright 3350 to all work, albeit with some early issues. The British never quite got the RR Vulture to work right and eventually gave up on it.

 

[tomo pauk]

Well, you have to admit nobody got those coupled engines to work except the US. Britain tried them too and failed just as miserably as the Germans did. The 606 wasn't the only coupled engine the Germans attempted. BMW tried it with their 803 unsuccessfully as was the follow-on DB 610. The US managed to get the P&W 4360 Wasp Major, Allison V 3420, and Curtiss-Wright 3350 to all work, albeit with some early issues. The British never quite got the RR Vulture to work right and eventually gave up on it.

RR Vulture was not a coupled engine (it was not equal to two Peregrines coupled, even the cylinder bore spacing was different), not it was the R-3350, nor the R-4360.
Closest to coupled engines in the UK were Napier's engines, like the Dagger and Sabre.
The DB 610 was with less problems than the 606, and even those problems had more to do with installation and intrinsic problems of the DB 60X line of engines (like the lack of oil de-aerator, late introduction of central oil feed, corrosion of valves due to not employing nickel - later that was cured by employing chrome-coating).

 

[riggerrob]

" ... On top of that, the Luftwaffe's leadership prefers things like flak and creating a completely unnecessary ground army because Göring sees this as a necessary political power play to gain favor, and you have a perfect storm of inability to meet mission requirements.

So, where to start?"

Including flack troops in the Luftwaffe Chain of Command makes sense, because it brought them into line with search-lights, radar and night-fighters.

OTOH Luftwaffe Field Divisions betray a weakness in the Nazi High Command, with every senior commander raising his own private army. During World War 2, Germany had 4 distinct types of infantry: Wehrmacht, SS, Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe. Whermacht were the regular army so rightfully had plenty of infantry. Shutz Staffelen started as Nazi Party police and body guards, but enlisted volunteers for a separate army before WW2. Waffen SS gained a reputation for fierce fighting on every front. Kriegsmarine infantry were only available in small numbers at the start of WW2 (e.g. 250 Kriegsmarine Infantry assaulted Westkappel Penninsula, Gdansk Harbor at the start of WW2. Later in the war, surplus sailors were formed into adhoc infantry regiments that fought on the Eastern Front.

Herman Goering's Luftwaffe formed two distinct types of infantry. The first were elite Fallschirmjagers who captured Fort Eban Emal on the first day of the invasion of Belgium. Fallschirmjagers also fought on all the other fronts. During the autumn of 1943, Fallschirmjagers in Italy transformed themselves into stubborn defenders.
Finally, as the Luftwaffe ran out of airplanes and petrol, they converted surplus personnel into adhoc Luftwaffe Field Divisions. Since they had little infantry training, they suffered heavy casualties during the last months of WW2.

Meanwhile, during 1944, the RCAF concluded that they had enough aircrew to win the war, so sent surplus aircrew home. This did not sit well with Canadian infantry regiments that suffered heavy casualties through 1943, 1944 and 1945 with few replacement soldiers reaching the battle field.

 

[T. A. Gardner]

" ... On top of that, the Luftwaffe's leadership prefers things like flak and creating a completely unnecessary ground army because Göring sees this as a necessary political power play to gain favor, and you have a perfect storm of inability to meet mission requirements.

So, where to start?"

Including flack troops in the Luftwaffe Chain of Command makes sense, because it brought them into line with search-light, radar and night-fighters.

OTOH Luftwaffe Field Divisions betray a weakness in the Nazi High Command, with every senior commander raising his own private army. During World War 2, Germany had 4 distinct types of infantry: Wehrmacht, SS, Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe. Whermacht were the regular army so rightfully had plenty of infantry. Shutz Staffelen started as Nazi Party police and body guards, but enlisted volunteers for a separate army before WW2. Waffen SS gained a reputation for fierce fighting on every front. Kriegsmarine infantry were only available in small numbers at the start of WW2 (e.g. 250 Kriegsmarine Infantry assaulted Westkappel Penninsula, Gdansk Harbor at the start of WW2. Later in the war, surplus sailors were formed into adhoc infantry regiments that fought on the Eastern Front.

Herman Goering's Luftwaffe formed two distinct types of infantry. The first were elite Fallschirmjagers who captured fort Eban Emal on the first day of the invasion of Belgium. Fallschirmjagers also fought on all the other fronts. During the autumn of 1943, Fallschirmjagers in Italy transformed themselves into stubborn defenders.
Finally, as the Luftwaffe ran out of airplanes and petrol, they converted surplus personnel into adhoc Luftwaffe Field Divisions. Since they had little infantry training, they suffered heavy casualties during the last months of WW2.

Meanwhile, during 1944, the RCAF concluded that they had enough aircrew to win the war, so sent surplus aircrew home. This did not sit well with Canadian infantry regiments that suffered heavy casualties through 1943, 1944 and 1945 with few replacement soldiers reaching the battle field.

This isn't necessarily the best option for flak. In the US Army, anti-aircraft was part of the coast defense branch (weird huh?). As such, the units in the field followed the Army's chain of command and supply rather than being a separate one like the Luftwaffe was. For operations in the field this greatly simplified both command and supply issues.
Antiaircraft in the British service was split in responsibility between the Army and RAF. The Army controlled most AA guns and units but the RAF was responsible for airfield defense and formed their own units for that purpose.
There was no reason for the Luftwaffe to operate panzer and infantry divisions whatsoever other than Göring was loathe to give up command of roughly a quarter million men to the Wehrmacht. Even the Fallschirmjäger divisions were essentially just motorized infantry divisions, as after Crete they had little more than a reinforced regiment of actual parachute trained troops available and most Fallschirmjäger post Crete never even got parachute training. The Luftwaffe field divisions first started forming near the end of 1942. They were 2 regiment units with reduced support services and fell apart quickly not only because of poor training, but lack of equipment. Many had little or no artillery other than possibly an 8.8 cm abteilung assigned. When artillery was given to them it was in small quantity and almost always captured or obsolete equipment. For example, the 2nd, had just 8 Skoda 75mm M15 mountain guns assigned, a WW 1 era Austro-Hungarian artillery piece.
The unit that took out Eban Emal--they didn't capture the fort so much as just render its primary weapons useless--was a small battalion of very highly trained combat engineers who used gliders, not parachutes, to land on the fort and destroy the fort's weapons, and turrets.

The SS was the same way. There were about a half-dozen or so really good SS units of division size by mid to late war. The other thirty-ish "divisions," many of which were never fully formed were mostly a polyglot of foreign troops, dregs, and bits and pieces of other SS responsibilities (like the 4th SS Politizi division) that were of indifferent quality and often some of the worst units in German service (13th SS Hanschar and 36th SS Dirlewanger as two examples). Again, these units had their own separate chain of command and supply from the Wehrmacht leading to issues in coordinating them in combat.

In October 1944, Himmler took over the replacement army and started shipping replacements from wherever to any unit needing them. A big block of ex-sailors went into Volksgrenadier divisions and served on both fronts. The Luftwaffe retained more control over their men only because Göring shielded them more from this change but even that wasn't enough often to prevent them from being combined into new ground units. The 16th VG for example.

 

[_Del_]

'I've also read of another problem, in that Himmler didn't trust Ernst Heinkel, as he believed Heinkel had 'Jewish Blood in him'. Also, since Junkers was effectively owned and controlled by the Nazi Party, contracts and resources tended to be funnelled towards Junkers, the best example of this would be the cancellation of the He 219 in favour of the various Ju 188 and 388 based night fighters.'

It's been ages, but I recall Speer saying in his memoir that while 219 was great, it took a disproportionate amount of industrial effort compared to the alternatives, and that they had (finally) gotten everyone to realize they needed as many fighters as possible.
Sort of a victim of timing in that regard. These decisions came about when they were using Ju 88's in a zerstorer role against day-light bomber formations because the need was so dire. Also, the Ju-88 as a night fighter had roughly twice the range/endurance (though poorer raw performance) of the Ohu and three times that of the 110 night fighters. They decided on the merits that the increased performance wasn't worth the opportunity costs.
I remember this mostly because I fell in love with the Uhu at first sight when I was a young, and had to search the world (as it seemed to me at the time) to find a 1:72 kit.
It came as something of a surprise to read later that Speer regarded it, unlike the advanced 262 program, a massive diversion of industrial effort when they could least afford it. I'm not at all sure he and Milch were wrong, more's the pity.

 

[tomo pauk]

Some opportunities wrt captured production lines. Germany has more machine tools than they can use, so bulk-up the aero industry of Italy. Especially the Italian aero-engines makers. Eg. send good deal of tooling from Hispano Suiza to Alfa-Romeo, so they can actually make all these DB 601s the Germans were counting upon. Ditto for the tooling from G&R - send it to Piaggio. Leave just a small portion in France to keep Vichy friendly. French workers are more likely to willingly go to Italy than in Germany?
Outsource the 1-row radials to the former "Polish Skoda" factory that made 1-row radials before October 1939, use the manpower from there. Use the Avia factory in a timely manner (Germany waited until 1944 to have them produce engines).

 

[riggerrob]

Dear tomo pauk,
I am not sure if it was wise for Nazi Germany to manufacture such a wide variety of trucks, AFVs, airplanes, etc. They eventually lost WW2 because of strained supply lines. One major strain on supply lines was attempting to shipping different spare parts: spark plugs, tires, light bulbs, etc. to different combat units driving a wide variety of AFVs.
Czech patterns may have been okay for Luftwaffe training squadrons based in Czechoslovakia, but front-line combat troops need a much smaller variety of spare parts.

 

[tomo pauk]

Nazi Germany lost they war due to biting off more than they could've chew?
But indeed, having such a vast variety of weapon systems was also a problem. You can note that people dabbling in alternate history often suggest cutting the number of German/Axis-used designs to the workable minimum, and it is hard to disagree with that suggestion.

For this thread, my suggestion is that LW has two fighters + 1-engined jet fighter when engines are available. Bombers - we're stuck with Ju-88 and Do 217, a proper fast bomber/night fighter is also needed. We might also kill off the Hs 129, have Henschell make Fw 190s instead. No He 177, no Me 210/410, no Arado 240/440 - make a 2-engined jet bomber instead.

Axe the following engine projects:
- Jumo 222 and 213 (shove a better S/C on the Jumo 211 instead, produce the jet engines);
- DB 603 line (improve the 601 and 605 instead);
- BMW 802 (that one wasted the resources the 801 needs - a competitive S/C for 1943 is a good start like the 801E had; jet engine is next).
Fund the HeS engines with radial S/C since those are simple and light, the compressors have far less parts = need less man-hours to make them.

 

[pathology_doc]

(killing Goering, Hitler etc. is an old joke)

Someone once suggested that the reason time travellers find it so hard to kill Hitler is that the space-time continuum acts in such a way as to keep him alive... so that he can make the critical decisions which will lose the war for Germany. (This tends to happen in Connie Willis's novels; they come out of timewarp at the right place or the right time, but never both.)

IIRC Tarantino's "Inglorious Basterds", in which Hitler DOES die "early" (and represents more of a divergent timeline rather than travel from the future), is set sufficiently far into the war that most of the bad calls have already been made.

Back to the topic of discussion, I think it could be argued that there is general agreement that the organization, administration and co-ordination of Nazi Germany's aeronautical development and production were gravely wanting.

 

[uk 75]

Failing to knock Britain out of the war after the Fall of France was the decisive mistake of the war.
The Luftwaffe should have been used to destroy the RAF and the factories that supplied its aircraft. Similarly the RN should have been targeted in its ports by whatever means available.
Churchill was hated by most of the political class and such setbacks would have enabled the Tories who hankered after a deal with Hitler to ditch him as Chamberlain had been.
Getting Britain out of the war in 1940 would have kept it out of European war once Japan had unleashed its assault in the East. A likely defeat at Singapore of much of the Home Fleet sent to reinforce it in 1941 would have seen Britain broken as a major power.
As long as Britain continues to fight after 1940 the US will be drawn into the European War. No amount of tinkering with the Luftwaffe could match the Arsenal of Democracy. Once the Reich and the USA are at war, Germany is going down.

 

[T. A. Gardner]

The best German option, given Italy is in the war, is to defeat Britain in the Middle East and Africa completely. They could have done this with a focus on that theater while continuing a U-boat war in the Atlantic supported by a concentrated Luftwaffe effort to sink merchant shipping in coordination with the KM. Britain itself remains a low intensity air war that can be sustained. The Russia campaign doesn't happen and the Germans dig in and fortify in the East.
Once Japan enters the war, things for Britain would be looking pretty grim. The Middle East is largely in German hands, the war in the Atlantic is going much worse, and Germany isn't going to declare war on the US.

(One of my favorite "What-if's" is Germany instead declares war on Japan leaving the US and Britain in a quandary)

 

[_Del_]

I admit to have never spent much time on it, so criticism is welcome,, but I've long been intrigued by the possibility of Germany rolling over Turkey, and then pushing toward the Suez from the East. Turkey is in pretty sad shape militarily. Politically it's a bit of a mess with Ataturk recently dying.

The downside is your supply line is stretched substantially, but it seems to me it would be vastly more secure. Everything could hug the shore, or even come across the Black Sea. Then rail and road. Less vulnerable than the ship/air convoys skirting Malta.

Curtail the Italian invasion of Egypt, and support the Greek campaign early and fervently. Then keep going across the Strait.

Hold the line between Tunis and Tobruk. Reinforcing the holdings at ports you already hold needs a lot less logistically than sustaining an offensive into Egypt. Everything that isn't a port is essentially just dirt. Worry about keeping the ports the Italians already have.

Pour the new surplus of effort through Turkey. Now GB can be nervous about your position on the map.

If you can get to the east bank of the Suez, you don't really need to "take" Alexandria. Just being as close as Gaza puts you within striking distance of Bur Daid and the canal -- about 200 km. Lay mines at night, and severely curtail shipping through the canal, if not close it.

You can slowly build up and let the British decide whether you intend to unite the fronts on the Mediterranean coast through Egypt, or whether you turn your eye to Iraq or the Gulf oil fields of the Saudis who cut ties with you but are ostensibly neutral, but Standard Oil is selling to the Allies, not you. Everything they send to Egypt is that much less available at the Gulf shore, and vice versa. And everything sent to Bur Said or the Sinai might open an opportunity for the Italians or a coordinated offensive.

You've created a situation that Britain needs to successfully handle. It puts the supply line to India and beyond in a bind. Gives the Japanese some possible breathing room. You've put them in a critical position. If GB brings enough power to bear to push you back to Turkey or even across the straight, you're no worse off than before strategically, and all that Allied effort had to be diverted from elsewhere.

To me, holding Turkey is potentially a decisive point for the Axis. It's a great place to kick off a campaign against anywhere in the Near East (and even, eventually, Georgia and the Caucus Oil fields up to Stalingrad. When/if the time comes, it will be much easier to cut Lend/Lease aid via Iran).

The Axis had no qualms about violating neutrality when they deemed it necessary. Seems like a missed opportunity.

 

[Arjen]

I don't see any timeline that, once Germany goes to war in Europe, does NOT include a German invasion of the Soviet Union. Because finding Lebensraum was one of the central tenets of the NSDAP leadership. That doesn't change with killing Hitler. Dragging the USA into the war, in my opinion, turned a highly unlikely German victory in a war of attrition with the Soviet Union into certain defeat. Most of the German effort went into the Eastern Front. By far.

 

[EwenS]

I admit to have never spent much time on it, so criticism is welcome,, but I've long been intrigued by the possibility of Germany rolling over Turkey, and then pushing toward the Suez from the East. Turkey is in pretty sad shape militarily. Politically it's a bit of a mess with Ataturk recently dying.

The downside is your supply line is stretched substantially, but it seems to me it would be vastly more secure. Everything could hug the shore, or even come across the Black Sea. Then rail and road. Less vulnerable than the ship/air convoys skirting Malta.

Curtail the Italian invasion of Egypt, and support the Greek campaign early and fervently. Then keep going across the Strait.

Hold the line between Tunis and Tobruk. Reinforcing the holdings at ports you already hold needs a lot less logistically than sustaining an offensive into Egypt. Everything that isn't a port is essentially just dirt. Worry about keeping the ports the Italians already have.

Pour the new surplus of effort through Turkey. Now GB can be nervous about your position on the map.

If you can get to the east bank of the Suez, you don't really need to "take" Alexandria. Just being as close as Gaza puts you within striking distance of Bur Daid and the canal -- about 200 km. Lay mines at night, and severely curtail shipping through the canal, if not close it.

You can slowly build up and let the British decide whether you intend to unite the fronts on the Mediterranean coast through Egypt, or whether you turn your eye to Iraq or the Gulf oil fields of the Saudis who cut ties with you but are ostensibly neutral, but Standard Oil is selling to the Allies, not you. Everything they send to Egypt is that much less available at the Gulf shore, and vice versa. And everything sent to Bur Said or the Sinai might open an opportunity for the Italians or a coordinated offensive.

You've created a situation that Britain needs to successfully handle. It puts the supply line to India and beyond in a bind. Gives the Japanese some possible breathing room. You've put them in a critical position. If GB brings enough power to bear to push you back to Turkey or even across the straight, you're no worse off than before strategically, and all that Allied effort had to be diverted from elsewhere.

To me, holding Turkey is potentially a decisive point for the Axis. It's a great place to kick off a campaign against anywhere in the Near East (and even, eventually, Georgia and the Caucus Oil fields up to Stalingrad. When/if the time comes, it will be much easier to cut Lend/Lease aid via Iran).

The Axis had no qualms about violating neutrality when they deemed it necessary. Seems like a missed opportunity.

Discussed at great length over on the Axis History Forum site. IIRC one of the problems identified was that the logistics are not as easy as it might seem.

Could a German invasion of Turkey succeed? - Axis History Forum

 

[tomo pauk]

I admit to have never spent much time on it, so criticism is welcome,, but I've long been intrigued by the possibility of Germany rolling over Turkey, and then pushing toward the Suez from the East. Turkey is in pretty sad shape militarily. Politically it's a bit of a mess with Ataturk recently dying.

Attacking Turkey in 1941 instead of Soviet Union is a boon to the Axis/Germany. So is not attacking either of the two.
Alas, in this scenario Germany willingly puts both of their feet into the bear trap.

On the alternative guns Germany might have for their A/C for air-to-air fighting:
- the belt-feed MG FFM installed within the wings of the Bf 109 (historically, the belt-fed FFM use seems limited to the Do 217 night-fighters; @Tony Williams might know more)
- a MG FFM scaled-up for 25mm round; probably gets the 200 g shell @ 700 m/s and 550-600 rd/min, weight about 40-50 kg? For Fw 190 in outer wing; as a motor-cannon where possible; for night fighters and jet fighters; alternatively an 'alt MK 108' - still 30 mm, but a shell of 250-270g at 700 m/s instead of 330g at 500 m/s, gun weight of ~70 kg
- a 'MK 105' - 30mm cannon that is in-between the historical MK 108 and MK 103, ie. a 330g shell @ 700-750 m/s, ~500 rd/min, 80-100 kg. As a motor-cannon, for new fighters, for night fighters.

Fighter's weapon mix might be 2x MG 151/20 + 2x bigger cannon for Fw 190, 2x MG FFM + 1x bigger cannon for the Bf 109; no cowl MGs.

 

[Tony Williams]

On the alternative guns Germany might have for their A/C for air-to-air fighting:
- the belt-feed MG FFM installed within the wings of the Bf 109 (historically, the belt-fed FFM use seems limited to the Do 217 night-fighters; @Tony Williams might know more)
- a MG FFM scaled-up for 25mm round; probably gets the 200 g shell @ 700 m/s and 550-600 rd/min, weight about 40-50 kg? For Fw 190 in outer wing; as a motor-cannon where possible; for night fighters and jet fighters; alternatively an 'alt MK 108' - still 30 mm, but a shell of 250-270g at 700 m/s instead of 330g at 500 m/s, gun weight of ~70 kg
- a 'MK 105' - 30mm cannon that is in-between the historical MK 108 and MK 103, ie. a 330g shell @ 700-750 m/s, ~500 rd/min, 80-100 kg. As a motor-cannon, for new fighters, for night fighters.

Fighter's weapon mix might be 2x MG 151/20 + 2x bigger cannon for Fw 190, 2x MG FFM + 1x bigger cannon for the Bf 109; no cowl MGs.

Germany tried to develop a belt feed for the MG FF, driven by the bolt movement, but curiously failed (where the Japanese succeeded). For night fighters they developed a large capacity magazine (2,000 rounds IIRC) with a power-driven feed.

 

[tomo pauk]

Germany tried to develop a belt feed for the MG FF, driven by the bolt movement, but curiously failed (where the Japanese succeeded). For night fighters they developed a large capacity magazine (2,000 rounds IIRC) with a power-driven feed.

Thanks for the feedback.
Looking at the manual for the Do 217J, the power-driven feed was attached to the MG FFM, job of the drive being pulling the ammo belt, removing the ammo from belt, and feeding the cannon itself:

"Die elektrischen Gurtzuführer fördern den Gurt entsprechend dem Munitionsverbrauch der Waffe, lösen die Patronen aus dem Gurt und führen sie, ähnlich wie eine Trommel T60-FF, der Waffe zu. Die leeren Gurtglieder fallen einzeln aus dem Gurtzuführer durch einen Schacht nach unten ins
Freie (siehe unter „c. Hülsen- und Leergurtabführung"). "

Last sentence reads, roughly: "Empty belting elements fall from the feed drive though a chute to outside (see under 'guiding of casings and empty belting elements')."

The power drive device (elektrischen Gurtzuführer) was different for left and right-side feed, named GZL1-FF and GZR1-FF respectively:

"Entsprechend dem für die vorderen und hinteren Waffen verschiedenen
Einbau sind auf die vorderen Waffen Gurtzuführer GZL1-FF für Linkszufüh-
rung und auf die hinteren Waffen Gurtzuführer GZR 1 - FF für Rechtszuführung
aufgesetzt. "

Ammo was fed from the belt boxes to the cannons via 'channels' (similar to the ones used on the A-10 or modern cannon installation):

 

[HoHun]

Hi Tomo,

On the alternative guns Germany might have for their A/C for air-to-air fighting:
- the belt-feed MG FFM installed within the wings of the Bf 109 (historically, the belt-fed FFM use seems limited to the Do 217 night-fighters; @Tony Williams might know more)
- a MG FFM scaled-up for 25mm round; probably gets the 200 g shell @ 700 m/s and 550-600 rd/min, weight about 40-50 kg? For Fw 190 in outer wing; as a motor-cannon where possible; for night fighters and jet fighters; alternatively an 'alt MK 108' - still 30 mm, but a shell of 250-270g at 700 m/s instead of 330g at 500 m/s, gun weight of ~70 kg
- a 'MK 105' - 30mm cannon that is in-between the historical MK 108 and MK 103, ie. a 330g shell @ 700-750 m/s, ~500 rd/min, 80-100 kg. As a motor-cannon, for new fighters, for night fighters.

Fighter's weapon mix might be 2x MG 151/20 + 2x bigger cannon for Fw 190, 2x MG FFM + 1x bigger cannon for the Bf 109; no cowl MGs.

What's the intended niche for the 25 mm MG FF/M? The difficulty the Luftwaffe historically faced really was to design a large-capacity mine shell with the associated fuzes to make it work, and if you don't axe the MK108 completely, you're going to have a duplication of effort the Luftwaffe can ill afford. If you have a 30 mm cannon in the works, designing a new 25 mm cannon that can't be used in a synchronized mount doesn't seem to add all that much, especially as the both the Fw 190 and the Me 109 can actually use the 30 mm cannon in a wing (or underwing) mounting. If you'd suggest a 25 mm spin-off of the MG 151, that would make more sense in my opinion ...

With regard to a slightly increased muzzle velocity ... well, historically, the Luftwaffe was optimizing several parameters at once, and these were rate of fire, shell content, weapon weight, and probability of scoring hits. In the comparison between the MK108 and the MK103, they found that the MK108 was the superior weapon as the weight of gun permitted the use of two MK108 for one MK103, while the MK103 was found to be inaccurate in spite of the high muzzle velocity ... or maybe because of the high muzzle velocity, as this caused a large dispersion pattern.

I'm also convinced that muzzle velocity is a factor whose importance in actual combat is commonly overrated because people try to transfer their infantristic shooting experience to air combat. You don't need a flat trajectory in air combat because you're basically shooting at point blanc range anyway, and your sight is adjusted so that the trajectory never deviates far from the aiming mark at typical combat ranges. (Few people are aware that the inevitable convergence/divergence of wing-mounted armament actually causes greater deviations.) At the ranges at which a flat trajectory begins to tell, long barreled high-velocity guns tend to give such a large dispersion pattern that only a fraction of rounds is on target anyway, even given correct aiming, so as always in aviation, you have to choose your compromise wisely ...

The Luftwaffe expectation really was that the planned introduction of the EZ42 would overcome any disadvantages the low muzzle velocity of the MK108 would have even when facing hypothetical Allied jet bombers, as the sight automatically compensated both for lead and for bullet drop even at long combat ranges.

Accordingly, in an alternative timeline, it might be a better call for the Luftwaffe to get the EZ42 into service early while sticking to the historical guns, than to try and improve on the already very good guns they historically had.

I'm with you on the elimination of cowl guns, though. I never quite understood the rationale behind keeping these, they hardly seem worth the drag penalty they incurred.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

 

[riggerrob]

" ... To me, holding Turkey is potentially a decisive point for the Axis. It's a great place to kick off a campaign against anywhere in the Near East (and even, eventually, Georgia and the Caucus Oil fields up to Stalingrad. When/if the time comes, it will be much easier to cut Lend/Lease aid via Iran).

The Axis had no qualms about violating neutrality when they deemed it necessary. Seems like a missed opportunity.

Once Germany captured the oil fields, there is little advantage to also capturing Stalingrad. IOTL Stalingrad was little more than a bump on the road to the oil fields. Just blockading the South ends of the Volga and Dnieper Rivers was enough to hamper Soviet war transport.

 

[HoHun]

Hi Tomo,

On the alternative guns Germany might have for their A/C for air-to-air fighting:
- the belt-feed MG FFM installed within the wings of the Bf 109 (historically, the belt-fed FFM use seems limited to the Do 217 night-fighters; @Tony Williams might know more)
- a MG FFM scaled-up for 25mm round; probably gets the 200 g shell @ 700 m/s and 550-600 rd/min, weight about 40-50 kg? For Fw 190 in outer wing; as a motor-cannon where possible; for night fighters and jet fighters; alternatively an 'alt MK 108' - still 30 mm, but a shell of 250-270g at 700 m/s instead of 330g at 500 m/s, gun weight of ~70 kg
- a 'MK 105' - 30mm cannon that is in-between the historical MK 108 and MK 103, ie. a 330g shell @ 700-750 m/s, ~500 rd/min, 80-100 kg. As a motor-cannon, for new fighters, for night fighters.

Fighter's weapon mix might be 2x MG 151/20 + 2x bigger cannon for Fw 190, 2x MG FFM + 1x bigger cannon for the Bf 109; no cowl MGs.

Sorry, I stumbled over the keyboard before I was actually ready to post, so I now edited my text into the accidentally posted message above. I'd blame the cat if I had one ;-)

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

 

[_Del_]

Once Germany captured the oil fields, there is little advantage to also capturing Stalingrad

Not sure if I agree with that, either (I'm very disagreeable lately!). Not only is Stalingrad an industrial center churning out T-34's and other goodies, it's a major transportation hub. Blocking the mouth of the Volga still leaves the L-L route through Turkmenistan to Stalingrad, and all the traffic both directions between central Russia and Stalingrad. Moving L-L aid without Stalingrad is substantially harder.
The river traffic on the Don and Volga works both ways, as well, easing your own logistics if you're pushing deeper into Russia.

The Black Sea area seems to me the center of gravity for both the Russian and Near East fronts. The mistake it seems to me (with heavy doses of hindsight) wasn't the decision to push to Stalingrad; it was the earlier decision to push straight to Moscow (switching gears midstream once that had begun was also clearly a mistake). This was a battle for survival. I don't think for a second that capturing Moscow ends the war-- and in the end, taking it doesn't do as much for the Axis war effort as much as taking Stalingrad, imo. Doesn't hurt that General Frost was quite a bit weaker here, too.

 

[Justo Miranda]

American bombers B-17 and B-24 were much better armed than their British counterparts and their crews had been trained to fly in self-defence formations only a few meters apart from each other. The rules of air combat determined that an attacker fighter would not risk flying through such a compact formation, having to choose between shooting from far away and deviating at the last moment exposing their ventral surfaces to the powerful defensive crossfire of American gunners, who were considered statistically lethal from a distance of one thousand yards.

A lonely fighter attacking a 'box' got in the gunsight of as many as 40 Browning M2 heavy machine guns. The Germans tried many different Pulkzerstörer (formation destroyer) tactics to break the boxes without having to get too close. The four engine bombers, which they called Viermots or Dicke Autos, were attacked from a distance of 1,800 m by Me 410 A-2/U4 heavy fighters, fitted with Rheinmetall-Borsig BK.5 cannons of 50 mm that capable of dismantling a B-17 with a single hit. But they were so heavy that prevented the Me 410 could escape the Mustangs escort.

The Viermots were attacked from 1,300 m with W.Gr.21 rockets of 210 mm, launched from specially modified aircraft Bf 110 G-2/R3, Fw 190 A-7/R6 and Bf 109 G-6/R2. However, this type of spin-stabilised rocket was very inaccurate and, after the attack, the launcher plane could not release the launch tubes on flight, which considerably diminished its speed. From a distance of 900 m, some Ju 88 P-2 and Bf 110 G-2/R1 fired their Rheinmetall-Borsig 'Flak 38' of 37 mm, an anti-tank canon with a low rate of fire that was too heavy to be installed on a single seat fighter and which use in air-to-air mode was a failure.

The Luftwaffe also tested various air-to-air bombing techniques in the summer of 1943, using fighters Bf 109 G-4 that flew at 1,000 m over the stream bombers, throwing AB 50 containers, each one loaded with 34 standard infantry fragmentation grenades. The Fw 190 A-4/U3 of the I./JG1 launched SC 250 bombs and AB 500 containers, loaded with 370 kg of HE and provided with time and proximity fuses, over the 'boxes' without achieving success.

At the beginning of 1944 there were already designs and prototypes of air-to-air missiles created to solve the '1000 yards problem', but until they reached service status, the Luftwaffe was forced to fight the Viermots using Sturm (assault) fighter units specialized in schnauze auf schnauze (frontal attacks) combat. The advantage of a head-on pass was that the fighter remained only 5 seconds in the 1,000 yards area and took it another 9 seconds to cross the 'box', if it was lucky enough to not collide against any bomber. The downside was that the aircraft crossed so quickly that the fighter barely had time to fire. And to shoot down a Viermot were needed many shots!

Major Hans Georg von Kornatzki proposed the OKL to use saturation tactics by which a group of at least thirty fighters simultaneously attacked a 'box' to avoid the concentration of defensive fire against a single fighter. Kornatzki did not get the thirty fighters but he obtained approval from the general Adolf Galland to test new tactics with a section of fifteen aircraft that was named I./JG1 Sturmstaffel 1. The tests began in Achmer-Osnabrück in late 1943 using Fw 190 A-6 fighters in mock combat against an Fw 200 bomber.

Further analysis of the films made with the EK16 gun cameras served to determine that the optimal firing distance was of 200 m, approximately when the four engines of the bomber appeared to be in the target circle of the Revi 16B gunsight. The 'Sturmstaffel 1' became operational in February 1944 under command of major Kornatzki with eighteen Fw 190 A-6 aircraft based in Dortmund.

His combat method consisted in carrying out a head-on pass with twelve aircraft flying wing-tip to wing-tip in a broad arrow formation that was called Breitkeil by the Germans and 'Company Front' by the Americans. Upon receiving an order from the staffelführer all airplanes simultaneously fired their MG 151/20 cannons. In a typical head-on pass, the four guns of an Fw 190 - with a rate of fire of 780 rpm - could make 160 shots launching between 960 and 1760 grams of HE against the target, depending on the type of ammunition used. According to statistics from the Luftwaffe, at least 400 grams of HE were required to destroy a B-17 with a 95% certainty, therefore the attacker fighter should hit the target with 36 shots of M-Geschoss or 67 shots of MX-Geschoss ammunition.

In a frontal attack, the punch of the MG 151 was increased thanks to the combined speed of both aircraft on collision course. In those combat conditions, the radial engines, the Plexiglas nose and the cockpit windshield of the bomber were very vulnerable and the Sturm tactics were so effective that in early May the Sturmstaffel 1 became a Sturmgruppe within the JG3. After the head-on pass all Breitkeil aircraft broke left and right and organized to repeat the attack until breaking the cohesion of the 'box'. When this was achieved as a result of panic, the bombers were individually attacked by fighters of other units that had kept at a distance during the Pulkzerstörer combat.

In December 1943, the Focke-Wulf company began manufacturing a series of eighty Fw 190 A-7/R2 aircraft specially modified for the Sturm combat, replacing the two MG 151 located outboard of the wings by other more powerful type MK 108/30 cannon, called Kurzgerät by the pilots. In February 1944, the 2./JG11 started operational testing with these aircraft, testing head-on pass tactics as they flew into a shallow dive of fifteen degrees to increase attack speed. In April, the 5./JG1 made operational tests with the new MK 108 cannons, attacking from the rear of the 'box'. They noted that the low range and high dispersion fire factor of the Kurzgerät required shooting from less than 100 m from the target to obtain results. From this distance, the attacker fighter should make at least 52 shots to achieve the three impacts that, statistically, would cause the destruction of the Viermot.

The Fw 190 A-7/R2 could only carry 110 shells of the Minengeschoss 30 x 90 RB type, so in a classic attack from the rear, the pilot should start shooting from 90 m reaching up to 30 m from the target before breaking contact. The casualties of the 'Sturm' units were terrible, The Sturmstaffel 1 pilots boasted of ‘not shooting until you see the whites of the eyes of the tail gunner’. This phrase became the slogan of the unit and was materialized in a couple of eyes painted on the flying jackets.

Losses increased even more when the bombers began to be escorted by large groups of Mustangs, Thunderbolts and Lightnings. Some Staffeln lost a third of its members in each combat and in August 1944 the Sturmgruppen were losing one fighter by every bomber that was shot down. During its existence, the I./JG1 withstood a 350% loss of pilots, the IV./JG3 a 200% and the II./JG4 lost 72 pilots in six months.

 

[T. A. Gardner]

To all that, what the Germans needed early on was a guided missile to replace the cannon. Only a paradigm shift in technology was going to end the Allied bomber offensive, even if only temporarily.