One for UK75 (RN Amphibs Mid-70s)

[JFC Fuller]

One of the most often overlooked of the UK's many defence reviews is the 1974/5 affair which hit the Navy especially hard and was in effect a precursor to the more famous Nott review. The following was deleted from the Royal Navy's long term plans at the time:

9 Frigates (Type 22s) and Destroyers (Type 42)
1 Fleet Maintenance Ship
3 Large Tankers
1 Afloat Support Ship
2 Commando Ships

Cancelled at the same time was Skynet 3 which would have apparently provided Milsatcom East of Suez.

All of the cancelled ships are interesting but I think the Commando Ships are the most interesting. I imagine that they would have been very similar to the Invincible's and would have been ordered immediately after them, we will probably never know what they would have looked like though as apparently no money was ever spent on them.

 

[Danentwisle]

Something like Ocean would be most likely I imagine. Possibly with Gas Turbines instead of diesels.

 

[uk 75]

JFC

Thank you thinking of me.

The seminal work by Norman Friedman on British Carrier Aviation appeared in 1988, since when we have learnt much more from documents about the later postwar years. Sadly he has not had time to update the book, nor produce a work on British Amphibious warfare vessels similar to his tome on the US Navy's kit.

That leaves us with Moore and Brown's Rebuilding the Royal Navy which provides us with some helpful information, but also many gaps.

The only design for a Commando ship replacement for Bulwark and Albion in the 60s that appears is Study No 4 of the Future Fleet Working Party in 1966 which shows a simple ship similar in size to the US Iwo Jima. Interestingly a German magazine (Marine Rundschau I think) mentions in its news pages in a 1966 issue that the RN were looking at Iwo Jima type ships to replace the Commando ships.
Brown/Moore tells us that the FFWP decided in November that the new Command Cruiser would not have an amphibious warfare role, though this was later built into the Invincible class, at least for carrying helicopters on exercises.

The next development is the decision to replace Albion with Hermes rather than Centaur (which lingered as an Accommodation ship). The conversion started in 1971.

In Postwar British Carrier Aviation Friedman describes how Bulwark and Hermes lost their roles as Commando Ships in the 1974-5 cuts only to be reprieved in 1977 as ASW ships (this was under NATO pressure to fill the gap until the Invincibles arrived). As you say we have no indication anywhere what work had been done to develop a new Commando ship design between 1966 and 1975. Given that Bulwark and Hermes were to be replaced by Invincible and co there may even have been no great urgency to develop a separate design.

From 1977 a series of designs emerge, some based like Ocean on the Invincible hull. Brown/Moore shows two artists impressions from 1980 or so. Earlier designs may have been very similar. Vickers and other private shipbuilders started producing a whole raft of Harrier, light, ASW and multi role flat top designs from the mid 70s on, but none gained acceptance .

The RFA took quite a hit. The three large tankers, one of which had sunk at sea were not replaced by new charters. The Fleet Maintenance Ship to replace HMS Triumph (a converted light fleet carrier) and the Afloat Support Ship to replace the last two Head class ships would probably have been either conversions or chartered commercial designs rather than in house. However, we just don't know. The Falklands sorts this out to some extent.

The destroyer and frigate strengths are given full coverage in Friedmans Destroyers and Frigates and other contributors to these pages have a much better grasp of the detail here than I do.

Fearless and Intrepid were also the subject of private sector designs for replacements from the late 70s. Old copies of Navy International and similar magazines have many bits of artwork. The five LSTs of the Knight class do not seem to have been given any re-design. Australia ordered a similar design (HMAS Tobruk)long after the five were complated.

Hope this helps
UK 75

 

[JFC Fuller]

The key point is that the 1974/5 review not only removes the existing commando carriers but also cancels the planned replacements for those ships. My belief remains that had these vessels of been built they would have been ordered not long after the Invincible and may well have been very similar to them. In reality, after 1975 any work done would probably have been aimed at export and not for the RN.

 

[Hano]

The key point is that the 1974/5 review not only removes the existing commando carriers but also cancels the planned replacements for those ships. My belief remains that had these vessels of been built they would have been ordered not long after the Invincible and may well have been very similar to them. In reality, after 1975 any work done would probably have been aimed at export and not for the RN.

I've just written my MA thesis on the 74/75 review, it's one of the few pieces of academic study so far done on the topic, very little use yet been made of the material at The National Archives. I think the key point here is that in fact, the Navy got off very lightly. The Treasury had had the surface fleet in its sights since the early 60s and was *very* keen to cut escorts in particular. The MOD was able to resist this pressure, mainly down to the united front presented the Chiefs of Staff who were able to generate a consensus that accepted their 'Critical Force Level' as the minimum required to maintain our NATO and residual Empire commitments. But, the Treasury bided its time. The 1981 Review with its savaging of the surface fleet is a good illustration of what the Treasury were pushing for in 1974/5.
cheers
H

 

[JFC Fuller]

Hano,

I hope you MA thesis scores well, do you mind me asking where you are studying?

Agreed, little has been written about the 1974/5 review, I suspect because there is nothing obvious and shiny that gets cut (unlike the 60s or the Nott review); however this is largely achieved by cutting the less glamorous and less obvious parts of the services. Around this time the RAF Transport Command loses 1 Comet Squadron, 1 Belfast Squadron and 2 Britannia Squadrons without replacement (effectively terminating its strategic lift capability) and Skynet 3 is cancelled. The RN keeps its hull numbers up but only by sacrificing the ships already listed as well as some frigates and destroyers from the long term programme and by accepting hulls with only limited equipment fits (fitted for but not with as it is now known). There is also a curtailment of a number of development programmes such as an improved Ikara.

 

[Hano]

It's the War Studies MA at Kings College London. I think you're right as to why the historiography is so thin, it's not as immediately attention grabbing as 66 or 81. As I said, it could so easily have been a lot more dramatic. At one point all the amphibs were going to go, the Marines to be transferred to the Army. Adm Ashmore did very well indeed in persuading people that reinforcement of the Northern Flank was a key NATO commitment. (Incidentally, he also saved the Royal Yacht Britannia, despite the Defence Minister's objections.)
One of the reasons for a lot of the paring down of fittings can be traced to the introduction of Functional Accounting practices in the late 60s early 70s. Put simply, it allowed the Treasury to scrutinise in minute detail exactly where every penny was going on a new ship. This allowed them to salami slice in all manner of ways. So for example, when scrutinising the T22 design, they were able to ask 'why does an ASW ship need a 4.5" gun?' hence the first batch didn't have one. Or, crucially 'why does any ship need a CIWS, given the expensive layered defences they already have?' and we all know how that story ended.
The axing of the Belfasts, some would contend, triggered an early example of PPP. A heavy life cargo company bought 5 of the aircraft and recruited a lot of the pilots, crew and maintenance people straight form the RAF. Caused a lot of amusement when the aircraft were chartered by the RAF in 82 and 91...
H

 

[phil gollin]

.


Hano,


I like researching at the TNARO, but have never really looked at post 1960 subjects as it SEEMED, when I started in the 1990s, that a lot of information was missing/weeded out because of nuclear issues.


Have you found that a problem, or are they a little more forgiving about such issues nowadays ?


.

 

[Hano]

Hano,
I like researching at the TNARO, but have never really looked at post 1960 subjects as it SEEMED, when I started in the 1990s, that a lot of information was missing/weeded out because of nuclear issues.
Have you found that a problem, or are they a little more forgiving about such issues nowadays ?

I can't say I've found that a problem, although there's certainly difficulties. I had a long discussion with one of TNA's senior archivists about this and the real problem lies in the arbitrary way in which material was kept. As far as anyone can work out, there was no consistant criteria by which departments decided what to keep and what to throw away. It's not just a Navy problem, it's the same throughout the MOD and its antecedents. It's a reflection of the federal nature of the MOD and the difficulty in co-ordinating its competing, occasionally feuding, constituent parts; a lot of material was withheld from the centre lest one of the other services get hold of it. Even what does survive frequently got filed in unexpected places. It drives archivists and especially historians insane with frustration.
By contrast, if you ever look at Treasury records for the same topics, and if you're a historian you absolutely should they're a goldmine, they're meticulous models of clear and focused thinking by comparison. The internal memos are extremely frank and reveal a huge amount about Treasury thinking on defence policy.
cheers
H

 

[Hood]

Eric Grove lists the 1975 cancellations (for amphibious forces) as, "a new commando helicopter and two new amphibious ships."
This would seem to imply that a new helicopter was sought for the RM airborne lift, and the two amphibious ship's are not mentioned by type. They could be LSLs. If they were Commando Carriers I think Grove would have made more of it in the text. They can't be LSDs as Fearless and Intrepid weren't being retired, although only one would be active at any time. Also, there were plans to acquire alternate means of transport in an emergency by acquiring ferry-type merchants.

 

[JFC Fuller]

Hood,

Grove's reference for his cancellation list is Cmnd 5976, the statement on defence estimates 1975. That document simply lists two "purpose built" amphibious ships. That these were Commando ships is given away in in later responses to parliamentary questions but it is clear that no money was ever spent on them and they were removed from the long term plans prior to any major design work being undertaken on them. From the then Parliamentary Under-Secreatary of State for Defence (Royal Navy):

There will be a reduction in our amphibious forces involving premature disposal of HMS "Bulwark" and her helicopter squadron, and 41 Commando of the Royal Marines will be phased out as we prepare to leave Malta at the end of the present agreement in 1979. We shall not be proceeding with the construction of two new purpose-built commando ships.

Source: http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1975/jul/09/royal-navy

It is pretty clear that these ships would have been commando vessels based on the rest of the RN amphibious inventory; the original Round Table class and the Fearless class ships were all built in the 60s and so were very new. The Commando carriers on the other hand were all war construction. That the new ships were in the long term plans in the early 70s means they would not have been in service before 1980 at the very earliest and that was the planned out of-service date for Hermes even during the CVA01 affair. D.K. Browne and George Moore mention this vessel as a Commando Carrier in their introduction to Rebuilding the Royal Navy stating that "Little work had been done on the design..".

The ferry plan actually happened; in 1976, during NATO exercise TEAM WORK, the Norwegian car ferries Bergen, Bolero and Venus were chartered by the Royal Navy to transport Royal Marines across the North Sea though I don't know how long this idea was carried on for, SEALINK Ferries were also considered. It was really just pre-planned STUFT.

The new Commando Helicopter is an interesting one; the defence estimates (Cmnd 5976) for that year certainly state that plans to replace the Wessex Mk5 had been abandoned but in January of the same year the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence (Royal Navy) correctly pointed out the following:

The Wessex 5 helicopters used by the Royal Navy are on average about 10 years old. These aircraft still have many years of useful life and any question of replacement should not arise for some considerable time.

Source: http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/written_answers/1975/jan/16/wessex-helicopters

Of course ultimately the Wessex Mk5 was replaced by Westland Commando (Sea King) Mk4 starting in early 1980 (starting with 846 NAS which disbanded with the Wessex in December 1979) so there was a replacement anyway. I wonder whether the abandoned 1975 Commando Helicopter programme just a long term aspiration cancelled to smooth out the budget line in the out years...?

 

[Hood]

The Commons Debate entry is interesting. If only there was more to go on as proof, as you say though, it links nicely with the design Brown and Moore mention. I'm guessing he may have used the wording Commando Ship to avoid any political fallout from using Commando Carrier.

I'm sharing your opinion earlier on in this thread, the earlier designs were probably close to the CAH, as then planned, and its not hard to imagine an Illustrious with four/ six LCVP in davits aft, no Sea Dart (perhaps Sea Wolf was planned given the time of the design). I would be fairly sure in betting the new Commando Helicopter would have been a Sea King and with Illustrious being designed around such aircraft a similar sized ship seems possible.

It's interesting to parallel this with the earlier little-known LSD designs of the late 40s/ early 50s that never got past the drawing board either.

 

[uk 75]

The most interesting period for me about the RN Amphibious fleet is the early 60s when a large number of designs are being looked at for a purpose built replacement for Albion and Bulwark.

The other components of the Amphibious force have been established ( 2 LPDs an 5 LSTs) and as far as I can find no work was in hand to design additional ships or replacements. The closest I can find is the Australian Tobruk class which serves as a basis for replacement LSTs in the 80s.

The leave us with the Commando Ships/Commando Carriers. We know from Brown and Moore that a simplified Iwo Jima style ship was around in the sketchbooks and designs looked at by the 1966 Future Fleet Working Party. This design probably did not survive and with the emergence of the Invincible Command cruisers later ASW cruisers any amphibious ship would have used the same hull.

We know from the designs submitted in the 80s and shown in various magazines that a Commando Ship (LPH) was very much like the eventual Ocean in appearance. It is likely that the 2 ships given up in the 70s were similar in appearance.

 

[uk 75]

The most interesting period for me about the RN Amphibious fleet is the early 60s when a large number of designs are being looked at for a purpose built replacement for Albion and Bulwark.

The other components of the Amphibious force have been established ( 2 LPDs an 5 LSTs) and as far as I can find no work was in hand to design additional ships or replacements. The closest I can find is the Australian Tobruk class which serves as a basis for replacement LSTs in the 80s.

The leave us with the Commando Ships/Commando Carriers. We know from Brown and Moore that a simplified Iwo Jima style ship was around in the sketchbooks and designs looked at by the 1966 Future Fleet Working Party. This design probably did not survive and with the emergence of the Invincible Command cruisers later ASW cruisers any amphibious ship would have used the same hull.

We know from the designs submitted in the 80s and shown in various magazines that a Commando Ship (LPH) was very much like the eventual Ocean in appearance. It is likely that the 2 ships given up in the 70s were similar in appearance.

This thread has been dormant for a while but I still find the lack of information on this subject disappointing. We need a Friedman on UK amphibs

 

[Hood]

The best I can offer is this snippet of information here.

 

[uk 75]

Hood Thank you The integration of the two types of cruiser design from 1966 into the LPH replacement plans is interesting.

 

[JFC Fuller]

Ed Hampshire, in his excellent From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic states that design work for a replacement HMS Bulwark, the implication being the ship would serve alongside Hermes which was converted to the role, was begun in 1969 and that the early sketch options were as follows:

i. Minimum Ship, 20 knots from a single screw, built to merchant standards with accommodation for 1,400 including 650 commandos (900 at overload), est. cost £20-25m
ii. Intermediate Ship, 30 knots from twin screws, naval standards; similar to the Command Cruiser but without Sea Dart and the command and control facilities, est. cost £25-30m
iii. "full-scale" Commando Cruiser/Carrier with nine helicopters, eight Harriers and accommodation for 322 commandos (644 at overload), est. cost £35-40m

The reference for the above is DEFE 24/385 which are the Command Cruiser files at the National Maritime Museum.

That the above are radically different concepts suggests that these were very preliminary proposals, a long way from being something that could be ordered. The differences are not just in the ships themselves but in the size of the Commando forces and naval aviation, and the nature of amphibious doctrine itself.

 

[Hood]

I've read DEFE 24/387 but not 385, nor indeed 386 which is also on the Command Cruiser circa 1969.

This information would tie-in well with the 1970 information I obtained, the 'Ferry' version probably being i. and the CCH-based 'Military' being ii. (or possibly iii.). The last option feels like something rather bigger than CCH with nine Wessex and eight Harriers. Probably not far off from Bulwark's size and I suspect didn't last very long as an option.

 

[JFC Fuller]

My first thought was the following:

i. seems analogous to study No.4 in the 1966 Future Fleet Working Party Large Ship studies
ii. would have been the then CCH design with the Sea Dart and C2 facilities removed thus creating more space for troops and their equipment
iii. would have been the then CCH design with Commando facilities added, similar to the relationship between study No.1 and No.8 in the 1966 Future Fleet Working Party Large Ship studies

The ultimate Invincible class had an internal volume (3,178,303 cubic ft) close to the Centaur class (3,248,932 cubic ft) as it was. What is curious about No.iii is that two of them would be required to lift a single Commando which makes me wonder whether it was a reversion to the earlier suggestions of spreading commando capability across other ship types (inc. CVA01 and Escort Cruisers).

Unfortunately, we don't have anymore context at the moment so all we can do is speculate.

 

[uk 75]

An interesting new set of plans.
Originally 6 Command Cruisers were planned. The design was first illustrated publicly at the time of the 1970 Conservative Defence White Paper. The catastrophic failure of the UK economy made it impossible to order more than three.
Hermes comes out of refit in time to scrap Albion. Bulwark has to hang on until Invincible fiinally completes at the end of the decade.
Paradoxically a competent Labour government from 1970 might have avoided the disastrous Industrial Relations Act and Barber Boom while ordering Command Cruisers to keep industry going. Of course Ark and her Air Group would have retired in 1972 as Healey had announced. Tiger's rebuild would probably have also joined Lion's in not happening. Hermes and Blake would have been the only major surface ships with Bulwark retained in reserve.
The Command Cruisers would all have had the capacity (as the Invincibles sometimes did) of transporting a Commando and helos.
But after the October 1973 oil shock the 4th to 6th units would still have never been built.