Not a lot of HTP

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What happens if the UK doesn't focus on HTP for aircraft, missiles and submarines?

We know there was musing of nuclear propulsion for submarines and ships. So arguably this gains focus and effort much earlier.

And for missiles, LOx won out for the IRBM.

But during this period there was also the rise of the concept of first rocket only and later mixed (jet and rocket) powered fighters.
But what happens if this concept is effectively consigned to the dustbin in the early 50's?
 
We lose a great british self derisive joke related to those two unfortunate submarines, I mean: HMS Exploder and HMS Excruciator.

More seriously: the Swedes may not suceed where the British failed, a decade later in the 1960's.

Also AIP propulsion as a low-end to SSNs might be delayed.

If you wanted an alternate oxidizer for the Saro fighters, try N2O - nitrous oxide, better known as laughing gas.
 
Assume the German facilities for HTP are destroyed and thus no cheap quick means to establish bulk production of HTP.

This increases emphasis on new nuclear propulsion for ships and submarines. As resources are not diverted to HTP development.

Having a higher priority from 1953 as argument for nuclear submarines wins out.
Analysis of earlier opens prospect of submarines capable of carrying ballistic missiles.

1955 accelerated program as sufficient quantities of uranium becomes available. Approved shoreside prototype that year.

1957 Defence Review increases and secures long-term plan and funding.

Meanwhile.....

Only the LOx/Kerosene motor effort proceeds as HTP production is very low.
While OR.301 is issued in '51, the potential exists for abandonment in 1952 as E.T.Jones thought a Mach 2 aircraft with twin jet engines was more important.
Potentially Saro are awarded ER.134T submission P.163.

Alternatively the 1953 defence cuts and the focus on mixed power interceptors that led to F.177.
 
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Oldies here will remember a now-extinct creature called the Scientific Civil Service. Born in the Great War, the notion was that only Applied Research could/should be done in risk-financed industry; Pure Research (so many dead-ends) was for the public purse: all especially so in Munitions, the merchants of death issue. So, all those Defence Research Establishments. Aero-nuts know of RAE, NGTE, RPE, RRE...but War Office for the Army and Admiralty for the RN Scientific Service had their lairs. Inc (by 1959) Adm'y Underwater Weapons Est/Portland.

We now have only DSTL, inc the CBW labs at Porton Down. All other Research with Defence potential is overhead in businesses.

One reason for that was Public Sector pensions, which made the lifetime cost of a public scientist...quite grotesque. Maybe linked to that was...no sense of urgency. Decisive for RN SS was a culture of disdain, even remoteness from reality: the Official Historian of UK WW2 Weapons Development: failures, “grave and continuous”; 1942’s hopes: “were soon belied...shortcomings (the) story of the fleet fighter (turret, 2-seat Roc) is even more melancholy” Postan,Quality,P172;Weapons,P135.

So,
imbibe some Prime and start to read the torpedo bits of Prof Hennessy's Silent Deep. More Prime, pls. "rotten, horror..." I can't go on. Suffice to say RNSS prejudiced Defence of the Realm. Early RN SSN/SSBNs for self-defence carried a dumb torp, origin 1928, such was the inadequacy of UK homing work. 1SL/CDS Mountbatten gets credit for extracting much nuclear reactor help from USN Adm Rickover: no-one has noticed his acquiescence in dismantling RNSS.

No Scientist appears to have pondered how raw conscripts could handle HTP - sub crew were (nominal) volunteers, but not in the Depots.
(Blue Steel/RAF, ditto).


 
I've used 'medium' Peroxide in lab to 'break down' organic samples for ash content when lesser tactics just charred.

Even 'medium' is nasty stuff, a view shared by one of our folk who'd worked with people-eating HF at a 'hole in map' nuclear site...

Conc Sulphuric, fuming Nitric, glacial Acetic, Formic, even 'Chromic Acid' lack ways 'medium' Peroxide may surprise...
 
We now have only DSTL, inc the CBW labs at Porton Down. All other Research with Defence potential is overhead in businesses.
Now the vast majority of pure/basic research is done in Industry, but still funded by government , through the likes of Dstl, research councils etc. Or as overheads on other government contracts

The research establishments very much did applied research as well
 
Refinement. In Real life....
Early 1950s.
Staff were part time on nuclear as Porpoise and HTP designs took up a lot of effort.
Furthermore 1953 Baltic small Submarine design effort. Boreas class. Stopped in 1955.
First Sea Lord went to Bath to apologise for the wasted effort.

1945 HMS Meteorite, ex-U1407 German Type XVII using HTP powered steam plant.
Decommissioned 1949.

1948 experimental HTP Submarine effort, HMS Explorer and Excalibur completed 1956 and 1958.
Main benefit was the attention to escape equipment and the continuing scaling issues as per HMS Porpoise.

Arguably the resources for the HTP submarines, the small submarine could have instead fed into the SSN effort.
Full-time staffing on the program from 1948 would result on a lot more done by the time a conclusion for SSBN is needed.
Arguably then the reactor effort would become the key dictator in progress.
 
HMS Exploder and HMS Excruciator... british humor as its best.

It took a few decades for the Swedes to make AIP submarine viables, with that wonder Sterling engine thing.
 
Refinement. In Real life....
Early 1950s.
Staff were part time on nuclear as Porpoise and HTP designs took up a lot of effort.
Furthermore 1953 Baltic small Submarine design effort. Boreas class. Stopped in 1955.
First Sea Lord went to Bath to apologise for the wasted effort.

1945 HMS Meteorite, ex-U1407 German Type XVII using HTP powered steam plant.
Decommissioned 1949.

1948 experimental HTP Submarine effort, HMS Explorer and Excalibur completed 1956 and 1958.
Main benefit was the attention to escape equipment and the continuing scaling issues as per HMS Porpoise.

Arguably the resources for the HTP submarines, the small submarine could have instead fed into the SSN effort.
Full-time staffing on the program from 1948 would result on a lot more done by the time a conclusion for SSBN is needed.
Arguably then the reactor effort would become the key dictator in progress.
Is there somewhere more information about this Boreas class, like intended technical characteristics?
 
There is a safer way to make the stuff:

Now, could you use that—and this in combination?

A sub as a cell?
 
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