No 1958 US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement?

[Lascaris]

What the title says. The 1958 agreement led to the sharing of nuclear technology between the US and Britain, with Britain eventually getting weapon design data, Polaris and Trident missiles and even a full nuclear reactor for her first nuclear submarine. On the other hand Britain became far more dependent on the US and unable to export military nuclear technology without US express permission, when Canada was looking into nuclear submarines in the 1980s for example export of Trafalgars would had required US consent.

So say the agreement fails to materialize which doesn't need all that much nudging to happen it seems to me. Britain still gets a degree of American aid behind the scenes say at about the same degree the French were given but nothing beyond this. No anglicized warhead designs, no Skybolt and no Nassau agreement, HMS Dreadnought has to wait for the British reactor design to be ready and so on.

I'd argue that despite calls for leaving the nuclear weapons business on costs grounds no British government of the era is going to do it. On the other hand Britain DID work under pretty sever economic strain so how do they go about it? Without the American factor France would be quite amenable to working together and it should be tempting for a cash strapped Britain. So do we end up seeing RN SSBNs with M1/M2/M4/M51 and French SSNs and SSBNs with RR PWR reactors? Mirage IVBs with Olympus engines and jointly designed air launched ballistic missiles (the French apparently played with the concept for Minerve) or for more economic solutions Spey Mirages?

In the same vein if British naval reactor technology is independent of the US it can be exported as well. Italy was very much interested in nuclear submarines in the 1960s but apparently Rickover was less than happy with exporting reactors. TTL though British reactors are a viable alternative. So Italy as a third partner in Anglo-French projects or atleast buyer? Then come the 1980s the Canadians also want SSNs...

And what is happening to other British projects? For example CVA1 looks as an obvious candidate for someone proposing to stick to a 35,000t ship for example...

 

[Archibald]

The french would jump into British arms, and a nuclear pact would happen...

 

[zen]

More pertinent to the period, would be working with Australia. Who had been made promises, which US opening up had forced to be betrayed.

The IRBM effort was quite far along by 1958, and it's RV research was part of what was 'shared' with the US to quite some influence on their designs.
Along with the UK's increasing concerns over safety.

The chief letdown was the LOx/Kerosene system for the missile. Due to how long it took to ready and how short a duration it could kept ready to launch.

The alternative most affordable was the HTP/Kerosene system. Already much understood.
But there isn't any real impediments to UK industry producing Hypergolic 'solid' (gel) propellant.
As was a 42" diameter solid fuel press was funded. Presumably for Tactical ranges similar to Pershing.

The Granit series was progressing well and lighter more compact devices would emerge anyway. Much of that is masked by the propaganda of Declinism but quite a bit of post '58 research into compact devices is domestic for reasons that include proving the UK was a valuable contributor to the colective knowledge base.

The original PWR-1 reactor was not reliant on copying US practice and was simply slow to become available from extent industry. The single US reactor only sped up the first SSN which was delayed due to slow progress on the domestic submarine reactor effort.

The chief casualty of this period is likely the planning of BAOR and the carrier fleet.
Focus would have to move to SSBN and SLBM.

Nassau was were this came to a head and both sides saw benefits to keeping relations close. An AH were '58 changes, suggest that there is no Skybolt for the V-Bombers and no Skybolt Cancellation Crisis.
In the short-term Blue Steel is already coming along, but the future has no easy path for the RAF. The shift to the RN is only hastened if The Deterrent is to continue.

 

[uk 75]

An interesting alternate history given opposition in the UK by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament but also by Tories like Enoch Powell who were sceptical of the Atlantic Alliance after Suez and doubted the value of nuclear weapons.

There would be no Holy Loch and US Polaris subs would have to use Rota in Spain instead.

The Thor missile deal which exposed the UK to counterstrikes by Soviet SS4 and 5 missiles would fall through.

US nuclear weapons might even be removed from UK bases.

Even Harold Macmillan was willing to give up nuclear weapons if they became too expensive..

Senior Generals like Carver would argue instead for an increase in conventional forces, possibly with a limited form of conscription.

The arrival of Labour in power in 1964 would almost certainly see all work on UK nuclear weapons stopped and the V force disbanded by 1970 as we withdrew from East of Suez.

A build up of conventional weapons like Sweden might have been done instead. Viggens for the RAF.

Cooperation with the US on patrols against the USSR might still have taken place with Porpoise and Oberon class boats.

 

[Dilandu]

Without the American factor France would be quite amenable to working together and it should be tempting for a cash strapped Britain. So do we end up seeing RN SSBNs with M1/M2/M4/M51 and French SSNs and SSBNs with RR PWR reactors?

A realistic probability, yes.

 

[TheKutKu]

De Gaulle did not have all his distinct ideas on strategic independence from the moment he took power back, there was a formative period in 58-59, France would be more amenable than some may think, I'm more worried about the british side wanting such cooperation, especially in a sustained way.

 

[Lascaris]

More pertinent to the period, would be working with Australia. Who had been made promises, which US opening up had forced to be betrayed.

So what are the Australians getting here? Their own nuclear bomb? Valiant class boats in place of the Oberons?

The IRBM effort was quite far along by 1958, and it's RV research was part of what was 'shared' with the US to quite some influence on their designs.
Along with the UK's increasing concerns over safety.

The chief letdown was the LOx/Kerosene system for the missile. Due to how long it took to ready and how short a duration it could kept ready to launch.

The alternative most affordable was the HTP/Kerosene system. Already much understood.
But there isn't any real impediments to UK industry producing Hypergolic 'solid' (gel) propellant.
As was a 42" diameter solid fuel press was funded. Presumably for Tactical ranges similar to Pershing.

Which still leaves the problem of basing... but then opens the possibility of a British or British/French Air launched ballistic missiles if Skybolt is not an option to begin with, if the technology is there. After all the logic behind wanting Skybolt ie the large already extant strategic bomber force is still there.

The Granit series was progressing well and lighter more compact devices would emerge anyway. Much of that is masked by the propaganda of Declinism but quite a bit of post '58 research into compact devices is domestic for reasons that include proving the UK was a valuable contributor to the colective knowledge base.

The original PWR-1 reactor was not reliant on copying US practice and was simply slow to become available from extent industry. The single US reactor only sped up the first SSN which was delayed due to slow progress on the domestic submarine reactor effort.

The chief casualty of this period is likely the planning of BAOR and the carrier fleet.
Focus would have to move to SSBN and SLBM.

I'd be inclined to think there is strong political pressure early to go with the smaller carrier proposals. So 35,000t most likely. Which could actually turn into a blessing as far as affordability goes in the end,

Nassau was were this came to a head and both sides saw benefits to keeping relations close. An AH were '58 changes, suggest that there is no Skybolt for the V-Bombers and no Skybolt Cancellation Crisis.
In the short-term Blue Steel is already coming along, but the future has no easy path for the RAF. The shift to the RN is only hastened if The Deterrent is to continue.

There were French paper plans for designs comparably to Skybolt and Blue Steel 2 as well. Developing something along these lines makes a certain degree of sense it looks to me.

An interesting alternate history given opposition in the UK by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament but also by Tories like Enoch Powell who were sceptical of the Atlantic Alliance after Suez and doubted the value of nuclear weapons.

There would be no Holy Loch and US Polaris subs would have to use Rota in Spain instead.

The Thor missile deal which exposed the UK to counterstrikes by Soviet SS4 and 5 missiles would fall through.

US nuclear weapons might even be removed from UK bases.

Even Harold Macmillan was willing to give up nuclear weapons if they became too expensive..

Senior Generals like Carver would argue instead for an increase in conventional forces, possibly with a limited form of conscription.

I don't really see Britain abandoning its nuclear weapons even if there were voices in support of this. All the more so in the late 1950s when the whole Western military strategy can be described as "start nuking the Soviet Union till the entire place glows in the dark." What is the strategic objective of the larger British conventional forces in Germany when WW3 begins and about everyone expects it to go nuclear in short order?

De Gaulle did not have all his distinct ideas on strategic independence from the moment he took power back, there was a formative period in 58-59, France would be more amenable than some may think, I'm more worried about the british side wanting such cooperation, especially in a sustained way.

De Gaulle, for arguably good reasons, wanted strategic independence from the US. Now would Britain be willing to cooperate? This is the era of Anglo-French projects like Concorde and Britain would need the French financial backing. Things could likely start small, for example instead of having SNECMA working with P&W you have it working with Bristol instead.

 

[alertken]

We can't ponder no MDA/1958 in isolation from Suez, 1956. A UK playwright has Ike as incandescent at UK/France misuse of his free kit on colonial escapades (H.Brenton, Never So Good, N.Hern, 08). Suez' lesson for CDG was to spend for Independence from US, but for PM Macmillan was to restrain Defence spend by increased Interdependence: we had lost MSP funds in 1955 (which had paid for Hunters, Canberras ...and...and...), were finding domestic AW to be expensive and fraught (Big Fission Violet Club would be a Sov secret weapon). Sputnik and threat of inundation by Sapwood caused USAF to endorse target integration with/SAC's use of the unsinkable a/c carrier, so Ike could override State's objection to Proliferation, saving us vast sums to move to fusion and AW miniaturisation. From 9/1/57-20/1/61 Ike and Mac could rerun 1943 N.Africa relations of mutual respect, even trust (so far as Statesmen can so indulge). (One writer suggests Ike felt US guilt in Truman erecting the McMahon barrier to AW co-operation and was happy to fix that by AW/MDA. I doubt that).

So: Suez: Case A: TriPartite Invasion succeeds before UN/US thwart it. PM Eden stays awhile, despite the health issue. Maybe no PM Mac, so no special relationship to override State's Proliferation issue. No MDA. I suggest around 1960 UK Ministers decide the cost of AW is without purpose, abandon it, join US dual-key structure in NATO and forget any EoS solo AW.

Suez Case B: International/UN response to Canal Nationalisation (which just might be to help train locals to run it, with paid access to all).
I suggest...much the same Defence outcome as Case A.

So: I seem to be saying: no MDA: lower UK Defence Budgets, higher domestic prosperity. The unintended consequence of Ike's generosity was to hold UK below FRG/Italy/Japan in speed of Recovery from WW2.
An intended consequence was total UK/US Solidarity over Cuba. However...I have elsewhere quoted CDG (an AW-empowered Statesman) to Dean Acheson delving into a briefcase to show recce pics of Sov AW presence in Cuba: in the sense: "keep your pics, your word is enough...We are with you". He did that before UK did.

No MDA might cause UK to ignore retired FM Monty, on MLF/ANF: "poppycock": mixed-manned Units would be the SACEUR norm for Land AW.

 

[zen]

So what are the Australians getting here? Their own nuclear bomb? Valiant class boats in place of the Oberons?

Australians can better describe their position at that time. Essentially they were working up to a nuclear program and had agreed to UK using sites in Australia in the expectation they wouldn't have to develop from scratch but acquire the knowledge and support from the UK in return.

The UK viewed this still through the lense of Imperial Defence.

Which still leaves the problem of basing... but then opens the possibility of a British or British/French Air launched ballistic missiles if Skybolt is not an option to begin with, if the technology is there. After all the logic behind wanting Skybolt ie the large already extant strategic bomber force is still there.

Basing with the French would be quite a potent and global spectrum.
The chief issue for Anglo-French developments is the need for high precision gyros. This is potentially an area France can contribute in a significant way as it could on propellant.

A hidden benefit would be standards and common production of nuclear materials and systems. This vould overcome some bottlenecks.

Anglo-French cooperation on civil and military transport aircraft could assist the airborne options.

I'd be inclined to think there is strong political pressure early to go with the smaller carrier proposals. So 35,000t most likely. Which could actually turn into a blessing as far as affordability goes in the end,

Access to French steam plant could make this affordable. If it's part of a package of cooperation in this area.
RN had to plan for new plant, which involves risk and cost. France had such plant for the Clemenceaus.

As an aside, we hear from others a lot of figures who opposed the nuclear Deterrent. But it's clearly biased since they don't provide corresponding advocates for it.
Their contribution is always of this character.

 

[Archibald]

The Clems and Audacious have the same BS-5 catapults, only length is different (171 ft vs 199 ft). Then the British circa 1956 studied a 35 000 tons + Medium Fleet Carrier, while the French until 1959-60 hoped for a third Clem' much enlarged: the Verdun, up to 45 000 tons.
I often think there might have been a sweept spot somewhere between 45 000 and 50 000 tons, for anglo-french carriers... if the British partially pay the bill, the French may afford a Verdun or a touch larger. Think CVF except 50 years ahead.

Main problems are the interceptors, unless VG happens a few years before OTL AFVG, anything the size of a Phantom only fits marginally on the Clems (also on Hermes, Victorious, and not-Phantomized Audacious, so...)

When did Vickers VG studies (580 series) started ? https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/supermarine-type-designations.1541/page-2

 

[zen]

'58 is a time when OR.339 and OR.346 are still live.
But in this post '57 environment, the French have the Mirage III and Etendard progressing.
While the UK has the Scimitar F mkI soon to service, Buccaneer S.mkI and Lightning on the way and the Sea Vixen FAW mkI.

UK could grab Etendard as a Hunter replacement and cheaper successor to Scimitar.....

 

[Lascaris]

The Clems and Audacious have the same BS-5 catapults, only length is different (171 ft vs 199 ft). Then the British circa 1956 studied a 35 000 tons + Medium Fleet Carrier, while the French until 1959-60 hoped for a third Clem' much enlarged: the Verdun, up to 45 000 tons.
I often think there might have been a sweept spot somewhere between 45 000 and 50 000 tons, for anglo-french carriers... if the British partially pay the bill, the French may afford a Verdun or a touch larger. Think CVF except 50 years ahead.

Main problems are the interceptors, unless VG happens a few years before OTL AFVG, anything the size of a Phantom only fits marginally on the Clems (also on Hermes, Victorious, and not-Phantomized Audacious, so...)

When did Vickers VG studies (580 series) started ? https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/supermarine-type-designations.1541/page-2

What could go wrong if you put an Avon engine on a Breguet Br.1120? And a few years down the road produced a Spey powered version?

 

[Archibald]

Since the Jaguar was originally the Breguet 1210... Cyclone would be the Breguet 1120. A perfect mirror image.

 

[Archibald]

Unfortunately the 1120 doesn't fit OR.346. Only VG designs can. Now, Breguet and Dassault only started to work on VG in 1962-63, so three years after Vickers. I'll try to check Breguet VG types numbers, must be post 1120 and the series stop at 1260 (the Alphajet !)

Edit: the Breguet 1200 was a Phantom like, fixed wing heavy fighter. The 1220 included competitors to the Mirage G (one engine) and also larger twin engines designs. NBRM-3 kickstarted those studies, sometimes between 1961 and 1963.

https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/vickers-supermarine-type-583-583v-584-589-vg-strike-fighter-family.1961/

You know what ? Vickers 583 + Breguet 1220 (or 122, if you prefer). Tadaaaaam !!!

 

[uk 75]

This thread might be more usefully titled UK French defence cooperation and widened in scope.
Churchill and his successor, Eden, were both Francophiles. Churchill in one of his grand gestures even offered to unite the two countries.
NATO was not a given. It was proceeded by Anglo French agreements aimed more at avoiding a repeat of German aggression than resisting the Soviet Union.
Stalin's offer of German unification if the country accepted neutrality was rejected by Adenauer (better half Germany whole?). But another Chancellor might have taken it.
In a fifties world where the US prefered to go back to isolationism links between London and Paris would have increased.
Suez in 1956 was another potential turning point. Some Conservative politicians were not as pro American as Macmillan.