No 1956 Suez crisis: Impact on UK Defence Procurement

[uk 75]

If the 1956 Suez crisis had not happened (Macmillan Prime Minister instead of Eden so no military response to Nasser's nationalisation of the Canal) the following might have been the impacts on British Defence Procurement.
Royal Navy
Without experience of operating helicopters at Suez there might have been no conversion of Albion and Bulwark to Commando Ships.
The use of Fleet Carriers to support amphibious assaults might have been less important than their NATO North Atlantic role.
The need for a nuclear Deterrent independent of the US might not have seemed as crucial.
Royal Air Force
The limitations of the Canberra and Valiant strikes on Egypt would not have underscored the need for TSR2
Army
The concept of airportable brigades for the UK Strategic Reserve might not have emerged and 3 Division would instead have received equipment for reinforcing BAOR.

Generally Macmillan would have been more relaxed about withdrawing from Empire without the shadow of Suez and resources might have been directed at NATO sooner.

 

[Archibald]

Suez was one among many nails in the 4th Republique coffin. Could butterfly away De Gaulle return; and doom France to civil war in the long term. Related to that Vietnam-like moral morasse called the Algerian war... and a maddening political instability worse than present day Belgium Italy and Israel together.
1946 1958 12 years 25 governments, one every 6 months.
I'm not blind dumb fan of De Gaulle - but on the Algerian morasse front he played smart, risked a lot including his own life, and took the correct long term decision(s). No way in hell France stayed there even with a military victory (at the cost of a moral defeat, even if FLNC fedayins were no angels either.)

 

[EwenS]

No Suez would not have prevented development of the Commando carrier in the RN.

RN helicopters had been transporting troops around in Malaya since 1952 so that aspect wasn’t new. Friedman in British Carrier Aviation notes that in July 1956, the Admiralty Board authorised work on a commando conversion of a light carrier. Then the Suez crisis blows up and Ocean & Theseus, training ships which had each had a detachment of ASW helicopters aboard from early 1956 for trials, were called up to their wartime troopship role. Someone put two and two together and an exercise took place 29 Sept-12 Oct to study helicopter assault. That proved successful and was used operationally.

Then we have the 1957 Defence Review, and it becomes clear that Bulwark and Albion will become available for commando carrier conversion. Given their better command and control and radar facilities compared to a Colossus, they become the conversion of choice. Bulwark then begins conversion in Jan 1959.

Over on the other side of the Atlantic the same thing is happening. USMC studies for helicopter assault began in 1946. After various delays, the first hardware appears in May 1956 with the completion of the Thetis Bay CVE conversion and start of design work on the Iwo Jima class LPH. 1959 sees 3 Essex class LPH conversions enter service and the laying down of Iwo Jima.

So with no Suez what happens in the 1957 Defence Review? Either way I think we get a commando carrier, but maybe not based on Bulwark.

 

[uk 75]

My argument about the carriers and commando ships is based on their "East of Suez" roles.
I think without the shadow cast by Suez a Macmillan government would have moved faster to get us out of this commitment. Paradoxical I know.

 

[Hood]

My argument about the carriers and commando ships is based on their "East of Suez" roles.
I think without the shadow cast by Suez a Macmillan government would have moved faster to get us out of this commitment. Paradoxical I know.

But there is all that sweet delicious oil in the Gulf still to protect.
Iran 1958 and Iraq/Kuwait 1960 still going to need sorting out plus Malaysian Emergency is ongoing and the Konfrontasi with Indonesia comes up 1964-65, tons of reasons to stay EoS and to make sure the region stays stable.
Plus there is CENTO and SEATO commitments to back up too. Of course no Suez means a whole new chain of dominoes (unstoppable Nasserism across the Middle East? No change?) but too much stuff was already in motion, Suez was an unexpected road hump to be got over or around.

 

[Dilandu]

Royal Navy would continue to pretend that nuclear weapon is not their concerns.

 

[starviking]

No Suez could mean no Simonstown accord, and easier transits to EoS. Impacts on the Iraqi Revolution, Sri Lankan expulsion of British forces, possibly Iran too.

Then again, Nasser being Nasser - he would probably find some way to needle the UK or West and start a conflict or Cold War.

 

[zen]

Without Suez Crisis...

Deterrent carries on, as that relates to experience of 1945.

Defence Review is 1956.

Carriers remain focused on Strike North.

If Nasser humiliated, he may be removed.
If still 'successful', then dominos fall. Iraq, Yemen, Aden, 'Somalia'.

 

[Hood]

The limitations of the Canberra and Valiant strikes on Egypt would not have underscored the need for TSR2

I would say that is inaccurate, I am working on an article to cover this but the Air Staff was obsessed by bombing accuracy from 1950 onwards, regardless of whatever theoretical NBC/NBS had or the visual bomb-sights of the Canberras, sizable efforts went into refining dropping accuracy, pathfinders, homing beacons, navigational aids and what we would today call smart weapons even before the V-bombers entered service and well before Suez.
The Valiant's poor showing was perhaps a bigger shock due to the amount of testing already undertaken to validate the system.

I think its perhaps too easy to read too into what was a week's worth of limited combat making use of available resources and doctrines. Operationally there were no doubt lessons to be learned, but it wasn't the kind of operation that had massive impacts, not when you consider the more drawn out counter-insurgency operations in Malaya and Borneo that were carving out some new niches on shoestring budgets at the extremity of supply lines and which actually lasted long enough to implement reforms and carry out operational research.
Suez validated some things like helicopter assault, but its not unlikely exercises would have done that anyway, indeed such thinking was already evident in Requirement NA.43 some 3-4 years prior.
Valiant inaccuracy was a fluke, soon Bomber Command was winning SAC trophies.

In any case with carriers it was a case of use them or lose them, without new roles the lighter carriers would have been pruned once helicopter ASW escort carriers had been killed as a concept by 1955.

 

[uk 75]

Some recent threads on UK 50s 60s procurement make the discussions here worth a second look.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

In the short term it helps the British economy because the recession that the Suez War created doesn't happen. For example, see this quote from the IWM website.

The canal was closed to traffic for five months by ships sunk by the Egyptians during the operations. British access to fuel and oil became limited and resulted in shortages. Petrol rationing was introduced in December 1956, lasting until May 1957.

closure of suez canal 1956 - Google Search

 

[zen]

We'll still see abandonment of F.155 and probably F.177....though as per OTL it might linger on into 1958.

The declaration of DAW that SAMs be not good enough in '56 and Fighters still needed imply that what might happen, is specification of a supersonic FAW for both RAF and FAA.
A tactical platform for LRI is still likely, but we may see a more pragmatic approach. That initial OR range of 600nm might stick.

Though A5 Vigilante lurks here and TFX will happen and exert it's influence.

The debate between pure CVA and CV-GWS and the whole NIGS farago still goes on. But if DAW is politically backed, then CVA wins out earlier and NIGS's still dies.

But this could draw money into AEW.....

Interim is still going to be limited numbers of Lightning, Scimitar and Sea Vixen.
Javelin and Buccaneer proceed.

It's possible with a bit more cash in the coffers that Rule of Cool's Lightning scenario goes ahead.

Though it might also be the case HSA's private venture P.1121 lured along by certain RAF figures actually wins out.

 

[1635yankee]

Without the US quashing this independent (and, imho, rather ill-advised) military action, the other NATO members may have considered that their armed forces didn't exist for more than US-approved activities.

 

[Rule of cool]

While virtually all of the factors that drove the 57 DWP were still occurring; US stopping MWDAP funding, ballistic missiles with thermonuclear warheads, increasing complexity of weapons platforms making them unable to be mass produced etc etc etc the lack of a Suez Crisis will have several impacts in British defence procurement.

• There will be no immediate economic crisis, no run on the pound, no recession, no immediate oil shortage, no great desire to make big changes to save money.
• There will be no fall of the Government, no Cabinet reshuffle and therefore no desire to drastically reform the MoD and produce a groundbreaking DWP within weeks of the new MoD assuming office.
• There is be no great crisis of confidence that arose of the humiliating back-down at Suez, which made Britain somewhat wary of exerting itself on the world stage.

 

[zen]

Walter Monkton, Eden's Defence Minister from 1955 to 1956. Only cabinet minister to oppose Suez.

Succeeded by Anthony Head, formerly Secretary of State for the Ministery of War (from 1951).

Reginald Maudling Minister of Supply from April 1955, refused to work under Harold Macmillan.