The general feeling among many of China’s naval neighbors and in U.S. military circles is that China has been turning into a bit of a bully in (re)staking territorial claims in the seas off its coasts, and there’s been an onslaught recently of material on how to deal with the Asian giant on that front.
Many of the recommendations carry some pretty large price tags to fund naval buildups that underscore the growing arms race in the region.
In his recent book, “Fire on the Water: China, America and the Future of the Pacific,” author Robert Haddick offers a few suggestions that make some sense -– at least when it comes to dollars and cents.
“Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and other claimants need to match China’s persistence –- (or) they risk conceding the seas to China,” says Haddick, a former U.S. Marine Corps officer with service in East Asia and Africa who more recently has been a research contractor for U.S. Special Operations Command.
“The civilian component of maritime presences should have the lead in such an effort,” he says. “The private fishing fleets of Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam and Malaysia should do more to match those from China. A subsidy fund organized by the U.S., Japan, India and Australia could support the capacity and endurance of fishing fleets from smaller countries for the sole purpose of strategic competition with China. Foreign assistance from these four countries should also support paramilitary maritime capacity of the South China Sea, such as coast guard cutters, fisheries enforcement craft, police patrol boats, and other maritime policing activity. The program could establish technical support for their Philippine counterparts and India units supporting Vietnam.”
The fishing boats and other civilian vessels could be armed with radios and satellite phones to make them better intel assets.
However, there is some risk, he notes.
“Boosting the maritime presence of the claimants opposing China will increase both the risk and maritime incidents and clashes and the risk of an accident or miscalculation that could lead to a conflict entangling the U.S,” he says.
But if the U.S. and its allies or partners want to stop China from trying to strong-arm its way back into certain maritime territories –- or take them over by simply asserting more control and more presence –- the nations will have to take on China at some point.
“Dissuading China,” he says, “will unavoidably require the U.S. and its partners to assume a heightened risk of confrontation.”
He says, “America’s partners in the region should improve their information ops and messaging the global audience. The U.S. should lead an effort to build up basic maritime domain awareness and information sharing among its partnership network.”
The U.S., Japan, India and Australia should assist some of the partners in acquiring UAV systems to expand their maritime patrolling coverage, he says. “A similar effort could promote the emplacement of undersea sensors for detecting PLAN (People’s Liberation Army Navy) submarine forces.”
Vietnam, the Philippines and others could buy frigates and patrol boats armed with anti-ship cruise missiles, torpedoes and anti-aircraft weapons, he says. The technology involved with these capabilities is relatively modest and is accessible to small countries.
Others note the practicality of such a low-cost and relatively feasible approach to naval security in the region.
“The most cooperative missions—those which countries most readily engaged in with others in the region— typically included positive-sum cooperative efforts such as HA/DR (humanitarian aid, disaster relief), counterterrorism, and coastal patrol,” the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) notes in its recent report, “Federated Defense in Asia.”
CSIS says, “Many states in Southeast Asia are likely to focus on these missions given their less technologically demanding requirements.”
At any rate, it would be a start.
