Multi-Object Kill Vehicle (MOKV)

[marauder2048]

Tucson-based Raytheon Missile Systems has reached a key milestone in developing a a new missile interceptor designed to simultaneously destroy several objects in one threat.

Raytheon said Friday it has completed the first program planning review with the U.S. Missile Defense Agency on the future Multi-Object Kill Vehicle (MOKV) concept.

The latest progress keeps the program on track for a concept review in December, the company said.

In August, Raytheon and Lockheed Martin each were awarded contracts worth about $10 million to develop concepts for the multi-object kill vehicle, which is designed to destroy target missiles in space by sheer impact.

Raytheon also released the first renderings of the new kill vehicle, which show a design that releases six separate kill vehicles in space. The new system will use advanced sensor, divert-and-attitude flight control and communication technologies, the company said.

Raytheon already makes single-target kill vehicles for the Missile Defense Agency’s Ground-based Missile Defense system and its Standard Missile-3, part of the sea-based Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense system.

The company also is working on a redesigned kill vehicle to replace its Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle, a part of the ground-based system that suffered three failed intercepts in a row before a successful test last year.

Raytheon and Lockheed were competing to develop a multiple-warhead missile interceptor concept called the Multiple Kill Vehicle, before it was canceled as part budget cuts in 2009.

The MOKV development work is being performed in Tucson, where the company also produces its current kill vehicles in a specialized factory.

http://tucson.com/business/local/raytheon-multi-kill-interceptor-reaches-milestone/article_4dc23d66-2f5a-5782-b955-36aa0e4c4e74.html

 

[fredymac]

MIRV'ed interceptors is an idea that keeps resurrecting itself no matter how many times it gets canceled.
Brilliant Pebbles was the final iteration of this concept in SDI. Lockheed and Raytheon had gotten pretty far along on the Multi Kill Vehicle before Obama killed the program. It will be interesting to see what if any differences will distinguish the MOKV from the MKV.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UDgIBES9U9M

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KBMU6l6GsdM

 

[bobbymike]

http://defense-update.com/20151122_ekv-mokv.html#.VlJvo_90zMo

 

[sferrin]

MIRV'ed interceptors is an idea that keeps resurrecting itself no matter how many times it gets canceled.
Brilliant Pebbles was the final iteration of this concept in SDI. Lockheed and Raytheon had gotten pretty far along on the Multi Kill Vehicle before Obama killed the program. It will be interesting to see what if any differences will distinguish the MOKV from the MKV.

Well they did add the "O" to avoid any embarrassing questions. Multiple kill vehicles is such a sweet idea they were forbidden by the ABM Treaty. Imagine a Spartan with a nose full of those things. Like an SM-3 on steroids.

 

[bobbymike]

http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/get-ready-russia-china-american-missile-defense-going-star-16226

 

[bobbymike]

http://www.scout.com/military/warrior/story/1691822-us-multi-object-interceptor-hits-icbm-decoys

 

[bobbymike]

http://m.waaytv.com/redstone_alabama/lockheed-martin-awarded-million-from-redstone-arsenal-s-missile-defense/article_c788b64c-05b9-11e7-a121-8317df88db6d.html

 

[bring_it_on]

Raytheon Co., Tucson, Arizona, was awarded a competitive cost-plus-fixed-fee contract up to $59,608,722 with an estimated completion date of April 2, 2020, for the Multi-Object Kill Vehicle (KV) technology risk reduction (TRR) effort. No options are contemplated. This contract represents part of the Missile Defense Agency's technology risk reduction strategy to improve performance and reduce risk for secure communications systems, high sensitivity multi-band sensor, survivable processor, KV divert and attitude control system, bus sensor and sensor pointing, and the engagement management. The work will be performed in Tucson, Arizona. This contract was competitively procured via publication on the Federal Business Opportunities website through an Advanced Technology Innovation broad agency announcement. Fiscal 2016 research, development, test and engineering funds in the amount of $3,590,000; and fiscal 2017 research, development, test and engineering funds in the amount of $5,232,000, for a total of $8,822,000 being obligated at the time of award. The Missile Defense Agency, Huntsville, Alabama, is the contracting activity (HQ0147-17-C-0003).

LINK

 

[bobbymike]

http://www.janes.com/article/70421/next-mokv-interceptor-development-phase-advances-with-three-contractors?utm_campaign=CL_Jane%27s%20360-17-May-2017_PC5308_e-production_E-902_KP_0517_0600&utm_medium=email&utm_source=Eloqua

 

[bobbymike]

2030?? Do we have any sense of urgency with key defense programs?

http://scout.com/military/warrior/Article/US-ICBM-Intercept-Paves-the-Way-Toward-High-Tech-Defenses-For-Th-101452534

 

[sferrin]

2030?? Do we have any sense of urgency with key defense programs?

http://scout.com/military/warrior/Article/US-ICBM-Intercept-Paves-the-Way-Toward-High-Tech-Defenses-For-Th-101452534

Nope. Some days I think even if somebody nuked us the politicians would just wring their hands and whine.

 

[Maury Markowitz]

key defense programs?

Key defense program? This is not one of those.

This is a weapon who's only purpose is to shoot down NK warheads. There is a greater possibility that NK won't exist in 2030 than there is this system will work by then and remain funded through that period.

 

[DrRansom]

2030?? Do we have any sense of urgency with key defense programs?

http://scout.com/military/warrior/Article/US-ICBM-Intercept-Paves-the-Way-Toward-High-Tech-Defenses-For-Th-101452534

It isn't as if North Korean has just developed almost all the hard bits of a thermonuclear ICBM.

I've seen several sources say that re-entry vehicle technology proved to be surprisingly easy, probably the only hard thing left is guidance.

 

[RyanC]

This is a weapon who's only purpose is to shoot down NK warheads. There is a greater possibility that NK won't exist in 2030 than there is this system will work by then and remain funded through that period.

NIKE ZEUS worked, SPARTAN worked, and GBI works.

And North Korea isn't going away by 2030 unless we invade/nuke them.

 

[fredymac]

Key defense program? This is not one of those.

This is a weapon who's only purpose is to shoot down NK warheads. There is a greater possibility that NK won't exist in 2030 than there is this system will work by then and remain funded through that period.

I rather doubt the CONOPS of this system is limited to North Korea. If you have documentation stating otherwise I would be interested in reading it unless you think it's a physics phenomenon specific to North Korean missiles.

As for North Korea not existing by 2030, I will side with Yogi Berra and his observation on predictions being hard and especially so when concerning the future.

 

[sferrin]

key defense programs?

Key defense program? This is not one of those.

This is a weapon who's only purpose is to shoot down NK warheads. There is a greater possibility that NK won't exist in 2030 than there is this system will work by then and remain funded through that period.

Actually, it's purpose is to upgrade GBI and SM-3 against ANY target. You should educate yourself on the program before deriding it.

 

[Maury Markowitz]

Actually, it's purpose is to upgrade GBI and SM-3 against ANY target. You should educate yourself on the program before deriding it.

And what might those "any" targets be, exactly? Can you name another country with the (at least potential) capability of attacking CONUS with such a small number of missiles that GBI could counter it?

North Korea, yes.
Russia, no.
China, no.
Everyone else on the planet, no.

 

[sferrin]

North Korea, yes.
Russia, yes.

See, "escalate to de-escalate"

China, yes.

While not called "escalate to de-escalate" I could easily see them being tempted to initiate a limited nuclear strike if they thought it would serve their purpose, and they're a lot more willing to go there than the U.S. If they thought they could nuke Seattle and L.A., without the US launching a full scale nuclear strike in response, they might be tempted to do it.

China: Nukes Seattle and L.A. then tells the US, "we won't hit anymore targets if you completely pull out of East Asia. If you retaliate we will launch the rest of our strategic nuclear weapons and destroy the rest of your major cities". What does the US do? That's right - not a damn thing. On the other hand, if we had the capability to deal with a limited strike, meaning China would be limited to large scale strikes - which WOULD elicit a full scale response - they might be tempted to cool their jets.

And why NOT have MKV to reduce the chances of an NK or Iranian success? Do you think their ICBM tests will fail forever?

 

[bobbymike]

North Korea, yes.
Russia, yes.

See, "escalate to de-escalate"

China, yes.

While not called "escalate to de-escalate" I could easily see them being tempted to initiate a limited nuclear strike if they thought it would serve their purpose, and they're a lot more willing to go there than the U.S. If they thought they could nuke Seattle and L.A., without the US launching a full scale nuclear strike in response, they might be tempted to do it.

China: Nukes Seattle and L.A. then tells the US, "we won't hit anymore targets if you completely pull out of East Asia. If you retaliate we will launch the rest of our strategic nuclear weapons and destroy the rest of your major cities". What does the US do? That's right - not a damn thing. On the other hand, if we had the capability to deal with a limited strike, meaning China would be limited to large scale strikes - which WOULD elicit a full scale response - they might be tempted to cool their jets.

And why NOT have MKV to reduce the chances of an NK or Iranian success? Do you think their ICBM tests will fail forever?

A recall a quote from the Chinese general in charge of their 3rd Artillery Force (nukes at the time) having stated "Want to trade a few hundred million citizens, we'd still have over a billion people left you'd be wiped out"

 

[fredymac]

If North Korea becomes a de facto nuclear power, the nonproliferation treaty is reduced to a sham. If the guy who runs the famine ridden dark patch above South Korea can have nukes, there is no argument for anyone else not having them. In that case, the list of small nuclear powers will grow starting with Iran and Saudi Arabia (you won't have one without the other).

A nuclear North Korea popping ICBM's over Japan will eventually push that country to create a guaranteed, non-ambiguous deterrent of its' own. Again, as a linked reaction, that means South Korea and maybe Taiwan join the club. As more countries join, the less restraint remains for those thinking about it.

With regards to their territorial waters, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines would also be candidates using the same rationale as Mr Kim . Interestingly, for most of these countries, the US would not be first on their targeting list. That doesn't seem to register for some people.

 

[kcran567]

What if N Korea uses a lower trajectory simpler strike method i.e. nuclear armed scud launched from a freighter near coastland area. What system would counter that type of threat? Existing Thaad? Not likely to have those on mainland US?

 

[sferrin]

What if N Korea uses a lower trajectory simpler strike method i.e. nuclear armed scud launched from a freighter near coastland area. What system would counter that type of threat? Existing Thaad? Not likely to have those on mainland US?

We'd be SOL. THAAD (preferably THAAD-ER) could do it but it would require a lot of units to cover the US. (Though not nearly as many as the Nike Hercules batteries we had back in the 60s - 134.)

 

[bring_it_on]

The cost of defending the mainland US against such an act would likely eat up a budget many times that of the MDA even if no new systems are developed . Money likely better spent at making sure they never get that close and on offensive capability.

 

[marauder2048]

What if N Korea uses a lower trajectory simpler strike method i.e. nuclear armed scud launched from a freighter near coastland area. What system would counter that type of threat? Existing Thaad? Not likely to have those on mainland US?

We'd be SOL. THAAD (preferably THAAD-ER) could do it but it would require a lot of units to cover the US. (Though not nearly as many as the Nike Hercules batteries we had back in the 60s - 134.)

:'(


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OnVHEmROaMM

 

[Maury Markowitz]

China: Nukes Seattle and L.A. then tells the US, "we won't hit anymore targets if you completely pull out of East Asia. If you retaliate we will launch the rest of our strategic nuclear weapons and destroy the rest of your major cities". What does the US do? That's right - not a damn thing.

Chinese military bases would be vaporizing even before their warhead made it halfway across the Pacific. In such an exchange, the entire Chinese military is beheaded and the civilian losses are less than what their warhead caused in the US.

Go ahead, suggest another scenario - the Snowcroft report already ran through them all so it's not like we haven't considered all of these.

And why NOT have MKV to reduce the chances of an NK or Iranian success? Do you think their ICBM tests will fail forever?

Neither of those countries is willing to commit suicide. If you don't agree with that, why have a deterrent at all?

 

[sferrin]

China: Nukes Seattle and L.A. then tells the US, "we won't hit anymore targets if you completely pull out of East Asia. If you retaliate we will launch the rest of our strategic nuclear weapons and destroy the rest of your major cities". What does the US do? That's right - not a damn thing.

Chinese military bases would be vaporizing even before their warhead made it halfway across the Pacific. In such an exchange, the entire Chinese military is beheaded and the civilian losses are less than what their warhead caused in the US.

Go ahead, suggest another scenario - the Snowcroft report already ran through them all so it's not like we haven't considered all of these.

It's one thing to consider the bear in it's den from the classroom. Quite another to confront it knife in hand.

And why NOT have MKV to reduce the chances of an NK or Iranian success? Do you think their ICBM tests will fail forever?

Neither of those countries is willing to commit suicide. If you don't agree with that, why have a deterrent at all?

Uhm...what? Deterrent is for rational actors. Defense is for when that fails. And, as I'm sure you know, deterrent has to be credible, both in hardware and in political will. Uncertainty is also a factor when discussing deterrent. If the other guy thinks he might not be able to get them all, (because of defenses and other factors) that will increase the deterrent value. In this an ABM has more value than a mobile ICBM as it can not only prevent the ICBM from getting hit but it can also prevent the surrounding countryside from getting fried. I'm puzzled as to why you think that's a BAD thing. Presumably you have locks on your doors and wear seat belts when driving?

 

[Maury Markowitz]

Deterrent is for rational actors.

So who are these irrational actors? China's leadership? Kim? A boogie-man who doesn't actually exist?

And, as I'm sure you know, deterrent has to be credible, both in hardware and in political will. Uncertainty is also a factor when discussing deterrent.

Indeed, and as the Snowcroft report noted, it's precisely that uncertainty that makes the US deterrent so credible.

In that era, the question was what the Soviets would do if their SS-18's were able to hit the Minuteman silos. Snowcroft noted that there was simply no way they could know. The US might counterforce launch-on-warning, or they might ride it out and counterstrike, or they might might just do a full launch against everything. No matter what the scenario was, the US had so many counteroptions that there was absolutely no way the Soviets could predict, or survive, the outcome. And so they would never try it.

And here we are 30 years later and we're still debating these well-hashed points, but this time we've replaced the Soviet's actually existing, entirely credible and massive fleet with a guy who doesn't even have a single working ICBM. Sheesh!

In this an ABM has more value than a mobile ICBM as it can not only prevent the ICBM from getting hit but it can also prevent the surrounding countryside from getting fried.

Wait, wait, you're now proposing that MOKV is to protect the deterrent?

It's rather unbelievable scenario in which an irrational actor starts with a counterforce strike.

I'm puzzled as to why you think that's a BAD thing.

It's not a BAD thing, it's a USELESS thing. We should spend as much on it as we do on defending against aliens.

 

[sferrin]

Deterrent is for rational actors.

So who are these irrational actors? China's leadership? Kim? A boogie-man who doesn't actually exist?

So you agree then, deterrent is a GOOD thing. Glad we got that straight.

And, as I'm sure you know, deterrent has to be credible, both in hardware and in political will. Uncertainty is also a factor when discussing deterrent.

Indeed, and as the Snowcroft report noted, it's precisely that uncertainty that makes the US deterrent so credible.

In that era, the question was what the Soviets would do if their SS-18's were able to hit the Minuteman silos. Snowcroft noted that there was simply no way they could know. The US might counterforce launch-on-warning, or they might ride it out and counterstrike, or they might might just do a full launch against everything. No matter what the scenario was, the US had so many counteroptions that there was absolutely no way the Soviets could predict, or survive, the outcome. And so they would never try it.

And here we are 30 years later and we're still debating these well-hashed points, but this time we've replaced the Soviet's actually existing, entirely credible and massive fleet with a guy who doesn't even have a single working ICBM. Sheesh!

Better to have it and not need it than to need it and not have it, no? Or is the several trillion dollar dent in the world economy, and hundreds of thousands dead, an acceptable sacrifice to you as long as you can sleep at night safe in the knowledge we don't have any evil defensive weapons?

In this an ABM has more value than a mobile ICBM as it can not only prevent the ICBM from getting hit but it can also prevent the surrounding countryside from getting fried.

Wait, wait, you're now proposing that MOKV is to protect the deterrent?

Is there a reason it has to be either/or?

I'm puzzled as to why you think that's a BAD thing.

It's not a BAD thing, it's a USELESS thing. We should spend as much on it as we do on defending against aliens.

Better to have it and not need it than to need it and not have it, no?

 

[Maury Markowitz]

Better to have it and not need it than to need it and not have it, no?

So you're all for the anti-alien-invasion laser then?

I'll get started, please send me the first $100 million installment. I take bitcoin.

 

[sferrin]

Better to have it and not need it than to need it and not have it, no?

So you're all for the anti-alien-invasion laser then?

I'll get started, please send me the first $100 million installment. I take bitcoin.

We'll have to agree to disagree then. I don't think leaving the country exposed to nuclear attack is desirable.

 

[Maury Markowitz]

We'll have to agree to disagree then. I don't think leaving the country exposed to nuclear attack is desirable.

So then you don't believe deterrence works. That's twice you've said that now.

 

[sferrin]

We'll have to agree to disagree then. I don't think leaving the country exposed to nuclear attack is desirable.

So then you don't believe deterrence works. That's twice you've said that now.

I believe airbags work. I still put my seatbelt on though. YMMV.

 

[bobbymike]

We'll have to agree to disagree then. I don't think leaving the country exposed to nuclear attack is desirable.

So then you don't believe deterrence works. That's twice you've said that now.

I believe airbags work. I still put my seatbelt on though. YMMV.

But with possible irrational actors as has been mentioned you would actually want a defensive system so your only response is not nuking them back.

 

[sferrin]

But with possible irrational actors as has been mentioned you would actually want a defensive system so your only response is not nuking them back.

Not only that but without defenses, even if you did nuke them back, you still get nuked. The whole concept of intentionally leaving yourself defenseless just does not compute.

 

[fredymac]

Hostility towards the idea of actually defending yourself is odd. Deterrence at its heart means I kill you if you kill me. You commit yourself to being a passive spectator watching incoming missiles destroy your population. You also have the macabre obligation to retaliate and kill the enemy population for no purpose other than post mortem revenge. A missile defense system working perfectly kills nobody.

The proposition of MAD requires rational actors, robust control over weaponry (accidents/rogue launch), and reliable intelligence over the disposition of the enemy's intent. The Soviets had almost convinced themselves that the US was committed to attack and were ready to act on the basis of a false sensor readings (Able Archer). Relying upon the mental stability and character of Kim Jong Un is not sound policy (unless you are professionally ignorant about his already known track record).

Statements that missile defense is impossible and no different than "alien defense lasers" are absurd and require impossible conspiracies involving thousands of people working on missile defense systems and tests.

 

[bobbymike]

https://www.defensenews.com/land/2018/02/28/strategic-command-chief-its-taking-way-too-long-to-get-space-based-missile-defense/

The report points to three lines in the MDA’s budget request related to a space-sensor layer. One is working to integrate a multispectral targeting system sensor onto a UAV to test the possibility of a future sensor. The MDA continues to fund the Space Tracking and Surveillance System demonstrators, but the report notes that funding in FY19 just sustains satellites as test assets. The budget also includes more work on the Space-based Kill Assessment payload, which is delayed by a year.

https://breakingdefense.com/2018/02/stratcom-wants-space-based-midcourse-tracking-vs-missiles-hyten/

 

[fredymac]

https://www.defensenews.com/land/2018/02/28/strategic-command-chief-its-taking-way-too-long-to-get-space-based-missile-defense/

The report points to three lines in the MDA’s budget request related to a space-sensor layer. One is working to integrate a multispectral targeting system sensor onto a UAV to test the possibility of a future sensor. The MDA continues to fund the Space Tracking and Surveillance System demonstrators, but the report notes that funding in FY19 just sustains satellites as test assets. The budget also includes more work on the Space-based Kill Assessment payload, which is delayed by a year.

https://breakingdefense.com/2018/02/stratcom-wants-space-based-midcourse-tracking-vs-missiles-hyten/

I couldn't find any posts regarding the STSS satellites which the article mentions. Two demonstrators were launched to prove they could provide the desired capabilities. They did so but the plan to proceed with a constellation and operational integration was, like the MKV program, canceled. Here are Northrop's videos on the satellite. The last video is somewhat telling in that it shows Northrop discussing how the satellites were able to provide business income in other areas given that no further satellites were ordered.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q-rPSyvIXsc
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s0o9Ec2t0gY
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ld2j3hrxOz8

 

[bobbymike]

From Inside Defense (behind the paywall)

DOD now treating missile defense flight test plans -- once public -- as classified

The Pentagon -- citing a need to "safeguard critical defense information" -- will no longer provide advance information about Ballistic Missile Defense System tests, a policy change that departs with a long-standing practice of routinely publishing both test schedules and test objectives.

 

[Maury Markowitz]

The Pentagon -- citing a need to "safeguard critical defense information"

Yeah, their budget!

 

[sferrin]

The Pentagon -- citing a need to "safeguard critical defense information"

Yeah, their budget!

I don't see the problem with that.