I recently read Shlomo Aloni's book Six-Day War 1967: Operation Focus and the 12 hours that changed the Middle East. It elaborates the IAF airstrikes from the 5 June 1967 Operation Moked that decapitated Arab air forces of Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq.
I am particularly interested in the long-range airstrikes conducted by the IAF against the Luxor, Ras Banas, Hurghada, and H-3 airfields. These missions were flown mainly by the single-seat Sud Aviation Vautour IIA from the 110th Sq. based at Ramat David AB.
The book quotes the airmen, who participated in these missions, and who claim that they were flying "straight line from Ramat David" to their targets. The book also mentioned that the low level flight had to be maintained to avoid adversary AD radars. Radio silence was also universal, but it's unclear whether it was limited to comm radios or to IFF, as well. There was no mention on navigation aids or instruments used in Operation Moked except the waypoints listed below, which were devised for the IAF strike pilots.
Given the long distance from the departure base to the targets and the alleged scarcity of intel eg. on the H-3 airbase in Iraq, will full respect, would it be really feasible for the airmen to find their distant targets while relying only on dead reckoning and using no navaids at low altitude? Did the IAF indeed rely on 5 June 1967 only on VFR and dead reckoning, or did they also use the ADFs, which were present on all IAF jets in that time?
I am particularly interested in the long-range airstrikes conducted by the IAF against the Luxor, Ras Banas, Hurghada, and H-3 airfields. These missions were flown mainly by the single-seat Sud Aviation Vautour IIA from the 110th Sq. based at Ramat David AB.
The book quotes the airmen, who participated in these missions, and who claim that they were flying "straight line from Ramat David" to their targets. The book also mentioned that the low level flight had to be maintained to avoid adversary AD radars. Radio silence was also universal, but it's unclear whether it was limited to comm radios or to IFF, as well. There was no mention on navigation aids or instruments used in Operation Moked except the waypoints listed below, which were devised for the IAF strike pilots.
- Point Telem and Point Boaz (surprisingly at sea)
- Point Hagan in Sinai
- Point Gimmel close to the Dead Sea (perhaps close to the modern NEOMI aviation waypoint)
- Point Tiach at the border between Israel and Egypt
Given the long distance from the departure base to the targets and the alleged scarcity of intel eg. on the H-3 airbase in Iraq, will full respect, would it be really feasible for the airmen to find their distant targets while relying only on dead reckoning and using no navaids at low altitude? Did the IAF indeed rely on 5 June 1967 only on VFR and dead reckoning, or did they also use the ADFs, which were present on all IAF jets in that time?