Ju 89A in place of the Fw 200C

[NOMISYRRUC]

I'm starting a new thread so that it doesn't hijack @airman's Do-19 evolution thread.

Is the following feasible, plausible and reasonable?

• In this timeline the Do 19 and Ju 89 weren't cancelled on 29th April 1937.
• The Do 19 V3 and Ju 89 V3 prototypes were completed.
• 12 Do 19A-0 and as Ju 89A-0 were ordered in 1937 and completed in 1938.
• After the batches of A-0 aircraft had been evaluated it was decided that the Do 19 would not be developed any further and to purchase enough Ju 89A-1s to equip one gruppe.
• 263 were built in place of the 263 Fw 200C that were built "in the real world" and like the Fw 200C they would be powered by Bramo 323 engines. The first aircraft was delivered in September 1939 (according to Smith & Kay) or January 1940 (according to Wood & Gunston). Whichever date was correct it was delivered instead of the first Fw 200C-0.
• Several of the Ju 89A-0s were rebuilt as Ju 89S prototypes and were the predecessors of 41 Ju 289s built in place of the 41 Ju 290s that were built according to Vajda & Dancey.
• There was also the 6-engine Ju 289 which was developed in place of the Ju 390.
• I'm guessing that Junkers didn't have the resources to design and produce the Ju 90 as well as the Ju 89. Therefore, Focke-Wulf built another 14 Fw 200As in place of the 14 Ju 90s (including prototypes) that were built in the "real world" which increased the total number of Fw 200As built "in this version of history" from 12 to 26 (including prototypes). The Fw 200 V1 was still converted into the Fw 200S-1 because the Germans wanted a civilian aircraft to carry the Olympic Torch from Berlin to Tokyo and all other things being equal this would have led to the JNAF ordering 5 Fw 200B transports and one Fw 200B-1 for reconnaissance, although, "in this version of history", the Japanese might have ordered 6 Ju 89s instead. The Luftwaffe would have commandeered these aircraft regardless of whether they were Fw 200s or Ju 89s.

The point of departure for this is that Luftkreis-Kommando VI (which at the time was the Luftwaffe's equivalent of RAF Coastal Command) decided to replace its existing flying boats and seaplanes with landplanes instead of a new generation of seaplanes and landplanes. Amongst other things it meant more Do 17s were built instead of Do 18s and more He 111s were built instead of the He 115. There was also a requirement for a longer-range reconnaissance aircraft to scout for the U-boats in the Western Approaches and after the Ju 89 was selected for further development it was decided to buy enough Ju 89A-1s to equip one gruppe in Luftkreis-Kommando VI pending the arrival the LRMP variant of the He 177, which in 1937 was expected to be during the course of 1941.

I'm not expecting the Ju 89 to be any faster than the Fw 200C, carry more ordnance than the Fw 200C or have more range and greater endurance than the Fw 200C. However, is it reasonable to assume the following?

• It would have had a higher serviceability rate than the Fw 200C.
• It would have had a lower non-combat loss rate than the Fw 200C due to being a military aircraft from the start rather than a modified airliner and therefore be more strongly built.

For what it's worth these are the specifications for the Do 19, Fw 200 and Ju 89 according to "Hitler's Luftwaffe" by Tony Wood & Bill Gunston, which is one of my sources for the above.

​

My other sources were Putnams "German Aircraft of the Second World War" by J.R. Smith & Anthony Kay, "German Aircraft Industry & Production 1933-45" by Ferenc A. Vajda & Peter Dancey and the Lufwaffe, 1933-45 website (https://www.ww2.dk/).

The 263 Fw 200Cs and 41 Ju 290s come from Vaja & Dancey's Table 8-Q "German Aircraft Production (1938-45)" which appears on Pages 145 & 146. This is an extract from the table. Please note that they classed the Fw 200 and Ju 290 as reconnaissance aircraft.

​

The "this version of history" edition of Vajda & Dancey would read.

​

I've selected the Ju 89 instead of the Do 19 because it involves less "shuffling" of development and production contracts around the aircraft industry. Junkers can build the batch of 12 Ju 89A-0s in place of the Ju 90s that it built in the "real world" and Ju 289s & Ju 389s instead of the Ju 290s & Ju 390s that it built in the "real world". It also avoids having to explain how Dornier can design (and build) the Do 19A-0, Do 219 and Do 319 (six-engine development of the Do 219) without not designing (and building) something else like the Do 217 and 317.

Please note that the number of Ju 89s and Ju 289s built "in this version of history" is the same as the number of Fw 200s and Ju 89s built in "the real world" so please don't send any knee-jerk replies saying that the Germans didn't have the resources to build them or it would have to be at the expense of something else. Similarly, the Ju 89s have Bramo 323 engines instead of DB601s, DB605 or Jumo 211s to avoid replies saying that Germany was incapable of building more engines of these types and that there'd be fewer He 111s and Ju 88s as a result. Finally, I've not had production of the Ju 89 terminated in 1942 in favour of more Ju 289s to avoid replies saying that Germany could not build enough BMW801 engines.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

No comments so far. Positive or negative.

 

[_Del_]

However, is it reasonable to assume the following?

• It would have had a higher serviceability rate than the Fw 200C.
• It would have had a lower non-combat loss rate than the Fw 200C due to being a military aircraft from the start rather than a modified airliner and therefore be more strongly built.

To the first one, not necessarily. A lot will depend on supply lines and production. I am not sure much changes in that regard unless production priorities are changed. As you've already done a good job anticipating, there is something of a zero sum game regarding production already (airframe and engines). If Germany opts for different priorities or mobilizes industry earlier, perhaps this changes.

The second assumption seems far safer and more likely, but not necessarily a given.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

However, is it reasonable to assume the following?

• It would have had a higher serviceability rate than the Fw 200C.
• It would have had a lower non-combat loss rate than the Fw 200C due to being a military aircraft from the start rather than a modified airliner and therefore be more strongly built.

To the first one, not necessarily. A lot will depend on supply lines and production. I am not sure much changes in that regard unless production priorities are changed. As you've already done a good job anticipating, there is something of a zero sum game regarding production already (airframe and engines). If Germany opts for different priorities or mobilizes industry earlier, perhaps this changes.

The second assumption seems far safer and more likely, but not necessarily a given.

Thank you for replying and thank you for your comments.

• Most of the books that I've read say that the the Fw 200C had very low serviceability rates.
• You seem to be suggesting that this was due to the small number Fw 200Cs that were built and due to its base being at the end of a long supply line.
• From which I deduce that the low serviceability rate was due to a shortage of spare parts & because it was difficult to get the spare parts that were made to the base and not because of any inherent fault in the aircraft.
• Therefore, any aircraft built instead of the Fw 200C is likely to have had a very low serviceability rate too and for the same reasons.
• Is that what you mean?

For what it's worth I think Germany could have built more aircraft in the period 1939-42, but I didn't want to incur the wrath of the toozerites. (Or should that be toozerists?)

• As far as I know the reason why the Fw 200C was built in small numbers was that it was intended to be a stop-gap for the He 177 and not due to a shortage of labour, raw materials and/or factory capacity.
• That said, I didn't want it to be built in large numbers in the first place.
  • I was thinking of 12 Ju 89A-0 (and 12 Do 19A-0) pre-production aircraft in 1938 which would be followed by one production aircraft in 1938, 36 in 1939, 58 in 1940 and then about 80 a year until it was replaced on the production line by the Ju 289 in 1944.
  • That's 25 extra aircraft in 1938, 35 more in 1939, 22 more in 1940, 26 more in 1941, 8 less in 1942 and 4 more in 1943 according to the production figures for the Fw 200C in Vajda & Dancey.
  • That's a net increase of 104 aircraft over six years for an average of 17⅓ a year.
    • I don't believe that an increase on this scale would lead to Germany having to reduce production of something else.
    • However, I think the Luftwaffe wouldn't miss 210 He 111s over the period 1938-43 at an average of 35 aircraft a year over six years if production of the He 111 (or Do 17 family and or the Ju 88 family) had to be reduced to make way for an increase in four-engine aircraft production.
    • The above is on an exchange rate of one four-engine aircraft for two twin-engine medium bombers.

As far as I know the Fw 200C had a weak fuselage, which led to many structural failures, including some aircraft which broke-in-two whilst on the ground. Is that correct?

• Is my assumption that the Ju 89 would have had a stronger fuselage and therefore not as prone to structural failures not necessarily a given, because there were other German combat aircraft that suffered from the same problems, in spite of being designed as such to begin with, that I don't know about, but you do?
• One that does spring to mind is the Bf 109. If I remember correctly (and I'm not sure that I do) its wings had a tendency to break towards the roots and fold upwards when performing violent manoeuvres at high speeds.

 

[_Del_]

You seem to be suggesting that this was due to the small number Fw 200Cs that were built and due to its base being at the end of a long supply line

I wasn't around in 1942, but my experience regarding availability rates is that it is generally less to do about "it broke", and more to do with "we need this specific part to fix it, but don't have it".
I may be reading this problem/solution backwards into history, but given how often we read of air frames with minor damage being cannabilized in that time frame, I doubt it. Fabricating on-site happened more often than it does today, I am sure, and perhaps this offsets to a degree.
It's not necessarily the low numbers of Condors produced, but the amount of production of spares you're asking Focke Wulf or another factory to produce to support them.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

The point of departure for this is that Luftkreis-Kommando VI (which at the time was the Luftwaffe's equivalent of RAF Coastal Command) decided to replace its existing flying boats and seaplanes with landplanes instead of a new generation of seaplanes and landplanes. Amongst other things it meant more Do 17s were built instead of Do 18s and more He 111s were built instead of the He 115.

One of the sources that I used for the Opening Post was the Luftwaffe, 1933-45 website (https://www.ww2.dk/) and according to that...

At the end of August 1939:

• The Luftwaffe had 15 Küstenfliegerstaffeln (Coastal Aviation Squadrons) which were equipped as follows:
  • 6 with the Do 18
  • 4 with the He 59
  • 3 with the He 60
  • 2 with the He 60 and He 115.
• In my timeline there would still be 15 squadrons, but they would be equipped as follows:
  • 6 with the Do 17Z
  • 4 with the He 59
  • 3 with the He 60
  • 2 with the He 60 and He 111H.

At the end of March 1940:

• There had been a net increase to 19 squadrons (including 6 operating landplanes) which were equipped as follows:
  • 3 with the Do 17Z
  • 5 with the Do 18
  • 1 with the He 59
  • 1 with the He 59 and He 115
  • 2 with the He 60 and He 115
  • 4 with the He 115
  • 3 with the He 111J
• In my timeline there would still be 19 squadrons, but they would be equipped as follows:
  • 8 with the Do 17Z
  • 1 with the He 59
  • 1 with the He 59 and He 111H
  • 2 with the He 60 and He 111H
  • 7 with the He 111H

At the end of September 1940:

• There were still 19 squadrons (including 6 operating landplanes) at the end of September 1940 which were equipped as follows:
  • 3 with the Do 17Z and Ju 88A
  • 4 with the Do 18
  • 1 with the Do 18 and Bv 138
  • 1 with the He 59, Ar 196 and He 115
  • 7 with the He 115
  • 3 with the Ju 88A
• In my timeline there would still be 19 squadrons, but they would be equipped as follows:
  • 4 with the Do 17Z
  • 4 with the Do 17Z and Ju 88A
  • 1 with the He 59, Ar 196 and He 111H
  • 7 with the He 111H
  • 3 with the Ju 88A

At the end of March 1941:

• There were still 19 squadrons (including 8 operating landplanes and one converting to landplanes) which were equipped as follows:
  • 3 with the Do 17Z and Ju 88A
  • 2 with the Do 18
  • 2 with the Do 18 and Bv 138
  • 1 with the Do 18 and He 115
  • 1 with the He 59, Ar 196 and He 115
  • 4 with the He 115
  • 1 with the He 115 and Ju 88A
  • 5 with the Ju 88A
• In my timeline there would still be 19 squadrons, but they were equipped as follows:
  • 2 with the Do 17Z
  • 1 with the Do 17Z and He 111H
  • 5 with the Do 17Z and Ju 88A
  • 1 with the He 59, Ar 196 and He 111H
  • 4 with the He 111H
  • 1 with the He 111H and Ju 88A
  • 5 with the Ju 88A

At the end of September 1941:

• There were 25 squadrons (including 11 operating landplanes) which were equipped as follows:
  • 4 with the Ar 196
  • 3 with the Bv 138
  • 3 with the Do 17Z and Ju 88A
  • 1 with the Do 18
  • 1 with the Do 18 and Bv 138
  • 1 with the He 59, Ar 196 and He 115
  • 4 with the He 115
  • 8 with the 88A
  • The 6 extra squadrons were formed in April 1941 and were designated Seeaufklärungsstaffeln (Sea Reconnaissance Squadrons).
• There were still 25 squadrons in my timeline, but they were equipped as follows:
  • 4 with the 196
  • 1 with the Do 17Z
  • 4 with the Do 17Z and Ju 88A
  • 1 with the He 59, Ar 196 and He 111H
  • 4 with the He 111H
  • 11 with the Ju 88A

At the end of March 1942:

• There were 25 squadrons (including 12 operating landplanes) which were equipped as follows:
  • 4 with the Ar 196
  • 4 with the Bv 138
  • 1 with the Do 18 and Bv 138
  • 1 with the He 59, Ar 196 and He 115
  • 3 with the He 115
  • 12 with the Ju 88A
• There were still 25 squadrons in my timeline, but they were equipped as follows:
  • 4 with the Ar 196
  • 1 with the Do 17Z and Ju 88A
  • 1 with the He 59, Ar 196 and He 111H
  • 3 with the He 111H
  • 16 with the Ju 88A

At the end of September 1942:

• There had been a reduction from 25 squadrons to 12 (all operating flying boats and seaplanes) as follows:
  • On 11th April 1942 the Second Staffel of Küstenfliegergruppe 906 (operating the He 115) was disbanded.
  • On 8th June 1942 the 3 Ju 88 squadrons belonging to Küstenfliegergruppe 506/Kampfgruppe 506 became the Third Gruppe of Kampfgeschwader 26.
  • And on 1st September 1942:
    • The 3 Ju 88A squadrons of Küstenfliegergruppe 106/Kampfgruppe 106 became the Second Gruppe of Kampfgeschwader 6.
    • The 3 Ju 88A squadrons of Küstenfliegergruppe 606/Kampfgruppe 606 became the First Gruppe of Kampfgeschwader 77.
    • The 3 Ju 88A squadrons of Küstenfliegergruppe 806/Kampfgruppe 806 became the Third Gruppe of Kampfeschwader 54.
  • The 12 surviving squadrons were equipped as follows:
    • 4 with the Ar 196
    • 1 with the Ar 196 and He 115
    • 4 with the Bv 138
    • 1 with the Do 18 and Bv 138
    • 2 with the He 115
• In my timeline the force was still reduced from 25 squadrons to 12 with the surviving squadrons equipped as follows:
  • 4 with the Ar 196
  • 1 with the Ar 196 and He 111H
  • 1 with the Do 17Z and Ju 88A
  • 2 with the He 111H
  • 4 with the Ju 88A

And that's where I'm going to leave it.

• As noted in the Opening Post I've substituted the Do 17 for the Do 18 and the He 111 for the He 115.
• I've substituted the Ju 88 for the Bv 138.
• I've kept the Ar 196 and He 60 because I couldn't think of aircraft that could be built instead of them and some would still be needed for the Bordfliegerstaffeln. However, in this timeline the aircraft operating from shore bases would have been fitted with a fixed-wheeled undercarriage instead of floats on the proviso that the substitution improved their performance and made them easier to operate.
• I've kept the He 59 because it was too early to have more He 111s built in place of the entire production run. Furthermore, the He 111s that could have been built instead of some of the He 59s would have been early marks of He 111 rather than He 111Hs.
• However, Smith & Kay wrote that the He 59 was designed to be fitted with floats or wheels and a photograph of the second prototype He 59b (D-2215) fitted with wheels is on Page 227. Therefore, in my timeline all the He 59s built for the Luftwaffe might have been the landplane version. If they were they'd have been converted to seaplanes after they'd been replaced by the He 111H in the Küstenfliegerstaffeln so they could be used in the air-sea-rescue role. The use of the He 59 in this role after it had been replaced by the He 115 in the "real world" and the He 111H in "this version of history" is a secondary reason for not building early marks of He 111 instead of the later He 59s.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

You seem to be suggesting that this was due to the small number Fw 200Cs that were built and due to its base being at the end of a long supply line

I wasn't around in 1942, but my experience regarding availability rates is that it is generally less to do about "it broke", and more to do with "we need this specific part to fix it, but don't have it".
I may be reading this problem/solution backwards into history, but given how often we read of air frames with minor damage being cannabilized in that time frame, I doubt it. Fabricating on-site happened more often than it does today, I am sure, and perhaps this offsets to a degree.
It's not necessarily the low numbers of Condors produced, but the amount of production of spares you're asking Focke Wulf or another factory to produce to support them.

As far as I know...

• The Germans concentrated on the production of aircraft at the expense of spare parts. The result was that the serviceability rates of all Luftwaffe aircraft were lower than they would otherwise have been.
• The serviceability rate of the Fw 200C was significantly lower than other combat aircraft operated by the Luftwaffe. If my memory serves me correctly:
  • At the start of the war, the Luftwaffe's average serviceability rate for combat aircraft was 90%, but it soon fell to about 60%. [See below.]
  • The Fw 200C had a serviceability rate of 25% which was less than half the average.
• The Fw 200C's lower than average serviceability rate was because it broke down more often than average rather than its spare parts being built in smaller than average quantities.

I thought it was reasonable to presume that the Ju 89 would have had a higher serviceability rate than the Fw 200C because I thought it was reasonable to presume that it wouldn't break down as often as the Fw 200C.

Edit

The serviceability rates came from "The German Air Force, 1933-1945: An Anatomy of Failure" by Matthew Cooper.

The notes I made from the book say that at 31st August 1939 the Luftwaffe had 3,374 combat aircraft, 552 transport aircraft and 167 seaplanes of which 75% were serviceable, 90% in front-line units.

The closest my notes say about the average serviceability rate falling to 60% is this from a section about the state of the Luftwaffe at the end of 1942:

• Total combat strength at 31.08.39 - 2,761 - Serviceability 75% - So 2,070 available
• Total combat strength at 30.12.42 - 3,440 - Serviceability 59% - So 2,030 available

Note that's total combat strength, not total combat aircraft. The notes I made from the section about the state of the Luftwaffe at the end of 1942 also say:

• 3,356 combat aircraft in September 1939 with a surplus of 3% over establishment.
• 4,300 combat aircraft in mid-1941 with reserves of 25%.
• 4,800 combat aircraft in mid-1942 which was the peak.
• 3,950 combat aircraft at the end of 1942 and 43% short of establishment.

The notes that I made from the chapters about the Luftwaffe's contribution to the Battle of the Atlantic say that the serviceability of the Fw 200Cs in KG40 never rose above 25%. The notes that I made from the section of the state of the Luftwaffe at the end of 1942 say that He 177 could carry 2,000lb over a radius of 1,200 miles at a speed of 303mph at a height of 19,030ft. They went onto say.

The inadequacies of the Fw 200, in particular its poor serviceability, made the introduction of the He 177 over the oceans as a recce-bomber imperative.

 

[Hood]

The Fw 200s poor serviceability could also be partly down to the fact that the Bramo 323 was relatively rare, only 5,500 were ever built of all variants and I get the sense that when BMW took over Bramo in 1939 they lost interest in it. It was also an engine with poor fuel economy compared with other German radials like the BMW 132. Ironically a lot of long-range reconnaissance aircraft had it because there was little other choice of German radials in that power bracket, but it wasn't an ideal choice.

As for criticisms, well the one that strikes me is why you've removed all the flying boats and seaplanes for the maritime reconnaissance role? It is a bit odd, like removing the PBY for the PB4Y in the USN or the Sunderland for Lancasters in Coastal Command. I find this very odd. Generally operating over water you want an aircraft that can operate on water to do things landplanes can't.

While I would agree that higher-end BV 222/ Martin Mars heavy flying boats were increasingly non-sensical, there was a place for small and medium flying boats. Arguably the Luftwaffe lost any real semblance of coherent flying boat development when Dornier turned its back on the sea and Blohm und Voss began to get all the contracts, the pre-war Do 24 perhaps being the best of the bunch. Their products were impressive to look at but actually quite buggy, the BV 138 being a structural nightmare with engine woes and the BV 222 was an oversized dead-end. Maritime operations were not taken seriously enough in the Luftwaffe; pre-1940 they didn't really see the need given the limited North Sea/Baltic operational areas. Suddenly by 1941-42 they are operating in 5 seas and 1 ocean without any suitable kit or any realistic chance of getting it in time.

Your Ju 89 is probably more reliable and much better equipped to defend itself and carry a worthwhile bomb payload but whether that would be sufficient to tip the balance once MACs start to appear with Grumman Martlets on them is open to question - Marlets having a quartet of 50-cal Brownings to call on for a start. Or even increased Beaufighter sweeps of known Ju 89 transit routes as a counter, maybe even earlier introduction of Mosquito FBs to Coastal Command as anti-Junkers intruders.

 

[pathology_doc]

but whether that would be sufficient to tip the balance once MACs start to appear with Grumman Martlets on them is open to question

I'm not sure that's even in the terms of reference. Short of something historically remarkable happening, like either the USSR or the US or both not entering the war against Germany, I think Germany's finished in the long run. The question the OP is asking is whether you end up with an airplane that does embarrassing things like break in half on landing less often because its stress calculations and flight profiles are those of a clean-sheet bomber rather than those of a civil airliner.

I think it would be easier to arrange for an alternative history in which the He177 is built with four separate engines or the cause of its combined engines' repeated fires (which IIRC is now known with hindsight and amenable to correction) is identified and cured at the design stage.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

but whether that would be sufficient to tip the balance once MACs start to appear with Grumman Martlets on them is open to question

I'm not sure that's even in the terms of reference. Short of something historically remarkable happening, like either the USSR or the US or both not entering the war against Germany, I think Germany's finished in the long run. The question the OP is asking is whether you end up with an airplane that does embarrassing things like break in half on landing less often because its stress calculations and flight profiles are those of a clean-sheet bomber rather than those of a civil airliner.

Correct.

I'm avoiding any discussion on whether it would have had better performance than the Fw 200C. It's about whether two to three times as many sorties could have been flown with the same number of aircraft during 1940 and 1941 if the Ju 89 had a higher serviceability rate and fewer non-combat losses than the Fw 200C.

Before anyone replies I know that more sorties would have resulted in more combat losses that over time would have cancelled out the reduction in non-combat losses.

I think it would be easier to arrange for an alternative history in which the He177 is built with four separate engines or the cause of its combined engines' repeated fires (which IIRC is now known with hindsight and amenable to correction) is identified and cured at the design stage.

For what its worth Alternatehistory.com has recently had a thread on on that subject.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

As for criticisms, well the one that strikes me is why you've removed all the flying boats and seaplanes for the maritime reconnaissance role? It is a bit odd, like removing the PBY for the PB4Y in the USN or the Sunderland for Lancasters in Coastal Command. I find this very odd. Generally operating over water you want an aircraft that can operate on water to do things landplanes can't.

Because before the war many of the middle and junior officers in the Maritime Luftwaffe thought landplanes would be harder to shoot down than flying boats and seaplanes. They were proved right when the flying boats and seaplanes that equipped the Küstenfliegerstaffeln at the outbreak of World War II were hacked out of the sky. Some of them were shot down by Avron Ansons and Blackburn Skuas.

Losses were so heavy that the senior officers thought that re-equipping them with early marks of the Do 17 and He 111 would have been an improvement. Though in the end it was new Do 17Zs and old He 111Js that equipped 6 out of 19 squadrons at the end of March 1940. By the end of September 1940 it was 3 out of 19 operating Ju 88As and another 3 out of 19 converting from the Do 17Z to the Ju 88A. By the end of March 1942 12 out of 25 squadrons were operating the Ju 88A.

 

[pathology_doc]

Some of them were shot down by Avron Ansons and Blackburn Skuas.

Ouch!

Now the Skua... okay, not the greatest fighter in the world, but still worth half a Spitfire in armament terms.

But to be shot down by an Anson must be the greatest insult.

 

[Hood]

Yes an Anson did shoot down a Do 18, but to be fair they were only defended by a couple of MGs in ring mounts. The Do 24 only had manual turrets I think, at least until a 20mm was fitted.

At this time the British were fitting all their new flying boats with powered turrets (they didn't call the Sunderland the 'Flying Porcupine' for nowt) and even the quad 20mm turret for the 'Ideal Bomber' and P.92 fighter was considered for future flying boats. Nearly all US flying boats post PBY had powered turrets too. The IJN, like the IJAAF, were rather less enthusiastic about turrets but even so the Kawanishi H8K was well armed from the start too.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Some of them were shot down by Avron Ansons and Blackburn Skuas.

Ouch!

Now the Skua... okay, not the greatest fighter in the world, but still worth half a Spitfire in armament terms.

But to be shot down by an Anson must be the greatest insult.

For what it's worth...

The entry on the Blackburn Skua on Page 58 of Putnams "British Naval Aircraft since 1912" by Owen Thetford.

The first notable action by a Skua was one by No. 803s aircraft which on 25th September 1939 shot down a Do 18 flying-boat off Norway, the first enemy aircraft claimed by the F.A.A. in the Second World War.

The entry on the Avro Anson in Putnams "Aircraft of the Royal Air Force since 1918" by Owen Thetford doesn't mention any actions between the Anson and a Do 18, but it does say this on Page 56.

Despite their relative obsolescence for first-line duties, Ansons gave a good account of themselves, and on one memorable occasion in June 1940 three of them over the English Channel not only survived an attack by nine Me 109s but succeeded in shooting down two of the enemy fighters and damaging another.

According to those books...

Anson Mk I
188mph maximum speed at 7,000ft and it didn't quote a sea level speed.
158mph cruising speed. It didn't say what height this was at.

Skua
225mph maximum speed at 6,500ft
204mph maximum speed at Sea Level
165mph cruising speed at 15,000ft.

From "Hitler's Luftwaffe" by Tony Wood and Bill Gunston

Arado Ar 196 (Page 126)
193mph maximum speed, it didn't say at what height, provide a maximum speed at sea level or a cruising speed.

Dornier Do 18 (Page 143)
162mph maximum speed at sea level. It didn't give a maximum speed at height.
106mph cruising speed. It didn't say what height this was at.

Heinkel He 59 (Page 176)
134mph maximum speed, it didn't say at what height, provide a maximum speed at sea level or a cruising speed.

Heinkel He 60 (Page 178)
149mph maximum speed, it didn't say at what height, provide a maximum speed at sea level or a cruising speed.

He 115 (Page 186)
203mph maximum speed, it didn't say at what height, provide a maximum speed at sea level or a cruising speed.

 

[Hood]

Such an event they even put it in children's books in 1945! https://www.bridgemanimages.com/en-...-colour-litho/colour-lithograph/asset/6001953