Indonesian confrontation continues: Sukharno a second Nasser

[uk 75]

a political what if that would have had a major impact on the UK would have been a continuation of the confrontation with Indonesia into the late 60s early 70s.

If Sukharno had survived and been as influential as Mao or Nasser, Britain would have had to take a much harder look at its East of Suez presence under pressure from its friends in the region and the US.

This would have had an influence on the shape of UK defence planning as in real life the confrontation was winding down when the new Labour Government took power.

The major beneficiary at first sight would look to be the F111 order. However, as with the Australian aircraft there might have been delays with these planes. The RN could then have stepped up to the plate with the Bucaneer on its carriers and the RAF might even have had a second crack at TSR 2 or UKVG without the Euro limits.

 

[Hood]

End result would have been the same. Britain is too broke to afford protecting Malaya with very little in return. Perhaps some token force would remain (the RN retains a refuelling detachment in Singapore to this day), couple of frigates perhaps. No need for much else, the Confrontation is acclaimed as the war won without a single shot fired. That alone would probably put off Healy sending another big force down there. Of course leaving the flank of the US forces in Vietnam open and forcing the US to get involved with support etc. would probably push the Johnson-Wilson relationship beyond the brink. Might hamper Polaris build-up etc. I just can't see any threat in the region being big enough to deter the Labour Government from cutting the ties that should have been cut ten years earlier (if you look at it in pure fiscal terms).

 

[JFC Fuller]

I have to agree with Hood here. Any continuation of the Indonesian crisis, or for that matter any other SEA crisis would at most just involve the UK using its existing assets as far as it could to engage. However, I fail to see it having any major impact on procurement or the trajectory of the UK presence EoS. Both of these, by the mid-60s, were almost completely defined by programme failures and economics (Why the RAF ended up with Jaguars rather than P.1154s etc). The fact that Australia participated in Vietnam whilst the UK progressively wound down its EoS presence (FEAF strength had been in free-fall for most of the 60s and the command was finally wound down in 1971 when the Carriers were also due to be retired) tells you all you need to know about the UKs presence EoS.

The harsh reality was that by the 1960s the relative economic decline of the UK meant that the global role was being undertaken to the detriment of the defence of the UK and rightfully this had to end. Sandys had been anti-carrier in the 50s and had it not have been for a vigorous effort by the Navy and Mountbatten in particular they would have gone in 1957; ultimately the Navy lost most of what it fought for in the 50s during the 1960s.

 

[alertken]

JFCF is exactly right. White Man's Burden was a spasm of pretension. Harold Wilson's efforts to keep us there endured to 16/1/68 due largely to a notion that little UK should provide the nuclear umbrella, that would deter Chinese adventurism over the Himalayas and Irrawaddy, and deflect a Soviet-leaning Congress Party from an indigenous nuke, provoking Pakistan.

Wilson had been obliged to impose "repulsive" deferral of lifting school-leaving age to 16, until 1971. Yes, we left full time education at 15 till then. Surely right, that UK's job was...to sustain UK jobs, and defend ourselves v. USSR. It was for Suharto's and Mao's neighbours to keep local loons at bay. Which they very capably have.

 

[uk 75]

Gentlemen

Thank you for a detailed account of the historical political and economic background to the late 60s early 70s. Of course I agree with all your points, which should help anyone using this site to learn about the uk secret projects.

Can I pose a different question in order to get us into the realm of whatiffery? Sukharno had the potential to be a massive destabilising influence in the region, his replacement by Suharto made life somewhat easier for the UK and Australia. Assuming that the UK had not faced the massive economic trauma of the period (Devaluation etc) would you have gone the RN or RAF route to maintaining a presence East of Suez. To make it easier assume that Alec Douglas Home won the 1964 election and that Peter Thorneycroft remains at Defence until replaced by Peter Carrington.

 

[pathology_doc]

Assuming the money is there and assuming the region stays destabilised (maybe even turns hot) and assuming the US is sufficiently distracted by Vietnam not to be able to help... IIRC Australia expected its F-111s in 1963 and ended up waiting nearly ten years for them, which takes us into an era where Australia is F-111-less but TSR.2 is still (barely) alive (with one in flight, one close and others already on the production line).


Having seen the aircraft fly, and having been convinced that aerodynamically at least it's everything it was promised to be (a start, at least), and being confronted with a hostile northern neighbour, maybe it could be prevailed upon to switch. Either that or TSR.2 dies and the focus turns to Buccaneers for the RAAF (not sure whether HMAS Sydney or Melbourne could have taken them; probably not) and a small number of Victors or similar for air-air refuelling on the way out and back. Question - could the Buccaneer strike avionics have been fitted in early TSR.2s as an interim measure until the dedicated system was ready?

 

[Pioneer]

pathology_doc, the Australian F-111 was purely political in intent by Menzies, with the intention of wedge politics.
The supposed 'dire importance' of such capability and cost of the F-111 was clearly demonstrated by the ten year delay (the interim leasing of the F-4E Phantom II - especially without aerial refuelling support only emphasised this).
If the said threat was so great the government would have/should have gone with the RAAF recommendation of the A-5B Vigilante.
What I always thought as an interesting scenario would have been if Australia withdrew it's participation in Vietnam for further/more intense operations against Indonesia.
As such, the Australian Government supports the likes of LSM Mk II and original DDL design ships....

Regards
Pioneer

 

[Rule of cool]

Soviet support for Indonesia, assuming a suitable political situation , would be very expensive. The Soviets supplied Indonesia with Tu16 bombers with AShMs, a Sverdlov cruiser, submarines, destroyers and missile boats along with the usual bevvy of migs and helicopters. The naval ships in particular would be a strain on the meagre Soviet treasury.

 

[Scott Kenny]

pathology_doc, the Australian F-111 was purely political in intent by Menzies, with the intention of wedge politics.
The supposed 'dire importance' of such capability and cost of the F-111 was clearly demonstrated by the ten year delay (the interim leasing of the F-4E Phantom II - especially without aerial refuelling support only emphasised this).
If the said threat was so great the government would have/should have gone with the RAAF recommendation of the A-5B Vigilante.
What I always thought as an interesting scenario would have been if Australia withdrew it's participation in Vietnam for further/more intense operations against Indonesia.
As such, the Australian Government supports the likes of LSM Mk II and original DDL design ships....

Regards
Pioneer

Why would the RAAF recommend A-5s with that barely-functional, nuclear only linear bomb bay?

Okay, yes, the aircraft itself worked and so did the avionics, which is an improvement over the F-111. But if you can't put the bombs where you want them, it's not going to work as a bomber.

Hence why the USN turned them all into heavy photo-recon birds.

 

[Rule of cool]

Why would the RAAF recommend A-5s with that barely-functional, nuclear only linear bomb bay?

Okay, yes, the aircraft itself worked and so did the avionics, which is an improvement over the F-111. But if you can't put the bombs where you want them, it's not going to work as a bomber.

Hence why the USN turned them all into heavy photo-recon birds.

The RA5C was not in direct competition with the F111 per se. 5 aircraft were looked at in November 1963 for 2 in service dates; F4C, Mirage IV and RA5C for 1966 and TSR2 and TFX for 1969. The RAAF recommended the RA5C for the 1966 date but the Government decided to hold on until 1969 so the TFX was then chosen.

As for the version of the Vigilante that the RAAF might have gotten, I don't think the project got that far. However the A5B had a fully developed advanced nav-attack system, the RA5C had a buddy refueling system that could be fitted to the internal bomb bay and had 4 wing pylons that could carry bombs. I doubt it would be too difficult to turn the RA5C into a pretty powerful strike aircraft for an in service date of 1966.

 

[Pioneer]

The RA5C was not in direct competition with the F111 per se. 5 aircraft were looked at in November 1963 for 2 in service dates; F4C, Mirage IV and RA5C for 1966 and TSR2 and TFX for 1969. The RAAF recommended the RA5C for the 1966 date but the Government decided to hold on until 1969 so the TFX was then chosen.

As for the version of the Vigilante that the RAAF might have gotten, I don't think the project got that far. However the A5B had a fully developed advanced nav-attack system, the RA5C had a buddy refueling system that could be fitted to the internal bomb bay and had 4 wing pylons that could carry bombs. I doubt it would be too difficult to turn the RA5C into a pretty powerful strike aircraft for an in service date of 1966.

Thank you Rule of cool for your reply - ditto!


Regards
Pioneer

 

[BlackBat242]

Why would the RAAF recommend A-5s with that barely-functional, nuclear only linear bomb bay?

Okay, yes, the aircraft itself worked and so did the avionics, which is an improvement over the F-111. But if you can't put the bombs where you want them, it's not going to work as a bomber.

Hence why the USN turned them all into heavy photo-recon birds.

The A-5B (and the RA-5C) had larger internal fuel tanks (460 gallons extra) and 4 underwing pylons, each rated for 3,080 lbs* AND plumbed for drop tanks.

They also planned for the bomb bay to be used solely for fuel tanks (as that of the USN's RA-5Cs always were). The USN simply had planned for an extra tank in place of the nuclear "store" (making 3 x 295 gallon internal drop tanks - the normal internal "stores train" was 2 fuel tanks and a nuclear bomb in front), which still sometimes tried to depart the aircraft upon catapulting - the RAAF could have simply bolted them in securely. The RA-5C replaced the nuclear bomb with an electronic recon module.

Here was the USN's ordnance list for the A-5B - the Mk 27, 28, & 43 weapons were nuclear bombs:




The RAAF's recommendation for the A-5B/RA-5C was based on "in production with revised version already flown, thus NO developmental delay or developmental risk".

The USN had already built 2 complete A-5Bs, 5 were converted on the assembly line to RA-5C prototypes, with another 11 A-5Bs held incomplete pending completion of the RA-5C test program - these became RA-5Cs as well.


* The max payload rating of each underwing pylon matches 6 Mk 82s plus the standard 6-bomb ejector rack - but this only comes to 24 bombs - somehow they were planning to carry 8 more Mk82s, perhaps under the belly where the RA-5C carried its camera/SLAR canoe.

 

[Rule of cool]

Is the ARM the Shrike? Given the Hancock mission was in late 1963 that's very early to have the Shrike listed as a potential weapon for the A5.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Is the ARM the Shrike? Given the Hancock mission was in late 1963 that's very early to have the Shrike listed as a potential weapon for the A5.

Bullpup.

 

[Scott Kenny]

The A-5B (and the RA-5C) had larger internal fuel tanks (460 gallons extra) and 4 underwing pylons, each rated for 3,080 lbs* AND plumbed for drop tanks.

They also planned for the bomb bay to be used solely for fuel tanks (as that of the USN's RA-5Cs always were). The USN simply had planned for an extra tank in place of the nuclear "store" (making 3 x 295 gallon internal drop tanks - the normal internal "stores train" was 2 fuel tanks and a nuclear bomb in front), which still sometimes tried to depart the aircraft upon catapulting - the RAAF could have simply bolted them in securely. The RA-5C replaced the nuclear bomb with an electronic recon module.

(...)


* The max payload rating of each underwing pylon matches 6 Mk 82s plus the standard 6-bomb ejector rack - but this only comes to 24 bombs - somehow they were planning to carry 8 more Mk82s, perhaps under the belly where the RA-5C carried its camera/SLAR canoe.

Except that the Vigilante gets rather slow when fitted with all the external pylons and weapons.

But I do follow the logic now.

 

[Rule of cool]

Bullpup.

ASM-N-7a & b are Bullpup, with the 250lb and 1,000lb warheads respectively. The Mk 79 mod 1 was napalm, Aero 7D was the Zuni and the LAU 10/A was 70mm rockets.

 

[Rule of cool]

They also planned for the bomb bay to be used solely for fuel tanks (as that of the USN's RA-5Cs always were). The USN simply had planned for an extra tank in place of the nuclear "store" (making 3 x 295 gallon internal drop tanks - the normal internal "stores train" was 2 fuel tanks and a nuclear bomb in front), which still sometimes tried to depart the aircraft upon catapulting - the RAAF could have simply bolted them in securely

The regular runway take off shouldn't shake the rear-most store loose.

The buddy store might have caused a political issue, the RAAF didn't get boom refuelling for the F111 so not to upset the nieghbours.

 

[BlackBat242]

Is the ARM the Shrike? Given the Hancock mission was in late 1963 that's very early to have the Shrike listed as a potential weapon for the A5.

Bullpup.

ASM-N-7a & b are Bullpup, with the 250lb and 1,000lb warheads respectively. The Mk 79 mod 1 was napalm, Aero 7D was the Zuni and the LAU 10/A was 70mm rockets.

The AGM-45 Shrike began development in 1958 under the designation ASM-N-10... in June 1963, the ASM-N-10 was redesignated as AGM-45A, and large-scale production of the initial AGM-45A-1 model for the USAF and the U.S. Navy began at Texas Instruments and Sperry Rand/Univac. It entered service with the Navy in 1965.

Since ARM is the normal acronym for Anti-Radiation (radar) Missile, given the dates they were likely thinking of Shrike (I don't know if there was another ARM in development at the time).

 

[Rule of cool]

Yes, I think the Standard ARM didn't start development until the Shike showed its limitations in combat in 1965-66.