The Army's future prestrategic nuclear weapon, the mobile Hadès missile (dual-capable) with a 350-500 km range and ability to carry a 10-to-25 kt nuclear warhead, a neutron bomb, a conventional warhead or chemical agents, will replace the ageing Pluton SRBM in 1992. In April 1989, France, reportedly, could manufacture 200 Hadès missiles with 20-60 kt warheads, with an expected initial order of 90 units (Webster, 1989a:4). Other sources put the warhead capability at 80 to 100 kt (Westerlund 1990:44). The French Army plans to purchase altogether 180 Hadès missiles (SIPRI, 1989:32).
The Hadès division will comprise three artillery regiments, and the first will be installed with the 15th Artillery Regiement at Suippes in the Marne region of eastern France. The second will be stationed with the 3rd Regiment at Mailly in the Aube region, also in eastern France. The details concerning the final third have yet to be decided, but Belfort has been mentioned. The Hadès division will also have the RITA communications net, a Mistral surface-to-air missile battery and a support battalion (Isnard, 1989:419). The Hadès system will be disguised to resemble a semitrailer, which will be capable of carrying two 7.2 metres missiles with inertial guidance systems powered by solid propellant motors (Westerlund, 1990:44).
The French Chief of Defence Staff, General Maurice Schmitt, has said that France would not be prohibited from relocating the Hadès missile into the FRG, which is the case with the Pluton missile (Air et Cosmos, 1989b:5). Mitterrand has stated on several occasions that the missiles are only of 'final warning' characters and are not to be used as battlefield weapons. However, the fact is that if the missiles can be moved into the FRG, it will greatly expand French power alongside Allied forces, and may also serve to lower German anxiety that the missiles would fall on German territory.
The Hadès missile is supposed to be placed under the command of the of the Chief of Defence Staff, thereby, in fact, opening up the possibility of using it as a battlefield weapon. It also has the deterrent value in that it is permanently situated in Europe, because of its mobility, and is expected to be less easily intercepted by enemy missile defences. Critics say that it makes the doctrine of 'the weak against the strong' outdated, and is a step closer to the NATO doctrine of 'flexible response'. Supporters say that it is a sign that France no longer accepts isolation from its European allies, and has started to build on a common European defence (Isnard, 1988e:31).
Although the deployment of the Hadès missile has become increasingly sensitive because of the German unification plans, France has no plans to scrap the missiles. The Chief of Defence Staff, Maurice Schmitt reportedly said that the reduced force levels proposed so far in the START talks are still too high to attract French participation (Isnard, 1990e:28). According to Jaques Isnard, France could very well decide unilaterally to cut the Hadès regiments from three to two, but the possible use of the missiles will remain ambiguous. Minister of Defence Jean-Pierre Chevènement is even reported to have said that the old Tous Azimuths Doctrine is now more than ever real (see chapter 2). In other words, France's nuclear deterrent is not directed at any particular enemy, but in all directions...(Isnard, 1990e:28).