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General Dynamics had not been funded to participate in the earliest concept exploration studies for Advanced Tactical Fighter / FX in 1965 and 1966, but in 1967 they won a contract for concept formulation studies alongside McDonnell-Douglas. While the air force was then still looking for a large, very complex, probably variable geometry fighter in the 60,000lb thrust class, as part of this contract General Dynamics worked on many variants including fixed-wing, variable geometry, single-engine and twin-engine, heavy and lightweight concepts. All the designs built on ideas already explored in the earlier 1965 ADF studies by Hillaker, most notably the blended fuselage tapering into a blunt edged leading-edge extension, mid wing and large bubble canopy, while the serious intake boundary layer issues encountered on the F-111 intakes might explain the unusual use of underslung axisymmetric engine pods on the General Dynamics’ large variable geometry design.
General Dynamics submitted their FX-132 design for the F-X contract definition phase in 1968 but they were unsuccessful, placing last of the four submissions. Former General Dynamics’ Control Systems Engineer Carl Droste said “many believed it to be the worst configuration we ever designed”, with variable geometry wings, podded engines, complicated cambered fuselage surfaces, hard core structure built inside the outer skin, and limited room for weapons. According to John H Watson, “General Dynamics had four FX designs going into the RFP time frame. They picked the wrong design and the wrong presenter. Also, it wasn’t their time to win a major program”. In fact, FX proved a humiliating third failure for General Dynamics following VFX (lost to Grumman, F-14) and AMSA (lost to Rockwell, B-1), which was partly why they subsequently went so hard on LWF.
Harry Hillaker was given the task of selling General Dynamics VG FX design to the Air Force (presumably, the “wrong presenter”?) and after failing to gain a contract was rather despondent, and was on the verge of quitting General Dynamics. He hadn’t believed in VG for the FX requirement, and had preferred the fixed-wing, lighter weight design, but having oversold VG on the F-111 the company felt a fixed wing FX design would reflect badly on the then-production F-111.
Out of the ashes of the FX debacle however emerged the F-16, via the FX-404, Model 401 design evolution.